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Abstract 
The current thesis provides novel insights into the n–2 repetition cost, a task-switching 
behavioural effect thought to reflect cognitive inhibition. The n–2 repetition cost is widely 
used as a measure of group and individual differences in inhibitory control; however, there 
was uncertainty around its reliability and the extent to which it reflects cognitive inhibition. 
Overall, the current thesis indicates that the n–2 repetition cost is unlikely to be a measure of 
cognitive inhibition. Experiment 1 showed that the n–2 repetition cost has low reliability at an 
individual level, which questions its use as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory 
control. Experiments 2–4 demonstrated that the n–2 repetition cost is considerably modulated 
by a non-inhibitory mechanism (i.e., episodic retrieval), which means that the common 
understanding that the cost reflects cognitive inhibition is incomplete. Furthermore, 
Experiments 5–7 show that the n–2 repetition cost seems not affected by cognitive resources 
as it is not modulated by working memory load; however, from Experiments 8–9 it cannot be 
said for certain that the cost is not modulated by attentional resources, because a trend for the 
cost to be smaller under conditions exhausting attentional resources was present. In terms of 
the individual differences in the n–2 repetition cost, this thesis shows that they are not 
explained with processing speed, depressive rumination, working memory capacity, or day-
to-day distractibility trait (Experiments 1, 4, 7, 8–9). And, computational modelling analyses 
(ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling; Simulation Studies 1–4) support the view that the n–2 
repetition cost is mainly due to non-inhibitory mechanisms. Taken together, the current thesis 
indicates that the n–2 repetition cost is unlikely to reflect cognitive inhibition, and if used as 
such should be interpreted with caution.  
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Introduction 
The following introduction and literature review’s aim is to introduce the 
reader to general concepts of controlled behaviour, the way psychologists understand 
it and assess it. First, broad examples of controlled behaviour’s function in day-to-
day life will be provided; next, current understanding of some of the general 
processes behind controlled behaviour will be discussed. This will be followed by 
presenting how controlled behaviour can be studied using task-switching paradigms, 
and summarising what we have learnt from early and modern task-switching 
research. This prelude will be used to then introduce and discuss experimental 
effects associated with task-switching research, with the effect of interest to the 
current thesis being the n–2 repetition cost—in the current thesis referred to as the n–
2 task repetition cost—which will be considered in detail. With that, a concept of 
inhibition, its different types, and why the n–2 task repetition cost is thought of as 
inhibitory effect will be discussed. This effect has been replicated extensively, and 
has become a measure of inhibitory processes; as such, the n–2 task repetition cost is 
an important effect, investigated by many, and used for group and individual 
differences research. The current thesis identifies and addresses gaps in research 
surrounding the n–2 task repetition cost. The critical questions that are asked in 
individual chapters of this thesis, overall, challenge the n–2 task repetition cost’s 
value as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control, and the extent to 
which it reflects inhibitory mechanisms.     
People go through their lives completing many different tasks every single 
day. Some of these tasks can be carried out automatically—that is, not requiring 
much thinking (e.g., well-practiced tasks such as brushing teeth, making coffee)—
and other tasks require more attention and effort (e.g., replying to emails, food 
shopping). Which task gets to be performed in each moment, in general, is 
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determined by context and a goal one may hold in mind; for example, in the morning 
making a cup of tea may be more appropriate than making a cocktail, unless we are 
on a holiday. Overall, the efficiency with which tasks are performed depends on 
many factors, from available time, cognitive ability, distractors, and health, just to 
mention a few. In general, humans are very good at behaving in a goal-oriented and 
context-specific manner; an important aspect of that is the ability to adapt our goals 
and modify behaviour depending on circumstances. A simple example of that is 
shifting between tasks; for instance, when we are writing an email we can pause that 
action to answer a ringing phone, only to return to writing that email later. That is, 
we do not have to finish writing an email before we can answer a phone; if we could 
not disengage from temporarily not relevant goals or behaviours, we could not react 
to and interact with our environment efficiently.  
The ability to alter our actions and intentions to match constantly changing 
demands of our world is an important aspect of being a human, one that is argued to 
have played an essential role in our evolution (Geary, 2004). For example, back in 
the days when humans had to forage for food, we had to be able to identify the most 
fruitful areas, and discontinue visiting locations which no longer provided food. An 
example more fitted for the 21st century is changing a PIN on our credit card; we can 
re-learn a new code, in place of the old one to access our money. In both scenarios, 
we have to disengage from old knowledge, as well as to learn and retain new 
knowledge to adapt our behaviour; it may take some time to perfect new actions, but 
the important feature of the provided examples is the ability to modify behaviour, 
which humans are very good at.  
Context-appropriate and goal-oriented behaviour also requires the ability to 
overcome prepotent responses (i.e., over-learnt/ automatic responses), and to ignore 
irrelevant information in our environment. So, for example, learning a new PIN, 
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initially we may make some mistakes typing a new one, because the old PIN can be 
so over-learnt that being exposed to a cash machine will trigger automatic retrieval 
of the old PIN, at which point we must exert some control and overcome the urge to 
type the old one. Or, whilst doing grocery shopping, when looking for a bag of 
sugar, we can ignore other items we could buy but are not relevant in that moment. 
That is, we can control which goals and actions are performed shifting from one to 
another depending on the context. 
When we investigate closer how simple and complex tasks are performed, it 
becomes obvious that what may seem as effortless behaviour (i.e., automatic yet 
controlled cup of tea making in the morning) arises as a product of intricate 
interactions between mental processes. Psychologists wonder about how controlled 
and stable yet flexible behaviour is produced; that is, how it is that we can focus on a 
goal in a given moment yet we can shift our attention from that goal and modify our 
behaviour—referred to as stability-flexibility dilemma (Goschke, 2000). Proposed 
theories explaining this dilemma are not perfect, but they are a good attempt to begin 
to understand controlled behaviour, as it will be demonstrated in this chapter.   
 
Executive Functions 
The most general theory on how controlled behaviour is produced refers to a 
system of mental processes known as Executive Functions (EF), which is a group of 
cognitive mechanisms that are thought to govern goal-oriented and context-specific 
behaviours (Burgess, 1997; Logan, 1985; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; 
Shallice, Burgess, & Robertson, 1996; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). This theory 
assumes that the EF system is made up of three domain general functions (i.e., global 
mechanisms) that are non-automatic in nature and are responsible for shifting 
between mental states, updating and monitoring information to inform goals, and 
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inhibiting irrelevant information (Miyake et al., 2000). These mechanisms are 
thought to be important for establishing, carrying out, and overcoming internally 
(i.e., through conscious intention) as well as externally (i.e., triggered by stimuli) 
driven goals. It is through EFs that we can choose not to eat a second portion of 
dinner even though we may be very tempted to do so.  
 Since all behaviours can be paired with different contexts—for example, 
putting a bag of sugar in a cupboard and not in a fridge—it is very important to know 
which action is necessary in a given moment, and EFs are believed to be crucial for 
selecting appropriate actions. Let us consider an example: we do not pick a pen up to 
write with every time we come across one; instead, we can acknowledge that a pen 
happens to be on our table but only use it when we need to. That is, it is only given 
the appropriate goal and context we choose to interact with objects around us. We 
live in a very stimuli-rich world, and in any given moment throughout every day, 
many different actions can be triggered, but yet, only certain ones get to be executed. 
As such, EFs are thought to coordinate low-level, automatic processes (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2017), so we can perform purposeful behaviour, that is to plan for, select, 
schedule, and monitor our actions (Banich, 2009). 
Being able to carry out goal-oriented and context-appropriate behaviour 
(often in the face of distractors) but adapt it when needed, is not only very important 
for healthy functioning but can also be easily taken for granted. Clinical research 
offers evidence to show what happens when EFs are impaired; in general, it seems 
that hindered EF system is associated with less control over one’s own behaviour 
(Archibald, Mateer, & Kerns, 2001; Iaccarino, Chieffi, & Iavarone, 2014; Lhermitte, 
1983). For example, those who suffered an injury to the frontal parts of the brain 
may have limited control over some actions; that is, under certain circumstances, 
they can show reflex-like behaviours (Archibald et al., 2001; McCombe & Warren, 
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1983), such as: manual grasping (i.e., a compulsion to grasp and use objects when 
placed in one’s hand), groping responses (i.e., a compulsion to touch and grasp an 
abject if in one’s near vicinity), imitation behaviour (i.e., involuntary mimicking an 
examiner’s behaviour without purpose), utilization behaviour (i.e., instrumentally 
correct use of objects in inappropriate contexts), and alien limb phenomenon (i.e., 
the lack of sense of control over own movements). What these conditions have in 
common is the impairment of the efficiency with which one can generate or control 
one’s own behaviour; specifically, it appears that these individuals have trouble 
selecting relevant and ignoring irrelevant information, which results in inappropriate 
actions being carried out. Atypical EFs are also associated with risky behaviours, as 
people who engage in gambling or online-gaming have a difficulty with overcoming 
strong desires to carry out behaviours that are considered dysfunctional (Dong & 
Potenza, 2016; Li et al., 2016; Yao et al., 2015); however, individual variability in 
EFs and cognitive control has also been shown to occur in people without obvious 
medical conditions (L. Cheng & Runco, 2015; León-Domínguez, Solís-Marcos, 
Barrio-Álvarez, Barroso y Martín, & León-Carrión, 2017), which some researchers 
suggest may be driven by genetics (Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake & Friedman, 
2012).  
Understanding how goal-oriented and context-specific behaviour arises is 
important for many reasons. Such knowledge can inform us about our strengths and 
limitations and how they can be accounted for in different occupations (Arbula, 
Capizzi, Lombardo, & Vallesi, 2016; P. Cheng, Tallent, Bender, Tran, & Drake, 
2017; Kim, Mayorga, & Harding, 2017; Méan et al., 2017; Sasangohar, Donmez, 
Easty, & Trbovich, 2017), and recruitment (Arbula et al., 2016); we can also track 
changes in behaviour to monitor progression of illness (M. F. Green, Kern, & 
Heaton, 2004; Rund, 1998), changes in aging (van Hooren et al., 2005), or if and 
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how behaviour changes under extreme circumstances (e.g., space psychology; 
Baarsen, Ferlazzo, Smit, Duijn, & van der Pligt, 2011).  
 
Task-Set 
As mentioned earlier, we are surrounded by a lot of stimuli in our 
environment, all of which typically afford more than one action and therefore can be 
engaged with in many ways. It was proposed by some researchers (e.g., Jersild, 
1927) that to act on a presented stimulus we have to have some prior information on 
what that stimulus is and what can be done with it; and some stimuli may evoke 
emotional responses (e.g., feeling frightened upon seeing a spider). Previous 
encounters with different stimuli provide us with information which is used in 
subsequent encounters to guide our behaviour on how and when to exert certain 
actions. Assuming that information associated with different stimuli is held in mind, 
it was suggested that such knowledge may be represented in mind as task-sets—or 
mental task-sets (Jerslid). In general, task-sets are not innate constructs (apart from 
drives; for example, hunger), but rather, they can be defined as learnt and practiced 
associations between some stimuli and responses, stored in our memory (e.g., when 
a phone rings we answer it); which other researchers have referred to as schemas 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
Jersild (1927, p.66) argued that task-sets are constantly adjusted and referred 
to them in the following way: “Every response which an individual makes is in a 
sense an act of adjustment. Every stimulus that comes to a responding organism is in 
a sense a test of the adaptability, the power of adjustment, possessed by that 
organism. The simple reaction time stimulus calls for a simple adjustment; the 
complex mental task calls for a more complex adjustment.” Another way Jersild 
invites us to think of tasks-sets is to consider them as reaction-systems or acquired 
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habits; that is, task-sets drive our behavioural patterns which we practice and adjust 
over time (e.g., language). It is important that these reaction-systems form so we 
have ready mental states (i.e., templates) to employ when interacting with our 
environment and other people; without some sort of mental representations of tasks 
forming we would not learn patterns between stimuli and actions, could not hold 
goals in mind, plan for, or monitor our behaviour. As it stands, there does not seem 
to be a limit on what adds up to a task-set; and Jerslid argued that small task-sets can 
become part of larger task-sets (e.g., source schemas, Norman and Shallice, 1986) if 
practiced enough because new associations between smaller task-sets will form. For 
example, when learning to drive a car, at the beginning we may form simple tasks-
sets to represent what a gearbox is and how to use it, when to use indicators or 
mirrors, how to operate pedals, and so on; after a while, once these separate task-sets 
are established in mind, we can begin to coordinate them together into a bigger task-
set which is driving a car (Norman & Shallice). Individual task-sets that make up a 
larger task-set are thought to be interconnected in such a way that, exposure to 
stimuli triggering retrieval of one of the simple task-sets will spread to other 
associated information within the larger task-set; this way our behaviour can be more 
efficient because relevant knowledge can be accessed faster (Jersild). This has 
consequences for how human behaviour can be explained because any psychological 
theories attempting to understand the mechanisms of controlled behaviour must 
consider and account for how knowledge is represented and stored in mind, as well 
as how knowledge is retrieved, selected and used for action generation in the face of 
distractors and competing mental tasks-sets.  
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 Task-Switching 
 Under the assumption that we hold mental representations of different 
stimuli, actions, and goals, one can begin to examine experimentally, through for 
example task-switching paradigms, how controlled behaviour is produced. Early 
observations of task-switching behaviour showed that we are less efficient when we 
alternate between tasks compared to when we focus on one task at a time; 
specifically, it was noted that when carrying out daily chores, tasks do not get 
completed as quickly if we switch from one chore to another, compared to when we 
complete one task at a time (Hollingworth & Poffenberger, 1919). Some years later, 
with the use of the list paradigm, it was experimentally shown that indeed, switching 
between tasks comes at a cost. For example, in one study (Jersild, 1927) participants 
were presented with two words lists; in the control-condition participants performed 
one task (i.e., naming a word of opposite meaning to the presented one; question-
answer), and in the shift-condition participants were required to alternate between 
naming a word opposite and verb-object tasks ( e.g., sing-song ,Woodworth & 
Wells, 1911). The speed and accuracy at which participants completed each words 
list were measured and compared. It was found that shifting between two tasks led to 
slower and less accurate performance, providing further evidence that switching 
between task-sets leads to inefficient performance, compared to when one task-set is 
repeated; however, people that were more efficient doing the single task, adapted 
better to alternating between two tasks. 
Jersild (1927) pointed to the control system being an important factor for 
efficient shifting between tasks (although control was not defined). It was proposed 
that during task-repetition trials performance is better because the task-set stays the 
same, compared to task-alternating trials during which a task-set has to be updated 
on each trial; as such, task-alternating takes longer due to the process of updating 
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which requires control.  Jersild also noted that the costs associated with switching 
tended to decrease when his participants had more practice switching between given 
sets, drawing attention to practice being another potentially important factor in task-
switching. This was interpreted in the following way: If individual tasks have 
separate mental representations in the form of task-sets, alternating between those 
task-sets calls for a larger task-set that can facilitate alternating between the smaller 
tasks; once the new task-set is practiced enough (i.e., becomes automatised), 
performance is more efficient (e.g., equivalent to performing task-repetitions, or as 
seen in the example of learning to drive a car). This interpretation fitted in with some 
earlier work on interference and adaptability (Culler, 1912), which showed that 
adaptation to new associations between stimuli and behaviour (e.g., having to re-
learn new response keys on previously practised and well performed task) takes 
time, and that interference (e.g., less efficient performance switching between 
compared to repeating tasks) is an incident of an automatisation process. Moreover, 
holding in mind established task-sets was proposed to create a state of readiness for 
tasks, and if the established task-set is combined with a new task-set, the state of 
readiness is disrupted, and hence performance is impaired. And lastly, a link between 
scores on intelligence and the ability to switch between tasks are made (Jersild, 
1927); specifically, people who scored higher on intelligence tests showed smaller 
costs when shifting between tasks compared to those who scored less. As such, it 
was suggested that the efficiency with which one switches between tasks (or learns a 
new task-set) is reflective of the ability to adapt to new situations—that is, the 
efficiency with which adjustments are made to tasks-sets—and so task-switching 
was referred to as a test of adaptability (Jerslid; Culler). To summarise, early 
research on task-switching points to the importance of defining and accounting for 
mental representations of tasks in theories of how efficient task-switching is 
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achieved; but also, it draws attention to control needed to perform tasks, practice and 
atomisation, as well as individual differences. 
 Modern experimental psychology continued to offer insights into the 
mechanisms responsible for efficient task-switching, and why we are less efficient 
switching compared to repeating tasks (Koch & Brass, 2013; Monsell, 2003). The 
most popular method to test how tasks are switched between in a controlled manner 
is to use adaptations of early task-switching paradigms; there are many different 
types of this method (e.g., mixed-tasks vs. single-tasks blocks, predictable/ 
unpredictable/ voluntry task-switching; Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003) with the 
most popular type being a cued task-switching paradigm, where participants switch 
between or repeat tasks, and each task is preceded with a cue informing them which 
task must be performed on the current trial. Modern task-switching tests are 
delivered on a computer (rather than with a paper and pen method, or using a 
typewriter, as it was done in early studies) and participants are instructed to perform 
as fast and as accurately as they can. Performance on these tests is assessed through 
the speed of reaction times (RTs) and accuracy recorded by the computer, where 
responses typically are measured with accuracy to 1ms.  
 
Switch-cost. Early task-switching experiments’ findings that we are less 
efficient switching between tasks compared to when we repeat a task has been 
confirmed many times by modern research (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Culler, 
1912; Grange & Houghton, 2014; Jersild, 1927; Luce, 1986; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995), and this effect is nowadays known as the switch-cost (SC, Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). An example of a modern task-switching paradigm which produces a SC is the 
following: participants may be presented with digits between 1–9 one at a time (apart 
from a digit 5) on the screen, and asked to switch or repeat between parity (i.e., odd 
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or even) and magnitude judgment (higher vs lower than 5, Koch & Allport, 2006). 
Before each task an appropriate cue is presented (e.g., words ‘parity’ or 
‘magnitude’); to give responses, participants typically are required to press one of 
two available keys (e.g., Z for odd/ lower than 5, or M for even/ higher than five). In 
terms of explanations on the source of the SC, there are a few different theories 
(Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 
2010), with the main ones being: the reconfiguration (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), 
task-set inertia (TSI, Allport et al., 1994), priming (Altmann, 2005; Logan & 
Schneider, 2006; Logan et al., 2007), and inhibition theory (Allport & Wylie, 1999; 
Astle, Jackson, & Swainson, 2006, 2012; Goschke, 2000; Koch, Gade, Schuch, & 
Philipp, 2010; Kuhns, Lien, & Ruthruff, 2007; Lien, Ruthruff, & Kuhns, 2006; 
Meiran, Hsieh, & Chang, 2011; Meiran, Hsieh, & Dimov, 2010; Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, Szmalec, & Vandierendonck, 2005).  
 
Reconfiguration theory. The reconfiguration theory (Rogers & Monsell, 
1995) argues that the SC arises as a result of a endogenously driven reconfiguration 
(i.e., intentional reconfiguration) of task-set which takes place between a switch from 
one task to another; and the reason performance is faster and more accurate in task-
repetitions is because as a task is being repeated, there is no need for a 
reconfiguration to take place—however, there is some evidence that reconfiguration 
is needed for both, task-switches as well as task-repetitions (Koch, 2005). By the 
reconfiguration theory, the reconfiguring of a task-set takes time, as such with more 
time between tasks (or following a cue), there should be more time for completion of 
task-set reconfiguration, and hence the SC should be reduced. In studies that varied 
the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) it has been shown that given enough preparation time 
(i.e., extending the CSI) the SC is considerably reduced (Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 
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2003; Nicholson, Karayanidis, Davies, & Michie, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995); 
this means that with sufficient time following a cue, a task-set can be reconfigured 
more effectively before a response is required. In support with reconfiguration 
theory, computational modelling studies showed that a modelling parameter linked 
to early-phase processing in task-switching (i.e., reconfiguration) taking place in 
working memory (WM)—an important aspect of task-switching (Liefooghe, 
Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos, 2008; Vandierendonck, 2012)—reflects well 
the SC (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014; Weeda, Van der Molen, Barcelo, & Huizinga, 
2014). 
However, the reconfiguration theory does not fully explain the SC; 
specifically, longer preparation does not remove the SC completely—as the 
reconfiguration theory would predict—leaving what is referred to as the residual SC 
(Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 2003). Practice (Kramer, Hahn, & Gopher, 1999; Strobach, 
Liepelt, Schubert, & Kiesel, 2012, but see also Logan & Schneider, 2006a; Meiran & 
Kessler, 2008), foreknowledge (Sohn & Carlson, 2000), providing explicit cues 
(Koch, 2003; D. W. Schneider, 2016), and controlling for priming of stimulus/ 
response/ cue repetitions (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016), do not seem to remove the 
residual SC. Some argue that the residual SC is due to participants failing to prepare 
regardless of preparation time (DeJong, 2000a; Meiran & Chorev, 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002)—preparation being successful on some but 
unsuccessful on other trials likely due to attentional differences. That is, advanced 
preparation is optional because the task can also be performed well without it, in 
which case performance is expected to be slower because the task-set 
reconfiguration takes place when a stimulus is presented; as such, the SC is likely to 
be due to a mixture of prepared and unprepared trials. And, comparing performance 
between three conditions where participants perform task-repetitions, task-switches 
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at long CSI and task-switches at short CSI, when looking at the whole RTs 
distribution, performance under long CSI on switch-trials at fast RTs is similar to no-
switch trials, and performance on switch-trials at slow RTs akin to performance 
under short CSI; this means, that when the task-set is well prepared (i.e., the 
reconfiguration is complete in advance) the SC is smaller.  
Another theory asserts that preparation cannot be fully completed without the 
presentation of the stimulus (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001); and there is also some evidence to suggest that 
the residual SC is largely generated through response selection processes rather than 
task-set switching processes (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Hunt & Klein, 2002)—for 
example, when eye-saccadic/ anti-saccadic measurements are used instead of motor 
responses to measure t ask-switching performance (which are more complex to 
execute)—the residual SC can be removed (Hunt & Klein, 2002). Moreover, 
stimulus-response (S-R) mappings—the pairing of the stimulus and response (e.g., 
press Z-key for parity numbers)—have also been shown to affect the SC (Altmann, 
2011; Cooper & Marí-Beffa, 2008; Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2007; R. Hübner 
& Druey, 2005); with repeating S-R mappings facilitating performance (i.e., 
reducing SC) and switching S-R mappings impairing performance (i.e., increasing 
SC). Together, it is taken as evidence that preparation is limited at reducing SCs; this 
questions how well reconfiguration theory can explain the SC.  
 
Task-set inertia. Another popular theory explaining the SC, and the residual 
SC, is called TSI (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000). Rather than the SC 
being endogenously driven, supporters of TSI argue that the SC is largely due to 
carry-over effects, for example automatic memory (i.e., priming) and interference 
processes; computational modelling studies support that view, providing evidence 
40 
 
that the TSI is linked to a parameter sensitive to carry-over effects, the drift rate 
(Schmitz & Voss, 2012; Weeda et al., 2014). It is thought that in task-switches, once 
a given task is completed, its activation does not stop instantly in place for the 
activation of the new task; instead, the just completed task’s activation decays 
gradually interfering with activation of the new task, and this remaining activation is 
being inhibited making returning to that task slower. By TSI theory it is speculated 
that if a task repeats, performance can be facilitated (i.e., through positive priming), 
but during task-switches abandoned task is inhibited (i.e., negatively primed), which 
means that re-activating previously inhibited task will be impaired. Important 
evidence for this is the asymmetric SC which comes from studies where participants 
switch between tasks of unequal difficulty; the easy task is dominant because it can 
be activated quickly—it tends to be the better practiced task, for example word 
reading in the Stroop test—and the difficult task is non-dominant because it is more 
difficult to activate—and it tends to be less practiced, for example colour naming in 
the Stroop test. In practice it means that for switches from difficult to easy tasks the 
SC is larger compared to switches from easy to difficult tasks. It is important to note 
that positive and negative priming effects are assumed to persist across trials. As an 
easy task is performed (which is activated easily being the dominant task), the 
difficult task is inhibited. To switch from an easy to a difficult task, activation of the 
difficult task—which takes time being a non-dominant, hence a difficult task—is 
affected by persisting strong activation of the easy task, which is resolved by 
activating the difficult task and inhibition of the easy task, leading to large SCs. But 
reactivating the easy task—even though affected by persisting activation of the 
difficult task and previous inhibition of the easy task—is strong because it is a 
dominant task, hence less affected by carry-over effects, leading to smaller SCs 
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(Allport et al., 1994).  The asymmetric SC can be reduced with preparation (Yeung 
& Monsell, 2003b), but practice does not eliminate it (Strobach et al., 2012).  
The observation that the SC is reduced with longer preparation, by the TSI 
theory is due to dissipating activation of previously relevant task-set (Allport et al., 
1994) rather than the reconfiguration/ activation of the new task-set (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). However, there is evidence that both reconfiguration and passive 
dissipation may be at play in task-switching affecting the SC. That is, in a study that 
used a cuing-paradigm (Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000), the CSI as well as the 
response-cue interval (RCI) were manipulated, with the CSI thought to be linked  to 
preparatory (i.e., reconfiguration), and the RCI thought to be linked to passive 
dissipation (i.e., TSI) mechanisms. It was found that, extending the RCI reduced the 
SC—per the TSI theory—but increasing the CSI further reduced the SC—as per 
reconfiguration theory.    
Focusing on response stage and what takes place after a response is made, by 
the TSI theory the magnitude of the SC reflects the time needed for the cognitive 
system to resolve interference between task-sets; and the extent to which task-sets 
interfere with each other in large seem to depend on S-R mappings. Specifically, S-R 
mappings may stay partially active after a switch, even when ample time for 
preparation is provided, leading to conflicts in response selection—which may 
explain why practice does not eliminate the asymmetric SC. For example, smaller 
SCs are seen for switching between tasks with dissimilar S-R mappings (i.e., leading 
to less interference) compared to similar S-R mappings (Allport et al., 1994); and 
there is evidence that memory of priming of S-R mappings can have a lasting impact 
(Pösse, Waszak, & Hommel, 2006). The importance of S-R mappings in task-
switching has been highlighted by other studies too; for example, performance 
following trials on which participants are asked to withhold their response (i.e., No-
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Go trials) is characterised by no SC (Verbruggen et al., 2005); and exploring 
preparatory stages in task-switching—following Go and No-Go trials—using 
electroencephalography (EEG), provided evidence that S-R mappings and their 
repetition/ switch are processed differently by the brain (Astle et al., 2006; Mueller, 
Swainson, & Jackson, 2007)—Go and No-Go trials are associated with lateral 
parietal positive activation (linked to attention, processing of stimuli), whereas No-
Go trials only are associated with late frontal negative activation (linked to action 
decision, reward, punishment). The EEG evidence for differential brain processing 
following making and withholding a response is a good illustration of how 
behavioural data can be informed by brain imaging studies; in this case, drawing 
attention to S-R mapping as an important factor in task-switching and associated 
effects. 
 
Inhibition. Another set of theories put an emphasis on inhibitory mechanisms 
leading to SCs. In general, inhibition is thought to resolve conflicts which are 
triggered by interference which could be from previously attended task, overlapping 
task-features or S-R mappings; overall, inhibition is thought to aid processing of 
task-relevant information against task-irrelevant information. There seems to be 
quite a lot of evidence to suggest that SCs may be caused by different types of 
inhibition; for example, lateral inhibition (Schuch & Koch, 2003), reactive inhibition 
(Koch, 2008; Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Wendt, Luna-Rodriguez, 
Reisenauer, Jacobsen, & Dreisbach, 2012) proactive-like type of inhibition (Allport 
et al., 1994; Meiran, 1996; Monsell & Mizon, 2006), or a combination of both, 
proactive and reactive inhibition in SC (Arbula et al., 2016; Bugg & Braver, 2016; 
Costa & Friedrich, 2012; Tarantino, Mazzonetto, & Vallesi, 2016; Vandierendonck 
et al., 2010; Whitson et al., 2014; Yu, Chan, Chau, & Fu, 2017).  
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The different types of inhibition will be discussed later; for now it is 
important to appreciate that the predominant number of reports on links between the 
SC and inhibition point to evidence for inhibition targeting response-stage, either 
through automatic inhibition of selected/ executed responses (Astle et al., 2006; 
Meiran et al., 2010; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen et al., 2005), or by resolving 
potential conflicts, such as incongruent responses (Goschke, 2000). Some argue for 
different types of inhibition (Astle et al., 2012); for example, inhibition of a task-set 
that affords an incongruent response (Meiran, Hsieh, et al., 2011), or inhibition of an 
abandoned task (Kuhns et al., 2007; Mayr & Keele, 2000). Evidence for different 
types of inhibition would suggest that it may be an adaptive phenomenon—
inhibition applied selectively, when interference is likely to occur—however this 
argument is objected (Lien et al., 2006). That is, it is known that SCs increase for 
switches between tasks sharing some features (e.g., bivalent stimuli) compared to 
switches between tasks not sharing features (i.e., univalent stimuli) (Allport et al., 
1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This is believed to be the case because bivalent 
stimuli’s mental representations (i.e., task sets) may overlap, therefore the retrieval 
of an appropriate task-set might be more difficult, compared to univalent stimuli. For 
bivalent stimuli the correct task-set has to be selected among competing task-sets, 
hence it takes longer to be performed (Allport & Wylie, 1999). However, Lien and 
colleagues showed that SCs were not larger when switching to previously inhibited 
more difficult task (i.e., bivalent task) compared to an easier task (i.e., univalent). If 
bivalent tasks required more inhibition—as it would be predicted assuming that 
inhibition deals with incongruency type of effects—then we would expect larger SCs 
for that type of switch compared to switches free from incongruency effects. 
Inhibition is definitely a mechanism that should be considered when 
investigating controlled behaviour as literature reviews illustrate (Kiesel et al., 2010; 
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Koch et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003); however, so far it is not clear what exactly is 
inhibited, or when and why this inhibition occurs, as results can vary considerably 
between paradigms. Inhibition in task-switching will be discussed further in detail in 
the next section, first, other theories explaining and important factors modulating SC 
will be mentioned.  
 
Alternative theories. The reconfiguration, TSI, and inhibition theories do not 
explain the SC fully. For example, task-repetitions are assumed not to require 
reconfiguration compared to task-switches, as such, extended preparation benefits 
should be specific to task-task-switches, but there is evidence that task-predictability 
can benefit task-repetitions and task-switches (Gotler, Meiran, & Tzelgov, 2003; 
Heuer, Schmidtke, & Kleinsorge, 2001; Koch, 2001, 2005); these results are against 
what the reconfiguration theory would predict. And, the asymmetric SC is not 
always present when switching between tasks of unequal difficulty as TSI theory 
would assume (Experiment 5, Allport et al., 1994). And when it comes to inhibition, 
researchers cannot agree on what is being inhibited and when. As such, SC does not 
seem to be explained by endogenous or exogenous mechanisms separately; but, 
theories that account for a combination of endogenous as well as exogenous 
processes and how they interact may be more appropriate (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; 
Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 2003; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Ruthruff, Remington, & 
Johnston, 2001; Schmitz & Voss, 2012; Sohn & Carlson, 2000; Yeung & Monsell, 
2003a). For example, Mayr and Kliegl used a BI paradigm with a 2:1 cue-tasks 
mapping (i.e., each task had two cues) and manipulated whether the cue, or the task 
repeated/ switched across the trials; they found that a large proportion of the SC was 
due to cue-switches. Moreover, cue-switches costs, but not task-switches costs, were 
sensitive to practice and preparation effects, whereas task-switches costs were 
45 
 
sensitive to response-priming effects and task-set inhibition. It is thought that a task-
set is automatically retrieved from long-term memory (LTM) into WM where 
conflicts (i.e., task-set, response) can lead to interference resolved with inhibition; 
which suggests a two-stage processing during task-switching (also known as 
multiple-components model).  
Computational modelling studies show nicely that endogenous and 
exogenous processes may contribute differently to the SC (Karayanidis et al., 2009; 
Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014; Weeda et al., 2014), supporting multiple-components 
theories (e.g., Ruthruff et al., 2001). A method known as diffusion modelling 
(Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) uses a number of different parameters ascribed to 
distinct processing mechanisms to describe reaction time (RT) performance; two of 
the main parameters are the drift rate, and the non-decisional parameter. In terms of 
the SC, it seems that different experimental factors (e.g., preparation, cues, and 
predictability) affect diffusion modelling parameters differently highlighting 
exogenous and endogenous mechanisms’ contribution to the SC.  
The non-decisional parameter—typically associated with basic encoding, 
WM processing and response execution (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004)—seems 
to be sensitive to preparation; specifically, this parameter is increased for switch-
trials with less time for preparation compared to switch-trials with lengthier 
preparation time (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). Since the non-decisional parameter 
is affected by preparation, it can be classed as an early processing phase parameter; 
and that would imply that preparation can begin without the presentation of the 
stimulus (e.g., it can begin with the cue presentation), which could mean that the 
non-decisional parameter can be sensitive to higher cognitive processes (e.g., 
advanced preparation) and not only basic encoding or response execution processes 
(e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2009). It could also mean, that the non-decisional parameter 
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indexes the time required to retrieve a new-task set/ S-R mappings, and with more 
preparation time, task-sets and S-R mappings can be retrieved more successfully. 
Another aspect of the SC and non-decisional parameter observed is that increases in 
non-decisional parameters seem to be task-switch specific; that is, the non-decisional 
parameter does not appear to be affected by cue-switches (Schmitz & Voss, 2014). 
The carry-over effects such as the TSI, are linked to the drift rate parameter, 
which typically reflects differences between conditions to do with how efficiently 
information needed for response selection accumulates; as such, lower drift rates are 
linked to more difficult tasks compared to easier tasks (Voss et al., 2004), and are 
linked to higher intelligence/ WM capacity (Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süß, & 
Wittmann, 2007). In general, the drift rate indicates relative task readiness or how 
efficiently a response is selected—with higher rates characterising readier tasks—
which can be affected by many factors, top-down as well as bottom-up ones (e.g., 
task difficulty, predictability, stimuli characteristics, arousal, and priming). In task-
switching the drift rate is decreased for task-switches compared to task-repetitions, 
and even smaller for short CSI compared to long CSI, and for predictable compared 
to unpredictable task-switches (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014); also, the type of cues 
(i.e., how informative they are) does not seem to affect task-switches but influence 
task repetition performance as reflected in the drift parameter (Karayanidis et al., 
2009). As such, it was proposed that at short CSI the TSI has particularly strong 
effect on drift rate through positive and negative priming, at longer CSI the relative 
readiness is further improved by preparation; this shows the importance of automatic 
(i.e., carry over effects like TSI) and control mechanisms (e.g., reconfiguration).    
Computational modelling of task-switching shows that controlled and 
automatic processes contribute to SC, and behavioural research points to factors that 
should be taken into account when explaining the SC. The main contenders are for 
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example, theories emphasising priming and episodic retrieval effects in task-
switching (Altmann, 2011; Druey, 2014; Friedman, Miyake, Robinson, & Hewitt, 
2011; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan & Schneider, 2006b; Logan, Schneider, & 
Bundesen, 2007; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003), importance of cues (Jost, De 
Baene, Koch, & Brass, 2013), decay of task set activation (Allport et al., 1994; 
Altmann & Gray, 2008; Meiran et al., 2000; Sohn & Anderson, 2001), and temporal 
distinctiveness (Grange, 2016; Grange & Cross, 2015; Horoufchin, Philipp, & Koch, 
2011). 
 
Priming.  Performance on cognitive tasks (including task-switching) can be 
considerably affected by priming—subconscious memory process—and automaticity 
(Logan, 1985, 1988). Associations between environmental factors and action are 
stored in memory and retrieved when necessary, making our actions more efficient 
(Hommel, 2000, 2004, Logan, 1985, 1988). Priming can facilitate or impair our 
behaviour through automating activation of declarative and procedural memories 
upon seeing a given stimulus (e.g., remembering our PIN when using a cash 
machine). This unconscious memory effect is an important factor in human 
behaviour because in general, it can make us more efficient responding to and 
interacting with our environment as well as other humans (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996; Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012). Positive priming is 
when behaviour is facilitated through previous exposure to stimuli and associated 
actions (e.g., reading), whereas negative priming is a slower behaviour due to 
previous exposure to stimuli (e.g., slower reaction to previously ignored stimuli) 
(Tipper, 1985; Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  
Task-switching performance has been shown to be sensitive to priming 
effects because it involves repetitive exposure to pairing of stimuli and responses 
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leading to positive as well as negative priming (e.g., tasks’ shared perceptual features 
and/ or responses may become inhibited if not relevant in a given moment) (Allport 
& Wylie, 1999, 2000; Altmann, 2011; Grange & Houghton, 2010; Hommel, 1998, 
2004; Horoufchin, Philipp, & Koch, 2011; Koch & Allport, 2006; Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Neill, 2007; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016; Schneider & Logan, 
2005; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003; Woodward & Meier, 2003). For instance, 
there is evidence (Waszak et al., 2003) that if a presented stimulus was previously 
relevant for another task, task-switching performance is less efficient—as measured 
by a larger SC—relative to when a stimulus was not previously relevant for another 
task. This was taken as evidence that processing of stimuli associated with other 
tasks leads to interference due to competing stimuli’s associations, which has 
support in other studies (Druey, 2014; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). Responses in 
task-switching also can be primed (Gade & Koch, 2007; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 
2016); for example, evidence suggests that if response keys overlap across different 
tasks (i.e., in bivalent tasks, where a task can afford more than one response 
category), it leads to larger inhibitory effects compared to when responses do not 
overlap (i.e., in univalent tasks, where a task can afford one response category). 
Together these findings were taken as supporting evidence for the view that positive 
and negative priming effects play an important role in successful task-switching.  
 
Episodic retrieval. Evidence from research into priming effects are very 
relevant to task-switching as shown in previous paragraph; further evidence for this 
comes from research investigating a memory mechanism known as episodic 
retrieval—thought to be behind the negative priming effect (Neill, 1997).  
Episodic retrieval can be described as an operation by which the most recent 
exposure to a given stimulus (i.e., declarative and procedural memories; for example, 
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task’s parameters such as stimulus features, distractors, response made) is retrieved 
automatically upon seeing that stimulus again, either facilitating or impairing 
performance. It has been speculated and supported experimentally (Hommel, 1998, 
2004, 2009), that performing a task results in this task’s parameters being integrated 
in the form of a memory trace (also known as an event-file), which can be retrieved 
as triggered by being exposed to the same stimulus again (i.e., a retrieval of the most 
recent episode). If upon seeing a given stimulus a retrieved response does not match 
the currently required action, by the episodic retrieval account, it should lead to 
impaired performance because a new response will have to be generated against the 
one that was initiated automatically through episodic retrieval; however, if the 
retrieved task’s parameters match the demands of the current task, performance 
should be facilitated (Hommel, 1998, 2000, 2004).   
Some of priming effects seen in task-switching have been already linked to 
episodic retrieval mechanisms (Altmann, 2011; Grange, 2016; Horoufchin et al., 
2011; Logan & Schneider, 2006b; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 
2016; Waszak et al., 2003).  
 
Cues.  A major aspect of tasks-switching is the use of cues; they have to be 
discussed further because our understanding of cues’ role in task-switching may 
influence the models that explain SC (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Cues are important 
because they trigger the retrieval of relevant task-set; as such, the role of cues in 
task-switching has been investigated extensively (Jost et al., 2013), and a few trends 
established will be discussed next.  
Cues that have—what can be considered weak associations with stimuli—are 
linked to larger SCs (Arbuthnott, Woodward, & Columbia, 2002); for instance, if 
participants switch between parity (i.e., odd/ even) and letter tasks (i.e., 
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vowel/consonant), if tasks are cued by abstract cues (e.g., symbols), the SCs are 
larger compared to if the tasks are cued with transparent cues (e.g., “odd/even”, 
“vowel/ consonant”). The weak cue-stimulus association refers to the idea that the 
relevant association is not well established in memory compared to a strong cue-
stimulus association which is well practiced and formed; therefore, weakly 
associated cues will not be as efficient at retrieving a given task-set compared to cues 
strongly associated with stimulus (see also, Gade & Koch, 2007; Logan & 
Schneider, 2006b; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003).  
Also, in a recently reported study (Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2017), pre-cues were 
incorporated into a task-switching paradigm, and they were shown to reduce SC. 
Specifically, two cue conditions were created, where in one condition a standard cue 
was used before each trial, and in the second condition participants saw a pre-cue as 
well as the standard cue. The standard cue informed participants that one of four 
possible tasks would become relevant (i.e., number judgment: odd/ even or lower/ 
higher than five; letter judgment: first/ second half in alphabet or vowel/ consonant), 
whereas the pre-cue informed participants that one of two task-sets would be cued by 
the standard cue; this way, participants knew that only two out of four task-sets 
would be relevant. Since the SC was reduced in the pre-cue condition compared to 
the standard cue condition, it was suggested that pre-cue reduced the number of 
possible tasks to be considered, therefore the number of competing task sets was 
reduced, which meant that the relevant task-set could be retrieved more efficiently. 
Similar effects have been shown to be present in experiments which varied the 
certainty of incoming tasks (see also, Lange, Seer, Müller, & Kopp, 2015; Mayr, 
2006), where more certainty on which task would become relevant next leads to 
smaller SC compared to when there is less certainty. This can be taken as evidence 
for a strategic/ adaptive type of processing.    
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Moreover, cues used in task-switching can be influenced by priming effects 
(Logan & Schneider, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), which is an important modulating 
factor seen in task-switching. For instance, if two cues per tasks are used (Logan & 
Schneider, 2006b) with some cue-pairs semantically associated within each task 
(e.g., king/ queen cues for a parity task; salt/ pepper cues for magnitude task), other 
cues associated between tasks (cues king/ salt for parity; cues queen/ pepper for 
magnitude task), and some cues not semantically associated within or between tasks 
(cues king/ salt for parity task; cues night/ verb for magnitude task, performance is 
the most efficient for task-repetitions under semantically or associatively primed 
cues. In terms of whether a cue or a task repeats or alternates, performance was the 
fastest for cues repetitions, and the slowest for cues alternations. 
The studies mentioned above illustrate nicely that cues are important for task-
switching efficiency, and that if cues are not informative (e.g., Koch, 2003), or are 
associated with other tasks, performance is affected adversely.  
 
Inhibition  
Before the second behavioural effect seen in task-switching will be 
discussed, another important concept will be addressed, inhibition (Miyake et al., 
2000). This mechanism is thought to operate to stop or supress a given process, for 
example, firing neurons, thoughts, or behaviour; as such, inhibition has been shown 
to be present at cellular, neural, as well as the behavioural level (Aron, 2007). In 
psychology inhibition in general, can be described as “… the stopping or  overriding 
of a mental  process, in whole or in part, with or without intention” (MacLeod, 2007, 
p.5). However, over the years, inhibition as a psychological concept has become a 
controversial topic, mainly because—unlike in physiology and neuroscience—in 
psychology an agreement on the role of inhibition in human behaviour has not been 
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settled yet, as inhibition is difficult to define and measure, and many diverse 
methods are used to assess it producing different results (Amer, Campbell, & 
Hasher, 2016; Anderson & Levy, 2007; Aron, 2007; Bruce Morton, 2010; Gorfein & 
MacLeod, 2007; Meiran, 2010; Morton, Ezekiel, & Wilk, 2011). As it will be shown 
in the coming paragraphs, there is a considerable amount of experimental evidence 
suggesting that there does not seem to be one type of inhibition (Aron, 2007; Costa 
& Friedrich, 2012; Howard, Johnson, & Pascual-Leone, 2014; Littman & Takács, 
2017); instead, when and how much inhibition is applied can depend on exogenous 
as well as endogenous factors such as genetic predispositions, developmental/ 
individual differences, tasks’ difficulty, practice, general health, and age (Amer et 
al., 2016; Friedman et al., 2008; Wilkinson & Yang, 2016).  
In psychology, researchers seem to talk about inhibition in diverse ways, and 
it can lead to confusion at times (MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Erin, Wilson, & Bibi, 
2003; Noreen, MacLeod, & Kim, 2015; Rey-Mermet, Gade, & Oberauer, 2017), 
especially if different studies focus on different aspects of inhibition; for example, 
how is it triggered, what its function is, what is being inhibited, what is it modulated 
by, how does it manifest in brain imaging—an issue that has been well addressed in 
the book “The concept of inhibition in cognition” (MacLeod, 2007). This is because, 
depending on what is being studied, inhibition can be defined differently, leading to 
inconsistencies in interpretation. Some emphasise the difference between interfering 
information or response being inhibited (Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & 
Gabrieli, 2002; Colzato et al., 2008; Wyatt & Machado, 2013a, 2013b), others talk 
about instructed compared to adaptive flexibility (Peters & Crone, 2014), or 
anticipatory and conflict/ interference driven inhibition (Whitson et al., 2014), but in 
task-switching research academics focus on inhibition’s automatic and cognitive 
facets (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010). For the current thesis, a few specific 
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types of inhibition will be introduced and discussed—lateral, reactive, and proactive 
inhibition—together with evidence for and against those types in task-switching.  
 
Lateral Inhibition. From research looking at cognition in chimpanzees we 
know that they do not seem to be able to overcome automatic responses (i.e., the 
prepotent responses) (Houghton & Tipper, 1996). That is, in an experimental setting 
chimpanzees can learn to point to a numeral 2 instead of 4 to get a better reward—
where the numeral 2 leads to receiving two and the numeral 4 leads to receiving four 
candies. However, if instead of numerals candies are presented to choose from—
where pointing to two candies leads to receiving four as a reward—subjects always 
reach for four candies, regardless of how much training they get. That is, they do not 
seem to be able to overcome the automatic response that the four candies evoke, 
which in this case is that they see four against two candies and four seems more 
rewarding. Humans on the other hand, are very good at overcoming undesired or 
currently not relevant responses, and we seem to be equipped with mechanisms—for 
example inhibition—preventing irrelevant actions being acted out (Tipper, Howard, 
& Houghton, 1998). If we are faced with a stimulus that evokes an irrelevant action, 
the irrelevant neuronal activations are thought to be inhibited through lateral 
inhibition to facilitate correct behaviour (Houghton & Tipper, 1994); a mechanism 
which has been confirmed to operate in single-cell recordings in animals (Blakemore 
& Tobin, 1972; Moran & Desimone, 1985; Schall & Hanes, 1993; Sillito, 1975). 
Lateral inhibition is a biological mechanism which, at a point of a response being 
selected, inhibits currently not relevant representations triggered through spreading 
of relevant representations activation; that is, the way neurons are connected makes 
it so that if a single neuron or population of neurons become excited, this excitation 
will spread to neighbouring neurons. To limit the excitation to the neurons that are 
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receiving direct stimulation (i.e., that are triggered by stimuli), the neighbouring 
neurons are inhibited via inter-neurons; through that inhibition, activations of 
relevant neurons are “sharpened” and stronger than neighbouring activations; 
consequently, aiding an appropriate action being generated. For example, if multiple 
responses are paired to one stimulus, neural activations of those different S-R 
mappings’ may be overlapped, hence when a stimulus is presented and requires a 
response, the activation of mental representation of  that task has to be limited to 
excitation of relevant representations, this is so the correct action is selected (e.g., 
Houghton, Tipper, Weaver, & Shore, 1996). As such, lateral inhibition is sensitive to 
the strength of competing responses, but relevant representations’ activations can be 
enhanced through attention, which leads to irrelevant activations being supressed 
more.  
Lateral inhibition is automatic in nature, and plays an important role in 
overcoming prepotent responses to ensure controlled behaviour (Houghton et al., 
1996; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Tipper, Howard, & Houghton, 2000). That is, our 
visuomotor system is crucial for learning associations between visually perceived 
stimuli and possible actions that go with these stimuli (Bunge, 2004; Goodale, 1998, 
2014); and it seems that the way action is selected upon seeing previously 
encountered stimuli is determined through the strength of activations these stimuli 
trigger. Specifically, stimuli with their associated actions have mental 
representations—that is, neuronal activations related to stimuli and action 
synchronise when they co-occur—and these activations are triggered upon seeing 
given stimuli (Rizzolatti et al., 1981); this means, that merely attending to stimuli 
briefly or covertly can trigger associated activations, including weakly associated 
ones (Houghton et al., 1996).  
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Reactive Inhibition. However, lateral inhibition is not always effective, and 
in certain situations another type of inhibition is needed, namely reactive inhibition 
(also known as self-inhibition) (Tipper et al., 2000). Reactive inhibition seems to be 
a global mechanism (although, there is evidence on selective reactive inhibition see 
Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010) needed for stopping an ongoing 
or started action, and as such, reactive inhibition affects the motor system in 
response to exogenous trigger (e.g., stopping a car at read light or withholding a 
response upon seeing a STOP signal during task-switching) (Aron, 2011; Braver, 
2012; Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009). Reactive inhibition can also be 
triggered by prior stimuli processing (Houghton & Tipper, 1994), and so if it is 
detected that activated mental representations pose a high risk of causing 
interference (e.g., overlapping responses), these representations are inhibited more 
through reactive inhibition, compared to mental representations characterised by 
low-risk of interference. Or, if irrelevant representations are too active—which often 
leads to a conflict in generating action—they are supressed more, which takes place 
via inhibitory self-feedback connections. That is, if too much irrelevant activation is 
detected, a self-feedback mechanism applies more inhibition to the irrelevant 
activations, or/ and after a task/ response is selected it becomes inhibited, hence 
reactive inhibition is also known as self-inhibition (Grange, Juvina, & Houghton, 
2013; Tipper et al., 2000; Wyatt & Machado, 2013a, 2013b). As such, reactive 
inhibition is transient and is believed to be an important mechanism for monitoring 
and resolving conflicts; it allows for post-event corrections which makes it important 
for sequential actions (Houghton & Tipper, 1994). This type of inhibition has been 
referred to as a residual aftereffect of processing that is not intended (Logan, 1994).  
Despite the importance of reactive inhibition in controlled behaviour, it has 
its limitations; namely, this type of inhibition is thought to affect the motor system 
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globally, and it does not seem to be suitable for actions which require decisional time 
(i.e., "hold your horses" scenario, Aron, 2011). That is, instead of behaving 
reactively (i.e., in response to external stimulus) we often need partial or selective 
control whilst we plan for actions we want to carry out; in other words, we 
sometimes have to keep our goal in mind before making a response. So, in general, 
reactive inhibition does not seem to be suitable to deal with control of cognitive 
processes; however, there is some evidence from brain imaging studies that reactive 
control can affect a preparatory stage of cognitive processing (Chikazoe et al., 2009; 
Hester et al., 2004; Jahfari et al., 2010; Zandbelt et al., 2008). 
 
Proactive Inhibition. Proactive inhibition is thought to be an intentional type 
of inhibition; that is, proactive inhibition is stopping of action or a thought prepared 
in anticipation of interference, and as such, proactive inhibition is thought to 
maintain goal-directed preparedness (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009; Elchlepp, 
Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016).  Proactive inhibition is believed to be 
superior to reactive inhibition (Suzuki & Shinoda, 2015); that is, it is generated by 
specific mental goals rather than being triggered by external stimuli, as such, it can 
be more selective compared to reactive inhibition which is more global (Aron, 2011). 
It would appear that, proactive inhibition is thought to be a top-down mechanism, 
hence superior to rather automatic lateral and reactive inhibition, and so it makes 
sense that it has been shown to be important for adopting strategies (Koch, Philipp, 
& Gade, 2006; Logan, 1985; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; D. W. Schneider & Logan, 
2005) for efficient performance of cognitive tasks, and for controlled behaviour in 
day-to-day life (Arbula et al., 2016; Bugg & Braver, 2016).  
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N–2 Task Repetition Cost 
Despite a lot of research being conducted into the source of the SC, the 
evidence is inconsistent and it is difficult to settle on one explanation. In an attempt 
to further explore one of the theories explaining the SC, researchers (Mayr & Keele, 
2000) developed a new paradigm, the Backward Inhibition (BI) paradigm, to test 
specific predictions around inhibition. Typically in task-switching experiments two 
tasks are used to either switch between or repeat, but the BI paradigm was designed 
to accommodate switching between three tasks (Mayr & Keele, 2000); an example 
of the BI paradigm is as follows (Mayr, 2002). Participants switch between three 
spatial transformations, vertical, horizontal, and diagonal, where each task has its 
own cue. Every trial is composed of a cue being presented first, followed by a target, 
followed by response (Figure 1.1, right hand side example). The cue appears above a 
black frame, and the target appears in one of the inner corners of that frame; spatial 
transformation of the target involves indicating which corner of the frame the target 
would move to (from where it is) if it was to be moved in the direction cued. In 
Figure 1.1 is an example for the horizontal task (as cued by the triangle); the target 
appeared in the lower left corner, and so if it was to be spatially transformed 
according to the horizontal task, it would end up in the bottom right corner. To make 
a response participants press one of four keys on the numeric part of the keyboard (1, 
2, 4, and 5); where each corner of the frame has a key assigned to it (1-bottom left; 
2-bottom-right; 4-upper left; and 5-upper right).  In this example participants would 
have to press key-2 as the correct answer; once a response is made, after a short 
while, another cue appears followed by another target, and so on. Examples of other 
BI paradigms are presented in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 Examples of task-switching paradigms used in this thesis. 
 
 
Mayr and Keele (2000) posited that carry-over effects defined by Allport et 
al. (1994) were important to be investigated further to understand better inhibition’s 
role in task-switching and SCs. Stronger activation of a relevant task-set among 
alternative task-sets and decaying task-set’s activation, is unlikely to be sufficient to 
deal with interference caused by competing activations; instead, it was proposed that 
inhibition of temporarily not relevant task-set is employed to aid selection of a new 
task-set. That is, as a conscious shift from a given task to another task is made, 
inhibition was hypothesised to be the mechanism that helps to disengage from the 
no-longer relevant task, so a new task can be successfully activated. As such, Mayr 
and Keele predicted that returning to a recently inhibited task, should be slower and 
less accurate, compared to performing a task that was not recently inhibited. If 
inhibition was present in task-switching, it was argued that it would be evidence for 
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cognitive control influencing endogenous control of goal-shifting. The BI paradigm 
is designed to test that hypothesis. 
In the BI paradigm participants switch sequentially between three tasks (i.e., 
A, B, and C task; letters A, B, C being arbitrary labels for tasks); sometimes they 
come across a task that they performed recently (i.e., referred to as ABA; a task on a 
current trial is repeated from n–2 trial, e.g., horizontal-vertical-horizontal), or a task 
that was not performed recently (i.e., CBA; a task on a current trial is NOT repeated 
from n–2 trial, diagonal-vertical-horizontal). Typically, a task on every current trial 
is compared via a computer code to the task on n–2 trial, and recorded accordingly as 
ABA or CBA. It is a consistent finding that, just as Mayr and Keele (2000) 
predicted, performance for ABA sequences is on average slower and less accurate 
than performance on CBA sequences; this effect is known as Backward Inhibition 
(BI), but is also referred to as the lag–2 repetition cost, or the n–2 repetition cost. For 
this thesis, the BI effect will be referred to as the n–2 task repetition cost, to 
emphasise that it is a task that is being repeated across the trials.  
The n–2 task repetition cost is believed to reflect cognitive inhibition by the 
following logic. At the point of switching away from a task, that task is inhibited so 
its activation does not interfere with activation of the next task; however, if a task is 
required soon after it was inhibited (i.e., in ABA sequences), it is less accessible, and 
hence performing it is slower and less accurate. This is compared to performing a 
task that was not inhibited recently (i.e., in CBA sequences), on which performance 
is faster and more accurate.  If performance on task-switching was driven by 
activation mechanisms only (e.g., Just, 1992), it should be faster for ABA compared 
to CBA sequences; this is because, decaying but remaining activation of task A that 
is being reactivated in ABA sequence should facilitate performance making it faster 
and more accurate. As such, the n–2 task repetition cost is an important factor 
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explaining goal-driven and context-appropriate action in task-switching for a long 
time (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010), and it has become a signature of 
cognitive inhibition. The current thesis will identify gaps in research around the n–2 
task repetition cost and address some of those gaps. Before the n–2 task repetition 
cost is discussed further, inhibition in task-switching will be explored first in the 
next few paragraphs. 
 
N–2 task Repetition Cost and Inhibition 
In terms of the n–2 task repetition cost, the original study by Mayr and Keele 
(2000) has been interpreted as evidence for inhibition driving the cost, but it was not 
certain which type of inhibition was at play. The authors proposed that lateral or self-
inhibition were the likely candidates, but they leaned towards the former one. This is 
because, in their Experiment 2, the authors showed that the n–2 task repetition cost 
was larger when a distractor on n–1 trial contained features of tasks from n–2 and n–
0 trial; by the self-inhibition theory, processing on n–1 trial should not affect n–2 
task repetition performance, but by lateral inhibition theory, since the distractor on 
n–1 shared features with the n–2 task, it was likely to be automatically inhibited 
making performing the n–2 task less efficient. As such, the authors make a clear 
distinction between lateral and self-inhibition. However, they also posit that it is the 
abandoned task that is being inhibited; that is, that inhibition is thought to suppress 
abstract task representations rather than action codes, and that such inhibition 
requires top-down control (Experiment 3), all of which imply self-inhibition, rather 
than lateral inhibition. 
In terms of what was being inhibited, Mayr and Keele (2000) speculated that 
task-set representations (i.e., higher representations) were unlikely to be affected; 
this is because the n–2 task repetition cost was not affected by preparation, as such 
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the n–2 task repetition cost was argued not to be a reflection of cognitive control 
mechanism as such, but one that aids controlled behaviour; that is, it subserves high-
level control but is a low-level process. Specifically, it appears that inhibition cannot 
be penetrated by other processes—such as longer preparation time or pre-planned 
sequences of task-switches—or be overcome at will. And, even though inhibitory 
mechanism seems to impair performance (and hence may not seem helpful), Mayr 
and Keele argued that functionally this mechanism is advantageous—as it allows 
disengagement from a recently-performed task—but task-switching paradigms 
demand unnatural processing of stimuli; that is, in real life it is unlikely that we have 
to sequentially go back and forth between stimuli in a rapid succession. As such, the 
n–2 task repetition cost was suggested to be triggered automatically by task-set 
competition triggered at the point of disengagement from a given task-set, and it 
cannot be overcome, instead it must decay gradually.  
However, despite inhibition being assumed to be triggered automatically, the 
n–2 task repetition cost was only present in a version of the BI paradigm with 
informative cues compared to uninformative cues (Mayr and Keele, 2000). 
Informative cues are considered to directly translate to the task (i.e., “Colour” word 
for the colour task) informing participants which task is relevant on a given trial so 
an appropriate task-set can be selected, whereas if the cues are not informative, they 
do not inform the participant about the task in any way (i.e., “xxxxxx” for the colour 
task). With the task being to locate a deviant stimulus among four stimuli, in the 
condition with no informative cues, participants have to locate the deviant stimulus 
in the bottom-up manner (i.e., the task is likely to be performed without a task-set 
being selected), and in the condition with informative cues, the cues provide 
information based on which the task-set is updated in a top-down fashion, and 
applied to the stimulus. Assuming that informative cues lead to a task being 
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performed through top-down processes, it can be argued that the n–2 task repetition 
cost is a result of cognitive control processing, and when a task is performed in a 
bottom-up manner, performance is more automatic.  
The studies that followed the original work by Mayr and Keele (2000) offer 
consistent evidence for the presence of the n–2 task repetition cost (Kiesel et al., 
2010; Koch et al., 2010); there is also rather consistent evidence for lateral inhibition 
driving the n–2 task repetition cost (Arbuthnott, 2005, 2008b; Mayr & Keele, 2000; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003; Sinai, Goffaux, & Phillips, 2007). However, there is some 
research based on which reactive (i.e., self-inhibition; Grange et al., 2013; Grzyb & 
Hübner, 2012; Houghton & Tipper, 1994, 1996; Koch, 2008; MacKay, 1986), and 
proactive inhibition (Costa & Friedrich, 2012; Kuhns et al., 2007; Lien et al., 2006), 
can be linked to the n–2 task repetition cost too. Nevertheless, these results have to 
be taken with caution because it seems that there are inconsistencies in terms of how 
inhibition is argued to operate; instead, by looking at actual paradigms, results, and 
the way researches make their arguments, commonalities can be identified. 
 
Lateral inhibition. One type of evidence for lateral inhibition as the source 
of the n–2 task repetition cost comes from a study that incorporated Go/ No-Go 
procedure into the BI paradigm (Schuch & Koch, 2003); it was found that if a 
response was not required on the n–1 trial (i.e., the No-Go condition)—regardless of 
preparation time—there was no n–2 task repetition cost observed, compared to when 
a response was required on n–1 trial. The n–1 trial is a task that is different from n–2 
and n–0 tasks, therefore if a task-set was being inhibited performing n–1 task should 
not affect n–2 task performance, unless as a given response is made other responses 
inhibited, as it is predicted by lateral inhibition. Furthermore, by adopting a double-
press technique—a method used to distinguish between response selection and 
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response execution—it was shown that the n–2 task repetition cost was absent 
following double-press No-Go trials (i.e., no response selection; two possible 
responses executed) compared to following Go trials (i.e., response selection and 
execution). Using the double-press method was important because it made it possible 
to distinguish between effects of selection and execution of response on behaviour, 
and examine which is targeted by inhibition; results point to the importance of 
response selection (but not execution) being targeted by inhibition and driving the n–
2 task repetition cost. Schuch and Koch proposed that the S-R mappings are targeted 
by inhibition; this is because—as it often is a case in task-switching experiments—
allowable responses overlap between different tasks (Gade & Koch, 2007b), and 
after every response selection, inhibition is applied to aid recoding of S-R mapping 
(Meiran, 2000). That is, as a given S-R mapping is selected, the alternative/ 
competing S-R mappings are inhibited to increase the strength of the relevant S-R 
mapping; this means that accessing previously inhibited S-R is impaired, making 
responses less efficient. It seems that it is enough to select (i.e., activate) without 
executing a response, for the S-R to be inhibited, even if it is for a task different to 
the one on n–2 trial. This also shows that tasks share S-R mappings which makes 
them sensitive to lateral inhibition.  
Another study investigated inhibition associated with the n–2 task repetition 
cost by looking at whether the cost is affected by task difficulty, and by examining 
the timing of the n–2 task repetition cost, as assessed with EEG (Sinai et al., 2007). 
Task difficulty was manipulated through introducing high and low interference 
environments, switching between dominant (i.e., over-learnt, easy/ semantic) and 
nondominant (i.e., difficult/ episodic) tasks. Switching from a dominant to a 
nondominant task (semantic-episodic-semantic; SES sequence) was hypothesised to 
reflect high interference environment and require more inhibition—as characterised 
64 
 
by larger n–2 task repetition cost—compared to switching from a nondominant to 
dominant task (episodic-semantic-episodic, ESE sequence) which reflected low 
interference environment. In terms of the timing of the n–2 task repetition cost, of 
interest were ERPs (event-related potentials) at cue presentation and response 
execution; this was to determine whether inhibition affects preparatory or response 
related processes.  
Sinai and colleagues (2007) found that the n–2 task repetition was larger in 
high interference compared low interference condition, as predicted. Also, the timing 
of the n–2 task repetition cost differed depending on whether it was high or low 
interference condition; that is, in the low interference condition (i.e., ESE), ERP 
effects associated with preparatory stage were observed, but in the high interference 
condition (i.e., SES) the ERP effects were linked to response stage. Specifically, for 
low interference condition, processes associated with n–2 task repetition cost (or 
rather processes at n-0 trial in ABA compared to CBA sequence; that is when 
reactivating previously inhibited task happens) were linked to increased attentional 
resources (reduced N2 and increased P3). The authors point out that this may be due 
to episodic tasks requiring stronger orientation, as they do not linger as much in WM 
compared to semantic tasks. For high interference condition, results indicate that 
semantic task (thought to be dominant) require stronger reactivation, as reflected in 
increased LRP-r—lateralized readiness potential for response execution (Falkenstein, 
Yordanova, & Kolev, 2006); this was suggested to be due to S-R mapping being 
more inhibited for semantic tasks.  
However, there is one uncertainty that Sinai and colleagues (2007) introduce; 
that is, larger n–2 task repetition cost in high interference compared low interference 
condition was interpreted as evidence for the n–2 task repetition cost being a result 
of a reactive type of inhibition (p.605), but overall, they refer to lateral and reactive 
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inhibition as being the source of the n–2 task repetition cost. As illustrated in earlier 
paragraphs, lateral and reactive inhibition are thought to be distinct mechanisms 
(e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003)—the lateral being a neuronal, 
automatic mechanism, and reactive inhibition being a mechanism dealing with 
interference. Because the authors manipulated the level of interference during task-
switching—which they did successfully—it would mean that the reactive inhibition 
is more likely to explain their results, but in their abstract, they point to lateral 
inhibition as being at play. It can be argued that without using a double-press 
method, it is difficult to determine which type of inhibition was driving effects seen 
in Sinai and colleagues’ study; The authors indeed mention that (p.597) it is 
uncertain if lateral inhibition supresses all competitors uniformly, or whether only 
the competitors which are most likely to lead to interference are inhibited. But it can 
be argued that reactive inhibition implies that for a competitor to be inhibited 
reactively, it has to be processed semantically first, at least in research of inhibition 
in language  (D. W. Green, 1998) where inhibition is reactive and proportional to the 
level of activation. Tipper and colleagues make a clear distinction between lateral 
and reactive inhibition too (Miyake et al., 2000; Tipper, 2001; Tipper et al., 2000); 
whereby if a stimulus/ distractor evokes a very strong response, lateral inhibition is 
not enough to resolve response conflicts, so reactively self-inhibition is applied. It is 
important to mention at this point that researchers have to be careful making 
distinctions between different types of inhibition, as inconsistencies may lead to 
inaccurate conclusions.  
Overall, it seems that lateral inhibition is a strong candidate driving the n–2 
task repetition cost. For example, Koch and colleagues (2010, p.7) in their review 
argue that the n–2 task repetition cost is not driven by a reactive form of inhibition, 
such as self-inhibition of responses, because: a) n–2 task repetition costs have been 
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shown to be present after immediate repetitions, b) n–2 task repetition cost is 
sensitive to characteristics on n–1 trial (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 
2003), c) there are no costs associated with immediate repetitions. Also, by lateral 
inhibition theory, assuming that when one task is activated, other tasks are being 
inhibited—where “magnitude of inhibition is determined by each node’s level of 
activation and the strength of its inhibitory connections to its associates” 
(Arbuthnott, 2008a, p.99)—in paradigms with unequal difficulty, the asymmetric 
costs are likely to be due to different levels of activation and inhibition between 
dominant and nondominant tasks, whereby dominant tasks trigger more activation 
and inhibition. And lastly, evidence that n–2 task repetition costs are not removed 
with foreknowledge (M. Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2003; Mayr & Keele, 
2000) would also suggest that n–2 task repetition costs are driven by an automatic 
type of mechanism like lateral inhibition.  
 
Reactive inhibition.  As argued in the previous section, the lateral inhibition 
driving the n–2 task repetition cost argument has some considerable support. 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that lateral inhibition on its own is not 
enough to produce the n–2 task repetition cost (Grange et al., 2013; Sexton & 
Cooper, 2017). Grange and colleagues make an interesting point whereby in lateral 
inhibition—assuming that whilst a given task is performed, its competitors become 
inhibited—repeating A task on the ABA sequence should lead to n–2 task repetition 
benefits and not n–2 task repetition costs. This is because in ABA sequence, task A 
is being inhibited once, but for CBA sequence, task A is inhibited twice—once when 
task C is performed, and second time when task B is performed (Figure 1.2); as such, 
this would result in less inhibition on ABA versus CBA sequence, which Grange and 
colleagues’ model could not account for. Instead, they propose that it is self-
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inhibition—that is, immediate application of inhibition on the used task set—that the 
n–2 task repetition cost is produced by. Also, they find that if behaviourally there is 
no inhibition detected, it does not mean that inhibition is not present; and if no 
inhibition is added to the model, n–2 task repetition benefits are observed instead of 
n–2 task repetition costs.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 A visualisation of a simulation of lateral-inhibition dynamics across a 
CBA task-switching sequence from Grange, Juvina, and Houghton (2013); “…at 
time of task A onset (vertical grey dotted line), task A is the least active due to it 
being laterally inhibited at n-2 and n-1.“ (p. 219). 
 
Moreover, in a study where participants had an opportunity to voluntarily 
choose the sequence of switched tasks (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008)—hence they did not 
need cues—it was found that participants avoided returning to a task from n–2 trial, 
but even then the n–2 task repetition cost was present. In Experiment 2 participants 
were allowed to repeat tasks; performance was still characterised by a preference to 
not return to the n–2 task, participants preferred to repeat rather than switch, and the 
n–2 task repetition cost was still present. This was taken as evidence that it was the 
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task-set that was being inhibited, and that the n–2 task repetition cost is not an 
artefact of processing explicit cues. As such, it seems that once inhibited task-set was 
less likely to be selected again. This fits in with findings from the SC research. 
Under the hypothesis that inhibition is applied strategically, and that responses can 
be inhibited once executed—especially, in tasks that use bivalent-incongruent 
responses—in one study it was shown that the strategy participants use during task-
switching seems to depend on the probability of occurrence of responses that lead to 
response perseverance, and as such is adapted accordingly (Grzyb & Hübner, 2013). 
That is, if tasks which can be classed as having high and low probability of response 
perseverance can be distinguished easily, a trial-by-trial strategy is applied; whereas, 
if high and low risk responses cannot be distinguished, the basic level of inhibition is 
increased for all responses. 
 
Proactive inhibition. There are many paradigms that can be used to assess 
proactive inhibition (Aron, 2007); for example, the level of certainty of whether 
participants will perform a switch or the repetition on the next trial (Czernochowski, 
2015; Yu et al., 2017), or the CSI can be manipulated (Arbula et al., 2016). The 
manipulation of uncertainty involves varying the extent to which participants can be 
certain on whether the next trial will be a switch or a repeat; that is, the condition 
with the highest certainty is meant to allow for proactive inhibition (i.e., participants 
can inhibit irrelevant and prepare relevant task-set), and in the condition with the 
lowest certainty, participants do not know whether a task is a switch or a repeat until 
they see the target (i.e., participants cannot inhibit any task because they do not 
know which one will become relevant, hence they cannot prepare). As such, 
uncertainty can be manipulated with CSI, where long CSI is meant to allow for task 
preparation including proactive inhibition, whereas the short CSI limits if and how 
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much preparation can occur prior to the presentation of the stimulus. But as it was 
mentioned earlier, foreknowledge does not remove SC (Sohn & Carlson, 2000), and 
other studies seem to support the view that inhibitory effects in task-switching do not 
appear to be overcome with pre-knowledge (M. Hübner et al., 2003; Mayr & Keele, 
2000); this would suggest that the effects ascribed to inhibition in task-switching are 
unlikely to be driven by proactive inhibition.  
However, again, researchers have to be very clear about what they mean 
when they mention proactive inhibition. Proactive inhibition in task-switching is 
unlikely to operate by consciously inhibiting information in advance. Findings from 
Mayr and Keele’s (2000) study have been interpreted by some as evidence for 
proactive inhibition (e.g., Kuhns et al., 2007), proactive in a sense of information 
being proactively inhibited upon disengagement, to reduce interference; this can be 
misleading. Proactive inhibition is related more to an early selection of information 
in anticipation of an event, which biases attention and other relevant processes to 
achieve a given goal; that is, proactive inhibition as a mechanism to maintain goal-
directed preparedness (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). In task-switching 
paradigms adapted to include foreknowledge—even though inhibitory costs are not 
removed—participants clearly perform tasks well, they maintain high accuracy and 
speed, and they maintain their goal which is switching between or repeating tasks. 
As such, as some information is pre-selected, hence its activation is strengthened, 
other information may be inhibited; that is, proactive inhibition/ control is a 
mechanism by which lower-level processes are biased so information is manipulated 
in a certain way—mainly  through directing attention to a task at hand—and as such 
inhibition may be indispensable part of task-switching, especially if interference or 
conflict is present (Elchlepp et al., 2016). 
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 Combining inhibition types. The alternative is that lateral and reactive (i.e., 
self-inhibition) inhibition are not mutually exclusive, and since inhibition can be 
triggered by different factors, it can be flexible (Costa & Friedrich, 2012; Sdoia & 
Ferlazzo, 2008). For example, in an eye-tracking experiment of attention, using a 
version of an intermodal-preferential-looking (IPL) task, toddlers switched between 
semantic categories (Chow, Davies, Fuentes, & Plunkett, 2016); the testing phase 
involved toddlers looking at two pictures (i.e., one target-table, one distractor-
flower) paired with a spoken word (“look” or “wow”), and it was of interest which 
picture they looked preferentially at. The presentation of the target was preceded by 
a prime which was semantically related (i.e., chair) or unrelated (i.e., coat) paired 
with its audio label, and in between the prime and the target was an intervening 
phase—a picture and its audio label, or a checkerboard and a sine wave tone. Results 
showed that switching attention from prime to an intervening word (as opposed to a 
tone) inhibited the prime; that is, in the tone-intervening condition (compared to the 
word-intervening condition), toddlers showed more preferential looking at a target 
after seeing a related prime than the unrelated prime. The authors interpreted their 
results as evidence for semantic backward inhibition (i.e., the n–2 task repetition 
cost); that is, as attention was switched from a related prime to an intervening word, 
activation of the intervening word inhibited the prime such that it did not facilitate 
performance. It was posited that since there were differential effects of intervening 
phase on primes—an effect similar to those seen in Go/ No-Go experiments (Schuch 
& Koch, 2003)—it is unlikely that self-inhibition only was at play; instead the 
authors argued that a combination of lateral and self-inhibition was more likely. 
 
Inhibition as a “by-product”. There is another way of thinking about 
inhibitory effects in task-switching experiments; inhibition being a by-product of 
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other cognitive processes (Gade & Koch, 2005; Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 
2009; Houghton & Tipper, 1994; M. Hübner et al., 2003; Philipp & Koch, 2006; D. 
W. Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Tipper, 2001). 
Specifically, as we focus on a given stimulus or a task—or as a target is selected—
information outside of our focus is being inhibited automatically (akin to lateral 
inhibition), this is to ensure that the relevant activations are heightened. This type of 
inhibition can be applied at a physical and semantic level, and its strength can be 
adjusted depending on the level of interference (akin to self-inhibition). As such, it 
makes sense that in many experiments inhibition cannot be prevented or overcome 
(Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; M. Hübner et al., 2003; Mayr & Keele, 2000). 
This fits in with the view that controlled behaviour can be achieved by biasing 
information processing (Elchlepp et al., 2016); that is, that cognitive control 
influences low-level mechanisms by increasing baseline activity relevant to a task, 
which results in response inhibition. 
 
Goals of the PhD 
 The goal of this PhD was to investigate the n–2 task repetition cost further 
and offer novel insight into this effect. The reviewed literature clearly shows that the 
n–2 task repetition cost is a well-researched and established effect, and that it is 
likely to reflect inhibitory processing. The importance of the n–2 task repetition cost 
is significant because it has become a signature of cognitive inhibition in task-
switching, as it has been used as such in individual (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007, 2012) and group differences research (Fales, Vanek, & 
Knowlton, 2006; Foti et al., 2015; Greenberg, Reiner, & Meiran, 2013; Lawo, 
Philipp, Schuch, & Koch, 2012; Mayr, 2001; Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & Keele, 
2006; Moritz, Hübner, & Kluwe, 2004; Philipp & Koch, 2009; Prior, 2012; Whitmer 
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& Banich, 2012; Yiu-kwan, 2008). However, academics do not seem to agree 
entirely on what kind of inhibition, and whether it is actually inhibition, that drives 
the n–2 task repetition cost; and despite a lot of interest in the n–2 task repetition 
cost, there are a few gaps in research that needed addressing.  
The first important issue to visit is the reliability of the n–2 task repetition 
cost. This effect has been used as a measure of individual differences; but yet, there 
was no study reported—before this PhD started—that looked at whether the n–2 task 
repetition cost is a reliable measure. This was problematic because in psychology to 
make meaningful conclusions for individual differences research, we have to have 
confidence that tests we use are reliably measuring cognitive processes of interests. 
As such, the first goal of the current thesis was to establish the reliability of the n–2 
task repetition cost, which is addressed in Chapter 2. It can be reported in advance 
that the results of this study show that the n–2 task repetition cost is not a reliable 
measure, which questions the suitability of this effect as a measure of inhibitory 
control, of which consequences are discussed in detail in the respective chapter. 
Another issue around the n–2 task repetition cost was to do with whether it 
actually measures inhibition. Indeed, this effect has been very resistant to 
explanations other than inhibitory ones, but there is a lot of evidence that would 
suggest that some of the factors that are known to modulate the n–2 task repetition 
cost and performance in task-switching in general, are important to revisit. For 
example, it seems that priming and episodic retrieval mechanisms are closely linked 
to the efficiency with which task-switching is performed and the extent to which 
inhibitory effects are present. Therefore, as a second goal of this PhD, the aim was to 
further explore whether and to what degree the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated 
by episodic retrieval (Hommel, 2004; Neill, 1997). Moreover, since in Chapter 2 the 
n–2 task repetition cost was shown not to be reliable, it was also of interest to 
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examine its reliability controlling for potentially modulating effects. By gaining a 
better understanding of the effects of this non-inhibitory mechanism on the n–2 task 
repetition cost, an improved and well-informed interpretation of it can be developed. 
This topic is addressed in Chapter 3, where in a series of three studies, the n–2 task 
repetition cost is shown to be modulated to a large extent by episodic retrieval. 
Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that controlling for episodic retrieval, the 
reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost does not improve. These findings further 
question the extent to which the n–2 task repetition cost measures inhibition, and its 
usefulness as such.  
The next area that was considered to be under-researched was concerned with 
predictors of the n–2 task repetition cost. That is, there are a lot of studies reported 
that looked at roles of cues, stimuli, response, RCI, or CSI, but there is no indication 
on what can predict the n–2 task repetition cost.  Inhibitory effects outside of task-
switching research (Conway & Engle, 1994; Lavie & Fox, 2000) have been shown to 
be dependent on WM and perceptual resources; as such, if the n–2 task repetition 
cost reflects inhibition, it was likely that it can be explained by individual differences 
related to cognitive and perceptual capacities. The third aim of this thesis was to look 
at whether the n–2 task repetition cost can be explained by individual differences in 
WM capacity and attentional/ perceptual resources. Chapter 4 looks at the 
relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost and WM, and whether it can be 
modulated by WM manipulations; in a series of three studies it was shown that the 
n–2 task repetition cost does not seem to be linked to WM or be modulated by it, 
regardless of whether it is controlled for episodic retrieval or not. Chapter 5 
investigates whether and to what extent the n–2 task repetition cost is explained by 
individual differences in distractibility—as measured with Cognitive Failures 
questionnaire (CFQ, Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982)—and whether 
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it is modulated by perceptual load. The scores on CFQ did not predict the n–2 task 
repetition cost (even when controlled for episodic retrieval); the results for 
perceptual load modulation of the n–2 task repetition cost are rather inconclusive, 
but in general a trend of the n–2 task repetition being reduced under conditions of 
exhausted attentional/ perceptual resources the n–2 task repetition was observed. 
The final goal of this PhD involved looking at methods used to analyse data 
in task-switching experiments, and what we can learn about the n–2 task repetition 
cost using alternative methods. That is, typically in task-switching research data are 
analysed through looking at central tendencies such as mean reaction times and mean 
accuracy.  However, this method can be considered as limited, and a more in depth 
understanding of performance on task-switching can be obtained using techniques 
such as, the whole distribution of reaction times (Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 
1991) and computational modelling (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Therefore, as the 
last goal of the current PhD, using data from four studies (three already collected and 
one collected specifically for computational modelling), in Chapter 6, n–2 task 
repetition costs were analysed with ex-Gaussian and computational modelling. 
Overall, the results from Chapter 6, further disprove the n–2 task repetition cost as an 
effect reflecting inhibitory control, and support the view that the n–2 task repetition 
cost is largely due to non-inhibitory, memory mechanisms. 
It is important to mention that each chapter in this thesis is written in the 
format of a paper, and at the end of the thesis a General Discussion chapter 
summarises the key messages from the experimental and computational chapters.  
Therefore, inevitably there will be some degree of repetition throughout the chapters, 
but this was necessary so that each chapter could stand on its own as a paper 
submission. 
 
75 
 
 
Chapter 2 Inhibition in Task-Switching: The 
Reliability of the N–2 Task Repetition Cost12 
 
 
Abstract 
The n–2 task repetition cost seen in task-switching is an effect of slower response 
times performing a recently completed task (e.g. an ABA sequence) compared to 
performing a task that was not recently completed (e.g. a CBA sequence). This cost 
is thought to reflect cognitive inhibition and has been well replicated (Koch, Gade, 
Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). As such, the n–2 task repetition cost has started to be used 
as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control (e.g. Whitmer & Banich, 
2007); however, the reliability of this measure has not been investigated in a 
systematic manner. The current study addressed this important issue. Seventy-two 
participants performed three task-switching paradigms; participants were also 
assessed on rumination traits and processing speed (PS)—measures of individual 
differences potentially modulating the n–2 task repetition cost. Significant n–2 task 
repetition costs for each paradigm were found. However, split-half reliability tests 
revealed that this cost was not reliable at the individual-difference level. Neither 
rumination tendencies nor PS predicted this cost. It was concluded that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is not reliable as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory 
control. 
  
                                                 
1 This chapter has been published as Kowalczyk and Grange (2016) and is reproduced with 
permission of the copyright holder. Thanks to Frederick Verbruggen, Miriam Gade, Cai, Longman, 
and an anonymous reviewer for comments and suggestions.  
2 Kowalczyk, A. W., & Grange, J. A. (2016). Inhibition in task switching: The reliability of the n−2 
repetition cost. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2016.1239750 
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Introduction 
Cognitive control 
Task-switching paradigms are used to investigate cognitive control; 
specifically, to assess humans’ ability to exert behaviours that are context-specific, 
typically in an environment which affords more than one action. Cognitive control is 
a mental construct believed to coordinate abilities to select, process, and interpret 
internal and external inputs translating them into controlled actions and thoughts.  
For example, we can focus on one task (e.g., typing a manuscript), but if needed, we 
can temporarily disengage from that activity to focus on a different task (e.g., 
reading previously prepared notes; answering a ringing phone), only to return to the 
original task later. Efficient cognitive control facilitates the ability to switch our 
attention between different tasks, and helps us to maintain our focus on a given 
activity in the face of distractors when necessary. 
When cognitive control works well, carrying out goal-oriented behaviours 
may seem effortless, but when cognitive control fails, its importance becomes 
apparent. Dysfunctional cognitive control may manifest as a difficulty to switch 
attention between tasks (e.g., persevering with a no longer relevant task), an inability 
to focus exclusively on one task (e.g., being distracted by irrelevant stimuli), or 
stimuli-driven behaviour (e.g., flicking a light switch regardless when exposed to it; 
Archibald et al., 2001; Lhermitte, 1983). 
For a seemingly effortless goal-oriented behaviour to be effective, we must 
be able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information, as well as to 
attend to relevant and ignore irrelevant information. The cognitive control processes 
coordinating goal-oriented behaviour and modifying it when necessary are not fully 
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understood; however, conceptually these processes are speculated to be part of a 
dynamic system (Goschke, 2000), which adapts behaviour in a moment-to-moment 
manner, by activating relevant- and inhibiting irrelevant-dimensions of tasks (Mayr 
& Keele, 2000). 
 
Backward Inhibition Paradigm 
Task-switching paradigms are suitable for investigating cognitive control 
because switching between tasks requires attending to a relevant goal, suppressing 
irrelevant information, and executing an appropriate action for every task; abilities 
thought to be regulated by cognitive control (Grange & Houghton, 2014; Kiesel et 
al., 2010; Monsell, 2003). In the laboratory setting, participants are presented with 
computerised task-switching paradigms, which typically involve rapid judgments to 
stimuli shown sequentially on a computer screen. The paradigm of interest to the 
current study (and the whole of the thesis) is the Backward Inhibition (BI) paradigm; 
which is believed to be particularly suitable for testing cognitive control. In this 
paradigm, participants switch between three tasks; for example, participants may be 
presented with numerical stimuli and be asked to perform tasks such as, judging 
whether the number is odd/even (a parity judgment), lower/higher than 5 (a 
magnitude judgment), or whether it is red/blue (a colour judgment). To assess task-
switching performance, reaction times (RTs) and accuracy (%) are recorded and 
analysed. Based on that data, inferences about candidate cognitive processes 
associated with task-switching are made (see Grange & Houghton, 2014; Kiesel et 
al., 2010;  and Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010, for reviews).  
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N–2 Task Repetition Cost 
Typically, in BI paradigms all three tasks are presented in such fashion that 
no immediate repetition of a one task is allowed (e.g., parity-parity-magnitude), 
meaning that participants always switch from one task to another. This means that 
two types of sequences of stimuli presentation occur: ABA (e.g., parity-size-parity) 
and CBA (e.g., magnitude-size-parity) sequences. Mayr and Keele (2000) created the 
BI paradigm to test a hypothesis about cognitive control in task-switching; they 
speculated that cognitive inhibition facilitates task-switching by temporarily 
inhibiting abandoned task’s mental representation, when it momentarily becomes 
irrelevant. That is, when a given task is completed and attention shifts away from it 
(A→BA), that task becomes inhibited so it does not interfere or interferes less with 
the next task (ABA). However, inhibiting comes with a cost, because once applied 
inhibition cannot be overcome, it decays over time reducing inhibited task’s 
accessibility; if a task is required soon after it was inhibited (AB→A), it should be 
“harder” to re-activate. As such, it was speculated that performing a task that was 
abandoned recently (hence inhibited) should be impaired; that is, responding to a 
previously inhibited task (ABA) should be characterised by slower and less accurate 
RTs compared to a task that was not inhibited recently (CBA). The difference in 
performance between ABA vs. CBA sequences is known as the n–2 task repetition 
cost, and this cost is thought to be driven by inhibition (Mayr & Keele, 2000); hence, 
the n–2 task repetition cost is argued to reflect cognitive inhibition. 
 
Group Differences Research 
Researchers have explored characteristics of the n–2 task repetition cost 
extensively (e.g., Gade et al., 2014); it has been replicated many times (for reviews 
Gade, Schuch, Druey, & Koch, 2014; Kiesel et al., 2010), and it has been resistant to 
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non-inhibitory accounts (Koch et al., 2010; Mayr, 2007). Consequently, this effect 
has become a signature of cognitive inhibition, and has been used as such in group 
differences research, examples of which are provided below. 
Looking at age differences, younger (average 20-24 years old) and older 
adults (average 66-71years old) (Lawo, Philipp, Schuch, & Koch, 2012; Mayr, 2001; 
for alternative results see Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) seem to have comparable 
inhibition when assessed with the n–2 task repetition cost. Parkinson’s patients have 
larger inhibition (as assessed with larger n–2 task repetition cost) compared to 
healthy control group (Fales et al., 2006), which was interpreted as being likely due 
to striatal dysfunction possibly causing impaired interplay in the prefrontal cortex, 
associated with task-switching. In major-depressive disorder (MDD) patients’ 
difficulty to switch between tasks was claimed to be due to inability to activate a 
new task-set rather than an inability to inhibit an irrelevant task-set; as depressed 
participants showed larger switch cost and intact BI (Whitmer & Banich, 2012). 
Pathological gamblers’ inability to resist to gamble was argued to be due to a 
combination of stronger activations and weaker inhibition (Yiu-kwan, 2008). In 
another study, it was found that task-set selection and inhibition seem 
neurocognitively dissociable, with right-frontal parts of the brain being linked to 
inhibition, and the left-frontal brain linked to set-activation/ retrieval (Mayr et al., 
2006). Children’s with Williams’ syndrome difficulty to process visuospatial 
information was proposed to be due to navigational strategy not being modulated via 
inhibition, making it inflexible  (Foti et al., 2015). People with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD)—characterised by intrusive and repetitive thoughts difficult to 
disengage from—were showed to have spared inhibitory control, as their n–2 task 
repetition costs were similar to the control group (Moritz et al., 2004). Inhibition in 
language-switching was demonstrated not to target specific task-set aspects (e.g., 
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cue, stimulus-response mapping) (Philipp & Koch, 2009), and inhibition in bilingual 
people was observed to be stronger than in monolingual people (Prior, 2012). And 
mindfulness was posited to improve inhibition, as indicated by larger inhibition after 
inducing mindfulness (Greenberg et al., 2013). 
 
Individual Differences  
As shown in the previous paragraph the n–2 task repetition cost has become a 
very popular tool to assess cognitive inhibition; now, studies that used the n–2 task 
repetition cost to investigate individual differences in inhibitory control will be 
introduced. These studies were an inspiration to conduct the current study. That is, 
despite the n–2 task repetition cost being robust, when it comes to interpreting 
results from individual differences studies, a potential issue was identified; the 
reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost was not investigated in a systematic 
manner—until the current study was conducted.  
 Whitmer and Banich (2007) looked at whether depressive rumination trait—
recurrent thoughts about emotions and feelings appearing in person’s mind (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991)—is linked to performance on task-switching. Assuming that 
people exhibiting depressive rumination are characterised by “attentional 
inflexibility”—a cognitive inflexibility, such as persevering with a given thought 
despite of negative feedback (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000)—the authors 
speculated that this attentional inflexibility may be due to an inhibitory deficit, or 
deficit in task-switching ability. That is, it was hypothesised that people ruminate 
because they cannot block/ deactivate ruminative thoughts, or switch from one 
thought to another. Whitmer and Banich found a negative correlation between the n–
2 task repetition cost and the tendency to engage in depressive rumination (as 
assessed with Ruminative Response Scale, RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
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1991). These findings were interpreted as evidence that depressive ruminators’ 
attentional inflexibility—difficulty to disengage from unwanted thoughts—is due to 
impaired cognitive inhibition; that is, those who scored higher on RRS showed less 
inhibition in task-switching (i.e., smaller the n–2 task repetition cost).  
Another study set out to distinguish—using brain imaging—between brain 
areas associated with activation vs. inhibition (Whitmer & Banich, 2012). A novel 
paradigm was used to investigate the relationship between behavioural differences in 
cognitive inhibition and brain activations during task-switching. Participants were 
assessed on cognitive inhibition via the n–2 task repetition cost—with larger n–2 task 
repetition cost indicating better inhibition—and then they were tested in the fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) scanner performing task-switching between 
two tasks vs. repeating the same task. Isolating inhibition related brain activity is 
considered challenging, because existing methods do not allow for a direct measure 
of inhibition; despite the n–2 task repetition cost being a robust measure, the ABA 
vs. CBA comparison is thought to reflect the effect of reactivation of a previously 
inhibited task rather than inhibition, which takes place two trials prior (Dreher & 
Berman, 2002; Sinai et al., 2007). Moreover, inhibition is thought to be equally 
exerted on a task before the task B in ABA and CBA sequences, which means that at 
brain activations level, no differences would be expected. Therefore, for fMRI 
session the authors used two tasks (i.e., AB) as opposed to three (i.e., ABA) to 
distinguish between disengagement from a task (which is thought to be affected by 
inhibition), and performance on trials where no inhibition of task-set is assumed to 
take place (i.e., AA).  Next, changes in brain activations associated with AA task 
sequence were hypothesised to reflect task-set activation, whereas activations 
changes linked to AB sequence were hypothesised to include inhibition; this is 
because, the authors assumed that switching from a task A to a task B requires 
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inhibition of task A, whereas repeating a given task does not. As such, the AB task-
switching sequence was assumed to include inhibitory processing and the AA 
sequence was assumed to show non-inhibitory processing. Next, individual 
differences in the n–2 task repetition cost, were regressed against brain activations 
associated with activity during task-switching (i.e., AB task-switching), controlling 
for non-inhibitory processing (i.e., during AA sequence). Looking at n–2 task 
repetition costs’ relationship with brain activations changes recorded with fMRI, it 
was found that “stronger inhibition” (larger n–2 task repetition costs) was associated 
with increased bilateral activation of the putamen (part of the basal ganglia; 
“gatekeeper of working memory”, e.g., McNab & Klingberg, 2007), and the 
supplementary motor/ premotor cortex (associated with action rules, stimulus-
response mappings, response selection, e.g., Shibasaki et al., 1993), which was 
interpreted as evidence for these areas to be involved in task-set inhibition. 
A more recent study (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) looked at cognitive control 
and interference resolution of conflict in task-switching, and individual differences 
in working memory capacity (WMC). The n–2 task repetition cost was used as one 
of the measures of task-switching; specifically, inhibition in task-switching. 
Pettigrew and Martin speculated that, rather than the n–2 task repetition cost 
reflecting cognitive inhibition, they argued that it reflects an automatic, low-level 
inhibition (i.e., lateral inhibition). As such, it was predicted that the n–2 task 
repetition cost should not be explained by WMC, and this is what they found. 
Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost was not predicted by WMC; however, it 
was correlated with WMC (the smaller the n–2 task repetition cost was, the larger 
the WMC was; for an alternative evidence see Grange, n.d.). Furthermore, the n–2 
task repetition cost was not correlated with or explained by other measures of 
cognitive control: response-distractor inhibition tasks group (nonverbal Stroop task, 
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Stroop task), and resistance to proactive interference tasks (recent negatives task, 
cued recall task). These results were interpreted as evidence that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is a reflection of an automatic mechanism, such as lateral inhibition, 
rather than a reactive inhibition mechanism. The n–2 task repetition cost not being 
explained by WMC is unexpected in light with theories which assume that it reflects 
cognitive inhibition (for a review see Koch et al., 2010); and theories that link 
inhibition to WMC (e.g., Mccabe, Mcdaniel, & Hambrick, 2010; Miyake et al., 
2000). That is, if the n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition, we would expect it 
to be predicted by individual differences in WMC too.  
As shown above, the n–2 task repetition cost is used widely in research for 
various purposes; however, this effect was utilised without knowing if it is reliable. 
The lack of research on reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost is problematic when 
it comes to interpreting results from studies that used it to assess individual 
differences in cognitive control. This issue is given more weight by evidence 
(Grange & Juvina, 2015) that the magnitude of the n–2 task repetition cost varies 
considerably between healthy participants—an evidence for the variation in the n–2 
task repetition cost occurring naturally in non-clinical population—even after 
practice on the BI paradigm. That is, substantial within- and between-subject 
differences of practice effect on the n–2 task repetition cost were observed; as some 
participants’ n–2 task repetition costs clearly reduced in magnitude, whereas in about 
a third of the subjects, this cost did not change. Moreover, not all participants 
showed n–2 task repetition costs. Grange and Juvina also showed, by modelling the 
n–2 task repetition cost, that individual differences they observed were well 
modelled by varying the strength of the inhibition parameter in the model; it was 
also speculated, but not tested, that the parameter representing the rate at which 
inhibition decays should be considered in future research projects. It means that the 
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n–2 task repetition cost may vary between participants due to some participants 
having strong/weak inhibition and/ or their inhibition decaying at different rates.  
There is still a lot to understand about the n–2 task repetition cost; one could 
argue that until we understand the source of the n–2 task repetition cost, we should 
be careful making speculations around individual differences in cognitive control 
assessed by it. 
 
The Current Study 
To summarise, despite the n–2 task repetition cost being well replicated, and 
the extensive interest from group and individual differences researchers, its 
reliability needed to be investigated in a systematic manner. For a test to be 
considered reliable, it has to produce measurements that are reproducible and 
consistent over a course of time (Drost, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). This is 
because, if a measure is not reliable, it does not capture variations in participants’ 
performance, which means that we cannot assess intra- and inter- individual 
differences in cognition over time. Also, cognitive tests are used to assess typical 
(i.e., healthy) as well as atypical populations (i.e., clinical); therefore, it is important 
that measured can provide a “baseline” of healthy behaviour/ cognitive processes, 
which later can become an indicator of how cognition changes when it becomes 
impaired, and for this, reliable measures are needed.  
However, it is not uncommon for cognitive tests—used for clinical and 
research purposes—to not have been tested for their reliability (Bird, Papadopoulou, 
Ricciardelli, Rossor, & Cipolotti, 2003, 2004). When tested for reliability, some 
measures extensively used to assess individual differences in cognitive control have 
been shown to be reliable (stop-signal task: Congdon et al., 2012; go/no-go task: 
Leue, Klein, Lange, & Beauducel, 2013; Stroop test: Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & 
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Cramer, 2005). Whereas other measures have been shown to have low reliability 
(e.g., the negative priming effect; Bestgen & Dupont, 2000); therefore, the 
robustness of a measure should not be mistaken for reliability, and researchers 
should—as part of good practice—report reliability of measures they use.  
Whilst this study was being conducted, a report indicating the n–2 task 
repetition costs’ reliability appeared. Among other results, Pettigrew and Martin 
(2015) reported reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost; its split-half reliability 
ranged between .44- and .51 (Spearman-Brown corrected correlation coefficient). 
This is considered low because, as a rule of thumb, it is accepted that for a given 
measure to be considered reliable, its Spearman-Brown correlation coefficient must 
be at least .7 (e.g., Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1967; Picardi & Masick, 2013; 
Revelle & Condon, 2014; Streiner, 2003); and in some circumstances a reliability of 
.9 may be desirable (e.g., Bird et al., 2003; Cronbach, 1951). This indication of the 
n–2 repetition cost low reliability made the current study even more important than 
originally anticipated. 
In the current experiment, the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost was 
examined in a systematic manner; unlike Pettigrew and Martin’s (2015) study. That 
is, many different BI paradigms are used in task-switching, and they all seem to 
produce n–2 task repetition costs, despite differences in cues, stimuli and/ or 
response requirements. Therefore, in order for the current study’s findings to be 
generalisable, participants performed three versions of the BI paradigm: the “Target 
Detection” paradigm (similar to Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009, Experiment 
3); the “Visual Judgment” paradigm (similar to Gade & Koch, 2008); and the 
“Numeric Judgment” paradigm (similar to Schuch & Koch, 2003).  
The split-half reliability method was chosen to analyse the reliability of the 
n–2 task repetition cost with, because the cost is sensitive to practice effects (Grange 
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& Juvina, 2015), and, the split-half analysis—unlike the alternative test-retest 
methods—requires a single exposure to the test. Also, the split-half procedure is less 
time consuming compared to test-retest, and since reliability testing requires 
collection of many data points—and because three BI paradigms would be used for 
the current study—for practical reasons, the split-half reliability was deemed more 
suitable than the alternative. Moreover, the split-half reliability has been suggested to 
be more suitable for examining the reliability of cognitive tests (Drost, 2011). 
It is important to mention, that the split-half reliability procedure can be 
problematic if data are split in an arbitrary manner (e.g., reliability of odd vs. even 
trials); that is, one cannot be certain that the obtained reliability—which typically is a 
single point-estimate—is an accurate estimation of reliability, or that it is not due to 
the way the data were split. Therefore, an alternative way of obtaining split-half 
reliability coefficients was chosen, which is explained in detail in results section. 
Exposing participants to three paradigms allowed for the split-half reliability 
of each paradigm, as well as the correlation of n–2 task repetition cost between 
paradigms to be explored; this is the first investigation of this type reported. Since, 
there is an indication that low inhibition (as indicated by small n–2 task repetition 
costs) is linked to higher scores on depressive rumination scale (Whitmer & Banich, 
2007), and because there is evidence that participants’ the n–2 task repetition cost 
can vary considerably (Grange & Juvina, 2015), participants’ depressive rumination 
was assessed with the intention to control for that variable in reliability testing. Also, 
individual differences in processing speed (PS)—another factor potentially 
associated with the n–2 task repetition cost—was assessed; PS has been linked to 
cognition in general (Brown, Brockmole, Gow, & Deary, 2012; Stawski, Sliwinski, 
& Hofer, 2013), and to aging cognition (Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, & Pedersen, 
2005; Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 2005). That is, faster PS is associated with 
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more efficient performance on cognitive tasks (especially requiring top-down 
control), and it becomes slower as we age. Moreover, PS has been linked to the 
Stroop effect, an effect linked to inhibition, characterised by slower performance to 
incongruent stimuli compared to congruent stimuli (Naber, Vedder, Brown, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2016). 
To anticipate the results, the n–2 task repetition cost was found to have very 
low reliability across all three BI paradigms. 
 
 Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. This study was approved by the University Ethical Research 
Panel at Keele University. The sample was made up of first year Psychology 
students from Keele University whom participated in exchange for partial course 
credit. The inclusion criteria were: to be at least 18-years-old, understand spoken and 
written English, and have normal/ corrected-to-normal vision.  
To obtain sufficient sample size for the current study, the R package “pwr” 
(Champely, 2009) was employed to conduct power analysis, with the expected effect 
size of the reliability measure. Aiming for an effect size—Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient—of r ≈ .54 (adjusted for split-half reliability analysis; see 
Results section for details), and desired power of 95%, the required sample size was 
38. The expected correlation coefficient was reduced to a more conservative r = 0.4 
which at 95% power, which made the required sample of 75 participants.  
Out of the ninety-four participants recruited, data of twenty-two were 
removed; fourteen due to accuracy on some of the BI paradigms being below 
required 90%; seven with incomplete data (attended ½ experimental sessions); and 
one with an unusually large n–2 task repetition benefit (> 700 milliseconds, ms). 
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Data of seventy-two participants (60 females; mean age = 18.76, SD = 1.07) were 
used for the analysis. The sample size was three participants below the intended 
sample size; however, the study maintained more than 94% power. 
 
General Procedure. Three BI paradigms, a depressive-rumination 
questionnaire (i.e., RRS), and a PS task were completed by participants during two 
separate sessions, each lasting 45 minutes (1–8 days apart, M = 3.10, SD = 2.30). A 
Latin Square Design (3x3) was used to counterbalance BI paradigms’ order; the 
RRS/ PS task was administered at the beginning of each session (which alternated 
across participants). BI paradigms were presented on a standard PC with a 17in. 
monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Responses were made on a 1-ms precise USB keyboard. 
Before participants practiced individual tasks, they learned the cue-task and 
S-R pairings; the practice session consisted of 16 trials (for each BI paradigm), and if 
participants made four or more errors on the first practice, the practice was repeated, 
but a total of two practices were allowed. If participants made an error during 
practices, they saw the word ‘Error’ (font the Courier New, size 18; 1000ms). 
 
Task-switching paradigms: general procedure. Each BI paradigm had an 
identical main procedure: A single trial consisted of a cue presented for 500ms, 
followed by appearance of a stimulus; both disappeared when a response was made. 
Then, the cue for the next trial appeared 100ms after a response was recorded 
(response-cue interval, RCI). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. For each BI paradigm there were four blocks of 120 trials; 
in between blocks participants took a self-paced short break. 
To ensure the sufficient amount of data is collected (i.e., number of trials per 
participant) to observe a correlation, multivariate normally distributed data with 
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known correlation (i.e., correlation coefficient 𝑟 = .7) between two variables were 
generated artificially, and modelled with the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) 
modelling (S. D. Brown & Heathcote, 2008). Among possible number of trials (i.e., 
20, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1000) the optimal number of trials at which correlation is 
observed, was at between 100 and 250 trials per condition (i.e., ABA and CBA 
sequences each); therefore, 4803 trials per paradigm was decided as a suitable 
amount of data to be collected. 
Within each BI paradigm the order of tasks (i.e., A, B, and C trials) was 
randomised, with the exception that no immediate task-repetitions were allowed—
task-repetitions within a run of task-switches have been shown to reduce the 
magnitude on the n–2 task repetition cost (Philipp & Koch, 2006). Each current trial 
n was compared to the trial on n–2 trial allowing for trials to be registered as ABA or 
CBA sequences. See Figure 2.1 for a visualisation of the trial structure in each BI 
paradigm.  
 
                                                 
3 During data collection, due to coding error, for the Target Detection Paradigm, 360 trials were 
collected, instead of 480.  
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Figure 2.1 Schematic overview of the trial structure for each of the task-switching 
paradigms. Note the images are not to scale. This figure is reproduced from 
Kowalczyk & Grange (2017, p. 2422). 
 
The Target Detection paradigm. This paradigm was based on the procedure 
of Houghton, Pritchard, and Grange (2009), Experiment 3; it required participants to 
make spatial localisation judgments of stimuli (Mayr & Keele, 2000).  
The cues were shapes (triangle, square, octagon; height and width 4 cm) and 
targets were oval shapes with different features (see Figure 2.1). All ovals had a 
height of 6 cm; three ovals had widths of 2.3 cm, and one oval had a width of 3.5 
cm. Cues and stimuli were presented in grayscale shading on a white background. 
Participants responded to the location of the target associated with the presented cue. 
The cues and stimuli were paired in the following way: the square cue went with the 
“shaded” target, the triangle cue with the “bordered” target, and the octagon cue with 
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the “angled” target. The cue appeared in the centre of the screen, followed by four 
oval shapes (three possible targets and one distractor), with one oval centred within 
each quadrant of the screen.  The position of the target on the stimuli display was 
randomised.  
Participants responded by pressing one of four response keys depending on 
the location of the correct target. Each key corresponded to one corner of the screen: 
upper left-D, lower left-C, lower right-N, and upper right-J. Participants used their 
index and middle fingers of both hands to respond with; middle fingers on D/J, and 
index fingers on C/N. 
 
The Visual Judgments paradigm. This paradigm is based on the procedure 
of Gade and Koch (2008). Participants made judgments about the visual 
characteristic of a single multivalent stimulus. The stimulus on each trial was either 
the letter “A” or the number “4”, in either red or blue font; the stimulus could also be 
large or small. Participants judged whether the stimulus was a digit or a letter (a 
Form task), small or large (0.5cm vs. 1cm; a Size task), or whether it was red or blue 
(a Colour task).  
The stimulus appeared in the centre of a white rectangle (4 cm high x 3.5 cm 
wide), and a task was cued by four cues of one type presented around the rectangle; 
each cue centred to each side of the rectangle. The $ sign cue (1 cm high) was linked 
with the Form task, arrows pointing up and down (1 cm high) with the Size task, and 
yellow squares (1 x 1 cm) with the Colour task. Participants responded with their 
index fingers by pressing one of two keys: “Z” (blue, small, or letter), and “M” (red, 
large, or digit). 
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The Numeric Judgments paradigm. This paradigm used the type of stimuli 
previously used by Schuch and Koch (2003), with central/peripheral judgment 
replaced by the word/digit judgment. The stimulus presented on each trial was either 
a digit (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9) or a number word (one, two, three, four, six, seven, 
eight, and nine). Participants judged whether the stimulus was odd or even (a Parity 
task), whether it was lower or higher than five (a Magnitude task), or whether the 
stimulus was in a digit or a word form (a Form task). Task cues were the words 
“parity”, “magnitude”, and “form”. Both, the cue and the stimulus, were presented 
on the screen in black (Courier New, size 24 font) on a grey background.  The cue 
was presented above a central fixation cross, and the stimulus was presented below it 
(see Figure 2.1). Participants responded with their index fingers by pressing one of 
two keys: “Z” (odd, lower than five, or word), and “M” (even, higher than five, or 
digit). 
 
Materials. Participants’ PS (i.e., processing speed) was assessed with an 
adaptation of the Digit Symbol Substitution Task (e.g. van der Elst, van Boxtel, van 
Breukelen, & Jolles, 2006). PS has not been directly associated with the n–2 task 
repetition cost; however, it has been shown to predict overall cognitive abilities 
(Brown, Brockmole, Gow, & Deary, 2012; Stawski, Sliwinski, & Hofer, 2013), 
changes in aging cognition (Finkel et al., 2005; Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Salthouse, 
2005), performance on the Stroop task (Naber et al., 2016), and has been shown be 
closely linked to the efficiency interference when processing stimuli is dealt with 
(Philip & Seymour, 1973; Seymour, 1974). Some even argue (Naber et al., 2016) 
that it is a combination of pre-set dynamics of processing efficiency and lateral 
inhibition rather than cognitive control, that explains the Stroop effect. Therefore, PS 
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was deemed a potentially important factor to be controlled for in the reliability 
analysis of the n–2 task repetition cost.  
In the Digit Symbol Substitution task, participants were given a sheet of 
paper on top of which nine digit-letter pairs were printed (Figure 2.2). Below those 
pairings was a grid with digits printed in a random order; underneath each digit 
participants had to write (with a pencil) the letter that corresponded to it. After a 
practice with seven pairs to match, participants had 120 seconds to couple as many 
digit-letter pairs as possible. Participants matched letters with digits in a sequential 
manner, without skipping any pairs; if they made a mistake, they could correct it by 
writing over the letter or crossing the error. Participants could score a maximum of 
133 correctly matched digit-letter pairs; the higher the score, the more efficient PS is.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 An illustration of how the Digit Symbol Substitution task. 
 
Participants’ depressive rumination trait was assessed with a short version 
(10 statements) of the RRS (i.e., Ruminative Response Scale)—Brooding and 
Reflection parts  (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), which has been 
shown to be reliable (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Thanoi & Klainin-Yobas, 
2015; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). The internal reliability of the RRS in the current 
study was high (Cronbach’s alpha 𝑟 = .81). 
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 Participants answered the following question, “…how often you do things 
described in each statement”, in relation to 10 statements (e.g. Think ‘What I am 
doing to deserve this’?). To reflect on the extent to which participants felt each 
statement described them, four answers on a 1–4 scale were allowed (1- “almost 
never”, and 4- “almost always”). The maximum possible score on the RRS was 40, 
and the minimum score was 10; the higher the score, the stronger the depressive 
rumination trait is. 
 
Design 
A within-subjects design was used to examine the reliability of the n–2 task 
repetition cost, with dependent variables (DVs) RTs and accuracy, and independent 
variables (IVs), Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) and Paradigm (Target Detection vs. 
Visual Judgment vs. Numeric Judgment). To look at whether the n–2 task repetition 
cost was predicted by RRS and/or PS scores, a multiple regression was conducted, 
with RRS and PS scores as predictors, and the RT and accuracy n–2 task repetition 
cost as DVs. Details of the reliability analysis procedure are outlined in the Results 
section. 
 
Results 
Data trimming. For all three BI paradigms, before analysis was conducted, 
data were trimmed. First, data of participants whose accuracy was lower than 90% in 
any of the BI paradigms were removed. Then, for the accuracy analysis the null trials 
were removed (first two trials of each block). For the RTs analysis, additionally error 
trials, as well as the two trials following errors were removed (those are not 
classifiable as an ABA or CBA sequence); this led to 6% of trials being removed 
(4.6%, in the Target Detection; 5.7% in the Visual Judgment; and 7.4%; in the 
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Numeric Judgment paradigm). For the RTs analysis, RTs faster than 150ms, and 
slower than 2.5 standard deviations above each participant’s mean (within each 
paradigm) for each cell of the experimental design were removed too. Altogether, the 
removal of null/error trials, and RTs trimming led to 11.7 % of trials being removed 
(9.9 %, in the Target Detection; 11.3%, in the Visual Judgment; and 13.7%, in the 
Numeric Judgment).  
Before conducting the reliability analysis, performance on each BI paradigm 
was explored with the standard RTs and accuracy analyses to assess whether n–2 
task repetition costs were present. Moreover, the magnitude of n–2 task repetition 
costs between the three paradigms were compared to examine whether and how 
much this effect varied across paradigms. For mean RT and accuracy for each level 
of the design see Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Mean response times (in milliseconds) and accuracy (in %) for ABA and 
CBA sequences for each BI paradigm. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Note that for accuracy a negative n–2 task repetition cost reflects poorer accuracy on 
ABA trials. 
 Response 
Times  
 Accuracy   N–2 task repetition 
cost 
Paradigm ABA CBA  ABA CBA  RT Accuracy 
Target 
Detection 
1014 
(27) 
923 
(28) 
 97.20 
(.24) 
98.12 
(.18) 
 91 -.92 
Visual 
Judgment  
1280 
(41) 
1175 
(38) 
 96.94 
(.24) 
97.27 
(.25) 
 105 -.33 
Numeric 
Judgment 
1323 
(45) 
1237 
(42) 
 96.27 
(.28) 
96.27 
(.31) 
 86 0 
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Response time analysis. RTs were analysed via a 2x3 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The main effect of Task Sequence was significant, 
F(1, 71) = 108.98, p < .001, ηg2 = .02, as participants were slower performing ABA 
(1212ms) compared to CBA sequences (1120ms). The main effect of Paradigm was 
also significant, F(2, 142) = 61.19, p < .001, ηg2 = .16, the Target Detection 
paradigm was performed the fastest (968ms), followed by the Visual Judgement 
paradigm (1230ms), and the Numeric Judgement paradigm (1276ms). There was no 
significant interaction between Task Sequence and Paradigm, F(2, 142) = 0.67, 
p=.51, ηg2 < .001, indicating an equivalent n–2 task repetition costs across the three 
paradigms. The density functions of the n–2 task repetition cost’s distributions in 
each BI paradigm are depicted in Figure 2.3; as it can be seen, there was a 
considerable spread in the n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., n–2 task benefits and costs 
are present). 
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Figure 2.3  Density functions for reaction times (at the bottom) and accuracy (at the 
top) n–2 task repetition costs distribution for the Numeric, Visual, and Target 
Detection paradigm. 
 
Accuracy analysis. A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed 
that there was: a significant main effect of Task Sequence, F(1,71) = 10.22, p < .01, 
ηg2 = .01, as participants were more accurate in CBA (97.22%) compared to ABA 
sequences (96.80%). The main effect of Paradigm was also significant, F(2, 142) = 
19.07, p < .001, ηg2 = .07, as participants were most accurate performing the Target 
Detection paradigm (97.66%), followed by the Visual Judgment paradigm (97.10%), 
and the Numeric Judgment paradigm (96.27%). The interaction between Task 
Sequence and Paradigm was significant, F(2,142) = 4.01, p<.05, ηg2 = .008. The 
accuracy n–2 task repetition cost was significant for the Target Detection paradigm, 
t(71) = -4.71, p < .001, 95%CI = [-1.31, -0.53], but it was not significant for the 
Visual Judgement paradigm, t(71) = -1.42, p =.16, 95%CI = [-0.78, 0.13] or for the 
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Numeric Judgment paradigm, t(71) = -0.01, p =.99, 95%CI = [-0.52, 0.52].  See 
Figure 2.3 for the density functions of the distributions of accuracy n–2 task 
repetition cost across paradigms; again, the n–2 task repetition cost is considerably 
spread across participants, with n–2 task benefits and costs present. 
 
Correlations. To examine whether participant’s overall performance (RTs 
and accuracy) was stable across all three paradigms, a Pearson product-moment 
correlation analysis was conducted, which for completeness, includes individual 
differences (Table 2.2–2.3). 
 
Reaction time. Mean RTs from all three BI paradigms correlated 
significantly: The Target Detection correlated with the Numeric Judgment (r = .64, p 
< .001) and the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .68, p < .001); the Numeric Judgment 
correlated with the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .75, p < .001). To note, these 
correlations remain significant when analysis was adjusted for multiple comparisons.  
 
Accuracy.  Overall, accuracy also correlated significantly between three 
paradigms: The Target Detection correlated with the Numeric Judgment (r = .42, p < 
.001), and the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .50, p < .001); the Numeric Judgment 
correlated with the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .63, p < .001). These correlations 
also remain significant when controlling for multiple comparisons. 
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Table 2.2 Correlation matrix for the mean response times from the three task-
switching paradigms, individual differences (RRS-Depressive Rumination; P Speed-
processing speed), age, sex, and the break (Gap) between the two experimental 
sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS P Speed Age Sex Gap 
Numeric —        
Target .64** —       
Visual .75**   .68** —      
RRS .02  .10 .19 —     
P Speed .49**  .63** .49** -.08 —    
Age .35*  .25* .30* -.02 -.21 —   
Sex .06  .14 .03 -.21 -.21 .11 —  
Gap .02 -.03 .05  .12 -.02 .13 .19 — 
 
Table 2.3 Correlation matrix for the mean overall accuracy from the three task-
switching tests, individual differences (RRS-Depressive Rumination; P Speed-
processing speed), age, sex, and the break (Gap) between the two experimental 
sessions. 
 Numeric Target Visual RRS P Speed Age Sex Gap 
Numeric —        
Target  .42** —       
Visual  .50**  .63** —      
RRS  .14  .27*  .22 —     
P Speed  .05  .08 -.07 -.08 —    
Age -.04  .07  .01 -.02 -.21 —   
Sex -.08 -.13  .02 -.21 -.21  .11 —  
Gap  -.17  .12  .01  .12 -.02 -.13 .19 - 
Note: **p<.0018 (Bonferroni-corrected criterion for significance). *p<.05  
 
Individual differences. Next, participants’ individual differences scores—
PS and RRS—were examined to assess whether they correlated with RTs from task-
switching. This was mainly to perform a manipulation check on PS measure; PS 
should correlate with overall performance, as the literature suggests.  
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The mean PS score was 91.41 (SD = 12.78, min. = 66, max. = 121)4, and the 
mean RRS score was 19.04 (SD = 5.00, min. = 11, max. = 37). Performance on RRS 
did not correlate significantly with performance on the PS task (see Table 2.2). 
Correlation analysis between mean RTs and individual measures revealed that, the 
negative correlation between RTs and PS was significant, for all three task-switching 
paradigms (Numeric Judgment, r = -.49, p < .001; Target Detection, r = -0.63, p < 
.001; the Visual Judgment, r = -.49, p < .001); that is, higher PS scores were 
associated with faster RT. However, the RRS score did not correlate with RTs on the 
three BI paradigms. 
Importantly, since RRS and PS were factors potentially to be controlled for in 
the reliability analysis, a multiple regression was conducted to examine whether, 
those two variables predicted n–2 task repetition costs. This analysis revealed that 
RT and accuracy n–2 task repetition costs were not predicted by either the RRS or 
the PS score in any of the three BI paradigms (see Table 2.4–2.5)5. As n–2 task 
repetition costs were not explained by individual differences, these individual 
differences were not controlled for in the between-paradigm correlations, or the 
reliability analysis. 
 
  
                                                 
4 One participant had missing data for the Processing Speed measure; to maintain power, this 
participant’s data was kept and the missing value was imputed using the mean score for the 
Processing Speed test. Removing this participant changes none of the conclusions. 
5Transforming RRS and the processing speed scores into z-scores and then inputting them into the 
regression analysis also yielded non-significant results. 
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Table 2.4 Summary of multiple regression analyses for reaction time n–2 task 
repetition costs as the dependent variable, and the P Speed (processing speed) and 
RRS scores ad independent variables. 
  t p β F df p adj.R2 
 Predictor        
 
Target 
 
 
RRS 
 
-0.01 
 
.99 
 
-0.03 
    
P Speed  0.14 .90   0.11     
Overall model    0.01 2,68 .99 -.03 
 
Visual 
 
RRS 
 
1.30 
 
.38 
 
2.06 
    
P Speed -0.74 .46 -0.68     
Overall model    0.72 2,68 .49 -.01 
 
Numeric 
 
RRS 
 
1.18 
 
.24 
 
3.91 
    
P Speed   -1.13 .26  -1.45     
Overall model    1.46 2,68 .24 .01 
 
Table 2.5 Summary of multiple regression analyses for accuracy n–2 task repetition 
costs as the dependent variable, and the P Speed (processing speed) and RRS scores 
ad independent variables. 
  t p β F df p adj.R2 
 Predictor        
 
Target 
 
 
RRS 
 
0.02 
 
.98 
 
0.0001 
    
P Speed -0.47 .64   0.008     
Overall model    0.12 2,68 .89 -.03 
 
Visual 
 
RRS 
 
-0.09 
 
.93 
 
-0.004 
    
P Speed -0.02 .98 -0.0004     
Overall model    0.005 2,68 1.0 -.03 
 
Numeric 
 
RRS 
 
1.24 
 
.22 
 
0.07 
    
P Speed   0.31 .76  0.006     
Overall model    0.80 2,68 .46 -.006 
 
 
Between-paradigm correlation. One of the aims of the current study was to 
assess whether the n–2 task repetition cost correlated between the three BI 
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paradigms. This was achieved by conducting Pearson product-moment correlations 
on n–2 task repetition costs across paradigms, separately for RT (Table 2.6) and 
accuracy (Table 2.7). 
 
Response time. Correlation analysis revealed that the Target Detection did 
not correlate significantly with the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = .07, p = .57), but 
it correlated significantly with the Numeric Judgment paradigm (r = .25, p = .036); 
the Visual Judgment correlated significantly with the Numeric Judgment paradigm (r 
= .30, p=.01)6. The two correlations that were significant, do not remain significant 
when using Bonferroni corrections for multiple correlations. 
 
Table 2.6 Correlation matrix for n–2 task repetition costs in response times from the 
three BI paradigms, individual differences (RRS-depressive rumination and P Speed-
processing speed), age, sex, and the break (Gap) between the two experimental 
sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS P Speed Age Sex Gap 
Numeric —        
Target    .25* —       
Visual    .30*   .07 —      
RRS  .15   .01   .12 —     
P Speed     -.15   .02  -.10 -.08 —    
Age  .14 -.10  -.02 -.02 -.21 —   
Sex  .06 -.04  -.05 -.21 -.21  .11 —  
Gap  .09  .07    .17  .12 -.02 -.13 .19 — 
 
                                                 
6 Equal trials correlation analysis: the n–2 task repetition cost correlated only between the Visual and 
Numeric Judgments paradigms (r = .28, p = .01). The reported correlations remained unchanged when 
analysis was controlled for individual differences in processing speed via partial correlations: Target 
Detection paradigm did not correlate with the Visual Judgement paradigm (r = .07, p = .56), but it did 
correlate with the Numeric Judgement paradigm (r = .25, p = .03); the Visual Judgement paradigm 
correlated with the Numeric Judgement paradigm (r = .30, p = .01). Note these latter correlations do 
not remain significant when using Bonferroni corrections for multiple correlations. 
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Accuracy. The accuracy n–2 task repetition costs did not correlate 
significantly across three paradigms: Target Detection paradigm did not correlate 
with the Numeric Judgment (r = .06, p = .64), or the Visual Judgment paradigm (r = 
-.15, p = .22); the Numeric Judgment paradigm did not correlate with the Visual 
Judgment paradigm (r = .01, p =.93).  
  
105 
 
Table 2.7 Correlation matrix for n–2 task repetition costs in accuracy from the three 
BI paradigms, individual differences (RRS-depressive rumination and P Speed-
processing speed), age, sex, and the break (Gap) between the two experimental 
sessions. 
 Numeric  Target Visual RRS P Speed Age Sex Gap 
Numeric —        
Target .06 —       
Visual .01 .15 —      
RRS .16 .00 .03 —     
P Speed .02 .06 .00 -.08 —    
Age -.09 .07 .11 -.02 -.21 —   
Sex -.18 .08 -.10 -.21 -.21 .11 —  
Gap -.08 .07 .10 .12 -.02 -.13 .19 — 
 
 
Reliability analysis. To assess the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost 
(for RTs and accuracy), a split-half reliability analysis was conducted. Instead of 
obtaining a single-point estimate of the split-half reliability coefficient, a form of 
bootstrapping was conducted, where many random splits of the data were performed, 
and for each split a reliability estimate was calculated (see e.g. Congdon et al., 
2012). First, for each participant within each paradigm, trimmed data were split 
randomly into two halves; for each half mean RT/ accuracy were calculated—for 
ABA and CBA sequences—to calculate n–2 task repetition costs for each half. Then, 
a Pearson product-moment correlation between n–2 task repetition costs from the 
two halves was conducted, and the point-estimate was stored. This procedure was 
repeated 500 times, allowing for a distribution of correlation coefficients. 
 The split-half reliability method requires the estimated reliability coefficient 
to be adjusted; this is because, by splitting of data in half, the total number of data 
points being used in the reliability analysis are reduced, which can reduce the 
reliability coefficient. To adjust the split-half reliability, the Spearman-Brown 
correction is used, which is given by 
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Equation 2.1 
𝑟𝑐 =  
𝑁𝑟
1 + (𝑁 − 1)𝑟
 
 
 
where r is the Pearson product-moment coefficient and N is the number of “tests” 
being combined (for the current study there were two halves, so N = 2). For the 
current study, the reliability of rc—the corrected reliability coefficient—of at least .7 
was to be interpreted as strong reliability. With N = 2, this pertains to an uncorrected 
r ≈ .5385. 
The bootstrapping reliability coefficient estimation yielded some negative 
(uncorrected) r values, which indicates total lack or a very low reliability (Crawford, 
Sutherland, & Garthwaite, 2008), and renders the Spearman-Brown correction 
uninterpretable. Therefore, below the uncorrected r is reported, and rc  is referred to 
when interpreting the full results. 
 
Response times. The results for the n–2 task repetition cost (RTs) split-half 
reliability analysis are depicted in Figure 2.4 in what is known as violin plots; these 
represent a distribution of correlation coefficients for the split-half reliability for 
each of the three paradigms. A violin plot is like a standard box-plot, with the 
addition of a rotated density function of the distribution of scores, allowing a better 
description of the shape of the distributions (Adler, 2005).  
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Figure 2.4 Reliability checks for the n–2 task repetition cost for response times. The 
plots show violin plots of the (uncorrected) bootstrapped split-half reliability 
estimates (correlation coefficients, r) each paradigm. The horizontal dashed line 
represents the criteria for reliability (r ≈.5385; Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle & 
Condon, 2014). 
 
AS it can be seen in Figure 2.4, the median correlation coefficient values (r) 
for the split-half reliability for each of the three paradigms did not reach the criterion 
for reliability (as stated, equivalent to an uncorrected r ≈ .5385). The tails of 
distribution of coefficients for the Target Detection and the Numeric Judgment 
paradigms cross the reliability criterion; however, this is not considered as strong 
evidence for acceptable reliability. The median values of uncorrected correlation 
coefficients were: r = .35 for the Target Detection, r = .23 for the Visual Judgment, 
and r = .43 for the Numeric Judgment. These translate to corrected values of rc = .52 
for the Target Detection, rc = .37 for the Visual Judgement, and rc = .60 for the 
Numeric Judgement paradigm. 
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Accuracy. The reliability analysis for the accuracy n–2 task repetition cost 
revealed that median values of reliability coefficients did not reach the required 
criterion, as depicted in Figure 2.5. The median values of uncorrected correlation 
coefficients were: r = .07 for the Target Detection, r = .18 for the Visual Judgment, 
and r = .19 for the Numeric Judgment paradigm. These translate to corrected values 
of rc = .13 for the Target Detection, rc = .31 for the Visual Judgement, and rc = .32 for 
the Numeric Judgement paradigm. 
 
Figure 2.5 Reliability checks for the n–2 task repetition cost for accuracy. The plots 
show violin plots of the (uncorrected) bootstrapped split-half reliability estimates 
(correlation coefficients, r) each paradigm. The horizontal dashed line represents the 
criteria for reliability (r ≈.5385; Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle & Condon, 2014). 
 
Exploratory analysis. Work conducted for this study was published 
(Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017), and the following are analyses recommended by the 
reviewers.  
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Practice effect. Participants had 16 trials of practice for each BI paradigm, 
which could be considered as a relatively short practice period, which could mean 
that participants’ performance had not reached asymptote before the experimental 
blocks commenced. If participants did not exhibit optimal performance, it could have 
affected the reliability coefficient estimation results7; therefore, an exploratory 
analysis was conducted to check if the reliability analysis was higher in more 
practiced blocks. For each of the three paradigms, the split-half bootstrapping 
analysis was redone without the first block; this additional analysis revealed that the 
reliability results were not affected by lack of insufficient practice; that is, the 
correlation coefficients stayed below the required criterion. 
 
 Response times. The median values of correlation coefficients were r = .33 
(rc = .50) for the Target Detection, r = .34 (rc = .51) for the Visual Judgment, and r = 
.39 (rc = .56) for the Numeric Judgement paradigm.  
 
Accuracy. The median values of correlation coefficients were r <.0001 (𝑟𝑐 = 
.001) for the Target Detection, r=.25 (𝑟𝑐 = .40) for the Visual Judgment, and r=.09 
(𝑟𝑐 = .17) for the Numeric Judgment paradigm.  
 
Order of paradigms. Another check was performed to establish whether the 
poor across-paradigm reliability was a result of a reduction in n–2 task repetition 
costs as participants progressed through the experimental sessions8; due to the 
counterbalancing, this could mask reliability effects if not controlled.  
                                                 
7 Thanks to Cai Longman for suggesting this possibility. 
8 Thanks to Cai Longman for suggesting this possibility. 
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To perform the necessary analysis to address this potential issue, n–2 task 
repetition costs for each participant were re-categorised as a function of “paradigm 
order” (i.e., “1st paradigm encountered”; “2nd paradigm encountered”; “3rd paradigm 
encountered”). A one-way ANOVA with the n–2 task repetition cost as a DV and the 
paradigm order as the IV was then carried out. This analysis revealed that there was 
no significant effect of order on the n–2 task repetition cost, F(2,142) = 0.22, p > .8, 
ηg2= .002; the n–2 task repetition cost for the 1st paradigm encountered had a mean 
of 88ms (SE=13), 95ms (SE=13) for the 2nd, and 99ms (SE=13) for the 3rd paradigm 
encountered. Therefore, poor reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost was not due to 
reduction in n–2 task repetition costs as participants proceeded through the 
experiment. 
 
General Discussion 
The n–2 task repetition cost is an effect seen in task-switching, and it is 
thought to reflect cognitive inhibition; the current study examined how reliable the 
n–2 task repetition cost is at assessing individual differences in cognitive control. 
Three different BI paradigms were used to measure the n–2 task repetition cost; as 
expected, and consistently with the existing literature, large and statistically-
significant n–2 task repetition costs were found in all three paradigms. The split-half 
reliability of the n–2 task repetition costs in all three paradigms was low; moreover, 
the individual differences—i.e., RRS and PS—were not associated with n–2 task 
repetition costs. 
The finding that split-half reliability of the n–2 the repetition cost is low, 
substantiates results from another study (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015). The authors of 
that study used a BI paradigm as part of their tests-battery to study the relationship 
between WM and flexible task-switching; despite not being the focus of their study, 
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for some of the measures they report split-half reliability, and the n–2 the repetition 
cost’ reliability was low (𝑟𝑐 = .44). The current study confirms that finding and 
extends it, as it is the first study to investigate the reliability of the n–2 the repetition 
cost in a systematic manner. Specifically, there are many BI paradigms and they 
differ in terms of cues, stimuli and response mapping; and to establish a clearer view 
on reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost, the current study used different BI 
paradigms, aiming to represent methods used in task-switching research thereby, 
offering more generalisable findings. 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, despite the n–2 task 
repetition cost being well replicated, its reliability was not known, which was 
problematic for interpretation of the n–2 task repetition cost in individual differences 
studies. For measures that are meant to assess individual differences, it is important 
that they are reliable. A reliable test has to produce measurements that are 
reproducible and sensitive to individual differences for any changes in performance 
to be observed (Drost, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). Therefore, the finding 
that the n–2 task repetition cost has low reliability presents a challenge to researchers 
wishing to use the n–2 task repetition cost for individual differences research. A 
reliable tool estimates inter- and intra-person variability in a meaningful way, so it 
provides an indication of a person’s “cognitive status” (Salthouse, 2007). Also, if a 
given measure taps into a single process rather than a number of different processes 
(unless they are related; for example, when measuring anxiety, a measure can tap 
into its cognitive, behavioural, and affective components of anxiety), that measure 
would be expected to be reliable (Streiner, 2003). Therefore, the initial implication 
of the finding that the n–2 task repetition cost has low reliability raises the question 
as to the cognitive processes “captured” by that effect; specifically, whether the n–2 
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task repetition cost is a measure of a single ability (or related processes), in this case, 
cognitive inhibition.  
For example, as it was proposed by Grange and Juvina (2015), individual 
differences in the n–2 task repetition cost can be modelled by varying the strength of 
inhibition; also, it has been suggested that another aspect, the rate at which inhibition 
decays, is potentially important for future modelling of individual differences in 
inhibition. In practice, it means that there may be substantial variations in 
performance even between trials within one participant. The current findings suggest 
the n–2 task repetition cost does not seem to capture individual variation in a reliable 
manner, making the interpretation and meaningfulness of the results uncertain. It is 
possible that as-yet unidentified factors might have affected the reliability of the n–2 
task repetition cost. For example, performance can naturally vary within a person 
due to short (across sessions), long term fluctuations (e.g., due to cognitive aging), 
and it can depend on how accurate the measurements are (Salthouse, 2007). Also, 
participants may have different levels of engagement during a single testing session, 
especially if the task is considered as undemanding and repetitive (Allan Cheyne, 
Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009). 
 
N–2 Task Repetition Cost 
 To provide more generalizable findings, cognitive control was assessed with 
three different BI paradigms, which made it possible to examine the correlation of 
the n–2 task repetition costs across the paradigms. This was important to establish, 
because if a measure is reliable and taps into the same ability—in this case 
inhibition—it is expected that participants’ performance between paradigms should 
be associated. However, what was found was that whilst the group-level n–2 task 
repetition cost did not vary significantly across different paradigms—that is the n–2 
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task repetition cost was equivalent across the three paradigms—the individual n–2 
task repetition costs did not correlate across paradigms. This can be interpreted as 
converging evidence for the lack of reliability in the measure. Specifically, if the n–2 
task repetition cost was a reliable and accurate measure of an individual’s inhibitory 
control, then individual’s large n–2 task repetition cost in one paradigm should show 
similarly-large n–2 task repetition costs in other paradigms. If anything, some 
participants showed an n–2 task repetition benefit on one or two paradigms and the 
n–2 task repetition cost on the remaining paradigm/s. Taken together, low reliability 
for individual n–2 task repetition costs and partial correlation of that effect between 
three paradigms, indicates that the n–2 task repetition cost is an unreliable. However, 
the current study assumed that if the n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition, this 
inhibition is stable within participant, whereas it is possible that inhibition is not 
stable within individuals, and if that is the case, the BI paradigm inhibition may be 
not sensitive enough to those variations. Also, the n–2 task repetition cost may not 
be as pure a measure of cognitive inhibition as currently believed. Future research 
should explore potential reasons for the apparent lack of reliability. 
 
Individual Differences 
 As indicated by the findings from the current study (see Figure 2.3; see also 
Grange & Juvina, 2015), the n–2 task repetition cost seems to vary substantially 
between participants. The source of these variations is uncertain, but the n–2 task 
repetition cost has been used to measure individual differences in cognitive 
inhibition. Despite the current study showing that depressive rumination nor PS were 
associated with the n–2 task repetition cost (although PS was correlated with RT 
performance), some important points came out from this study; however, the points 
below are made keeping in mind that the n–2 task repetition cost is not reliable, 
114 
 
which may be the main reason for the lack of the relationship between the n–2 task 
repetition and depressive rumination and PS. 
 
Trait rumination. Depressive rumination has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with the n–2 task repetition cost (Whitmer & Banich, 2007), but the 
current study failed to replicate that finding. Specifically, none of the three BI 
paradigms’ n–2 task repetition cost was associated with trait rumination. It is 
uncertain yet as to why this association was not present; existing literature offers 
inconsistent findings, as Chen, Feng, Wang, Su, and Zhang (2016)—unlike Whitmer 
and Banich—also found no relationship between those two variables. The initial 
implication of these discrepancies is that more research is needed to establish 
whether and to what extent trait rumination links to cognitive inhibition.  
It is plausible that the findings from the current study and those of Chen et 
al.(2016) reflect a genuine failure to replicate Whitmer and Banich’s results (e.g., 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015); however, it seems that it is more likely that 
methodological differences may be the source of these inconsistencies. What sets 
Whitmer and Banich’s study apart is that in their regression analysis of the n–2 task 
repetition cost being predicted by rumination, they controlled for the switch cost 
(SC)—the RT difference between task-switches vs. task-repetitions. The current 
study and the one by Chen and colleagues, did not control for the SC. This is a 
potentially important difference because the SC and the n–2 task repetition cost have 
been shown to be dissociable (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012; Yiu-kwan, 2008); 
specifically, people’s ability to activate a relevant task, may be separate from how 
efficiently an irrelevant task is inhibited. Also n–2 task repetition costs reduce in 
magnitude if immediate task-repetitions are allowed within a run of task-switches 
(Koch et al., 2006); therefore, to obtain the strongest n–2 task repetition costs, the 
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current study utilised only task-switches (unlike Whitmer and Banich). However, it 
is possible that when investigating individual differences in cognitive control (with 
the n–2 task repetition cost), SC also must be accounted for. 
Also, the three above mentioned studies have in common the type of sample 
used; that is, data for these studies were collected from healthy populations, as 
represented by university students’ samples. Whitmer and Banich (2007) found 
significant correlations between n–2 task repetition costs and depressive rumination 
in pre-selected respondents (categorised as “low” and “high” ruminators), as well as 
in the not preselected sample. The current and Chen et al. (2016) studies did not 
classify their participants into low and high ruminators; however, as Whitmer and 
Banich indicate, this preselection was not necessary to observe the correlation 
between the n–2 task repetition cost and rumination. There is a possibility that the 
lack of the relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost and depressive 
rumination is due to low reliability of the cost, but that does not explain why 
Whitmer and Banich found this relationship in their study.  
 
Processing speed. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, PS—
though not directly linked to the n–2 task repetition cost—has been shown to predict 
the general efficiency with which cognitive tasks are performed. Since PS has been 
also linked to Stroop effect—assumed to reflect cognitive inhibition—if the n–2 task 
repetition cost reflects inhibitory processes, PS should explain the individual 
differences seen in n–2 task repetition cost too. However, the Stroop effect has been 
shown to be reliable (e.g., Strauss et al., 2005) unlike the n–2 task repetition cost, 
which may be the reason for no relationship between the cost. Nevertheless, in one 
of the checks it was established that PS predicted average RTs in the three BI 
paradigms used; this means that the PS measure successfully captured individual 
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differences in PS and predicted performance as expected. Yet, it is unclear why PS is 
not related to n–2 task repetition cost. Therefore, at this stage it is uncertain whether 
PS not predicting the n–2 task repetition cost is due to PS not influencing inhibition 
or due to the cost’s low reliability.  
 
Choice of Reliability Criterion  
During a review of this paper for publication, it was suggested that the 
reliability coefficient of .7 was too stringent for a cognitive test, as this criterion is 
typically used for reliability testing of psychometric measures. However, other 
studies that looked at the reliability of cognitive measures used a similar criterion 
(e.g., Dale & Arnell, 2013). Moreover, the level of reliability found in the current 
study has been referred to by other researchers as “moderate” (Leue, Klein, & Lange, 
2013), “poor”–to–“good” (Condon et al., 2012), and “quite low” (Pettigrew & 
Martin, 2015). None of these are necessarily “correct”, and it is up to the reader to 
make a judgment on how to interpret this study’s results. Nevertheless, it is 
important to mention that a reliability of .5-.6 is acceptable in early stages research—
preliminary or explorative studies—and a reliability of .8 is considered adequate for 
basic research—applied research, for example, looking at differences in 
experimental treatments—whereas, a reliability of .9 is a minimum for clinical 
research (Nunnally, 1967; Streiner, 2003). Taken together, literature suggests that the 
n–2 task repetition cost’s reliability found in the current study is not sufficient for the 
use in individual differences research.  
 
Reliability and Sample Type 
There was a possibility that the homogenous sample used in the current study 
might have reduced the differential validity by reducing the variance of the n–2 task 
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repetition cost, lowering the chances to measure reliability accurately9. The current 
study aimed to obtain data from a type of sample that is comparable to the studies 
reported in the literature. It was not the focus of this study to investigate how more/ 
less homogenous sample influences the differential validity and if it affects the 
variance of the n–2 task repetition cost, but this remains an interesting question for 
future research. However, based on observations from the current and previous 
studies, in a sample as homogenous as university students, there is considerable 
variance of the n–2 task repetition cost (e.g. Grange & Juvina, 2015; see also Figure 
2.3 in the current chapter). 
 
N–2 Task Repetition Cost and Inhibition 
The current study’s findings indicate that the n–2 task repetition cost has low 
reliability; moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost did not correlate well across the 
three BI paradigms. This can be interpreted as evidence that the n–2 task repetition 
cost is an unstable measure of inhibitory control; or that inhibition in task-switching 
is unstable, and the measure is not sensitive to inhibition variations. There is another 
potential explanation of why the n–2 task cost’s reliability is low; namely, it is 
possible that the n–2 task repetition cost is not a “pure” measure of inhibition. 
Specifically, if the n–2 task repetition cost reflects a mixture of cognitive 
mechanisms—one of which being inhibition—then the measure would be unstable 
and therefore not reliable.  
There are several possible factors that may confound a measure of inhibition 
in task-switching. For example, if in task-switching inhibition is applied to resolve 
interference, it is important to know where that interference comes from. This is 
because interference may arise as a result of lapses in attention (Allan Cheyne et al., 
                                                 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting we discuss this.  
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2009), task-unrelated-thoughts (van Vugt & Broers, 2016), mismatches in episodic 
retrieval (Mayr, 2007; Neill, 1997), or perceptual load (Lavie, 1995), just to mention 
a few. 
To give an example of how one of those factors could modulate performance 
on task-switching, let us consider episodic retrieval (Mayr, 2007; Neill, 1997). 
Episodic retrieval theory, when applied to task-switching, would predict: as a given 
task is carried out, an episodic trace of that task is stored in memory and with it the 
task’s parameters (e.g., cue, stimulus characteristics, and response executed). If the 
same task is cued soon after it was performed (e.g., parity-magnitude-parity 
sequence), a memory trace of that task is automatically retrieved. So, using the 
example from one of the paradigms used in the current study, if the first task is a 
parity judgment where the stimulus is a digit “8” requiring a “Z” key response, 
followed by magnitude judgment, and then followed by another parity judgment; if 
the second parity judgment’s parameters are the same as the first one (i.e., another 
“8” stimulus with “Z” response), that task should be performed faster—because an 
episodic memory trace of previously performed parity judgment will be retrieved—
compared to if the second parity judgment was about a digit “3”—which is the same 
task to be performed but a different response (i.e., “M” response key). Episodic 
retrieval is not controlled for in task-switching paradigms; therefore, it is uncertain 
how much of the n–2 task repetition cost is due to episodic retrieval mismatches. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, reports three studies that explored to what extent episodic 
retrieval influences the n–2 task repetition cost, and whether this modulation changes 
the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost.  
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Difference Measures 
After the paper for the current study was accepted for publication, it became 
apparent that there may be a very good reason for the n–2 task repetition cost to be 
low10. Namely, some literature offer evidence to illustrate that difference score 
measures are bound to have low reliability (Crawford et al., 2008; Cronbach & 
Furby, 1970; Dunlap, Kennedy, Harbeson, & Fowlkes, 1989; Kopp, 2011). That is, 
reliability of difference scores is “a function of the average reliability of its two 
components and of the correlation between them” (Kopp, p. 562; Crawford et al.).  
That is, if a difference score is made up of two related components, the correlation 
between those components will be high (or even approach the reliabilities of the two 
components); as such, the variance of the difference scores is likely to reflect mainly 
error variance. Since the n–2 task repetition cost is a difference score, the low 
reliability identified in the current study is likely to be due to the nature of the cost, 
which gives more weight to the advice concluded in the current study, which is to be 
cautious using the n–2 task repetition cost for individual differences research and/ or 
for neuropsychological assessments (Kopp; Crawford et al.). Difference scores are 
also prone to have negative reliability coefficients; as it was observed in the currents 
study. In terms of interpreting the n–2 task repetition cost, the difference scores’ 
reliability research would suggest that such measures are very difficult to interpret. 
Similar evidence has been put forward for negative priming effect (Bestgen & 
Dupont, 2000) and Stroop test (Strauss et al., 2005); and as such, these measures 
should be interpreted with caution too. Some would suggest that instead of 
difference scores, rate residual scores (Hughes, Linck, Bowles, Koeth, & Bunting, 
2014), which take into account RTs and accuracy, are a more accurate measure of 
cognitive processes because they account for differences in processing speed (Rush, 
                                                 
10 Thanks to Professor Bruno Kopp for this suggestion.  
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Barch, & Braver, 2006). This method involves calculating a rate of correct responses 
per second for the conditions of interest, and these rates are put into regression 
(Hughes et al., 2014); however, using rate residual scores does not seem to improve  
the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost in one of the studies (Pettigrew & 
Martin, 2015), because its reliability was low. Also, Pettigrew and Martin showed 
that the n–2 task repetition cost did not correlate with working memory regardless of 
the rate residual scores or the difference scores were used; however, but it seems that 
the rate residual scores method can improve the SC’s reliability (Hughes et al., 
2014). 
  
Conclusion 
Data from the current study suggest the n–2 task repetition cost is not reliable 
as a measure of individual differences of inhibitory control. Individual differences in 
depressive rumination and processing speed did not predict the n–2 task repetition 
cost. Taken together, these results show that interpretations of the n–2 task repetition 
cost as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control should be cautious 
until we are certain that it reflects inhibition, and it does so in a reliable manner.  
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Chapter 3 Inhibition in Task-Switching and 
Episodic Retrieval11 
 
 
Abstract 
In task-switching experiments slower reaction times returning to a task completed 
recently (i.e., ABA sequence) compared to performing a task that was not performed 
recently (i.e., CBA sequence) is known as the n–2 task repetition cost, an effect 
thought to reflect cognitive inhibition. Three experiments in the current study 
showed consistently that the n–2 task repetition cost is in large part due to non-
inhibitory mechanism, episodic retrieval (Experiment 2), with the n–2 task repetition 
cost being larger under episodic mismatches (i.e., n–2 task repetitions with n–2 
response switch) compared to episodic matches (i.e., n–2 task repetition with n–2 
response repetition). Also, episodic retrieval was shown to modulate cue-
transparency which in turn affected the n–2 task repetition cost (Experiment 3). 
Moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost, nor the episodic retrieval, were modulated by 
low-level perceptual mismatches/ matches of stimuli features (Experiment 4). 
Additionally, the n–2 task repetition cost’s reliability was low with and without 
controlling for episodic retrieval. The main conclusion from the current study is that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is attributable to a combination of non-inhibitory (i.e., 
episodic retrieval) and inhibitory mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
11 An adapted version of this chapter was published (Grange et al., 2017), and 
components of the paper are reproduced; permission of the copyright holder granted: 
Copyright © 2017, American Psychological Association. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 2 reported a study that found that the effect known as the n–2 task 
repetition cost—thought to reflect cognitive inhibition—has low reliability 
(Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017). From those results it was suggested, among other 
things, that the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost may be low due to some 
unaccounted-for factors influencing performance, or due to the n–2 task repetition 
cost not being a pure measure of inhibition. It was proposed that the n–2 task 
repetition cost may reflect inhibition as well as other, non-inhibitory mental 
processes, for example, episodic retrieval. The current chapter reports a series of 
experiments which looked at whether and to what extent, the n–2 task repetition cost 
is modulated by episodic retrieval; whether controlling for episodic retrieval 
improves the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost; and the effects of cue-
transparency and/ or low-level, task-irrelevant stimulus features on episodic retrieval 
and the n–2 task repetition cost. 
 
Cognitive Control 
Every day, humans are exposed to an environment saturated with stimuli that 
we can act on, some of which we want to pay attention to, and some of which we 
want to ignore. In general, our behaviour is governed by what we attend to; 
therefore, to achieve our goals we must be able to distinguish between relevant and 
irrelevant information, and act on it appropriately. We also must be able to maintain 
a given goal when we encounter distractions, as well as to change our goal/ 
behaviour when necessary. For example, when walking to a shop to buy some bread, 
we may have to walk past other shops (e.g., clothes shops), meet someone we know, 
or receive a phone-call, all of which can distract us from the original goal.  However, 
we can ignore distractions or we can choose to engage in them, whilst maintaining 
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the original goal in mind. Cognitive control is thought to be a system of different 
mental processes working together allowing us to adapt our behaviour to match 
current environment’s and/or our goals’ demands; that is, to allow us to behave in a 
manner that corresponds with our intentions and is context-specific. This cognitive 
system is believed to coordinate and maintain our goals, at the same time allowing 
flexible behaviour change when necessary (Goschke, 2000). 
 
Backward Inhibition Paradigm 
One specific mental process which is thought to aid goal-oriented behaviour 
is inhibition. This mental process is assumed to act like ‘breaks’ on our intentions 
and actions to support selection and conduct of appropriate behaviours. In cognitive 
psychology, a method known as the backward inhibition (BI) paradigm has become 
a very popular tool to assess inhibition in task-switching (Mayr & Keele, 2000). The 
idea behind this paradigm is that participants switch rapidly between series of stimuli 
presented in close temporal succession on a computer screen. For example, they may 
see a series of digits (one a at a time) and react to each according to rules of one of 
three tasks: for a parity task, they must judge whether the digit is odd/even; for a 
magnitude task, if the digit is lower/higher than 5; and for a colour task, whether the 
digit is blue/red. The nature of the BI paradigm requires participants to switch 
between tasks in a controlled manner, applying correct rules to each stimulus. It is a 
very common finding that when participants return to a task that they performed 
recently (i.e., ABA sequence) they are slower and less accurate compared to when 
they perform a task they did not complete recently (i.e., CBA). The difference in 
performance—for reaction times (RTs) and accuracy—between ABA and CBA is 
referred to as the n–2 task repetition cost (Mayr & Keele, 2000).  
125 
 
It is generally accepted (see a review by Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 
2010) that the n–2 task repetition cost is due to cognitive inhibition. When we switch 
away from a task, that task continues to be active (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) 
which is thought to interfere with the activation of the next task. Mayr and Keele 
speculated, that to activate a given task—against a competitor (e.g., previous task’s 
representation)—it is not enough to strengthen activation of the currently relevant 
task to select it (Houghton & Tipper, 1994). To reduce the interference from an 
activation of the no longer relevant task, Mayr and Keele argued that irrelevant 
task’s activation must be inhibited to aid selection of the next task (Berg & Schade, 
1992). Inhibition is believed to temporarily suppress the abandoned task’s 
representation; and if inhibited task is required soon after it was disengaged from 
(i.e., in ABA sequence), that task should be less accessible compared to when a 
current task was not abandoned recently (i.e., CBA sequence). This is exactly what 
Mayr and Keele found, and they speculated that it was the task-set—a set of rules on 
how each task is to be performed (Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995)—that was 
being inhibited. 
The reason Mayr and Keele (2000) argued that it is cognitive inhibition that 
the n–2 task repetition cost reflects, is that in one of their experiments (Experiment 
3) this cost was shown to be driven by top-down processes. Specifically, when no 
cues were presented—that is, participants had to perform each task in a bottom-up 
manner—no n–2 task repetition cost was present, but when cues were provided, the 
cost was observed.  Bottom-up processing allows for tasks to be performed as driven 
by stimulus’ perceptual characteristics rather than via effortful, endogenously driven 
processes. Therefore, the n–2 task repetition cost is believed to arise when conscious 
control is applied; that is, when conscious manipulation of task-sets is required, and 
this conscious shifting between task-sets is supported by inhibition. Thus, the n–2 
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task repetition cost was deemed to be a cognitive inhibition effect, has been 
replicated as such many times, and seems robust against non-inhibitory explanations 
(e.g., Koch et al., 2010; Mayr, 2007). Moreover, the inhibition applied to task-sets is 
thought not to be under top-down control, because the n–2 task repetition cost is not 
affected by the expectancy effects (Experiment 5, Mayr and Keele); that is, knowing 
the sequence of tasks in advance (four at a time) does not affect the n–2 task 
repetition cost. But, inhibition is thought to be triggered as a result of top-down 
shifting between tasks, suppressing abstract task-sets, hence is referred to as 
cognitive inhibition.  
 
N–2 Task Repetition Research 
Under the understanding that the n–2 task repetition cost reflects cognitive 
inhibition, it has been used as such in individual (Whitmer & Banich, 2007) and 
group differences research (Dreher, Kohn, & Berman, 2001; Fales et al., 2006; Lawo 
et al., 2012; Mayr et al., 2006; Moritz et al., 2004; Prior, 2012). With the n–2 task 
repetition cost being used to assess cognitive inhibition, there is a need to understand 
this effect further, so we can have confidence in it.  However, despite extensive 
research around the n–2 task repetition cost, and some evidence that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is observed for different response modalities (e.g., foot, finger, vocal; 
Philipp & Koch, 2005) suggesting diversity of inhibitory processes, some questions 
remain unanswered. For example, we cannot be certain yet what is being inhibited 
during task-switching (review, Koch et al., 2010). Early research would suggest that 
inhibition that drives the n–2 task repetition is applied to abandoned task’s 
representation (Mayr & Keele, 2000). However, there are a few other candidate 
processes in task-switching which may be targeted by inhibition, if we assume that 
the n–2 task repetition cost arises as a result of interference (Allport & Wylie, 1999, 
2000; Waszak et al., 2003). Specifically, task-set is thought to provide rules on how 
127 
 
to perform each task, but in theory, tasks’ parameters (e.g., low-level representations 
of cues, stimuli, responses) activations can also be in conflict, which could be 
resolved with inhibition (Arbuthnott, 2008b; Grange & Houghton, 2010b; Houghton 
et al., 2009); although others would argue that inhibition is a global mechanism, 
rather than a selective one (Gade & Koch, 2012). 
 
Cues. One of the low-level task’s parameters which could lead to inhibition 
being applied are cues, which are often used in many BI paradigms. Cues have been 
shown to be important for retrieval of information (Jost et al., 2013), and they trigger 
the retrieval of a previously encountered/ learnt task-set associated with that cue 
(Grange & Houghton, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; based on general episodic 
memory research, Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Moreover, processing of cues is also 
argued to contribute considerably to the switch cost (SC, Logan & Bundesen, 2003; 
Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), as well as the n–2 task repetition cost (Grange & Houghton, 
2010b; Houghton et al., 2009). 
Specifically to the n–2 task repetition cost, the extent to which a cue 
translates to a task (i.e., its transparency), seems to be one of the driving factors of 
this cost (Houghton et al., 2009); that is, the less informative the cue is (e.g., a shape 
cueing a “parity” task), the larger the n–2 task repetition cost, compared to 
informative cues (e.g., a word “parity” cueing a “parity” task), which produce 
smaller costs. Moreover, if half-way through the experiment participants are asked to 
learn new cues having already learned cue-task mappings, the n–2 task repetition 
cost’ magnitude doubles (Grange & Houghton, 2010b). The cue transparency is 
thought to influence the level of inhibition applied for the following reason; 
assuming that upon seeing a cue task-sets are retrieved from long-term memory 
(LTM, Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003) and loaded into working memory (WM), where 
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it is translated into a task, the efficiency of that translation can depend on 
transparency of cues. That is, less informative cues require more processing in WM 
before a decision is made, whereas more informative cues do not require translation, 
or require less of it (Grange & Houghton, 2010b; Houghton et al., 2009). This results 
in non-transparent cues and their associated task-sets to linger in WM, leading to a 
conflict with other task-sets activated between task-switches, compared to 
transparent cues which need no translation, hence do not lead to conflicts in WM; 
and conflicts are assumed to be resolved with inhibition, whit less inhibition applied 
to transparent compared to non-transparent cues.  
 
Response. Other area of evidence would suggest that the n–2 task repetition 
cost is very likely to be due to a conflict during the response stage of task processing 
(for a review see, Koch et al., 2010). It appears that, if a response is not required on 
n–1 trial (i.e., Response–noResponse–Response), the n–2 task repetition disappears, 
compared to when a response is required on n–1 trial (i.e., Response–Response–
Response); this has been interpreted as evidence for response stage being an 
important factor driving the n–2 task repetition cost (Schuch & Koch, 2003, 2004). 
Specifically, if competing responses activations become inhibited in between 
switches, we would expect to see the n–2 task repetition cost; but, if a response was 
not made, there should be no inhibition, hence no n–2 task repetition cost, as was 
found by Schuch and Koch (for more evidence for this see Gade & Koch, 2007b; 
Grzyb & Hübner, 2013; Sinai et al., 2007). 
 
Stimulus. It has been shown also that stimuli processing can affect 
performance on cognitive task-switching too, as the stimulus can become bound to 
the task (Waszak et al., 2003), and response (Pösse et al., 2006), and lead to 
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interference, which younger adults seem to be better at overcoming than older adults 
(Mayr, 2001). Also, when a stimulus’ features overlap between tasks (i.e., stimuli-
bivalency) compared to when they do not  (i.e., stimuli-univalency), processing of 
the stimulus and/ or responding to it is slower; which is referred to as the bivalency 
cost (Woodward & Meier, 2003). The important difference between bivalent and 
univalent stimuli is that, the former type affords multiple responses, whereas the 
latter type affords only one response. As such, processing of bivalent stimuli taking 
longer may be due to more reconfiguration required compared to univalent stimuli 
(Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), but it can also be due 
to inter-trial effects, such as negative priming (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 
2000). However, the source of the bivalency cost may be more complex as it has 
been demonstrated that stimulus’ bivalency affects participants’ strategy (Woodward 
& Meier, 2003). Specifically, it appears that if among univalent stimuli, a small 
number of bivalent stimuli is added, participants exercise more caution responding, 
their responses become slower and are more accurate. In relation to the n–2 task 
repetition cost, evidence shows that this cost can be present in tasks where stimulus-
response mappings overlap (i.e., multivalent stimuli) (D. W. Schneider & 
Verbruggen, 2008), as well as for tasks that have unique stimulus-response mappings 
(i.e., univalent stimuli, Costa & Friedrich, 2012; Gade & Koch, 2012). Despite 
inconsistencies in research observations on stimuli role in task-switching, overall it 
can be said that stimuli can play an important role in task-switching performance, 
and therefore should not be discounted. 
 
Other manipulations. Furthermore, assuming that task’s individual 
parameters can be inhibited, and that responses are subject to inhibition, if more time 
passes from a response being made to the next task, or from a cue to a stimulus, the 
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n–2 task repetition cost should be smaller, because there will be less interference 
between activated parameters, with decaying inhibition having a lesser influence on 
other parameters/ tasks. This is supported by experiments manipulating the interval 
between the response and cue (i.e., response-cue interval, RCI), where the longer the 
RCI, the smaller the n–2 task repetition cost is (Altmann, 2007; Gade & Koch, 2005; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000).   
In terms of whether inhibition of cues processing is affected by passing time, 
it seems that varying the cue-stimulus-interval (CSI) does not influence the 
magnitude of the n–2 task repetition cost (Costa & Friedrich, 2012; Lawo et al., 
2012; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Philipp & Koch, 2006); for an alternative view see 
Grange & Houghton (2011). If a cue processing can be influenced by inhibition, the 
more time passes between a cue and a stimulus, inhibition should decay, and 
participants should prepare better—assuming that preparation is successful (DeJong, 
2000b)—leading to smaller n–2 task repetition costs, but evidence does not seem to 
support that view. It is unclear why, if the n–2 task repetition cost is smaller for 
longer RCI, the same effects are not observed varying CSI.  
 
Episodic Retrieval 
Another possible factor that may contribute to effects seen in task-switching 
(i.e., SC, the n–2 task repetition cost) is episodic retrieval (Neill, 1997). Episodic 
retrieval can be described as an operation by which the information about most 
recent exposure to a given stimulus (i.e., declarative and procedural memories; for 
example, task’s parameters such as stimulus’ features, distractors, response made) is 
retrieved automatically upon seeing that stimulus again, either facilitating or 
impairing performance. Specifically, it seems that performing a task results in this 
task’s features being integrated in the form of a memory trace (also known as an 
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event-file), which can be retrieved as triggered by being exposed to the same 
stimulus again (i.e., a retrieval of the most recent episode) (Hommel, 1998, 2004, 
2009). For example, if upon seeing a given stimulus a retrieved response does not 
match the currently required action, by the episodic retrieval account, it should lead 
to an impaired performance because a new response will have to be generated 
against the one that was initiated automatically through episodic retrieval; however, 
if the retrieved task’s parameters match the demands of the current task, performance 
should be facilitated (Hommel, 1998, 2000, 2004). The formation of event-files has 
been suggested to be present at the LTM (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) as well as at 
the WM level (Baddeley, 2000). 
Early research suggesting existence of event-files show that response-related 
information is integrated with stimuli-related information (Hommel, 1998); that is, 
stimulus and response features can bound into a common memory structure. In one 
of Hommels’ experiments (1a, 1b) participants were presented with a stimulus 
(S1)—varying in form, colour, or location—to which they had to make a simple left/ 
right response (R1) on some trials but not on others; a cue (e.g., in the form of a row 
of three pointing left/ right pointing arrows) was presented so participants knew in 
advance which response they were required to make (Left or Right). The R1 
response was followed by a second stimulus (S2), to which participants had to make 
a second response which was a binary-choice (R2); this time participant did not 
know in advance which response they would make, but the response was made to 
task-relevant feature of S2. The S1 and R1 acted as primes for stimulus and 
response, and due to their temporal closeness, they belonged to the same event, but 
their pairing was not task-related. Out of the three stimulus’ features, only form (e.g., 
stimulus being a letter O or X) was relevant to the task (i.e., R2), and for response 
features, only location was relevant. And, S1 and S2 features were either matched or 
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mismatched across trials, so were R1 and R2. The authors found that repetitions of 
colour on its own did not seem to affect performance—this type of priming does not 
result in global features binding—instead, it would appear that stimulus form (i.e., 
task-relevant feature) bounded with response location, so did stimulus location and 
response location; that is, features showed binding into event-files locally and 
selectively. Specifically, repeating a valid stimulus-response—one presented in 
priming phase, even though S1 and R1 were not task-relevant—benefits performance 
of it; or, putting it in other words, performing of S2 and R2 was affected by features’ 
combination on S1 and R1. This fits in with the view that performing a task leads to 
a memory trace of that task being stored, and then automatically retrieved when that 
task is encountered again facilitating performance of it (Logan, 1988). Hommel 
argued, and consequently showed, that colour-feature was not integrated into event-
files because it was not task-relevant (Experiment 2); but when colour-feature 
became relevant to task, it was selectively bound into event-files with response. 
For task-switching it means that if a task-set’s parameters are repeated across 
the trials, performance should be faster (as the retrieved information matches 
memory trace of a task stored in LTM memory) compared to when task-set’ 
parameters mismatch. When the episodic retrieval account was applied to explain 
some of the effects thought to reflect cognitive inhibition, it has been shown that 
these effects are attributable to a large extent to automatic episodic retrieval (Spapé 
& Hommel, 2008; Tipper, 2001) or even explained by it (Fox & de Fockert, 1998). 
However, in relation to the n–2 task repetition cost, initial investigation of episodic 
retrieval effects on the n–2 task repetition cost showed that it could not be attributed 
to, or modulated by episodic retrieval account (Mayr, 2002). In a specially prepared 
paradigm (Figure 3.1), in which tasks’ features can be easily manipulated, Mayr 
showed that when episodic retrieval was controlled for, there was a numerical 
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reduction in n–2 task repetition costs for episodic matches compared to episodic 
mismatches; however, episodic retrieval account did not explain the n–2 task 
repetition cost, as statistically the n–2 task repetition cost was not different for n–2 
Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. This was taken as evidence that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is a result of persisting inhibition rather than episodic 
retrieval mismatches.  
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence from experiments looking at the SC 
(an effect of slower responses switching between tasks compared to repeating tasks), 
which show that this effect is considerably modulated by episodic retrieval (Allport 
& Wylie, 1999; Altmann, 2011; Goschke, 2000; Horoufchin et al., 2011; Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016).  For example, Schmidt and 
Liefooghe showed that feature integration in task-switching plays an important role 
in how large the SC is; in Experiment 1 of their study, they manipulated individually 
whether within a task repetition/ switch, the stimulus and response repeated or not. 
For task-repetitions, performance was faster when both, the stimulus and response 
repeated; and when only response was repeated, performance was faster for task-
repetitions but led to a cost in task-switches. 
These findings have an implication for the interpretation of the source of the 
SC, because dominant theories argue that the SC is due to a reconfiguration of task-
set between switches (Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), or due to inhibition 
of a task that becomes temporarily irrelevant (Allport et al., 1994), emphasising the 
role of cognitive control causing the SC. However, research on episodic retrieval 
effects on performance on task-switching show that a large part of the SC is 
attributable to a more automatic process, namely how task-set parameters are bound 
and retrieved, that is, how strong the association between the stimulus and the task is 
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(episodic binding, Waszak et al., 2003); event-files, Pösse et al., 2006), and whether 
retrieved task’s memory trace matches or mismatches across the trials.  
More evidence for priming effects in task-switching comes from studies that 
looked at priming of cues (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). It was 
noted that typically during task-switching experiments, when a task repeats, the cue 
repeats too, whereas when a task-switches, the cue and the task-switch; as such, it was 
not certain how much of the SC was due to a task-switch or a cue-switch. Using two 
cues per task instead of one (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003)—
allowing for trials where only cue or task switch—it was found that cue-switches 
contribute largely to the SC and the n–2 task repetition cost; specifically, practice 
influenced mainly cue-switches, not having much effect on task-switches; preparation 
affected cue-switches rather than task-switches; and task-switches were sensitive to 
response-priming effects. Moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost was eliminated under 
n–2 cue-repetitions. The evidence from studies using two cues is interpreted in two 
ways; some argue for cue-switch costs being a result of endogenous control (Grange 
& Houghton, 2010a; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), whereas others posit that the costs are 
driven by cue-priming (Logan & Bundesen, 2003).  
The theory that SC and the n–2 task repetition cost are driven through 
endogenous control (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003) argues that, the role of cue is to 
retrieve and activate necessary information (first stage), which is then loaded into 
WM, where retrieved rules are applied to the stimulus resulting in response being 
generated (second stage). The finding that the n–2 task repetition cost is eliminated 
under n–2 cue repetitions was interpreted as evidence that, cue encoding and task-set 
retrieval are automatic and necessary before a reconfiguration in WM can take place, 
and these two mechanisms are distinct from each other but can interact; and that it is 
the task-set’s rules application in WM that is inhibited (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). In 
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practice it means that if a task repeats on the next trial no further configuration is 
needed because the retrieved task-set matches the one in WM, but if a task-switches, 
the task-set has to be reconfigured. It is assumed that when enough time is given (i.e., 
at long CSIs) performance on task-repetitions and task-switches should be similar, 
because cue encoding and task reconfiguration should be complete under long 
compared to short CSI (Logan & Bundesen, 2003). The endogenous control 
hypothesis is supported by research looking at cue-transparency’s effects on n–2 task 
repetition costs (Grange & Houghton, 2010a), who showed that when perceptual 
features within cue-switches were kept constant, the n–2 task repetition cost was 
present.  
The theory on cue-switch costs being driven by automatic priming of cues 
(e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003) is supported by evidence from a study that used 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) to examine the time course of task-switching; this 
is achieved by manipulating the CSI. Typically, under short CSI the SC is larger 
compared to long CSI (e.g., Meiran, 1996). For task-switches, if SOA is zero—the cue 
and the stimulus being presented simultaneously—RT captures cues encoding as well 
as task-switching processes; but when SOA is longer, the cues can be processed first, 
before the target appears; as such for longer SOA it is assumed that RTs reflect mainly 
task-switching processes. This time-course function was modelled (Logan & 
Bundesen) in two models of task-switching; the first model assumed endogenous 
control in task-switching, and the second model was under perceptual-priming driving 
task-switching performance. Under the cue-priming hypothesis, the cue and the target 
are stored in memory as a compound, and as such on each single trial enough 
information for a given response can be provided through retrieval, hence no 
endogenous configuration (i.e., control) should be needed. Specifically, encoded cues 
can be matched to previously stored cues’ representations in LTM and WM; and a cue 
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matching the information held in WM is encoded faster leading to a speedier 
performance compared to when a cue matches information in LTM. Under task-
repetitions, the cue will match information in the WM and LTM, whereas under task-
switches, information will match only information in LTM; hence, task-switches take 
longer to perform compared to task-repetitions. As such, cue repetition priming effects 
should be seen under short CSI, compared to long CSI. Logan and Bundesen showed 
that the model under perceptual-priming effects on task-switching is sufficient to 
explain differences between task-switches and task-repetitions, thereby providing 
evidence for exogenous mechanisms driving task-switching. 
 
Experiment 2 
Taking into account evidence on priming and episodic retrieval effects in 
task-switching, and noting the numerical trend for the n–2 task repetition cost to be 
smaller under episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches in Mayr’s (2002) 
study (a lack of a significant interaction is not indicative of a no modulatory effects), 
the aim for Experiment 2 was to replicate the study conducted by Mayr, focusing on 
aspects of the experiment relevant to the investigation of whether episodic retrieval 
modulates the n–2 task repetition cost. That is, some manipulations in Mayr’s study 
are not pertinent for the current experiment; for example, measuring the SC, or 
varying CSI and RCI. To maximise the chance of observing a robust n–2 task 
repetition cost, a short RCI was utilized, which has been shown to increase the n–2 
task repetition cost (Gade & Koch, 2005; Grange & Houghton, 2009; Mayr & Keele, 
2000); also, no immediate repetitions were allowed, as the inclusion of those has 
been shown to reduce the n–2 task repetition cost (Philipp & Koch, 2006).  
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Method 
Participants. Seventy-nine participants were recruited from the School of 
Psychology at Keele University in exchange for partial course credits or single cash 
payments of £6.00. Data were used in analysis if participants had an overall accuracy 
of at least 90%; seventy-six participants met that criterion (mean age 21.63, SD 6.43, 
fifty-eight females). The inclusion criteria were to be at least 18-years-old, have 
normal or corrected to normal vision, and understand written and spoken English.  
 
Stopping rule. For all three experiments performed in the current study, 
samples sizes were determined through what is known as Sequential Bayes Factors 
(SBF, Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, 2014). This method, 
unlike the standard power analysis (null hypothesis statistical testing, NHST, i.e., 
using p-values), does not require a researcher to calculate the sample size before the 
experiment takes place. Instead, the results are assessed by looking at evidence data 
provide; which in practice means that, data are collected until the null or the 
alternative hypothesis is supported—BF10 reaches a certain threshold—or a pre-set 
maximum number of participants is reached. BF10 of 1/6 or below and of 6 or above, 
are considered accepted as indication compelling enough evidence to stop collecting 
data; this is because these thresholds have been shown to have low rates of False 
Positive Evidence and False Negative Evidence (Schönbrodt et al., 2014)—this 
guideline was used for the current experiment. 
To assess when enough data are gathered to support either of the hypotheses 
(null or alternative), the strength of evidence is estimated through what is referred to 
as a Bayes Factor (BF). With BFs the relative evidence for either of the hypotheses 
explaining data can be quantified. The BF is defined as seen in Equation 3.1 
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Equation 3.1 
 
𝐵𝐹10 =  
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0)
 
 
 
where, 𝐷 refers to the actual data, 𝐻0 is the null hypothesis,  𝐻1 is the alternative 
hypothesis, and 𝑝 is the probability. The BF10 reflects how much more likely either 
of the hypotheses are given the data, which is evaluated based on comparing 
probable models explaining patterns seen in data. For example, for Experiment 2 it 
was of interest if the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by episodic retrieval, 
which can be modelled with: 1) null-model: the n–2 task repetition cost does not 
differ between episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches; or 2) alternative-
model: the n–2 task repetition cost differs between episodic matches relative to 
episodic mismatches. For each model a BF is calculated and then compared; the 
numbers 1 and 0 by the BF in Equation 3.1 denote that the BF is calculated as a ratio 
of probability of data under the alternative hypothesis (e.g., a likely difference) 
compared to the probability of data under the null hypothesis (e.g., an unlikely 
difference). The larger the BF10 is than 1, the more support there is for the alternative 
hypothesis, and the further away BF is below 1, the more evidence there is for the 
null-hypothesis. The BF10 for Experiment 2 was estimated by comparing BF for the 
two probable models (null vs alternative hypothesis) with a Bayesian t-test (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009).  
One of the advantages of Bayesian analyses is that a prior knowledge (i.e., 
prior belief) can be used to inform the analysis. For example, a prior belief could be 
that we expect data (i.e., prior distribution of parameters in the model) to be 
normally distributed; and, for all three experiments in the current study, a prior on 
alternative hypothesis was assumed to be characterised by Cauchy distribution with 
scaling factor r=.707 (the true effect size), which is a t-distribution with a single 
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degree of freedom (Gronau, Ly, & Wagenmakers, 2017; Rouder et al., 2009). The 
collected data’s parameters distribution is compared with the prior belief, which 
gives posterior distribution, which tell us by how much our belief has to be updated; 
that is, how much more likely data are under the null compared to the alternative 
hypothesis. 
The SBF analysis allows for optional stopping of data collection. As soon as 
“enough” evidence is gathered for either of the hypotheses (null or alternative 
hypothesis), data collection is stopped. However, when using SBF, it is a good 
practice to set a minimum and a maximum sample size before the initial analysis is 
conducted (Schönbrodt et al., 2015). For all the three experiments in the current 
study, a minimum of twenty participants were tested initially, then data collection 
continued until enough evidence was gathered to support either of the hypotheses, 
with the limitation that if evidence did not support either of the hypotheses at eighty 
participants, it would be concluded that the results are inconclusive, and data 
collection would stop. Data collection did not exceed the 80 participants mark for 
any of the three experiments. At seventy-nine participants (where data of seventy-six 
were entered into analysis), the BF10 reached a criterion at which data collection was 
planned to stop; that is, the BF10 was above 6 (see results section for details), in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli. The task-switching paradigm was presented on a 
standard PC with a 17in. monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Responses were made on a 1-ms precise USB keyboard. 
 
Backward Inhibition paradigm. The stimuli were shown in a black square 
frame (8cm x 8cm) on a white background; in the center of that frame a cue in the 
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form of a word was shown (“horizontal”, “vertical”, “diagonal”; black Verdana font, 
size 22). The target appeared inside the frame, in one of the inner corners in the form 
of a black circle (1cm diameter). Responses were made on a numerical keypad, and 
responses were spatially–congruent to the corners of the frame; that is, each corner 
of the frame had one keyboard-key assigned: 1 (lower-left), 2 (lower-right), 4 
(upper-left), and 5 (upper-right) were used. If the participant gave an incorrect 
answer, they saw “Error” message on the screen (red Verdana font, size 22). 
 
Procedure. Participants attended a single session during which they 
performed a version of task-switching paradigm based on Mayr (2002). A single trial 
consisted of a cue, stimulus, and response. Each trial started with a presentation of a 
black square frame; above that frame the cue appeared (150ms); inside the frame, in 
one of the inner corners the target (a black circle) appeared. Participants had to make 
a spatial transformation of the target; that is, they had to indicate in which inner 
corner of the black frame, would the target move to, if it moved according to the 
cued task (Figure 3.1). So, if the cue was “horizontal” and the target was in the 
lower-left corner, it would move to the lower-right corner. In this example the 
participant had to press the key 2 to give the correct answer. As soon as participants 
made a response, the cue and stimulus they responded to disappeared; 150ms (RCI) 
later another cue appeared above the frame followed by another target. If the 
participant gave an incorrect answer, they saw the “Error” message on the screen. 
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Figure 3.1 Schematic overview of Mayr's (2002) task-switching paradigm. The 
dotted arrows indicate correct answers and they were used only for instruction 
purposes. 
 
Each participant performed 480 trials; to optimise participants’ performance 
(i.e., to avoid participants becoming fatigued) all the trials were split into four blocks 
of 120 trials in each, with breaks (participant-paced) between the blocks. Participants 
always switched between the three different tasks (i.e., horizontal, vertical, 
diagonal). It was emphasised to participants that they had to respond as fast and as 
accurate as possible.  Instructions were given to participants verbally, after which 
participants had a practice consisting of sixteen trials. If four or more errors during 
the first practice were made, participants were offered another practice with sixteen 
trials; however, no more than two practices were allowed per participant.  
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Each current trial n was compared to the task on the n–2 trial allowing for 
trials to be registered as ABA or CBA sequences. Importantly, the E-Prime software 
registered which response-key participants should press on each trial; as such, it was 
possible to code for whether response on n trial, was an n–2 Response Repetition (n–
2 RR) or a n–2 Response Switch (n–2 RS) within ABA and CBA sequences.  
 
Design. A within-subjects design was used to examine RTs (ms) and 
accuracy (%) as dependent variables, and Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), and 
Response (n–2 RR vs. n–2 RS) as independent variables.   
 
Results 
For the current study two types of analysis were conducted: the standard null-
hypothesis testing (assessed via p-values), and a Bayesian alternative (assessed via 
Bayes Factors); both are reported below. 
 
Data trimming. Before the data were put into the analysis, data trimming 
was performed. Initially, participants whose overall performance was below 90% 
were removed. Then, for accuracy analysis, the null trials were removed, as these 
trials were not classifiable as ABA or CBA sequence (i.e., first two trials of each 
block, two trials following error). For the RT analysis, further trimming was 
performed; that is, errors trials were removed, as well as RT faster than 150ms, and 
RTs slower than 2.5 standard deviation from participant’s mean. Data trimming led 
to 16.4% of trials being removed (Response Repetitions 15.6%, and Response 
Switches 16.7%).  
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 Reaction time analysis. RTs were analysed via a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with two factors: Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), and Response (n–2 RR 
vs. n–2 RS). Mean and standard errors for RTs and accuracy are contained in Table 
3.1. The analysis revealed that there was a significant main effect of Task Sequence, 
F(1,75) = 94,14, p < .001, ηg2 = .018; that is, participants performed CBA faster 
(958ms) than ABA sequence (1,025ms). There was also a significant main effect of 
Response, F (1,75) = 18.21, p < .001, ηg2 = .004; that is, performance was overall 
faster for n–2 RR (976ms) compared to n–2 RS (1,007ms). Most importantly, there 
was an interaction between the Task Sequence and Response, F(1,75) = 9.60, p < 
.003, ηg2 = .002 (Figure 3.2); that is, the n–2 task repetition cost was considerably 
smaller for n–2 RR (48ms) compared to the n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 RS 
(86ms). The density functions for the n–2 task repetition cost’s distributions, under 
n–2 RR and n–2 RS, are depicted in Figure 3.3. Individual t-tests revealed that the n–
2 task repetition was significant for n–2 RR, t(75) = 4.2, p < .001, 95%CI [26,70], as 
well as for n–2 RS, t(75) = 13.00, p < .001, 95%CI [73, 99].  
 
Table 3.1 Mean Response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard errors, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (RR) and n–2 Response 
Switches (RS). 
 Task Sequence 
 ABA CBA 
 RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
   n–2 RR 1000 (28) 96.20 (.39) 952 (28) 96.36 (.39) 
   n–2 RS 1050 (29) 95.02 (.35) 964 (28) 95.81 (.34) 
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Figure 3.2 An illustration of a two-way interaction for mean response times between 
Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Repetition vs. n–2 Switch). 
Error bars denote ±1 SE around the mean. 
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Figure 3.3 Density functions of the reaction time (RT) the n–2 task repetition costs 
distributions under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches, calculated 
as RT (ABA) - RT (CBA). 
 
 
Bayesian analysis. The BF10 for the alternative-hypothesis (presence of 
difference of the n–2 task repetition cost between n–2 RR and n–2 RS) compared to 
the null-hypothesis (absence of difference of the n–2 task repetition cost between n–
2 RR and n–RS) was 9.97. That is, the data are about 10 times more likely to be 
explained by the alternative-hypothesis (i.e., presence of difference of the n–2 task 
repetition cost between Response Repetition and Response Switch) than the null-
hypothesis. This is considered as strong evidence for the n–2 task repetition cost 
being modulated by episodic retrieval. 
 
 Accuracy analysis. Accuracy was analysed via a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with two factors: Task Sequence and Response. The main effect of Task 
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Sequence was not significant, F(1,75) = 3.36, p = .07, ηg2 = .006. The only 
significant result for accuracy analysis was the main effect of Response, F(1, 75) = 
12.17, p < .001, ηg2 = .01; that is, participants were more accurate performing n–2 
RR (96.28%) compared to n–2 RS (95.41%). The interaction between the Task 
Sequence and the Response was not significant, F(1,75) = 1.32, p = .25, ηg2 = .003. 
The visualization of interactions are in Figure 3.4, and density functions distributions 
for accuracy n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR and n–2 RS are provided in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 An illustration of a two-way interaction for mean accuracy between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 
Response Switch). Error bars denote ±1 SE around the mean. 
 
147 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Density functions of the accuracy the n–2 task repetition costs 
distributions under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches, calculated 
as % Accuracy (ABA) - % Accuracy (CBA). 
 
 Reliability analysis. There is evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost is not 
a reliable measure (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 2), and one of the 
suggestions for why that reliability may be low is that perhaps the n–2 task repetition 
cost is not a pure measure of inhibition. Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost may 
be confounded by episodic retrieval mismatches—which the current study 
confirmed—therefore, the reliability of n–2 task repetition was analysed to see 
whether controlling for episodic retrieval improves its reliability compared to that 
reported by Kowalczyk and Grange.  
 RT and accuracy n–2 task repetition costs under n–2 RR and n–2 RS were 
analysed for reliability using the split-half reliability analysis. For every participant 
data were split randomly into two halves, and n–2 task repetition costs for each half 
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(under n–RR and n–2RS) were calculated, followed by the split-half reliability 
analysis being conducted (Congdon et al., 2012; Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017). The 
Pearson product-moment correlation analysis between the two halves was conducted 
for each data split; this was repeated 500 times, and then a median reliability 
coefficient was obtained for n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR and n–2 RS.  
 When split-half reliability is used, the total number of data points is reduced 
which can reduce the reliability, so to account for splitting of data, the median 
reliability coefficients for RTs and accuracy were adjusted using the Spearman-
Brown correction, which is given by 
Equation 3.2 
 𝑟𝑐 =
𝑁𝑟
1 + (𝑁 − 1)𝑟
 
 
where r is the Pearson product-moment coefficient and N is the number of “tests” 
being combined (for the current study there were two halves, so N = 2). 
 Typically, it is expected that for a measure to be reliable its reliability 
coefficient rc should be at least .7 (Cronbach, 1951; Picardi & Masick, 2013; 
Revelle, 2014), this is equivalent to r ≈ .5385 for the uncorrected reliability 
coefficient. The results for the current study’s reliability analysis are seen in Figure 
3.6; these graphs are violin plots (used to represent continuous distribution) which 
include a marker of median of the data (the white dot) with an interquartile range 
(black box around the white dot), as well as a double kernel probability density of 
the data at different values (Adler, 2005). The dashed line represents the criterion for 
uncorrected reliability coefficient.  
 
Response times. The median value for the uncorrected reliability coefficient 
for the n–2 task repetitions cost under n–2 RR it was r = .34 and for the n–2 task 
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repetition cost under n–2 RS it was r = .15; these translate to corrected reliability 
coefficients of, rc = .34 (for n–2 RR) and rc = .26 (for n–2 RS).  
 
 Accuracy. The median value for the uncorrected reliability coefficient for the 
accuracy n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR was r = .27, and for the accuracy n–
2 task repetition cost under n–2 RS it was r = .-15; which translates to rc =.42 (for 
n–2 RR), and rc =.26 (for n–2 RS).  
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Figure 3.6 Reliability checks for the n–2 task repetition cost; reaction times at the top 
panel, and accuracy at the bottom panel. Violin plots represent uncorrected, 
bootstrapped split–half estimates of correlation coefficients (r). On the left are plots 
for n–2 Response Repetitions (N–2 RR), and on the right are plots for n–2 Response 
Switches (N–2 RS). The horizontal dashed lines represents the criteria for reliability 
(𝑟 ≈ .5383; Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle & Condon, 2014). 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate if the n–2 task repetition cost is 
modulated by episodic retrieval. Mayr’s (2002) study showed that this effect was not 
explained by episodic retrieval; however, a numerical trend for the n–2 task 
repetition cost to be smaller under episodic matches (the n–2 RR) compared to 
episodic mismatches (the n–2 RS) was observed. Therefore, a close replication of 
Mayr’s experiment was run, with a few adjustments to the paradigm to ensure a 
strong n–2 task repetition costs. The current experiment yielded a robust n–2 task 
repetition cost, which was considerably smaller for n–2 RR compared to n–2 RS; 
which means that a large proportion of the n–2 task repetition cost was due to non-
inhibitory mechanism (i.e., episodic retrieval mismatches). This means that n–2 task 
repetition costs reported in literature (as discussed in reviews, Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Koch et al., 2010), are also likely to be confounded by non-inhibitory processes, 
because episodic retrieval is not controlled for in BI paradigms.  To summarise, the 
extent to which the n–2 task repetition cost measures inhibition is questioned, 
providing evidence against generally accepted view that this cost reflects cognitive 
inhibition (Koch et al., 2010; Mayr, 2002, 2007). 
 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 showed that performance on task-switching can be modulated 
by episodic retrieval; specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost—thought to reflect 
cognitive inhibition—was shown to be in large proportion due to episodic retrieval. 
This is consistent with research showing that the SC is susceptible to general priming 
(Altmann, 2005; Logan & Schneider, 2006b; Logan et al., 2007), and episodic 
retrieval effects (Allport & Wylie, 1999; Altmann, 2011; Goschke, 2000; Horoufchin 
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et al., 2011; Logan & Bundesen, 2003); and with studies showing that stimuli and 
responses’ features—specifically the way they are paired—can bind into event-files 
in memory (Hommel, 1998), priming subsequent processing of that task, facilitating 
or impairing performance (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). As such, at this stage it is 
not clear whether only certain, or all parameters (e.g., cue, stimulus, response) within 
the BI paradigm are sensitive to episodic retrieval effects. 
Experiment 3 looked at how cue-processing affects the n–2 task repetition 
cost when episodic retrieval is controlled for. Research on cue-transparency effects 
on the n–2 task repetition cost (Grange & Houghton, 2010b; Houghton et al., 2009) 
suggests that inhibition—measured with the n–2 task repetition cost—is triggered as 
a result of non-transparent cues’ activations lingering in WM leading to conflicts; 
with transparent cues requiring no or less translation in WM hence leading to less 
conflicts, compared to non-transparent cues, which trigger more inhibition. 
However, assuming that episodic retrieval can depend on the quality of cues—how 
accurately and efficiently they aid retrieval—it can be argued, that since non-
transparent cues are more difficult to interpret compared to transparent cues, and 
transparent cues are processed with no need for translation, episodic retrieval should 
facilitate performance to a larger extent under non-transparent compared to 
transparent cues.  
Also, under the cue-priming hypothesis (Logan & Bundesen, 2003) a cue is 
stored in a cue-target compound, and it can be assumed that cues that have stronger 
relationship with the target (i.e., as seen in transparent cues) compared to those that 
have a weak association (i.e., seen in non-transparent cues), lead to more efficient 
retrieval. Therefore, the episodic retrieval effect should be larger under non-
transparent comparted to transparent cues, as they can benefit more from episodic 
priming. 
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The cues used in Experiment 2 were relatively transparent (Houghton et al., 
2009)—words “horizontal”, “vertical”, and “diagonal”—and in Experiment 3, new 
cues were used to represent very transparent and non-transparent cues.  
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-six participants’ data were used in the main analysis. All 
participants came from the same sample pool as in Experiments 1–2. The number of 
participants was determined by Sequential Bayesian Factor as in Experiment 2; 
however, this time the compared models were different.  
For Experiment 3 it was of interest whether the n–2 task repetition cost is 
modulated by Response and/ or Cue-Type. A Bayesian factorial analysis (Morey, 
Rouder, & Jamil, 2015; Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, & Wagenmakers, 
2016) was conducted with the n–2 task repetition cost as a DV, and Cue-Type 
(Arrows vs. Shapes) and Response (n–2 RR vs. n–2 RS) as IVs. The probable 
models used to describe data were: 1) the main effect of Cue-Type; 2) the main 
effect of Response; 3) the two main effects of Cue-Type and Response; 4) the two 
main effects (Cue-Type and Response) and an interaction between them. Participants 
were entered into each model as a random effect, and each model was compared to a 
common denominator which was that the n–2 task repetition cost was best explained 
by the random effect of participants. At sixty-six participants the BF10 for the best 
(Model 4) compared to the second best model (Model 3) was above 6 therefore data 
collection was stopped. The model with two main effects (Cue-Type and Response) 
and interaction between them (Model 4) was over seven times more likely than the 
model with the main effect of Cue-Type and the main effect of Response (Model 3). 
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Apparatus and stimuli. BI paradigms were presented on a standard PC with 
a 17in. monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA). Responses were made on a 1-ms precise USB keyboard.  
 
Backward Inhibition paradigm. The stimuli and the set-up of the experiment 
was the same as in Experiment 2, except that two types of cues were used, Shapes or 
Arrows (2.5 cm in width and height). For the Shapes cues, a “hexagon” was used for 
the vertical, a “square” for a diagonal, and a “triangle” for a horizontal task. For the 
Arrows cues, two vertical arrows were used for the vertical, two horizontal arrows 
for the horizontal, and two diagonal arrows for the diagonal task (see Figure 3.7). 
Shapes cues were used as non-transparent cues, and Arrows cues were used as 
transparent cues; where, the former type was chosen as suitable for abstract cue-
target associations—which are difficult to translate into tasks—whereas the latter 
type was chosen as suitable for informative cue-target associations, which easily 
translate into tasks. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 A visual representation of cues used in Experiment 3. 
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Procedure. Participants attended a single session during which they 
performed BI paradigms with two different types of cues; one half with “Shapes” 
and second half with “Arrows” cues. The order of these two halves was 
counterbalanced across participants. Before performing each BI paradigm with 
different cues, participants learnt relevant cue-to-task relationships and practiced 
them for 16 trials. If they made four or more than four errors in the first practice, 
they were given another practice; however, no more than two practices per 
participant were allowed.  
 
For each BI paradigm (i.e., with Shapes and Arrows cues) individual 
participants performed 360 trials, and to optimise participants’ performance all trials 
were split into three blocks of 120 trials in each BI paradigm, with participant-paced 
breaks between the blocks. As in Experiment 2, no immediate task-repetitions were 
allowed (Koch et al., 2006). Participants were told to be as fast and as accurate as 
possible (as in Experiment 2), and the timings (i.e., cue/ stimulus etc.) were the 
same. Data were collected in the same way as in Experiment 2; that is, the same code 
for recording task sequences and responses was used.  
 
Design. A within-subjects design was used to examine RTs (ms) as accuracy 
(%) as dependent variables, and Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 RR 
vs. n–2 RS), and Cue-Type (Arrows vs. Shapes) as independent variables.  
 
Results 
 Data trimming. As in Experiment 2, data trimming involved initially 
removing data of participants whose overall performance was below 90%; then for 
accuracy analysis, the null trials were removed (i.e., first two trials of each block, 
156 
 
two trials following an error). For the RT analysis, further trimming was performed; 
errors trials, as well as RT faster than 150ms, and slower than 2.5 standard deviation 
from participant’s mean were removed. Overall, 14.7% of trials were removed; 
16.4% for Shapes (16.3% for n–2 RR; 16.5% for n–2 RS), and 13% for Arrow cues 
(12.8% for n–2 RR; 13.1% for n–2 RS).   
 
 Reaction time analysis. The three-way repeated measures ANOVA—for 
which descriptive statistics are in Table 3.2—yielded all main effects and 
interactions significant. The main effect of Cue-Type was significant, F(1,65) = 
247.98, p < .001, ηg2 = .4 (720ms for Arrow, 1067ms for Shapes); so was the main 
effect of Task Sequence F(1,65) = 61.75, p < .001, ηg2 = .01 (916ms for ABA, 
871ms for CBA); and the main effect of Response, F(1,65) = 24.53, p < .001, ηg2 = 
.006 (888ms for n–2 RR, 909ms for n–2 RS).  
In terms of interactions, there was a significant interaction between Cue-Type 
and Task Sequence, F(1,65) = 15.85, p < .001, ηg2 = .003. The n–2 task repetition 
cost was smaller for Arrow (22ms) compared to Shapes cues (68ms); and the n–2 
task repetition cost was present under Shapes, t(130) = 6.1, p < .001, 95%CI [46, 
90], as well as under Arrow cues, t(130) = 4.2, p < .001, 95%CI [11, 32].  There was 
also a significant interaction between Cue-Type and Response, F(1,65) = 16.1, p < 
.001, ηg2 = .003; namely, the difference between n–2 RR and for n–2 RS was 
smaller, and not significant—t(130) = -1.6, p = 1, 95%CI [-18, 2]—for Arrows (8ms) 
compared to Shapes cues (53ms), t(130) = -4.7, p < .001, 95%CI [-76, -31]. A third 
significant interaction was between Task Sequence and Response, F(1,65) = 14.87, p 
< .001, ηg2 = .004; specifically, the n–2 task repetition was smaller, and not 
significant, under n–2 RR (20ms), t(130) = 1.9, p = .06, 95%CI [-.8, 40], compared 
to n–2 RS (70ms), t(130) = 10, p < .001, 95%CI [57, 83].  The interaction between 
the Task Sequence and Response is a replication of the results from Experiment 2, 
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which showed that the n–2 task repetition cost was modulated by episodic retrieval. 
Importantly, there was significant three-way interaction between Task Sequence and 
Response across Cue-Types, F(1,65) = 8.9, p < .005, ηg2 = .002, suggesting that the 
n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 RR and n–2 RS differed across the two Cue-Types 
(Figure 3.8). Separate ANOVAs for Shapes and Arrows cues, revealed the 
following.  
Under Shapes cues, the main effect of Task Sequence was significant, 
F(1,65) = 47.69, p < .001, ηg2 = .02; so was the main effect of Response, F(1,65) = 
26.94, p < .001, ηg2 = .01. And the interaction between Task Sequence and Response 
was significant too, F(1,65) = 13.37, p < .001, ηg2 = .008. Individual t-tests showed 
that for n–2 RR the n–2 task repetition cost was not present, t(65) = 1.4, p = .2, 
95%CI [-11, 64], but it was observed under n–2 RS, t(65) = 10.0, p < .001, 95%CI 
[89, 129]. 
Under the Arrows cues, the main effect of Task Sequence was significant, 
F(1,65) = 13.12, p < .001, ηg2 = .004; but the main effect of Response was not 
significant, F(1,65) = 1.99, p = .16, ηg2 = .0006. The interaction between Task 
Sequence and Response was significant, F(1,65) = 4.90, p = .03, ηg2 = .0007. 
Individual t-tests revealed that for n–2 RR the n–2 task repetition cost was not 
present, t(65) = 1.5, p = .1, 95%CI [-4, 29], but it was observed for n–2 RS, t(65) = 
5.3, p < .001, 95%CI [19, 42]. 
Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost differed more between n–2 RR and 
n–2 RS for Shapes compared to Arrows cues (Figure 3.9); for density functions of n–
2 task repetition costs under Shapes and Arrows cues see Figure 3.10. 
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Table 3.2 Mean Response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard errors, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within Response Repetitions (RR) and Response 
Switches (RS), for Arrows-Cues and Shapes. 
 Task sequence 
 ABA CBA 
Cue type RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
Arrows     
   n–2 RR 722 (22) 98.05 (.29) 709 (20) 96.64 (.40) 
   n–2 RS 739 (20) 96.36 (.32) 709 (20) 97.49 (.22) 
Shapes     
   n–2 RR 1053 (29) 96.90 (.40) 1027 (30) 95.75 (.49) 
   n–2 RS 1148 (28) 94.20 (.47) 1039 (30) 96.66 (.30) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 A three-way interaction between the Cue-Type, Task Sequence (ABA vs. 
CBA), and Response (Repetition vs. Switch). Error bars represent  ±1 𝑆𝐸 around the 
mean. 
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Figure 3.9 Reaction times n–2 task repetition costs for n–2 Response Repetition and 
n–2 Response Switch under Shapes/ Arrows cues.  Error bars represent ±1 SE 
around the mean. 
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Figure 3.10 Density functions for reaction time (RT) n–2 task repetition costs 
distributions for n–2 Response Repetitions (Repetitions) and n–2 Response Switches 
(Switches), calculated as RT (ABA) - RT (CBA); on the top for Shapes cues and on 
the bottom for the Arrows cues. 
 
Bayesian analysis. The model of interest was the model 4—with two main 
effects (Cue-Type and Response Repetition) and interaction between them—which 
was compared to the model with the highest BF; in this case it was model 3—with 
two main effects (Task Sequence and Response). Comparing these two models’ 
BF—model 4 (BF 1,227,034)/ model 3 (BF 154,746)—gave a BF10 of 7.93. That 
means, the model 4 was almost eight times more likely to account for patterns seen 
in data. This is considered as moderate evidence for the–2 task repetition cost being 
more modulated by n–2 RR under Shapes compared to Arrows cues.  
 
Accuracy analysis. The three-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed the 
following results; the main effect of Cue-Type was significant, F(1,65) = 16.58, p < 
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.001, ηg2 = .04 (97.13% for Arrows cues, 95.88% for Shapes cues; but the main 
effect of Task Sequence was not significant, F(1,65) = 1.38, p = .24, ηg2 = .002. The 
main effect of Response was significant, F(1,65) = 12.81, p < .001, ηg2 =  .01 
(96.81% for n–2 RR, 96.18% for n–2 RS).  
The interaction between Task Sequence and Cue-Type was not significant, 
F(1,65) = 3.80, p = .056, ηg2 = .004; neither was the interaction between Cue-Type 
and Response, F(1,65) = 1.33, p = .25, ηg2 = .002. But the interaction between Task 
Sequence and Response was significant, F(1,65) = 51.97, p < .001, ηg2 = .06; for n–2 
RR there was an n–2 task repetition benefit of .013, and for the n–2 RS there was an 
n–2 task repetition cost of -.018. Individual t-tests showed that the n–2 task 
repetition benefit was significant under n–2 RR t(130) = 3.8, p < .001, 95%CI [.006, 
.20], and the n–2 task repetition cost was significant under n–2 RS, t(130) = -7.1, p < 
.001, 95CI% [ -.023, -.013].  
 The three-way interaction between the Task Sequence, Response and Cue-
Type, was not significant, F(1,65) = 1.69, p = .20, ηg2 = .002 (see Figure 3.11 for 
interactions visualization, Figure 3.12 graph for averaged n–2 task repetition costs, 
Figure 3.13 for density functions of n–2 task repetition costs).  
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Figure 3.11 An accuracy three-way interaction between the Cue-Type (Shapes vs. 
Arrows), Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), and Response (Repetition vs. Switch). 
Error bars represent ±1 SE around the mean. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 
Response Switches under Shapes/ Arrows cues.  Error bars represent ±1 SE around 
the mean. 
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Figure 3.13 Density functions for accuracy (%) n–2 task repetition costs distributions 
for n–2 Response Repetitions (Repetitions) and n–2 Response Switches (Switches), 
calculated as Accuracy (ABA) - Accuracy (CBA); on the top for Shapes cues and on 
the bottom for Arrows cues. 
 
 
Discussion 
Experiment’s 3 aim was to examine whether cue-transparency affected 
episodic retrieval, to establish whether the n–2 task repetition is driven by cue-
transparency or episodic retrieval. Performance was overall slower (and less 
accurate) for ABA relative to CBA sequences; that is, the n–2 task repetition cost 
was replicated from Experiment 2. Importantly, the n–2 task repetition cost was 
modulated by episodic retrieval; that is, the n–2 task repetition cost was smaller and 
non-significant under episodic matches (n–2 RR) compared to episodic mismatches 
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(n–2 RS) where the cost was present. Moreover, the cue-transparency manipulation 
worked because performance was less efficient under Shapes (i.e., non-transparent) 
compared to Arrows (i.e., transparent) cues; for example, performance was faster 
under transparent compared to non-transparent cues. As predicted, under Arrows 
cues the n–2 task repetition cost was smaller than under Shapes cues. The n–2 task 
repetition cost was absent under episodic matches regardless of the cue type; 
however, under episodic mismatches the n–2 task repetition cost was present and 
smaller under Arrows compared to Shape cues.  
The overall episodic retrieval effect was larger under the non-transparent 
relative to transparent cues; that is, the RT performance differed much less between 
episodic matches and episodic mismatches under Arrows cues compared to Shape 
cues. This means that, non-transparent cues lead to more interference than Arrows 
cues as predicted, and episodic retrieval seems to modulate the n–2 task repetition 
cost more than the cue-transparency. N–2 task repetitions coupled with n–2 response 
repetitions result in absent n–2 task repetition cost regardless of the Cue-Type; 
however, n–2 task repetitions coupled with n–2 response switches lead to larger n–2 
task repetition costs under Shapes cues compared to Arrows cues. This means that 
episodic mismatches drive the n–2 task repetition cost more than cue-transparency, 
because if cue-transparency drove the cost, the episodic retrieval modulation would 
be expected to be similar between the Cue-Types. It is not to say that cue-
transparency does not matter; clearly it does, but its role in driving the n–2 task 
repetition cost seems different to the one originally suggested (Houghton et al., 
2009).    
Furthermore, the n–2 task repetition cost’s magnitude was more spread for 
non-transparent cues compared to transparent cues; this can be interpreted as 
evidence that under transparent cues which are more informative performance is 
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more consistent, compared to less non-transparent cues which are less informative. 
That is, under transparent cues, exact memory trace of a previously performed task’s 
parameters can be retrieved facilitating performance, leading to efficient, effective, 
consistent, and fast responses; whereas, processing of non-transparent cues can 
involve more mechanisms—for example, complex reconfiguration, interference, and 
inhibition—resulting in larger variation of responses. Also, transparent cues can be 
assumed to have a strong relationship with the target compared to non-transparent 
cues, and as such are more likely to be practiced and automatic relative to non-
transparent cues. 
Since episodic retrieval was shown to have strong effect on the n–2 task 
repetition cost, with evidence that task’s features can bind into one compound, and 
that stimulus’ characteristics can be part of that compound (e.g., Hommel, 1998; 
Pösse et al., 2006; Waszak et al., 2003; Woodward & Meier, 2003), it was important 
to establish whether the n–2 task repetition cost is affected by stimulus’ features. In 
the BI paradigm used in Experiments 2–3 the stimulus was constant across trials, 
therefore it is unlikely that it had any effect on participants’ performance, but 
precisely because it did not differ across trials, it cannot be ascertained or speculated 
that it is not important for the n–2 task repetition cost.  
Experiment 4 looked at whether the n–2 task repetition cost is affected by 
stimulus’ features, and whether it interacts with or modulates episodic retrieval. 
 
Experiment 4 
Experiments 2 and 3 provided clear evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost 
is modulated by episodic retrieval of responses; that is, the n–2 task repetition cost 
was smaller for n–2 RR compared to n–2 RS.  Experiment 3 additionally showed 
that the effect of episodic retrieval modulates cue-transparency effects; specifically, 
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the episodic interference was larger for non-transparent cues (Shape) compared to 
transparent cues (Arrows). Experiment 4 was designed to further investigate the 
episodic retrieval effect on the n–2 task repetition cost, but this time looking at low-
level perceptual attributes of stimuli. 
Evidence from WM (Baddeley, 2000), episodic retrieval (Hommel, 2004), 
procedural learning (Pashler & Baylis, 1991), and task-switching research (Allport & 
Wylie, 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016; Waszak et al., 
2003) suggest that perceptual features of stimuli can become bounded with other 
task’s parameters (e.g., cue, response); as such, stimulus’ features may be important 
for manipulating and retrieving information during task-switching.  If the visual 
characteristics of stimuli play a role in task-switching performance—bound with 
other parameters—it is possible that stimulus’ features across trials can lead to 
interference, just as cue and response have been shown to do in Experiments 2-3. 
Therefore, it became important to investigate if the effect of episodic retrieval on the 
n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by low-level perceptual features of stimuli. In 
Experiments 2 and 3 the stimulus’ perceptual attributes were task-irrelevant, 
participants had to attend to stimulus’ location but not the low-level perceptual 
characteristics; also, the perceptual features of stimulus were kept the same across all 
trials. Experiment 4 aimed to manipulate stimulus features to investigate if low-level 
perceptual characteristics of the stimulus influence the n–2 task repetition cost, and/ 
or whether it affects episodic retrieval. If episodic retrieval is not sensitive to low-
level perceptual features of stimuli, it would suggest that task-irrelevant features are 
not retrieved, or at least, that if they are retrieved they do not interfere with episodic 
retrieval facilitation. Also, another possibility is that task-irrelevant stimulus’ 
features do not bind into event-file (Hommel, 1998).  
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To manipulate low-level perceptual stimuli characteristics, the BI paradigm 
from Experiment 3 was adapted; namely, the BI paradigm variation with Shapes-
cues was chosen—as it has been shown to produce the largest n–2 task repetition 
cost—to manipulate stimuli’s features. Instead of a black circle being a target, letters 
were chosen as stimuli to be varied across the trials. Two conditions were created; in 
one participants always saw a letter A as a target (Stimulus Match), and in the 
second condition participants saw a different letter of the alphabet on each trial 
(Stimulus Mismatch).  
 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-six participants were recruited from the same 
population as for Experiments 1–3. Data of twenty-five participants were used in the 
main analysis.  
The number of participants was determined by Sequential Bayesian Factor as 
in Experiment 3; however, this time the compared models were different. A 
Bayesian factorial analysis was conducted with the n–2 task repetition cost as a DV, 
and Stimulus and Response as IVs. The four probable models explaining data were: 
1) main effect of Response; 2) main effect of Stimulus; 3) main effects of Response 
and Stimulus; 4) two main effects (Stimulus and Response) and interaction between 
them. At twenty-six participants, the BF10 reached the criterion of being below 1/6, 
in favor of the model 2 best explaining the data (see Results for details). 
 
Apparatus and stimuli. BI paradigms were presented on a standard PC with 
a 17in. monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA). Responses were made on a 1-ms precise USB keyboard.  
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Backward Inhibition paradigm. The set-up of the experiment was the same 
as in Experiment 2-3. Shapes cues were used (2.5 cm in width and height): a 
“hexagon” was used for the vertical, a “square” for a diagonal, and a “triangle” for a 
horizontal task. The Shapes cues were shown to generate the largest n–2 task 
repetition cost across Experiments 2-3, hence were deemed suitable for the current 
experiment. This time instead of using a black circle as the stimulus, the stimuli were 
letters; in the Stimulus Match condition participants saw a letter A on each trial, and 
in Stimulus Mismatch condition the letter changed on each trial (Figure 3.14). 
Allowable response key-presses were the same as in the Experiments 2–3. The 
“Error” message was (22 Verdana; red font). 
 
Procedure. Participants attended a single session during which they 
performed BI paradigms with two different types of stimuli, one with “A” letter and 
one with “A-Z” letters; the order of these two was counterbalanced across 
participants. Before each half participants learnt relevant cue-task mappings and 
practiced task-switching with respective stimuli-type for 16 trials. If they made more 
than four errors they were given another practice with 16 trials; however, no more 
than two practices per participant were allowed.  
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Figure 3.14 An overview of the paradigm used in Experiment 4. 
 
As in Experiments 2-3 participants made a spatial transformation of the 
stimulus; that is, they had to indicate in which inner corner of the frame, would the 
target move to, if it moved according to cued direction. The timings of the stimulus, 
cue, response and intervals between these parameters, were the same as in 
Experiments 2–3. If the participant gave an incorrect answer, they saw the “Error” 
message on the screen.  
Each participant performed 360 trials, and to optimise participants’ 
performance all the trials were split into three blocks of 120 trials in each, with 
participant-paced breaks between the blocks. As in the previous experiments, no 
immediate task-repetitions were allowed (Koch et al., 2006). The task sequences and 
responses were recorded as in Experiment 2–3. 
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Design. A within-subjects design was used to examine RTs (ms) as accuracy 
(%) as dependent variables, and Task sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 RR 
vs. n–2 RS), and Stimulus (Match vs. Mismatch) as independent variables. 
 
Results 
 Data trimming. The data trimming was performed in the same manner as in 
Experiments 2-3. Overall, 13.5% of trials were removed because of accuracy and 
RTs trimming; 12.1% from Stimulus Match condition (11.2% for n–2 RR, 12.3% for 
n–2 RS) and 14.8% from Stimulus Mismatch condition (16.4% for n–2 RR, 14.5% 
for n–2 RS). 
 Reaction time analysis. RTs were analysed via a three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA with factors: Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 RR 
vs. n–2 RS), and Stimulus (Match vs. Mismatch).  
Descriptive statistics for the three-way ANOVA are in Table 3.3. The main 
effect of Task Sequence was significant, F(1,24) = 35.74, p < .001, ηg2 = .02; as 
participants were slower for ABA (1101ms) compared to CBA (1032ms) sequence. 
The effect of Stimulus was not significant, F(1,24) = 0.009, p = .92, ηg2 = .0001, 
neither was the effect of Response, F(1,24) = 1.2, p = .28, ηg2 = .0009. 
 An interaction between Task Sequence and Response was significant, 
F(1,24) = 17.04, p < .001, ηg2  = .006; the n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 RR was 
29ms and not significant t(49) =1.7, p = .09, 95%CI[-5.33, 64.53], and for n–2 RS it 
was 108ms and significant, t(49) =8.6, p < .001, 95%CI[83.01, 133.27], which is a 
replication of results from Experiment 2–3. The other interactions were not 
significant: Stimulus and Task Sequence, F(1,24) = 0.867, p = .36, ηg2 = .0004; 
Stimulus and Response, F(1,24) = 0.66, p = .43, ηg2 = .0003; and Stimulus, Task 
Sequence and Response, F(1,24) = 1.07, p = .31, ηg2 = .0006 (Figure 3.15). The 
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averaged n–2 task repetition costs are in Figure 3.16, and density functions for the n–
2 task repetition cost under Stimulus Matches and Stimulus Mismatches, for n–2 RR 
and n–2 RS is are depicted in Figure 3.17. 
 
Table 3.3 Mean Response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard errors, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (RR) and n–2 Response 
Switches (RS), for Stimulus Matches and Stimulus Mismatches. 
 Task sequence 
 ABA CBA 
Stimulus Match RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
Match     
   n–2 RR 1074 (51) 96.99 (.88) 1042 (51) 97.55 (.49) 
   n–2 RS 1124 (51) 96.60 (.42) 1038 (49) 97.86 (.56) 
Mismatch     
   n–2 RR 1075 (50) 95.63 (.69) 1047 (56) 97.62 (.72) 
   n–2 RS 1131 (49) 95.47 (.69) 1002 (45) 97.06 (.38) 
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Figure 3.15 Reaction times three-way interaction between Stimulus (Match vs. 
Mismatch), Task Sequence (ABA vs CBA), and Response (Repetition vs. Switch). 
Error bars represent ±1 SE around the mean. 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Reaction times n–2 task repetition costs for n–2 Response Repetition and 
n–2 Response Switch under Match/ Mismatch stimuli.  Error bars represent ±1 SE 
around the mean. 
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Figure 3.17 Density functions of the reaction time (RT) the n–2 task repetition costs 
distributions for n–2 response repetitions and n–2 response switches, calculated as 
RT (ABA) - RT (CBA); on the top graph for Stimulus Match and on the bottom a 
graph for Stimulus Mismatch. 
 
Bayesian analysis. The model of interest in Experiment 4 was model 4— 
two main effects (Stimulus and Response) and interaction between them—which 
was compared to the next-best model, which was model 2—the main effect of 
Response. Comparing those two models—model 4 (BF 23.37)/ model 2 (BF 
151.30)—gave the BF10 of 0.155. This means that model 2 is 6.46 times more likely 
to better explain data than model 4 (1/0.155=6.45). This is considered as moderate 
evidence for absence of full interaction between Response and Stimulus; meaning 
that the n–2 task repetition cost was not modulated by interaction between Stimulus 
and Response, and instead was more likely to be modulated by Response only.  
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 Accuracy analysis. Accuracy for n–2 task repetition cost analysis revealed 
just one significant main effect, the effect of Task Sequence, F(1,24) = 14.64. p < 
.001, ηg2 = .05 (96.17% for ABA and 97.52% for CBA sequence). The effect of 
Stimulus was not significant, F(1,24) = 2.46, p = .13, ηg2 = .02, so was the effect  of 
Response, F(1,24) = 0.58, p = 45, ηg2 = .001.  
None of the interactions were significant: Stimulus and Task Sequence, 
F(1,24) = 1.33, p = .26, ηg2 = .005; Stimulus and Response, F(1,24) = 0.23, p = .64, 
ηg2 =.0007; Task Sequence and Response, F(1,24) = 0.05, p = .82, ηg2 = .0002; and 
Stimulus, Task Sequence and Response, F(1,24) = 0.6, p = .44, ηg2 = .002 (see 
Figure 3.18 for interaction visualisation; 3.19 for n–2 task repetition costs, and 3.20 
for n–2 task repetition costs density functions). 
 
 
Figure 3.18 Accuracy three-way interaction between Stimulus (Match vs. 
Mismatch), Task Sequence, and Response. Error bars represent ±1 SE around the 
mean. 
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Figure 3.19 Accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for n–2 RR and n–2 RS under Match/ 
Mismatch stimuli.  Error bars represent ±1 SE around the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Density functions of the accuracy n–2 task repetition costs distributions 
for n–2 response repetitions and n–2 response switches, calculated as RT (ABA) - 
RT (CBA); on the top graph for Stimulus Match and on the bottom a graph for 
Stimulus Mismatch. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 4 was conducted to establish whether task-irrelevant stimulus’ 
features affect the n–2 task repetition cost and/ or episodic retrieval. The results 
showed that neither of those two were affected by low-level perceptual features of 
stimuli. This can be interpreted as evidence that task-irrelevant stimulus’ low-level 
perceptual features do not seem to affect the n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., contribute 
to how much inhibition is applied). It is not to say however, that if stimuli 
characteristics became task-relevant (which was not tested in the current study) the 
inter-trial mismatches would not affect performance on task-switching (e.g., 
Woodward & Meier, 2003). That is, letters used in Experiment 4 (and a black circle 
from Experiments 2–3) do not have any task-related features so are limited as to 
whether they can facilitate of interfere with retrieval. Also, letters used in 
Experiment 4 either always repeated or never repeated, therefore a comparison of n–
2 stimulus switch compared  to  an n–2 stimulus repetition was not possible, which 
can be taken as a limitation.  
To address the two limitations identified in Experiment 4 a different type of 
stimuli could be used to explore further the low-level stimuli features’ influence on 
the n–2 task repetition cost and/ or episodic retrieval. For example, in the BI 
paradigm like the one used in Experiment 4, two stimuli per task could be used, 
specifically two letters per task (e.g., A/ P for horizontal task; H/ S for diagonal; and 
K/ B for vertical task), and episodic retrieval of response could be controlled as 
before. Each task would be cued as usual and participants would be told to pay 
attention only to the location of the letter, and that it is not relevant which letter 
appears. Then the episodic retrieval modulatory effect on the n–2 task repetition cost 
would be examined under Stimulus-Switch and Stimulus-Repetition. If episodic 
retrieval is sensitive to stimuli low-level features, we would expect a facilitation of 
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Stimuli-Matches compared to Stimuli Mismatches; that is, the modulatory effect of 
episodic retrieval of the n–2 task repetition cost would be expected to be larger under 
Stimuli-Matches compared to Stimuli-Mismatches.  
As such, based on these results it cannot be ascertained whether under n–2 
RR, if the stimulus was repeated too, compared to if it was switched, it would lead or 
not to a facilitation. Numerically, n–2 task repetition costs were lower in Stimulus-
Match condition compared to Stimulus-Mismatch, which indicates that the n–2 
stimulus repetition benefited performance to some extent, compared to n–2 stimulus 
switch.  
 
General Discussion 
The current study investigated whether and to what extent episodic retrieval 
modulates the n–2 task repetition cost, which was explored with three experiments 
examining different aspects of the relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost, 
episodic retrieval, cue transparency, and stimulus low-level perceptual features. 
Experiment 2 showed that the n–2 task repetition cost is considerably reduced under 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches; in other words, ensuring n–2 
RR with n–2 task repetitions across trials facilitated performance on task-switching, 
and reduced the n–2 task repetition cost. Experiment 3 provided evidence that the 
episodic retrieval modulated cue-transparency which consequently affected the n–2 
task repetition cost. And, findings from Experiment 4 showed that low-level 
perceptual characteristics of the stimulus did not modulate the episodic retrieval or 
the n–2 task repetition cost.   
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Practical Implications 
The n–2 task repetition cost has been replicated extensively and up to now 
has been resistant to non-inhibitory explanations (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2010). This 
effect has become a signature of cognitive inhibition and it has been used as such for 
group (Dreher et al., 2001; Fales et al., 2006; Lawo et al., 2012; Mayr et al., 2006; 
Moritz et al., 2004; Prior, 2012) as well as individual differences in inhibitory 
control (Whitmer & Banich, 2007). From such research, theoretical implications 
have been suggested. For example, Withmer and Banich used the n–2 task repetition 
cost to investigate depressive rumination tendencies and cognitive inhibition in 
healthy participants. Their study was designed based on the idea that depressive 
rumination is associated with executive functions impairments; specifically, 
attentional inflexibility (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), which was speculated to 
manifest itself via impaired inhibition and/or switching ability. It was found that 
people who scored higher on the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS)—a measure of 
the extent of someone having recurrent thoughts about feeling depressed—showed 
smaller n–2 task repetition cost, which was taken as evidence that people who have 
the tendency to depressively ruminate may have inhibitory deficiency; although, the 
authors make a point of saying that the study used a correlational analysis which 
does not allow for causal relationship interpretation. In another study (Whitmer & 
Banich, 2012) the n–2 task repetition cost was used as a behavioral marker of 
cognitive inhibition efficiency which was regressed against functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) activations related to task-switching. The main finding of 
that investigation was that people who exhibited larger n–2 task repetition cost, that 
is people who were classed as better inhibitors, showed more activity in the basal 
ganglia and supplementary motor/ premotor area during task- switching, compared 
to task repetition. This was interpreted as these two brain areas being important for 
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task set inhibition. Since Experiments 2-4 from the current investigation showed that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is considerably modulated by episodic retrieval, findings 
from studies using the n–2 task repetition cost as a measure of inhibition are less 
clear now. For example, there is evidence that the basal ganglia are important for 
memory processes, including episodic retrieval (Foerde & Shohamy, 2013; Scimeca 
& Badre, 2012); therefore, it can be speculated that the n–2 task repetition cost in the 
fMRI study by Whitmer and Banich’s (2012) reflected episodic retrieval processes 
rather than inhibition. Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost being linked to brain 
activity in basal ganglia and supplementary motor/ premotor area, may be due to 
learning and memory processes; especially since the basal ganglia seem to be 
important for stimulus-response associations in humans and animals (Packard & 
Knowlton, 2002).  
The n–2 task repetition cost has also been used to assess inhibitory control in 
a substantial number of studies looking at group differences: in brain lesions (Mayr 
et al., 2006), neuroimaging (Dreher et al., 2001), healthy ageing (Lawo et al., 2012), 
Parkinson’s disease (Fales et al., 2006), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Moritz et al., 
2004), and bilingualism (Prior, 2012). These studies’ findings implications are now 
less clear and may require revisiting accounting for episodic retrieval. For example, 
larger n–2 task repetition costs in accuracy in Parkinson’s patients compared to 
controls may not be due to impaired inhibition but memory processes associated 
with the basal ganglia. 
 Moreover, there is evidence that the n–2 task repetition is not a reliable 
measure (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017), which was also supported by reliability 
analysis in Experiment 2 of the current chapter. Kowalczyk and Grange suggested 
that low reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost in their study might have been due 
other factors not accounted for. One of those possible factors was episodic retrieval. 
180 
 
The current study however, showed that when episodic retrieval was controlled for 
the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost was even smaller than in Kowalczyk and 
Grange’s study. This furthers uncertainty over the n–2 task repetition cost’s 
reliability and its usefulness as a tool assessing cognitive inhibition; therefore, the n–
2 task repetition cost should be interpreted with caution. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
From a theoretical and biological point of view, it makes sense for a process 
like inhibition to be important for task-switching (Goschke, 2000; Mayr & Keele, 
2000); or for a system by which once activated but no longer relevant task-
representations’ decay (Altmann & Gray, 2008). This is because, being faced with 
multivalent environment we often have to select among and act on stimuli effectively 
and accordingly; that is, we must exercise some control to disengage from and 
switch between mental states and behaviors dynamically, otherwise we risk being 
rigorous and incapable of adaptation. As such, cognitive inhibition has been deemed 
as the process which is very likely modulating controlled behavior; that is, a process 
by which we can maintain a given goal and action when needed, but also to change 
them if necessary. For a long time, the n–2 task repetition cost has been taken as 
evidence for inhibitory processes modulating task-switching and has been resistant to 
non-inhibitory explanations (reviews by Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010). 
However, the current study showed that the n–2 task repetition cost is clearly and 
considerably reduced by a non-inhibitory process, namely, episodic retrieval; 
therefore, this cost cannot be confidently spoken about as a measure of inhibition in 
task-switching.  
The main theoretical implications of the current study on understanding of 
the n–2 task repetition cost relate to the extent to which the cost reflects inhibition, 
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the cue-transparency role in task-switching, and low-level task-irrelevant features 
influence on performance.    
 
Episodic retrieval. In terms of the involvement of cognitive inhibition in 
task-switching, the current study’s findings point to the importance of non-inhibitory 
and automatic processes driving the n–2 task repetition cost to a large extent. The 
effect of episodic retrieval on the n–2 task repetition cost fits nicely with evidence 
from research on SC, which is also considerably modulated by episodic retrieval 
(Allport & Wylie, 1999; Altmann, 2011; Goschke, 2000; Horoufchin et al., 2011; 
Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). A large proportion of the 
SC and the n–2 task repetition cost being attributable to episodic retrieval, questions 
the role of cognitive control processes in task-switching, because effects ascribed to 
inhibition can be accounted for in large by non-inhibitory mechanisms. This means 
that the costs associated with task-switching are not so much due to inhibition, but 
due to automatic episodic retrieval of task-set parameters which do not match 
demand of the task at hand, which results in longer response selection and execution. 
It is not to say that after controlling for episodic retrieval, small residual switching 
costs are not attributable to inhibition, but at this stage it is uncertain what type of 
inhibition it is. Also, from current results it cannot be ascertained whether the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost is not an underestimated reflection of inhibition; that 
is, episodic matches may aid performance leading to shorter RTs, but it is not to say 
that inhibition was not applied in the first place, or that episodic mismatches lead to 
more inhibition compared to episodic matches.  
 
Cue-transparency. With regards to cue-transparency (Grange & Houghton, 
2010a; Houghton et al., 2009), the original research suggested that increases of the 
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n–2 task repetition cost under non-transparent cues compared to transparent cues, 
were due to non-transparent cues requiring more translation to a task in WM, of 
which activations linger in WM leading to interference resolved with inhibition; 
whereas, transparent cues need less or no translation in WM, therefore do not lead to 
as much if any interference, hence less inhibition is applied. Cues are an important 
aspect of task-switching (Jost et al., 2013), they aid retrieval of information 
necessary to perform a given task (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003); but it seems that when 
episodic retrieval is controlled for, the n–2 task repetition cost is absent regardless of 
the Cue-Type, and only the n–2 task repetition cost not controlled for episodic 
retrieval varies between the Cue-Type, with the n–2 task repetition cost being larger 
under non-transparent compared to transparent cues. This means that, when episodic 
retrieval is controlled for, the cue-transparency on its own does not modulate the n–2 
task repetition cost; but the effect of cue-transparency is present for the n–2 task 
repetition cost confounded with episodic mismatches. Specifically, when episodic 
retrieval is not controlled for, the effect of cue-transparency is larger under non-
transparent cues compared to transparent cues, which is likely due to more episodic 
interference, rather than requiring more translation in WM. This because under 
episodic matches in non-transparent cues condition, the n–2 repetition cost was 
removed, but if it was not removed, that would mean that the cue-transparency 
effects are stronger than episodic retrieval effect.  
RT performance for CBA sequence was similar under episodic matches and 
episodic mismatches (for both type of cues), but RT performance for ABA was 
particularly large under episodic mismatches under non-transparent cues. This 
means, that episodic mismatches impair performance which is further impaired by 
non-transparent cues. Specifically, it is likely that memory traces under non-
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transparent cues (i.e., not informative cues) cannot be effectively retrieved, which 
could be due to weak cue-task memory traces.  
 
Stimulus features. Existing literature identified that stimulus’ features can 
bind with task and response in the form of a memory compound/ event-file 
(Hommel, 1998; Pösse et al., 2006; Waszak et al., 2003), and that bivalency of the 
stimulus can lead to larger n–2 task repetition costs (D. W. Schneider & Verbruggen, 
2008); but see also evidence for n–2 task repetition cost for univalent stimuli (Costa 
& Friedrich, 2012; Gade & Koch, 2012). The current study found that the stimulus’ 
low-level features did not affect the n–2 task repetition cost or modulated episodic 
retrieval; which indicates that in the current study, stimuli were unlikely to become 
part of the event-files formed during task-switching. However, there was a trend for 
episodic retrieval facilitation to not be as efficient under stimuli mismatches 
compared to stimuli matches, but this pattern was not significant. It is possible that 
the stimulus’ manipulation was not sufficient to yield anticipated effects; that is, 
there is evidence that for stimuli low-level features to become part of the event-file, 
they must be task-relevant, and in the current study the stimuli features were all task-
irrelevant. In the current study, varying the low-level stimuli features during task-
switching led to no effects on the n–2 task repetition cost, but future studies should 
address whether episodic retrieval and on the n–2 task repetition cost is affected by 
varying task-relevant low-level stimuli features.   
    
Theories on the n–2 task repetition cost. In light with current study’s 
findings, many experiments on n–2 task repetition cost reported in literature should 
be revisited to update previously suggested explanations and interpretations. The 
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current study addresses only some of the factors associated with the n–2 task 
repetition cost, but many are still to be revisited. For example, Experiments 2-4 did 
not manipulate RCI or CSI, which were kept short and constant, but it is a common 
observation that the longer the RCI is, the smaller the n–2 task repetition cost is—
predominantly interpreted as evidence for activation-decay mechanisms (Altmann & 
Gray, 2008); also suggested to be evidence for inhibition-decay theory (Altmann, 
2007; Mayr & Keele, 2000)—so it is unknown for now whether the effect of 
episodic retrieval on the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated with longer RCI. 
Episodic retrieval is an important element of the activation-decay account; it 
assumes an interplay between encoding, episodic memory, decay, priming, 
interference, and retrieval; therefore, it seems important to control for episodic 
retrieval in future activation-decay models to obtain a clearer understanding of how 
the n–2 task repetition cost arises and what it reflects. In terms of the inhibition-
decay theory, it assumes that activated task-set becomes inhibited immediately after 
its use (Grange et al., 2013), as such, it does not recognize episodic retrieval as a 
factor modulating the n–2 task repetition cost. And in terms of activation-only 
model—reported in Grange and Juvina’s study—which produced the n–2 task 
repetition benefit rather than a cost, it was deemed not suitable to explain data. 
However, it has been noted in the current study and by other researches (Grange & 
Juvina, 2015; Grange, Kowalczyk, & Loughlin, 2017; Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017) 
that many participants show n–2 task repetition benefits instead of n–2 task 
repetition costs, with the number of n–2 task repetition benefits increased when 
episodic retrieval is controlled for. This implies that any model that attempts to 
explain n–2 task repetition cost should account for observation that not all 
participants show the costs associated with task-switching; also that, even if 
behaviorally it may seem that inhibition is absent or considerably reduced, it does 
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not necessarily mean that it does not play a part in task-switching, as activations and 
inhibitions in between task-switches may neutralise each other (Grange et al., 2013). 
For now we know that the n–2 task repetition cost is greatly modulated by episodic 
retrieval, but it remains uncertain if and to what extent inhibition affects performance 
on task-switching, especially that there is evidence that episodic retrieval and 
inhibition are not mutually exclusive (Spapé & Hommel, 2008; Tipper, 2001). 
 
Conclusion 
The current study reports three experiments which showed that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is considerably modulated by episodic retrieval. Moreover, cue-
transparency influences episodic retrieval increasing the n–2 task repetition cost; 
and, the n–2 task repetition cost and episodic retrieval are not affected by task-
irrelevant, low-level stimuli perceptual features. Lastly, controlling for episodic 
retrieval does not improve the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost. Taken 
together, these results indicate that the n–2 task repetition cost is unlikely to be a 
measure of inhibitory control, and if used as such should be interpreted with caution.  
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Chapter 4 Cognitive Inhibition in Task-Switching 
and Working Memory Resources 
 
 
Abstract 
Task-switching requires an ability to attend to relevant and ignore irrelevant 
stimuli, as well as to execute goal-oriented action, processes which cognitive 
inhibition is thought to facilitate. Computerised task-switching paradigms are used to 
assess cognitive inhibition as estimated via the n–2 task repetition cost (Mayr & 
Keele, 2000), an effect of slower performance returning to a task performed recently 
compared to performance on a task that was not completed recently. The n–2 task 
repetition cost has been used to measure individual differences in inhibitory control; 
however, its magnitude varies considerably between participants, the source of 
which is unknown. Cognitive inhibition can depend on working memory (WM) 
resources (Conway & Engle, 1994), as such, the current study investigated the 
relationship between n–2 task repetition costs (Grange, Kowalczyk, & Loughlin, 
2017) and WM. Experiment 5 showed that the n–2 task repetition cost was not 
significantly correlated with WM capacity; and Experiments 6 and 7 revealed that n–
2 task repetition costs were not modulated by WM load. These results imply that 
individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost cannot be explained by WM 
resources, and that the cost is not modulated by WM.  
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Introduction 
Task-switching ability is important in day-to-day life as it allows us to shift 
our intentions and behaviours as our goals change, ultimately making it possible for 
us to act appropriately in different contexts. An important aspect of efficient task-
switching is the capacity to ignore goal-irrelevant or distracting information so we 
can focus on a task at hand; for example, if when reading a book our phone rings, we 
can ignore it or we can choose to answer the phone and then return to reading the 
book. Successful task-switching and goal-oriented actions are important for our daily 
functioning, because if we were unable to adapt our behaviour according to changing 
goals, we could be “stuck” performing one goal regardless of changes in our 
environment, which could be detrimental; for example, when reading a book, if we 
heard a fire alarm, we would have a difficulty shifting our attention from the book to 
the alarm to act appropriately.  
An indication of what may happen if someone’s goal-oriented behaviour does 
not work efficiently can be seen in conditions associated with frontal lobe damage, 
which can manifest itself in many cognitive impairments, such as difficulty in 
selection and organisation of context-specific action (Archibald et al., 2001). People 
with frontal lobe injuries may show behaviours such as manual grasping (i.e., 
automatic object grasping, such as grabbing a finger placed in hand), groping reflex 
(typically seen in infants, but can be seen in adults; for example, holding and rubbing 
objects placed in from of a person), imitation behaviour (i.e., imitating others’ 
behaviour with no purpose), utilization behaviour (automatic, instrumentally correct, 
but exaggerated and context-inappropriate actions), alien hand phenomena (i.e., a 
sense of lack of control over performed actions/ movements) (Lhermitte, 1983), all 
of which have in common the impaired ability to perform goal-oriented and context-
specific behaviour in certain situations. 
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Task-Switching 
Even though task-switching may seem effortless, the efficiency with which 
we perform it determines a lot of our day-to-day functioning. In terms of what makes 
it possible for us to adapt our behaviour and intentions, it seems that it is likely that 
several different cognitive processes work together for us to be able to select actions 
appropriately to goals and ignore distraction, or simply for our behaviour not to be 
stimulus-driven. It appears that some of the important aspects of goal-oriented 
behaviour are the ability to maintain a given action when required, and to be able to 
adjust that behaviour when the goal changes; that is to have flexibility to shift 
attention from one task to another. Also, at the same time we have to be able to 
monitor the background environment so if previously irrelevant stimuli become 
relevant we can become aware of that as soon as it is possible so we can adapt our 
behaviour (Goschke, 2000). This ability to maintain a given goal but yet have the 
capacity to flexibly change that goal is referred to as the stability-flexibility dilemma 
(Goschke); which emphasises the idea that to try to understand controlled-action and 
the cognitive processes facilitating it, one must consider mechanisms maintaining as 
well as adapting behaviour in moment-to-moment fashion. 
Task-switching experiments allow us to test some hypotheses we may have 
about the stability-flexibility dilemma and associated cognitive processes; 
specifically, based on participants’ performance (i.e., reaction times and accuracy) 
we can make inferences about cognitive mechanisms assumed to facilitate task-
switching. For example, from early studies using task-switching paradigms it has 
become apparent that we are less efficient when we switch between tasks compared 
to when we repeat the same task, which is known as the “switch cost” (SC, for 
reviews on related research see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003).  The SC has been 
suggested to be due to a number of different factors (e.g., reconfiguration, task-set 
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inertia; Monsell, 2003); however, many explanations put a large emphasis on 
cognitive inhibition as being one of the factors thought to contribute to the SC (e.g., 
Allport & Wylie, 1999; Meiran, Hsieh, & Chang, 2011; Yeung & Monsell, 2003b). 
 
Task-switching and inhibition. In general, cognitive inhibition can be 
referred to as “the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, 
with or without intention” (Gorfein & MacLeod, 2007, p. 5), and it has been linked 
to many functional and dysfunctional behaviours (Amer et al., 2016). It seems that 
inhibition can influence performance on cognitive tasks and in day-to-day life 
negatively as well as positively (Amer et al.); but there is some evidence to suggest 
that low cognitive control is associated with problem solving requiring associative 
thinking, and analytical problem solving is linked to high level of control (L. Cheng 
& Runco, 2015). That is, for open-ended and creative tasks, it is beneficial for links 
to be made between not necessarily connected information and approach a problem 
from an unusual perspective (i.e., “thinking outside the box scenario”), which 
benefits from low cognitive inhibition; but when a problem has to be approached 
analytically, we benefit from focused attention which requires high cognitive 
inhibition (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012).  However, in general, low cognitive control—for 
example, an inability to disengage from the no-longer-relevant information—has 
been shown to be linked to psychopathologies (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, 
Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006; Gillan, Robbins, Sahakian, van den Heuvel, & van 
Wingen, 2016; Johnson, 2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).  
In task-switching, a method known as the Backward Inhibition (BI) paradigm 
has been used to investigate cognitive inhibition specifically. In the BI paradigm 
participants switch back and forth between three different tasks in such a way that 
they either perform pure switches (referred to as an CBA sequence) or they repeat a 
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task performed on n–2 trial (known as an ABA sequence). Performance is worse 
when repeating a task from an n–2 trial (i.e., ABA sequence) compared to 
performing a task that is not an n–2 task repetition (i.e., CBA sequence) (Mayr & 
Keele, 2000); this effect is known as the n–2 task repetition cost and it is thought to 
reflect cognitive inhibition. As we switch between tasks, a task that we switch away 
from becomes inhibited so its activation does not interfere with the next task, and if 
we return to a task that was inhibited soon after attention was disengaged from it, we 
should be slower performing that task because it will be under the influence of 
decaying inhibition.  
The n–2 task repetition cost has been replicated many times and has been 
resistant to explanations other than inhibitory ones (for reviews see: Kiesel et al., 
2010; Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010); although a recent study showed that a 
large proportion of the n–2 task repetition cost is due to a non-inhibitory mechanism 
(Chapter 3; Grange et al., 2017). Since n–2 task repetition cost is so replicable it has 
become a signature of cognitive inhibition and has been used as such to assess group 
differences in healthy and clinical populations (e.g., Fales, Vanek, & Knowlton, 
2006; Greenberg, Reiner, & Meiran, 2013; Moritz, Hübner, & Kluwe, 2004; 
Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012; Yiu-kwan, 2008). Moreover, individual differences studies 
link smaller n–2 task repetition costs to low (i.e., impaired) inhibition, and large n–2 
task repetition costs to high cognitive inhibition (Whitmer & Banich, 2007, 2012).  
 
Inhibition, Individual Differences, and Working Memory 
Despite the robustness of the n–2 task repetition cost there are still some 
unanswered questions related to it. For example, it has been noted that the n–2 task 
repetition cost varies greatly between healthy participants (Grange & Juvina, 
2015)—a pattern also noted in studies reported in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis—
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specifically, Grange and Juvina showed substantial within- and between-subject 
differences in the magnitude of the n–2 task repetition costs and practice effects. Not 
only did the n–2 task repetition cost varied considerably between participants in the 
first attended session—with absent n–2 task repetition costs for some participants—
not everyone benefited from the practice. That is, some subjects’ n–2 task repetition 
cost reduced markedly with practice, whereas in about a third of the sample the 
practice did not reduce it. It is uncertain why the magnitude of the n–2 task repetition 
cost differs between participants or where these differences arise from. Nevertheless, 
through performing computational modelling, Grange and Juvina suggested that 
individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost may be due to differences in the 
strength of inhibition (which was modelled successfully by varying the strength of 
inhibition parameter in the model); they also speculate that the rate at which 
inhibition decays may lead to inhibitory individual differences in task-switching (this 
however was not tested). Taken together, the implication is that individual 
differences in cognitive control (as measured by the n–2 task repetition cost) may be 
due to some participants having strong/ weak inhibition and/or due to differences in 
the speed of inhibition decay. Chapter 2 of this thesis also showed that the individual 
differences in the n–2 task repetition cost are not predicted by depressive rumination 
(contrary to Whitmer and Banich, 2007) or processing speed (Kowalczyk & Grange, 
2017), and that the n–2 task repetition cost is not reliable; together, this evidence 
questions how meaningful individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost are.  
 
Working Memory and Inhibition 
There is a possibility that short-term memory related mechanisms—
specifically working memory (WM)—may provide some insight into the source of 
the individual differences in n–2 task repetition costs. Grange and Juvina (2015) 
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hypothesised that practice would lead to smaller n–2 task repetition costs based on 
two theories. The first one assumes that the n–2 task repetition cost arises as a result 
of conflict in WM (Houghton et al., 2009); that is, cues are thought to be translated 
into tasks in WM, where inefficient translation of cues can lead to competition of 
different tasks’ representations (if, for example, incorrect information is retrieved). 
The more exposure participants have to each task, the more efficient individual cue-
task translation becomes (i.e., the cue interpretation, target identification, response 
selection), which eventually leads to faster responses as tasks parameters are 
automatically retrieved from long term memory (LTM) (Logan, 1988); in which case 
there should be less, if any, need for WM involvement, hence less potential 
interference that could lead to conflicts which need to be resolved through inhibition. 
The second theory assumes that practice leads to smaller n–2 task repetition costs 
because repeated exposure to each task will lead to an increase of the resting 
activation states of the tasks’ mental representations of these, which can overcome 
temporary instances of inhibition (Grange et al., 2013). The importance of these 
assumptions is that they put an emphasis on memory related aspects in task-
switching, about which there is little research reported. 
 
Working memory capacity. WM is a short-term memory system thought to 
be crucial for information processing during tasks requiring temporary information 
manipulation and storage (e.g., memorising a shopping list); also, WM is believed to 
have limited capacity (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and has been suggested to be the 
source of individual differences in inhibition during cognitive tasks (Conway & 
Engle, 1994; Engle, 1994; Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005). To relate WM capacity 
(WMC) to the n–2 task repetition cost, we have to consider what happens during 
task-switching: First, information about a given task is encoded and stored in the 
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form of what is referred to as a task-set; a task-set (Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 1996) 
holds information about how to perform a given task (e.g., the meaning of the cue, 
what the target stimulus looks like, and allowable responses), and this information is 
then manipulated and updated accordingly as participants perform tasks one after 
another (D. W. Schneider & Logan, 2014). When the cue is presented, the 
information about a given task is retrieved (from LTM, based on previous encounters 
with the task) and manipulated appropriately which is thought to take place in WM 
(e.g., Houghton et al., 2009; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003). It is speculated that as we 
switch between tasks, an interference between task-set parameters can occur; 
namely, an ongoing activation of a previously relevant task-set can conflict with the 
currently relevant task-set, and this is thought to be resolved by temporarily 
inhibiting the abandoned task-set (Arbuthnott, 2008a; Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000). Assuming that task-set information is manipulated in WM, it 
is possible that individual differences in WMC will influence the efficiency with 
which task-sets are manipulated/ inhibited, and tasks are performed, which can vary 
between people (Engle, 1994).  
 
WM capacity and individual differences. In general, evidence suggests (e.g., 
Conway & Engle, 1994; Engle, 1994; Kane & Engle, 2003) that people differ with 
regards to the “capacity” of their WM which seems to influence how well they do on 
cognitive tasks and in day-to-day life, especially if tasks are relatively demanding 
(e.g., tasks requiring more top-down control will rely more on WMC). Specifically, 
WM is believed to be responsible for how well we can attend to tasks, as well as how 
much information we can manipulate and temporarily hold in mind in a given 
moment; for example, remembering our grocery shopping list or someone’s phone 
number require WM. In a standard experimental WM task, participants memorise a 
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series of items shown one a time, in between which they must perform a secondary 
task, known as the distractor task, which stops them from rehearsing to-be-
remembered items (e.g., judging the symmetry of a presented figure). The larger the 
number of items recalled at the test phase, the larger WMC is thought to be available 
to maintain the “temporary structures” of items to-be-remembered during the 
distractor task; that is, Low WMC is associated with less recalled items and High 
WMC is associated with more recalled items. As such, WMC differs between people 
and it has a limit (Conwan, 2010), which makes it an important characteristic 
differentiating individuals on cognitive tasks. For example, when WM load (WML) 
is varied (from load level 0 to 3), where higher load refers to more items to be 
monitored and manipulated (Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 1999; Engle, 
1996), the negative priming effect—slower response times responding to a stimulus 
previously ignored, thought to reflect inhibition (Tipper, 1985)—disappears under 
increased WML. This suggests that processes driving negative priming effect are 
WM dependent; moreover, it was demonstrated that people with high WMC—
compared to those with low WMC—showed negative priming effect but only under 
WML-0, and by WML-3, performance facilitation rather than negative priming was 
observed. Taken together, these results support the view that, people’s WMC can 
affect performance on cognitive tasks, cognitive effects can be WM-dependent, and 
that as WML increases there are less attentional resources available, hence inhibition 
effects decrease. 
 
WMC and inhibition. Importantly for the current study, in a series of 
experiments (Conway & Engle, 1994) it was shown that the individual differences in 
WMC (Low vs. High WMC) are not reflected in the efficiency of activating relevant 
memories but rather to do with whether individuals have capacity to inhibit 
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irrelevant activations. That is, in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 from Conway and 
Engle’s study, participants were asked to memorise sets of letters—each set 
containing 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, or 12 letters; in Experiment 1 each letter appeared as a 
target in two out of four sets participants would have to recall (i.e., there was an 
overlap of letters across to-be-remembered sets, which could lead to interference 
during retrieval), and in Experiment 2 each letter appeared only in one set (i.e., no 
overlap of letters across to-be-remembered sets, which should not lead to 
interference during retrieval). Next, in both experiments, participants performed a 
speeded recognition task; that is, they were presented with a series of cues (i.e., 
numbers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 indicating the set of letters to be recalled) reflecting 
currently relevant set and letters to be verified as present or not in the cued set (one 
cue and one letter appeared at time). In one condition, the cue and the letter appeared 
simultaneously (i.e., the secondary-memory/ inactive-memory condition), and in the 
second condition, participants first saw the cue of the relevant set and then the letter 
(i.e., primary-memory/ active-memory condition). The secondary-memory condition 
was meant to create circumstances under which participants did not have time to 
bring to mind the appropriate set before being presented with the letter that needed to 
be matched to the content of the cued set; whereas the primary-memory condition 
allowed participants to bring to mind the required letters set before they saw which 
letter had to be compared against the retrieved set. In the context of task-switching, 
in BI paradigm cues are typically presented before the stimulus, therefore it can be 
assumed that participants have time to retrieve task-set information before the 
stimulus appears; also often bivalent stimuli are used which means that irrelevant 
task-set’s parameters can be triggered by the cue, as it is seen in condition of 
Conway and Engle’s study where letters overlap across the letter-sets.  
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Conway and Engle (1994) found that people did not differ in how fast they 
performed letter recognition in the secondary- or primary-memory conditions if to 
be-verified letters did not overlap across the sets. However, when the letters 
overlapped across the sets, people with Low WMC took longer to match the target 
letter against retrieved letter set under the secondary-memory condition compared to 
people with High WMC. This was speculated to be due to Low WMC individuals 
being unable to ignore irrelevant sets, forcing them to perform a serial search 
through sets and items to identify a relevant one, compared to High WMC 
individuals who can ignore irrelevant items during the search and select a relevant 
one faster. This was interpreted as evidence that WMC determines the level to which 
an individual can suppress irrelevant tasks’; that is, individuals with Low WMC have 
less attentional resources available to deploy inhibition, compared to individuals 
with High WMC who have more attentional resources, hence can inhibit irrelevant 
activations.  
Furthermore, WM is believed not to be necessary for performance on 
cognitive tasks for which controlled effortful behavior is not required (i.e. bottom-up 
processing)—for example, in a flanker task, locating a target letter Z in a row of 
zeros  (Shipstead, Harrison, & Engle, 2012)—and therefore, any individual 
differences in WMC are not expected to affect performance on those tasks. During 
such tasks, performance is thought to be facilitated via automatic spreading 
activation (i.e., activation of neuronal networks triggered by a stimulus for 
previously established associations) (W. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Therefore, 
when negative priming was shown to vary depending on WMC individual 
differences—with Low WMC individuals showing no evidence of negative priming 
compared to individuals with High WMC (Engle, 1996)—it was taken as evidence 
that inhibition relies on WM. As such, in Low WMC individuals, the irrelevant items 
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are speculated not to be inhibited because the primary task consumes all attentional 
resources (i.e., WM resources), leaving no resources left to apply to inhibition; 
therefore, there is no cost in performance when responding to previously ignored 
stimuli. This is compared to High WMC individuals who can actively inhibit to-be-
ignored items because the primary task does not use all of their attentional resources, 
therefore when they become relevant, the performance is impaired due to persisting 
inhibition.  
 
The Current Study 
From the task-switching literature mixed findings are reported with regards to 
the relationship between WM and task-switching. Some studies investigating the SC 
show that WM is important for task-switching (Goschke, 2000; Meiran & Kessler, 
2008; Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 2004; Saeki & Saito, 2004a, 2004b); for 
example, the SC increases under higher WML (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 
2001; Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Hester & Garavan, 2005), 
and higher WMC is linked to smaller SC (Butler, Arrington, & Weywadt, 2011; but 
see also Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016), However, others argue that WM and SC 
are not related (Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; Miyake et al., 2000; 
Rubin & Meiran, 2005; Sauseng et al., 2006). With regards to the n–2 task repetition 
cost, there is very little literature on the potential influence of WM on inhibition in 
task-switching; in fact, there are two publications that addressed that topic. One 
study was reported whilst the current study was being conducted (Pettigrew & 
Martin, 2015), and the second study is an unpublished investigation (Grange & 
Houghton, n.d.); they both showed no relationship between the magnitude of the n–2 
task repetition cost and WM. 
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Grange and Houghton (n.d.) based their study on two opposing theories. First 
one argues that WM is necessary for inhibition (Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 
1999; Engle, 1994) which predicts that people who have larger WMC should have 
larger inhibition (i.e., n–2 task repetition cost) compared to people with smaller 
WMC. The second theory says—contrary to inhibition being a resource-dependent 
process—that inhibition can be reactive and automatic in nature (Anderson & Levy, 
2007; Arbuthnott, 2008b; Sinai, Goffaux, & Phillips, 2007), and as such should not 
be tied to WM resources.  In support of the second theory, Grange and Houghton 
found that WMC was not related to the variance seen in n–2 task repetition costs; 
these findings were the same for a correlational analysis for the n–2 task repetition 
cost and Automated Operation Span (AOSPAN) measure of WM (Unsworth, Heitz, 
& Engle, 2005), and in an experiment which manipulated WML within a BI 
paradigm (based on D. W. Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008). The BI paradigm was 
modified in such a way that in between runs of task-switching participants saw 
letters (2 letters for Low WML, or 6 letters for High WML) which they had to study. 
There were 14 runs in each WML condition, where each run began with a 
presentation of letters (one letter at a time), which was followed by 12 task-switching 
trials; at the end of each run participants saw a probe letter, and they had to judge 
whether that probe letter was among the letters presented at the beginning of the run. 
The results showed that the number of letters participants had to remember (Low vs. 
High WML) did not seem to affect n–2 task repetition costs. 
Pettigrew and Martin (2015) also investigated the relationship between the n–
2 task repetition cost and WMC, and predicted no relationship between those two 
variables. They argued that the n–2 task repetition cost is not a reflection of a top-
down process but rather an automatic inhibition (based on work from: Gade & Koch, 
2005, 2007; Houghton et al., 2009; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008; Schuch & Koch, 
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2003) or self-inhibition (Grange et al., 2013; Koch et al., 2010), therefore it should 
not be associated with WM. That is, this account speculates that inhibition resolves 
conflicts/ interference in the cognitive system (e.g., Altmann & Gray, 2002) through 
low-level automatic inhibition of, for example, motor responses (Arbuthnott, 2005, 
2008a, 2008b; Schuch & Koch, 2003). Specifically, in order to be able to efficiently 
select an appropriate response, other competing responses are inhibited so they 
interfere less with the current goal; that is, the tasks’ motor responses are inhibited 
rather than the whole task-sets (Cooper & Marí-Beffa, 2008; Gade & Koch, 2007; 
Grzyb & Hübner, 2012; Regev & Meiran, 2016; D. W. Schneider & Verbruggen, 
2008; Schuch & Koch, 2003); as such, the n–2 task repetition cost would not be 
expected to be modulated by WM. As predicted they found no relationship between 
the n–2 task repetition cost and WM measures. 
The current experiment initially was designed to address some limitations in 
Grange and Houghton’s study (n.d.); that is, Grange and Houghton’s investigation 
utilized only one measure of WMC in their correlation experiment, which is argued 
insufficient when assessing WM (Conway et al., 2005). As such, at this stage, it is 
still uncertain whether their WML manipulation did not work or whether the n–2 
task repetition cost is truly not modulated by WML. Moreover, since the two studies 
on the relationship between WM and n–2 task repetition cost were conducted 
(Grange n.d.; Pettigrew et al., 2015), evidence emerged that the n–2 task repetition 
cost is not reliable at the individual differences level (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; 
Chapter 2 of this thesis), and that it is a confounded measure of inhibition (Grange et 
al., 2017; Chapter 3 of this thesis). In a series of three experiments, it was shown 
(Grange et al., 2017) that episodic retrieval substantially modulates performance on 
task-switching, influencing the magnitude of the n–2 task repetition cost. Episodic 
retrieval (Neill, 1997) is a process of retrieval of an event of recently encountered 
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information upon seeing a cue that triggers that retrieval (Hommel, 1998, 2004; 
Logan, 1988; Logan, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2007). Specifically, it is argued that, 
when stimuli are encountered and acted on, a memory trace of that event is created 
(known as an event-file); the memory trace of an event is thought to hold 
information on what stimulus goes with which cue, the stimulus’ appearance, and a 
response made (e.g., Hommel, 1998). Episodic retrieval can facilitate or hinder 
performance; that is, if upon seeing a cue relevant information matching a current 
event is retrieved, the response to the current event will be faster, compared to if 
retrieved information does not match the current task’s demands.  
In a typical BI paradigm performance is assessed based on whether a given 
task repeats across trials (i.e., ABA sequence) compared to when the task does not 
repeat across trials (i.e., CBA sequence); however, it was noted (Mayr, 2002) that 
when a given task repeats (i.e., ABA sequence) the responses made may differ (e.g., 
right-key press on first A-task, and a left-key press on second A-task). This was 
hypothesised to be potentially problematic for the inhibitory explanation of the n–2 
task repetition cost because according to episodic retrieval theory (Neill, 1997), if 
upon seeing a given cue retrieved information (e.g., what is the task?; what to look 
for?; which response to make?) mismatches the demands of the task at hand, 
performance on that task will be slower. On the other hand, if the retrieved task-
parameters match the demands of a task at hand, the performance on the current task 
should be facilitated (i.e., faster and more accurate). Grange and colleagues (see also 
Mayr, 2002), found that, the episodic retrieval account did not explain the n–2 task 
repetition cost entirely; however, controlling for response repetitions and switches 
within n–2 task repetitions, it was demonstrated that n–2 response repetitions 
substantially reduced n–2 task repetition costs compared to n–2 response switch. 
That means that a large proportion of the n–2 task repetition cost—typically 
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attributable to inhibition—can be explained to a large extent by memory related 
processes. The reduced n–2 task repetition cost has been proposed to be a “better” 
(i.e., not confounded by episodic mismatches) indication of cognitive inhibition, and 
has been referred to as the residual n–2 task repetition cost.  
The current study aimed to revisit the relationship between WMC and 
inhibition in task-switching, which was achieved by the following; the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval was used as a measure of cognitive 
inhibition, WMC was assessed with three separate measures shown to reliably assess 
this ability, and WM was modulated during task-switching. It was speculated that, if 
the residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects cognitive inhibition, and if inhibition 
relies on WM resources, it should relate to WMC; specifically, it was expected that 
individuals with Low WMC should show smaller residual n–2 task repetition cost, 
and individuals with High WMC should show larger residual n–2 task repetition 
cost. However, if the residual n–2 task repetition cost is not related to WM capacity, 
it will indicate that inhibition—as measured via the residual n–2 task repetition 
cost—either is not dependent on WMC, or that perhaps, the residual n–2 task 
repetition cost does not reflect a top-down control process, but rather an automatic, 
low-level process.  
 
Experiment 5 
Method 
Participants. Forty-two participants were recruited from Keele University in 
exchange for partial course credits. Participants were at least 18-years-old (M=19.17, 
SD 1.55; thirty-six females), understood spoken and written English, and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. One participant’s data were removed due to 
researcher’s error, leaving forty-one participants for the main analysis.   
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Stopping rule. The sample size for the current study was determined via what 
is known as Bayes Factors (BFs) for correlation (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012). 
Unlike the frequentists’ hypothesis testing for correlation, which utilizes p-values to 
determine the significance of a relationship between variables, Bayesian inference 
allows for quantification of evidence for the null hypothesis (e.g., a correlation being 
unlikely) and experimental hypothesis (e.g., a likely correlation). To make a 
Bayesian inference, the null hypothesis, H0, and the alternative hypothesis, H1, are 
assigned prior probabilities—p(H0), p(H1)—which are later compared to posterior 
probability (i.e., adjusted probability given data) of both hypotheses. This can be 
described as in Equation 4.1 
Equation 4.1 
𝐵𝐹10 =  
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0)
 
 
 
where, D refers to the gathered data, H0 reflects the null hypothesis, H1 
reflects the alternative hypothesis, and p is the probability; the numbers 1 and 0 by 
the BF denote that the BF is calculated as a ratio of probability of data under the 
alternative hypothesis (e.g., a likely correlation) compared to the probability of data 
under the null hypothesis (e.g., an unlikely correlation).  
The current experiment was interested in whether there is a relationship 
between the WMC and the residual n–2 task repetition cost, and BF10 informed us on 
at how many participants either of the hypotheses—the null (i.e., an unlikely 
correlation) vs. the alternative (i.e., a likely correlation)—was more probable (for 
which criteria are discussed later). Specifically, if the BF10  was below 1/6 or above 6 
(Schönbrodt et al., 2014), or if at eighty participants results were inconclusive, data 
collection was to stop. The further away from 1 the BF10 is, the more compelling the 
evidence is, where BF10 larger than 1 signifies support for the alternative hypothesis, 
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and smaller than 1 indicates that the data are better explained by the null-hypothesis. 
Also, it is understood that BF10 below 1/6 or above 6 is considered as compelling 
enough evidence to stop collecting data as it has been shown to have low rates of 
False Positive Evidence and False Negative Evidence (Schönbrodt et al., 2014). 
Before the first BF10 was calculated, a sample size of 20 participants was 
tested (Schönbrodt et al., 2015). In the reported experiment, at 42nd participant data 
collection stopped as the BF10 for the correlation between the residual n–2 task 
repetition cost and the WMC Composite Score was 0.1424, which is less than 1/6 
(i.e., one of the criteria for stopping data collection); this was interpreted as evidence 
that data were better explained by the null hypothesis (i.e., that the correlation was 
unlikely).  Specifically, the data were 7.02 times more likely under the null 
hypothesis compared to the alternative hypothesis (1/0.1424). 
All statistics were conducted using an R software (R Developement Core 
Team, 2018). To calculate the BF10 for the stopping rule, first, the correlation 
between the residual n–2 task repetition cost and WMC was calculated (standard 
coefficient r using frequentists’ method). Then, the calculated correlation coefficient 
(r) and the number of participants were entered to the JZS function (Jeffrey-Zellner-
Siow, Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, 2014; Wetzels & 
Wagenmakers, 2012), which calculates the BF10. Within the JZS function, the null 
and alternative hypotheses are conceptualised as two linear regression models (one 
for a likely correlation and one for an unlikely correlation), which are compared in 
terms of how well each predicts the data, as expressed with BF10.   
 
Apparatus and stimuli. The task-switching paradigm was presented on a 
standard PC with a 17in. monitor via E-Prime v. 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Responses were made on a 1-ms precise USB keyboard. 
206 
 
Backward Inhibition paradigm. The stimuli were shown in a black square 
frame (8cm x 8cm) on a white background; in the center of the frame a cue in the 
form of a shape appeared—a triangle signified the “horizontal”, a hexagon the 
“vertical”, and a square the “diagonal” task (cues were 2.5 cm in width and height). 
The target appeared inside the frame, in one of the inner corners in the form of a 
black circle (1cm diameter). If the participant gave an incorrect answer, they saw 
“Error” message on the screen (red Verdana font, size 22). 
 
WMC measures. The general information on nature of WMC tasks 
(Symmetry, Operation, Rotation Spans) used in this experiment is provided below; 
for details on the three WMC measures see the paper by Foster and colleagues 
(model 11, 2014; Unsworth et al., 2005). A shortened version of WMC tasks were 
used, which meant that there was one block of each WMC task was administered; 
this version of the complex span WMC tasks has been validated and shown to be 
reliable (Foster et al.)  All three WMC tasks required participants to memorise a 
number of to-be-remembered items in the face of distractors (i.e., tasks performed in 
between to-be-remembered items) and recall memorised items in the order they were 
presented when cued to do so. See Figure 4.1 for visual examples of WMC tasks. 
 
Operation span (OSpan). In the OSpan test participants were presented with 
letters (one at a time) which they had to memorise; in between the letters being 
presented, participants had to verify simple mathematical problems (e.g., (2+2) – 1 = 
3). On each trial there were between 3–7 to-be-remembered items and mathematical 
problems presented on each trial; participants did not know how many letters and 
mathematical problems would be presented.  
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Symmetry span (SymSpan). In the SymSpan task, the to-be-remembered 
items were locations of red squares in a 4x4 grid of potential locations. The 
distractor task was to judge if shapes presented in between the to-be-remembered 
items, were symmetrical along their axes. Again, one to-be-remembered item 
followed by one distractor task were presented at a time. On each trial between 2–5 
to-be-remembered items and distractor tasks were presented, and again, participants 
did not know how many would be presented on each trial. 
 
Rotation span (RotSpan). In the RotSpan task the to-be-remembered items 
were arrows (short and long) pointing in one of eight different locations. The 
distractor task was to judge if presented letter, which was rotated, was correctly 
presented or whether it was a mirror image of the letter. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Examples of WMC taska (Operation, Symmetry, and Rotation Spans) 
used in the current experiment. This figure was taken from Foster et al., (2014, 
p.228). 
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Procedure. Participants attended a single session during which they 
performed three WMC tasks and the BI paradigm.  
 
Backward Inhibition paradigm.  A single trial consisted of a cue, stimulus, 
and response. Each trial started with a presentation of a black square frame inside 
which participants saw a cue—a shape of a square, triangle, or hexagon—for a 
duration of 150ms. The cue was followed by the appearance of a black circle in one 
of the inner corners of the frame. Participants had to make a spatial transformation of 
the black circle as per the cue; that is, they had to indicate in which inner corner of 
the black frame, would the circle move to, if it moved according to the direction that 
the cue represented (Figure 4.2). The numerical part of the keyboard was used for 
responses; each corner of the frame had one keyboard-key assigned which was 
spatially-congruent with the grid location; keys 1 (lower-left), 2 (lower-right), 4 
(upper-left), and 5 (upper-right). So, if the cue was the hexagon and the black circle 
was in the lower-left corner, the correct answer would be that the black circle would 
move to the upper-right corner. In this example the participant had to press the key 4 
to give the correct answer. As soon as the response was made, the stimulus 
participant made the judgment about and the cue disappeared; 150ms (RCI; 
response-cue interval) later another cue appeared in the center of the frame followed 
by another black circle. The cue was selected in a random fashion with a constraint 
that immediate repetitions could not occur (Philipp & Koch, 2006); the location of 
the target was chosen at random. If participants made an error, they saw “Error” 
message (1000ms). 
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Figure 4.2 Schematic overview of the BI paradigm (Mayr, 2002). The arrows 
indicate correct answers and they were used only for instruction purposes. Images 
are not to scale. 
 
 
Each participant performed 480 trials; to optimise participants’ performance 
(i.e., to avoid participants becoming fatigued) the trials were split into four blocks of 
120 trials in each, with breaks (participant-paced) between the blocks. Participants 
always switched between the three different judgments (i.e., horizontal, vertical, 
diagonal). It was emphasised to participants that they had to respond as fast and as 
accurate as possible.  Instructions were given to participants verbally, after which 
participants had a practice consisting of sixteen trials; if they made four or more 
errors during the first practice, they were offered another practice with sixteen trials; 
however, no more than two practices were allowed.  
The task on each current trial n was compared to the task on the n–2 trial 
allowing for trials to be registered as ABA or CBA sequences. Importantly, the E-
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Prime software compared the response that should have been pressed to the one 
participants pressed which was registered as correct or incorrect, as well as which 
corner was the response given in on each trial which was used to code for n–2 
response repetitions and n–2 response switches within ABA and CBA sequences.  
 
WMC tasks. All instructions for each of the tasks were given on the 
computer screen, after which participants practiced in each WMC task, one at a time. 
During each WMC task participants saw one block of between two and seven (or 
two to five) to-be-remembered items, one at a time, between of which presentation 
they had to perform a distractor task. Each experimental block started with the 
distractor tasks, followed by the to-be-remembered item. On each WMC measure, 
participants’ task was to memorise to-be-remembered items in the order that they 
were presented, at the same time maintaining their performance at 85% on the 
distractor task; participants recalled to-be-remembered items at the end of the run of 
presented items, that is, at the end of the block. Participants were given feedback on 
their performance on memory and distractor task throughout each block (through a 
score on the computer screen); maintaining high accuracy on the distractor task was 
important as that task was mean to stop participant rehearsing to-be-remembered 
items. 
Based on the scores from each of the WMC measures a composite-score was 
created for each participant; namely, each WM measure score was Z-transformed 
(separately for each measure); then, for each participant, transformed scores from 
Operation, Rotation, and Symmetry were added and divided by 3. Obtaining Z-
scores for each participant for each measure provides a better indication of each 
participant's ability level in a meaningful way.   
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Design. For the task-switching part of the experiment a within-subjects 
design was utilized to examine reaction times (RTs, ms) and accuracy (%) as 
dependent variables, and the Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) and Response (n–2 
Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response Switch) as independent variables. To analyse 
the relationship between the residual n–2 task repetition cost with the WMC, a 
frequentist and a Bayesian version of a correlation was conducted.  
 
Results 
 Data trimming. Data were trimmed for accuracy and RTs analyses. For the 
former one, the null-trials were removed; that is, the two trials at the beginning of 
each block, and two trials following an error. For the RTs analysis, as well as null 
trials, the error trials were removed; moreover, RTs faster than 150ms or slower than 
2.5 standard deviations above each participant’s mean per experimental cell were 
removed. All three types of data trimming have led to an overall of 11.3% trials 
removed (10.8% for n–2 Response Repetitions; 11.4% for n–2 Response Switches).  
 
Reaction time analysis. RTs were analysed via a two factor repeated 
measures ANOVA with factors: Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) and Response (n–2 
Response Repetition, RR vs. n–2 Response Switch, RS). Mean and standard errors 
for RTs and accuracy are provided in Table 4.1.  
The analysis revealed that there was a significant main effect of Task 
Sequence, F (1, 40) = 12.30, p = .01, ηg2 = .012; that is, the standard n–2 task 
repetition cost (i.e., not controlled for episodic retrieval) was present as participants 
responded faster performing CBA (1162ms) than ABA (1220ms). There was also a 
significant main effect of Response, F(1,40) = 13.17, p < .001, ηg2 = .004; that is, 
performance was overall faster for n–2 RR (1174ms) compared to n–2 RS (1208ms).  
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The interaction between the Task Sequence and Response was significant, F 
(1, 40) = 21.66, p < .001, ηg2 = .001. That is, the n–2 task repetition cost was 
considerably smaller for n–2 RR (8ms) compared to the n–2 task repetition cost for 
n–2 RS (123ms); this means that the finding from Grange et al. (2017) was 
replicated. Individual t-tests revealed that, the n–2 task repetition cost was not 
significant for n–2 RR, t (40) = 0.031, p = 1, 95%CI [-51, 53], as RTs for ABA 
averaged at 1175ms for ABA, and at 1166ms for CBA sequence; however it was 
significant for n–2 RS, t (40) = 8.6, p < .001, 95%CI [87, 141], as average RTs for 
ABA was 1272ms, and 1149ms for CBA sequence. That means, that controlling for 
Response within n–2 task repetitions reduced the standard n–2 task repetition cost to 
the point that it was no longer significant. See Figure 4.3 for ANOVA illustration 
and n–2 task repetition cost densities graphs. 
 
Table 4.1 Mean response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard error, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (n–2 RR) and n–2 
Response Switches (n–2 RS). 
 
 Task Sequence 
 ABA CBA 
 RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
   n–2 RR 1175 (90) 98.19 (.32) 1166 (97) 98.14 (.38) 
   n–2 RS 1272 (99) 96.91 (.41) 1149 (96) 98.05 (.30) 
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Figure 4.3 At the top: An illustration of a two-way interaction (RT; ms) between 
Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 
Response Switch). At the bottom: Density functions for RT n–2 task repetition costs 
n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. Error bars denote ±SE around 
the mean. 
 
Accuracy analysis. A two factor repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy 
revealed that the main effect of Task Sequence was “almost” significant, F (1, 40) = 
4.04, p =.051, ηg
2 = .014; the overall accuracy on ABA sequence was 97.55% and 
98.09% accuracy on CBA sequence. The main effect of Response was significant, 
F(1,40) = 5.97, p = .02, ηg
2 =  .023; that is, participants were more accurate for n–2 
RR (98.17% ) compared to n–2 RS (97.48%).  
The interaction between the Task Sequence and Response was significant, F 
(1, 40) = 5.90, p = .02, ηg
2=.017. Individual t-tests revealed that for n–2 RR—as it 
was observed in RT analysis—there was no significant difference on accuracy 
between ABA and CBA trials, t (40) = 0.15, p = .90, 95%CI [-0.007, 0.008]; 
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whereas, for n–2 RS accuracy differed significantly, t (40) = -3.3, p = .002, 95%CI [-
0.018, -0.004]. For n–2 RR there was an accuracy n–2 task repetition benefit of 
0.05%, and for n–2 RS there was an accuracy n–2 task repetition cost of -1.14%; 
specifically, accuracy under n–2 RR was comparable between ABA and CBA 
sequences (with a tendency to lead to a benefit), but for n–2 RS there was a clear 
standard n–2 task repetition cost as accuracy was lower for ABA compared to CBA 
sequence (see Figure 4.4 for ANOVA illustration and n–2 task repetition cost 
densities graphs).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 At the top: An illustration of a two-way interaction (accuracy; %) between 
Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 
Response Switch). At the bottom: Density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition 
costs n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. Error bars denote ±SE 
around the mean. 
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Standard correlations. As expected (Grange & Juvina, 2015) RT n–2 task-
repetitions costs varied considerably between participants, which was true for the 
standard (-104–327ms) and the residual n–2 task repetition costs (-495–357ms). 
Looking at densities graphs for participants’ individual performance (Figure 4.3–
4.4), apart from n–2 task repetition costs, n–2 task repetition benefits were observed 
too; this was more pronounced under n–2 RR condition (in 17 participants) 
compared to the n–2 RS (in 3 participants). There was no significant n–2 task 
repetition cost under n–2 RR but the standard n–2 task repetition cost was present, 
and there was a considerable variance in n–2 task repetition costs between 
participants, therefore it was decided that the correlation analysis of WMC and the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost was still warranted. 
The correlation between the n–task repetition controlled for episodic retrieval 
(i.e., the n–2 task repetition benefit) and the WMC was not significant (𝑟 = .09, 𝑛 =
41, 𝑝 = .57). The standard n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., the n–2 task repetition cost 
under n–2 RS) also did not correlate significantly with WMC 𝑟 =  .23, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 =
.14; Figure 4.5).   
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Figure 4.5 A visualization of correlations between RT n–2 task repetition costs and 
WMC. The lines represent the best-fitting linear regression lines, and the shaded 
areas reflect the 95%CI for each regression. On the top correlations for n–2 
Response Repetitions are presented, and the bottom for n–2 Response Switches. 
 
The BF10 for the correlation between the WM and the n–2 task repetition cost 
controlled for episodic retrieval was 0.1423, which means that the absence of 
correlation was 7.3 times more likely than the presence of it (this correlation was 
used as a stopping rule for data collection); for the correlation between WMC and 
the standard n–2 task repetition cost the BF10 was 0.3443; this indicates that there 
was an anecdotal-moderate evidence for the lack of correlation, with the absence of 
correlation being 2.9 times more likely than presence of it.  
For accuracy, as expected (Grange & Juvina, 2015) accuracy n–2 task 
repetitions varied considerably between participants for the standard and the n–2 task 
repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval; this was true for the standard 
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(ranged from -0.08% to .04%) and the n–2 task repetition costs controlled for 
episodic retrieval (which range from -0.04 to .07%). Again, looking at individual 
performance, apart from n–2 task repetition costs, n–2 task repetition benefits were 
observed as well; this was more pronounced under n–2 RR condition (in 29 
participants) compared to the n–2 RS condition (in 12 participants).  
 The n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval also did not 
significantly correlate with the WMC (𝑟 =  .01, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 =  .95).  Whereas, the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., the n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 Response 
Switches) did correlate significantly with WMC (𝑟 = .34, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 =  .03); see 
Figure 4.6. The latter correlation did not stay significant when p value was adjusted 
for multiple tests (the corrected p-value for the correlation was .025). 
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Figure 4.6 A visualization of correlations between accuracy n–2 task repetition costs 
and WMC. The lines represent the best-fitting linear regression lines, and the shaded 
areas reflect the 95%CI for each regression. On the top correlations for n–2 
Response Repetitions are presented, and the bottom for n–2 Response Switches. 
 
The BF10 for the correlation between the WM and the n–2 task repetition cost 
controlled for episodic retrieval was 0.122, which means that the absence of 
correlation was 8.2 times more likely than the presence of it; for the correlation 
between WMC and for the standard n–2 task repetition cost the was 1.275; the BF10 
indicates that there was no decisive evidence for either of the hypotheses (i.e., the 
absence and present of correlation).  
 
Bayesian correlation estimation. To strengthen the results from the 
correlation analysis, a Bayesian parameter estimation for correlation between the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost and WMC was conducted. With this alternative 
statistical method, a model representing a correlation is devised, where prior 
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information (e.g., multivariate normal distribution based on means and standard 
deviations of the variables of interest) is utilized to estimate modelling and 
correlation coefficient parameters. The advantage of Bayesian correlation parameter 
estimation is that rather than having a single correlation coefficient point, a posterior 
distribution of estimated parameters and correlation are obtained with information on 
how the uncertainty of parameter estimates (i.e., 95% Highest-Density Interval). 
To perform Bayesian parameter estimation for a correlation, the n–2 task 
repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval, and WMC scores for individual 
participants were entered into a program called jags (Just Another Gibbs Sampler). 
This program takes a model of correlation between variables of interest with 
predictive priors on what patterns in the data are expected (e.g., how data are 
distributed); in this study, default priors within jags were used (e.g., that the 
correlation coefficient parameters are equally likely between -1 and 1, Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2013). Using priors and observed data, jags estimated the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval, WMC, and correlation parameters 
with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC; 5000 iterations) simulation, a 
computer-driven sampling method. Sample values for MSMC were taken from 
posterior distributions of n–2 task repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval, 
WMC, and correlation. The estimated parameters of n–2 task repetition cost 
controlled for episodic retrieval and WMC fitted the observed data well.  
The results showed that, the median of the Bayesian estimated correlation 
coefficient posterior predictive distribution was 𝑟 = .079; this is lower compared to 
the single point estimate correlation coefficient obtained in the standard correlation 
analysis.  The BF10 for this correlation coefficient estimation is 0.1371, which means 
that the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between WMC and the n–2 task 
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repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval is over 7 times (1/ 0.1371) more 
likely than the alternative that there is a correlation between these two variables.  
 
Discussion 
 Importantly for the Experiment 5, the findings from Grange and colleagues 
(in press.) that the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by episodic retrieval has 
been replicated; that is, the n–2 task repetition cost was reduced with episodic 
retrieval matches (n–2 RR), compared to mismatches (n–2 RS). Specifically, the n–2 
task repetition cost was reduced so much under episodic matches that performance 
on ABA and CBA sequence was comparable; whereas, for episodic mismatches 
performance was worse for ABA compared to CBA sequence (as seen in the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost).  
The variability of the magnitude of n–2 task repetition costs fitted well with 
the observation from Grange and Juvina (2015) on individual differences in the n–2 
task repetition cost. WMC scores also showed a good range of variability. The 
correlation analysis showed—and was confirmed by the Bayesian estimation of a 
correlation coefficient parameter—that n–2 task repetition costs were not associated 
with WMC; this finding supports evidence from Grange and Houghton (n.d.), and 
Pettigrew et al. (2015). This pattern of results was shown for both the standard and 
the n–2 task repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval. However, in light with 
the evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., the standard and the residual type) 
is not reliable at an individual level (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapters 2-3 of 
this thesis), it is possible that the lack of the correlation between n–2 task repetition 
costs and WMC was due to the former being not reliable; also, with the n–2 task 
repetition cost being a difference score—which are argued to be difficult to interpret 
(Crawford et al., 2008)—there is an issue around if and whether n–2 task repetition 
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cost are meaningful. As yet questions surrounding these issues are not answered, but 
researchers should be aware of them. Despite these uncertainties, some speculations 
about the results from Experiment 5 can be made.  
Even though the average n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic 
retrieval was very small and was statistically non-significant, its magnitude varied 
considerably between participants; that is, large n–2 task repetition costs as well as 
n–2 task repetition benefits were observed, as well as an n–2 task repetition cost 
approaching zero. Therefore, the lack of significant correlation between WMC and 
n–2 task repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval could not have been due to 
absence of individual differences in n–2 task repetition costs. The standard n–2 task 
repetition costs showed less variation than the n–2 task repetition costs controlled for 
episodic retrieval; this was mainly due to less people showing n–2 task repetition 
benefit (3 participants), compared to the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for 
episodic retrieval (17 participants).  Numerically, the standard n–2 task repetition 
cost was more associated with WMC (in RTs and accuracy) than was the n–2 task 
repetition cost when controlled for episodic retrieval. At this stage it is speculative, 
but these results may indicate that when performance on task-switching is facilitated 
through episodic matches, there may be less need for WM to deal with conflicting 
task sets, as task sets’ episodic traces are automatically retrieved.  
Unlike in Grange and Houghton’s (n.d.) study, the current study did not 
manipulate WML during task-switching; this means that, based on results from the 
current study, which only looked at association between the WMC and inhibition, 
limited conclusions can be made about the relationship between those two factors. 
The n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval not being related to 
WMC does not necessarily mean that this effect is not modulated by attentional 
resources; that is, individual differences in WMC did not seem to influence the 
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magnitude of n–2 task repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval; however, at 
this stage it cannot be ascertained whether limiting WM resources (achieved via 
experimental manipulation of WM load) would influence the efficiency of task-
switching and/or inhibition. Specifically, it is possible that exhausting WM 
resources—rather than looking at individual differences in WMC—will have an 
effect on whether and how much inhibition is deployed.  
 
Task-switching and articulatory suppression (AS). Task-switching 
research shows (Baddeley et al., 2001; Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Butler et al., 2011; 
Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Goschke, 2000; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Miyake et al., 
2004; Saeki & Saito, 2004a, 2004b) that increasing WML—for example, with an 
articulatory task which involves task-irrelevant utterances—increases the SC, which 
has been interpreted as evidence that WM is important for task-switching. This is 
thought to be because of an aspect of WM known as the phonological loop—an 
important mechanism for rehearsal and maintenance of a task’s representation in 
WM (Injoque-Ricle, Barreyro, Formoso, & Jaichenco, 2015; Kirkham, Breeze, & 
Marí-Beffa, 2012)—is likely to be affected adversely by AS. The phonological loop 
acts as inner speech which aids performance on tasks through sub-verbal rehearsal of 
information needed for task execution; as such, introduction of AS interferes with 
phonological loop because it is very difficult to perform verbalisation at the same 
time as rehearsing information sub-verbally, hence performance is no longer 
facilitated through the phonological loop (e.g., SC increases).  
From research on multitasking, using a virtual environment setting (i.e., 
Virtual Errands Test, Law, Logie, & Pearson, 2006) it was shown that when people 
were required to complete different goals (i.e., simple errands) when simultaneously 
having to do a secondary task (e.g., AS), the performance on the primary task was 
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negatively affected. This was interpreted as evidence that AS—which was used to 
increase WML—was interfering with the phonological loop and making people not 
being able to “rehearse” the representations of goals they needed to complete for the 
primary tasks. Furthermore, in the same study it was noted that the phonological 
loop seemed particularly important for early stages of learning a given task; that is, 
the primary task was most affected by AS if the primary task was not previously 
performed on its own. This gives further evidence that WM resources are important 
for shifting between goals, especially in relatively unpractised tasks.  In another 
study (Soto & Humphreys, 2008) it has been shown that WM seems to facilitate 
even visual selection tasks; specifically, if AS was added as a secondary task, 
performance on visual search was reduced. This was taken as evidence that WM is 
necessary for visual selection too. Together, in general, these studies show that 
WML can be manipulated with AS—which interferes WM’s phonological loop—
which can affect performance on cognitive tasks requiring shifting between tasks, 
maintaining goals in mind, and as well as task involving visual search.  
Using AS and foot-tapping manipulations (Goschke, 2000; Kirkham et al., 
2012), an unpublished study demonstrated that preparation does not affect the n–2 
task repetition cost (Grange, n.d.). Assuming that sub-verbalisation is important for 
task preparation and that n–2 task repetition cost can be reduced with preparation, 
AS should hinder performance on cognitive tasks by influencing preparation stage in 
task-switching. Importantly, it was shown that task-switching performance on BI 
paradigm can be successfully manipulated with AS (i.e., performance was slower 
under AS condition compared to control condition). In terms of the n–2 task 
repetition cost, it was also shown that AS had no effect on n–2 task repetition cost. 
That is, assuming that sub-verbalisation is important for task preparation and that n–
2 task repetition cost can be reduced with preparation, AS should have increased the 
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n–2 task repetition cost, but it only slowed participants’ performance; as such, it was 
concluded that preparation does not affect the n–2 task repetition cost.  
In terms of specific mechanisms responsible for worse performance on 
cognitive tasks (e.g., task-switching) under conditions of AS (which are thought to 
hinder WM processing) can be due to a few different reasons, some of which are 
introduced next. For example, assuming that the phonological loop is important for 
retrieval of task-sets—as it can facilitate  response selection (e.g., verbal self-cuing, 
Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 2004)—if a given task’s representation cannot be 
retrieved effectively, conflict in response selection may be present, hence more 
inhibition may be needed. More inhibition would also be required if the task could 
not be activated/ maintained effectively—that is, not activated to a stronger threshold 
than alternative, currently not relevant tasks’ thresholds—because other task 
representations may lead to more interference (Bryck & Mayr, 2005; Emerson & 
Miyake, 2003). Alternatively, assuming that phonological loop manipulations 
interfere with how effectively WM works (Baddeley, 1996; Repovs & Baddeley, 
2006), and that inhibition is dependent on WM (e.g., Conway & Engle, 1994), if task 
representations cannot be maintained through rehearsal (i.e., under AS creating high 
WML)—making representations weakly activated—less interference would be 
expected and, hence less inhibition to resolve it. 
Also, assuming that WM is important for accessing a task’s information form 
LTM (Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al., 2004; Saeki & 
Saito, 2004a), those WM resources are particularly needed for performing tasks with 
abstract cues, that is cues which do not have pre-experimental associations to the 
task. This is because cues are used to retrieve task-relevant information which is then 
manipulated and matched to demands of a current task (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003), 
which is thought to take place in WM (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kane et al., 2007; 
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Mayr & Keele, 2000; Monsell, 2003). Therefore, it is believed that performance on 
task-switching would be expected to be most sensitive to WML manipulations in 
paradigms which utilise abstract cues of which interpretation requires endogenous 
control; and tasks which can be performed via exogenous processes (i.e., stimulus 
driven responses) would not require the involvement of WM, as goals can be 
achieved via retrieval of information directly from long term memory (LTM). 
Above mentioned literature would imply that interfering with retrieval stage 
in task-switching (e.g., with AS) should affect preparation; and since the n–2 task 
repetition cost has been shown to be modulated by episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 
2017; Chapter 2–4 of this thesis), it was of interest to examine whether the episodic 
retrieval effect on the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by AS. Grange (n.d.) 
would suggest that AS does not affect the n–2 task repetition cost, however, the BI 
paradigm used in that study did not control for episodic retrieval, therefore it is 
uncertain whether it was the n–2 task repetition cost or the episodic retrieval not 
being affected by AS.  
In an attempt to further understand if WM has a role in driving the n–2 task 
repetition cost (i.e., cognitive inhibition), Experiment 6 was designed to manipulate 
WML by introducing AS to a BI paradigm. This secondary task should interfere with 
WM resources (e.g., the phonological loop) affecting task-switching performance in 
the following ways. If the residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition—
speculated to rely on WM resources (Conway & Engle, 1994)—smaller residual n–2 
task repetition cost should be observed under condition of High WML compared to 
Low WML. If the extent to which inhibition is deployed depends on how efficiently 
a task’s parameters are retrieved, activated, or maintained in WM, we should also see 
larger residual and standard n–2 task repetition costs in High WML compared to 
Low WML. However, if the residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects exogenous 
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processes (i.e., automatic), we would expect to see no effect of WML on the residual 
n–2 task repetition cost. Also, since episodic retrieval modulates the n–2 task 
repetition cost more under non-transparent cues compared to transparent cues 
(Grange et al., 2017), the AS is expected to interfere with that modulation if episodic 
retrieval depends on WM involvement.  
WML was manipulated by adding AS to a BI paradigm; the High WML 
condition required different days of the week to be uttered in a random order whilst 
switching between tasks, and the Low WML condition required saying the word 
“Sunday” whilst task-switching. The two WML conditions were meant to differ in 
terms of the level of the demand put on WM; in the Low WML repeating a word 
“Sunday” requires less control and WM manipulation than generating different day 
of the week in the High WML. As such, both AS conditions were expected to 
interfere with preparation stage of task-switching, but Low WML was meant to 
interfere less than the High WML. This is the first time when WML is manipulated 
in this manner within the BI paradigm.  
 
Experiment 6 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-one participants were recruited from Keele University 
in exchange for partial course credits. Participants were at least 18-years-old (Mean 
18.68, SD 0.70; 22 females), understood spoken and written English, and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. Data of eight participants were removed due to 
incomplete data (i.e., participants whom performed only one WML condition during 
testing), and data of three were removed due to accuracy being lower than required 
80%; a total of twenty participants were used in the main analysis.   
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Stopping rule. As in Experiments 2–5, the sample size for the current 
experiment was determined via BFs for a set of probable Bayesian factorial analysis 
of variance models (Rouder et al., 2016).  
First, using Rouder and colleagues’ method (with default priors) four 
different models explaining data were examined, with the n–2 task repetition cost as 
DV, and Response and WML as IVs. The four models were: 1) the full model—of 
most interest to this experiment—consisted of the main effect of Response, main 
effect of WML, and the interaction between them; 2) main effects of Response and 
WML; 3) main effect of Response; and 4) main effect of WML. In each model, the 
random effect of participants was added too, which was the common denominator 
against the models. The BF10 is calculated as a ratio of the model’s evidence—given 
data—against the common denominator.  
As in previous experiments which used BFs for a stopping rule, the initial 
sample of twenty participants collected before the initial BFs calculation. Data 
collection stopped when one of the criterions was reached; that is, when BF10 was 
below 1/6 or over 6, or results were inconclusive at eighty participants were tested. 
At the 31st participant data collection stopped as the BF10 was 0.08223; this is below 
1/6, indicating that one of the alternative models fitted data better than the full 
model. Specifically, data were about eleven times more likely explained with the 
main effect of WML, rather than the full model (i.e., the interaction between the n–2 
task repetition cost, Response, and WML. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and the stimuli in the BI paradigm 
were the same as in Experiment 5.  
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Procedure. Participants attended a single session (1 hour) during which they 
performed two versions of the BI paradigm adapted to manipulate WML; one with 
High WML and one with Low WML.  
 
Backward Inhibition paradigm.  This paradigm was the same as in 
Experiment 5, with exception that instead of 480 trials, participants performed 360 
trials. The number of trials was changed due to time constraints. Participant-paced 
breaks were provided in between the blocks of 120 trials.  
 
WM load. The WML was manipulated by introducing AS into the BI 
paradigm creating two conditions, High and Low WML. In the High WML 
condition, participants said different days of the week in a random order, one day per 
second. In the Low WML condition participants said the word “Sunday”, once per 
second. Before the practice a metronome was played for participants to get an idea of 
what one word per second feels like. Participants were instructed to perform task-
switching and AS simultaneously, but they could not synchronise performance on 
both; that is, they were asked not to synchronise their responses with verbalizations. 
As such, they were told, if they made a mistake on task-switching, they were to 
continue with verbalization, and if they made a mistake verbalizing, they had to 
continue with task-switching. Participants stopped verbalizations during the breaks. 
The order of WML conditions was counterbalanced between participants.  
 
Design. A within-subjects design was utilized to examine RTs (milliseconds) 
and accuracy (%) as dependent variables, and the Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), 
Response (n–2 Response Repetition, RR vs. n–2 Response Switch, RS), and WML 
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(High WML vs. Low WML) as independent variables. Performance was analysed 
via three-factor repeated measures ANOVA.  
 
Results 
 Data trimming. Data of participants who scored less than 80% on accuracy 
were removed. This criterion is different than the one used in Experiment 5 because 
it was uncertain how much WML manipulation would influence performance on 
task-switching. Therefore, to include as much data as possible, the overall accuracy 
criterion was lowered from 90% to 80%. As in Experiment 5, null-trials and two 
trials after an error, were removed for accuracy analysis; followed with error-trials, 
RTs less than 150ms, and RTs slower than 2.5 standard deviations from participant’s 
mean/ per experimental condition, being removed for RTs analysis. Overall, 33.95% 
of trials were removed, 27.79% from High WML (27.45% for n–2 RR; 27.89% for 
n–2 RS), and 20.26% for Low WML (17.09% for n–2 RR; 20.45% for n–2 RS). 
There were considerably more trials removed in data trimming in this investigation 
compared to Experiment 5; this could be attributed to WML manipulation which 
likely interfered with task-switching. For example, participants made more errors in 
Experiment 6 (accuracy around 92%) compared to Experiment 5 (98%), and since 
two trials after every error are removed, more trials were removed as a consequence 
of lower accuracy.  
 
Reaction times analysis. For means and standard errors of RTs and accuracy 
(%) see Table 4.2.  
A three-factor repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the main effect of 
Task Sequence was significant, F (1, 19) = 6.19, p = .02, ηg
2 =. 005 (ABA 1411ms; 
CBA 1350ms); but the main effect of Response was not significant, F (1, 19) = 1.20, 
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p = .29, ηg
2 = .001 (n–2 RR 1395ms; n–2 RS 1366ms). However, the main effect of 
WML was significant, F (1, 19) = 45.39, p < .001, ηg
2  =. 44, as performance was 
faster for Low WML (1016ms) compared to High WML (1745ms). This means that 
the WML manipulation worked.  
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response was not significant, F 
(1, 19) = 0.23, p = .64,  ηg2 < .001; under n–2 RR the n–2 task repetition cost was 
52ms (ABA, 1421ms and CBA 1369ms), and under n–2 RS the n–2 task repetition 
cost was 70ms (ABA 1401ms and CBA 1331ms); against a recent study that showed 
that the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 
2017). The interaction between Task Sequence and WML was also not significant, F 
(1, 19) = 0.19, p = .67, ηg2 < 001; under High WML the n–2 task repetition cost was 
47ms (ABA 1769ms and CBA 1722ms), and under Low WML the n–2 task 
repetition cost was 74ms (ABA 1053ms and CBA 979ms). Response did not interact 
significantly with WML, F (1, 19) = 0.48, p = .50, ηg2 = .001; under High WML 
average performance on n–2 RR was 1770ms and on n–2 RS it was 1720, whereas 
under Low WML performance on n–2 RR was 1011ms and on n–2 RS it was 
1020ms. The three-way interaction between Task Sequence, Response and WML 
was also not significant, F (1, 19) = 0.17, p = .68, ηg2 < .001 (Figure 4.7). RTs 
density functions for n–2 task repetition costs (n–2 RR and n–2 RS), for High and 
Low WML are depicted in Figure 4.8.  
 
 
231 
 
Table 4.2 Mean Response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard errors, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (RR) and n–2 Response 
Switches (RS), for High and Low WML. 
 
   Task sequence  
 ABA CBA 
WM load RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
High      
   n–2 RR 1773 (302) 91.70 (.018) 1733 (284) 89.93 (.017) 
   n–2 RS 1735 (276) 90.40 (.015) 1660 (268) 91.30 (.013) 
Low     
   n–2 RR 1056 (126) 94.50 (.009) 960 (110) 93.90 (.015) 
   n–2 RS 1029 (114) 92.90 (.014) 974 (118) 95.10 (.01) 
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Figure 4.7 At the top, an illustration of a non-significant three-way interaction 
between Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–
2 Response Switch) and WML (High vs Low) for RTs. At the bottom, n–2 task 
repetition costs varying across Response and WML. Error bars de-note ±SE around 
the mean.  
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Figure 4.8 Density functions for RT n–2 task repetition costs for High and Low 
WML under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
 
Log-RT analysis. Since there was a considerable difference in RTs between 
Low WML and High WML, RTs were log-transformed and a three-way ANOVA 
was repeated. This analysis showed a significant main effect of Task Sequence, F (1, 
19) = 14.38, p < .01, ηg
2  = .01 (ABA 7.19, CBA 7.13). The main effect of Response 
remained non-significant, F (1, 19) = 0.50 p = .49, ηg
2 < .001 (n–2 RR 7.17, n–2 RS 
7.16). And, the main effect of WML became larger, F (1, 19) = 69.19, p < .001, ηg
2 = 
.50 (High WML 7.42, Low WML 6.90).  
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response remained non-
significant, F (1, 19) = 0.49, p = .49, ηg2 < .001; under n–2 RR, ABA was 7.19 and 
CBA was 7.14, whereas, under n–2 RS, ABA was 7.19 and for CBA it was 7.12. The 
interaction between Task Sequence and WML also remained non-significant, F (1, 
19) = 1.62, p = .22, ηg2 = .002; under High WML ABA was 7.43 compare to CBA 
234 
 
7.40, and under Low WML ABA was 6.94 compared to CBA of 6.87. The 
interaction between Response and WML remained non-significant too, F (1, 19) = 
0.13, p = .72, ηg2   > .001; for High WML n–2 RR averaged log-RT was 7.43 and for 
n–2 RS it was 7.41, for Low WML, n–2 RR log-RT was 6.1 and for n–2 RS it was 
6.90. Lastly, the three-way ANOVA was also non-significant, F (1, 19) = 0.28, p = 
.61, ηg2   <. 001 (see Figure 4.9). 
 
 
Figure 4.9 At the top, an illustration of a non-significant three-way interaction 
between Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–
2 Response Switch) and WML (High vs Low) for log-RT. At the bottom, n–2 task 
repetition costs varying across Response and WML. Error bars de-note ±SE around 
the mean. 
 
Accuracy. A three-factors repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed 
the following results. The main effect of Task Sequence was non-significant, F (1, 
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19) = 0.01, p = .93, ηg
2 = .0001; that is, average accuracy on ABA sequence was 
92.36% and 92.41% on CBA sequences. There was no main effect of Response, F 
(1, 19) = 0.04, p = .84, ηg
2= .0001; that is, for n–2 RR accuracy was 92.32% and for 
n–2 RS it was 92.44%. However, the main effect of WML was significant, F (1, 19) 
= 13.20, p = .002, ηg
2= .07; that is, participants were more accurate for Low WML 
(94.10%) compared to High WML (90.66%) condition.   
There interaction between the Task Sequence and Response was significant, 
F (1, 19) = 6.10, p = .02, ηg
2=. 02, showing that the n–2 task repetition cost was 
modulated by episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 2017). Individual t-tests revealed that 
for n–2 RR there was no significant difference in accuracy on ABA (93.07%) vs. 
CBA sequences (91.57%) with a trend for n–2 task repetition benefit present, t (39) 
= 1.4, p = .20, 95%CI [-0.006, 0.036]; whereas, for n–2 RS there was a significant 
difference between accuracy on ABA (91.64%) compared to CBA (93.24%) 
sequences, t (39) = -3.1, p = .004, 95%CI [-0.026384, -0.005582]. The interaction 
between Task Sequence and WML was not significant F (1, 19) = 2.33, p = .14, 
ηg
2 =. 004 (under High WML accuracy on ABA was 91.01% and for CBA it was 
90.31%; under Low WML accuracy was 93.70% for ABA and 94.50% for CBA); 
the interaction between Response and WML was also not significant, F (1, 19) = 
0.28, p = .60, ηg
2 <. 001 (under High WML accuracy for n–2 RR was 90.47% and for 
n–2 RS it was 90.85%; whereas under Low WML for n–2 RR it was 94.18% and for 
n–2 RS it was 94.03%). Lastly, the three-way interaction (Task Sequence, Response, 
WML) was not significant, F (1,19) = 0.05, p = .82, ηg
2< .001 (Figure 4.10). 
Accuracy density functions for n–2 task repetition costs (n–2 RR and n–2 RS), for 
High and Low WML are depicted in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.10 At the top, an illustration of results from the three-way ANOVA analysis 
of accuracy. The main effect of WML and interaction between Task Sequence and 
Response were significant. At the bottom, the illustration of n–2 task repetition costs 
for n–2 Response Repetition and n–2 Response Switches under High and Low WML 
conditions. Error bars de-note ±SE around the mean.  
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Figure 4.11 Density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for High and 
Low WML under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
 
Bayes factors. Table 4.3 presents the results from the Bayesian comparison 
of n–2 task repetition costs being explained by four different models (see Stopping 
Rule section for details). For completeness, BF10 is reported for log-RT and 
accuracy, as well as RTs. The Bayesian analysis supports the frequentists’ analysis 
of variance of RTs; the n–2 task repetition cost was over twelve times more likely 
(1/.08224) to be explained by the model with the main effect of WML than the full 
model (main effect of WML, main effect of Response, and interaction between 
them). The model with the main effect of Response was over eleven times more 
likely (1/.08931) than the full model. The log-RT analysis favored the model with 
the main effect of WML, which was over ten times more likely (1/.09508) than the 
full model. In terms of accuracy, the result was that accuracy n–2 task repetition 
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costs were over six times more likely (1/.1604) explained by the main effect of 
WML than the full model.  
 
Table 4.3 Bayes factors (BF) for models predicting the n–2 task repetition cost as the 
dependent variable and Response and WML as IVs reaction time—RTs, log-RT—
and accuracy; the BFs for log-RT and accuracy, are reported for completeness. The 
reported models were compared to a common denominator of the n–2 task repetition 
cost predicted by a random effect of Participant. “+” indicates an addition of an 
effect, and “*” indicates an interaction. 
N–2 task repetition cost Model BF 
 
RTs 
Response (1) 0.2442 
WML (2) 0.2652 
R + WML (3) 0.06544 
R + WML + R * WML (4) 0.02181 
 
log-RT 
Response (1) 0.2713 
WML (2) 0.6652 
R + WML (3) 0.1789 
R + WML + R * WML (4) 0.06325 
 
Accuracy 
 
Response (1) 0.47889 
WML (2) 6.24923 
R + WML (3) 3.13698 
R + WML + R * WML (4) 1.00258 
 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 6 further investigated the relationship between n–2 task 
repetition costs and WM; this was achieved by manipulating WML within the BI 
paradigm. There were two WML conditions which required participants to utter one 
word per second; in the High WML condition participants said out loud different 
days of the week in a random order, and in the Low WML condition participants said 
word “Sunday”. Assuming that n–2 task repetition cost (controlled for episodic 
retrieval) reflect inhibition which depends on WM (Conway & Engle, 1994), it was 
239 
 
hypothesised that Low WML would not interfere with how much inhibition is 
deployed during task-switching, whereas the High WML condition should exhaust 
WM resources which should result in less WM resources left for inhibition 
deployment. The main prediction was that inhibition—as reflected via the n–2 task 
repetition cost—would be smaller under the High WML compared to Low WML 
condition.  
The results were as follows; the n–2 task repetition cost was present at RT 
but not accuracy level, where performance on ABA and CBA was comparable. The 
WML manipulation seemed to have worked because performance was considerably 
slower and less accurate under High WML compared to Low WML; there was no 
overall effect of Response though, as performance was similar under n–2 RR and n–
2 RS. There was a partial effect of Response (i.e., episodic retrieval) on the n–2 task 
repetition cost; that is, the accuracy n–2 task repetition cost was modulated by 
episodic retrieval—no n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR but present for n–2 
RS—but for RT performance this cost was not modulated, although numerically the 
n–2 task repetition cost was smaller under n–2 RR compared to n–2 RS. The WML 
did not affect the n–2 task repetition cost, although numerically it was lower under 
High WML compared to Low WML; moreover, Bayesian analysis of variance for 
RT and accuracy performance showed that the n–2 task repetition cost was more 
likely explained by the WML manipulation than the alternative explanation (i.e., 
main effect of Response/ WML and interaction between them). In terms of the 
episodic retrieval, it did not seem to be affected by WML; however, numerically 
performance was slower under High relative to Low WML, with RTs being 
comparable under n–2 RR and n–2 RS in the Low WML condition but in High 
WML condition RTs for n–2 RR were considerably faster under n–2 RR than n–2 
RS.  
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 Experiment 6 presented with some difficulties; namely it was found that, the 
WML manipulation used resulted in data being “noisy”. That is, performance was 
much slower in High WML compared to Low WML, and almost a third of 
participants did not complete one of the WML conditions in the allocated time. This 
indicates that perhaps the WML manipulation was too difficult and might have 
interfered with task-switching more than intended. Also, the n–2 task repetition cost 
did not seem to be modulated by episodic retrieval as it has been shown by other 
studies (Grange et al., 2017; Experiments 2–5 of this thesis); and assuming that the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost is a truer reflection of inhibition—which was 
hypothesised to be influenced by WML in the current study—it is difficult to 
interpret the results of Experiment 6 clearly or confidently, because the residual n–2 
task repetition cost was not present, and this is the first investigation of this sort.  
 Experiment 7 aimed to yet again manipulate WML but this time using what 
is considered an easier WML manipulation. Assuming that the High WML condition 
was too difficult in Experiment 6, Experiment 7 aimed to manipulate WML using a 
simpler AS for High WML and a motor task for Low WML. For the Low WML 
condition, “foot tapping” was chosen as a suitable secondary task, and for High 
WML “blah blah blah” AS was chosen. Foot tapping is considered a suitable control 
condition for the current study as it is believed not to require executive functioning, 
it is simple to perform (Baddeley, 1986, 1990), it has been previously used as a 
control task in task-switching studies looking at SC and WM (e.g., Miyake et al., 
2004; Saeki et al., 2006), and it is not meant to disrupt WM’s phonological loop 
hypothesised to be potentially important for explaining individual differences in the 
n–2 task repetition cost.  
For Experiment 7 it was speculated that if n–2 task repetition costs are 
present, they are expected to be modulated by episodic retrieval, and that inhibition 
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(as reflected in residual n–2 task repetition cost) should be modulated by WML. 
Specifically, the residual n–2 task repetition cost was expected not be affected by 
foot tapping compared to the AS condition which was expected to decrease residual 
n–2 task repetition costs; that is if residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition, 
and if inhibition relies on WM resources.   
 
Experiment 7 
Method 
Participants. Twenty participants were recruited from Keele University in 
exchange for partial course credits. Participants were at least 18-years-old (Mean 
19.25, SD 1.25; 17 females), understood spoken and written English, and had normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants’ data were used in analysis. 
 
Stopping rule. As in Experiments 2–6, the sample size for the current 
investigation was determined via BFs; specifically, BFs were obtained through the 
Bayesian factorial analysis of variance (Rouder et al., 2016). The procedure and data 
collection stopping criteria were the same as in previous experiments.  
The four models compared were: 1) the full model of the main effects of 
Response/ WML (i.e., Foot Tapping, FT vs. AS), and an interaction between them; 
2) the main effects of WML and Response; 3) the main effect of WML:; and 4) the 
main effect of Response. In each model, the random effect of participants was added; 
and, the model explaining residual n–2 task repetition costs as random effects was 
used as a common denominator.  
As in Experiment 1 and 2 data were collected from a sample of twenty 
participants, with intention to collect more data, before the initial BF analysis was 
conducted (Schönbrodt et al., 2015). At twenty participants, the BF10 for the 
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alternative model (i.e., the full model) compared to the alternative model (i.e., the 
main effect of Response), was 0.159; which translates to the alternative model being 
2.37 times more likely than the full model. The BF10 just about reached one of the 
two criteria (BF10 at < 1/6 or < 6) which is interpreted as anecdotal evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis. Data collection stopped at twenty participants due to ethical 
approval expiration before more data were collected. 
 
Procedure. Participants attended a single 1-hour session during which they 
performed two BI paradigms, each with a different WML; the Foot Tapping (FT) 
and Articulatory Suppression (AS). The task-switching procedure was the same as in 
Experiments 5–6. As in Experiment 6 there were three blocks of 120 trials in each 
for AS and FT condition. 
The AS condition involved performing BI paradigm with added verbalisation 
which was saying “blah blah blah” once per second. Once participants practiced 
verbalisation, they moved on to practicing task-switching; they were asked to carry 
out task-switching practice with verbalisation. As in Experiment 6, participants were 
asked to not synchronise the response with verbalisation. 
The FT condition involved doing BI whilst tapping the right foot, aiming to 
make one tap per second. Participants practiced foot tapping, and then task-switching 
with foot tapping, before they went on to do the actual experiment. 
 
Design. A within-subjects design was utilized to examine RTs (milliseconds) 
and accuracy (%) as dependent variables, and the Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), 
Response (n–2 Response Repetition, RR vs. n–2 Response Switch, RS), and WML 
(FT vs. AS) as independent variables. Performance was analysed via three-way 
repeated measures ANOVA. 
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Results 
 Data trimming. As in experiments 1–6 data were trimmed in terms of null 
trials, accuracy and RTs. Overall, this led to a removal of 19.4% of trials; from that, 
20.8% trials were removed from AS condition (20.6% n–2 RR; 20.3% n–2 RS), and 
18.1% from FT condition (21.5% n–2 RR; 20% n–2 RS). 
 
 Reaction times analysis. RTs analysis revealed that there was a main effect 
of Task Sequence, F (1, 19) = 24.44, p < .001, ηg
2 = .019, as performance was faster 
on CBA (947ms) compared to ABA (1012ms) sequence. Response had no 
significant effect on RTs, F (1,19) = 0.50, p > .4, ηg
2 = .001 (n–2 RR 975ms; n–2 RS 
985ms). The WML also had no significant effect on RTs, F (1,19) = 0.15, p > .7, ηg
2 
= .001 (AS 972ms ; FT 988ms). 
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response was non-significant, F 
(1,19) = 2.42, p > .1, ηg
2 = .002 (n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 RR, 45ms and for n–
2 RS, 85ms). The interaction between Task Sequence and WML was also non-
significant, F (1,19) = 0.80, p > .3, ηg
2 = .001 (n–2 task repetition cost for AS, 
51.3ms and for FT 78.7ms). The interaction between Response and WML was not 
significant, F (1,19) = 0.005, p > .9, ηg
2 = .000 (numerically RTs were faster for 
Response Repetitions; by 9.3ms for AS, and 11.9ms for FT). 
The three-way interaction between the Task Sequence, Response, and WML 
was not significant, F (1,19) = 0.56, p > .4, ηg
2 = .001 (the n–2 task repetition cost 
was smaller for Response Repetitions for both AS and FT). The visualization of the 
three-way interaction, as well as n–2 task repetitions costs are displayed in Figure 
4.12. For densities of n–2 task repetition costs see Figure 4.13; and for descriptive 
statistics, see Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Mean Response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard errors, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (RR) and n–2 Response 
Switches (RS), for FT (foot taping) and AS (articulatory suppression).   
   Task sequence  
 ABA   CBA 
WML RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
FT      
   n–2 RR 1033 (134) 96.65 (.009) 952 (108) 95.10 (.01) 
   n–2 RS 1030 (119) 93.90 (.009) 946 (112) 95.70 (.007) 
AS     
   n–2 RR 970 (108) 93.20 (.016) 966 (121) 94.50 (.012) 
   n–2 RS 1026 (117) 92.70 (.011) 935 (104) 94.80 (.008) 
  
245 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 At the top, an illustration of a non-significant three-way interaction 
between Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–
2 Response Switch) and WML (AS vs. FT) for RTs. At the bottom, n–2 task 
repetition costs varying across Response and WML. Error bars de-note ±SE around 
the mean.  
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Figure 4.13 Density functions for RT n–2 task repetition costs for Articulatory 
Suppression (AS) and Foot Tapping (FT) under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 
Response Switches. 
 
 Accuracy analysis. The three-way ANOVA revealed that there was a 
significant main effect of Task Sequence, F(1,19) = 6.01, p < .02, ηg
2  = .011, as 
participants were less accurate on ABA (94.05%) compared to CBA (95.04%) 
sequence. The main effect of Response was not significant F(1,19) = 0.80, p > .38, 
ηg
2= .004 (94.80% for n–2 RR and 94.30% for n-2 RS). The WML had a significant 
main effect on RTs, F(1,19) = 4.91, p < .04, ηg
2= .03, as participants had lower 
accuracy on task-switching under FT (93.80%) than on AS (95.30%) task.  
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response was significant, F (1, 
19) = 7.07, p < .02, ηg2  = .01; for n–2 RR accuracy on ABA was 94.80% and on 
CBA it was 94.80%, and for n–2 RS, for ABA accuracy was 93.30% compared to 
CBA of 95.30%. Individual t-tests revealed that under n–2 RR there was no 
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significant difference between ABA and CBA sequence, t (39) = 0.02, p = .98, 
95%CI [-0.016, 0.016]; however, under n–2 RS there was a significant difference in 
accuracy between ABA and CBA sequence,  t (39) = -3.84, p < .001, 95%CI [-0.030, 
-0.009]. The interaction between Task Sequence and WML was not significant, F (1, 
19) = 1.50 , p < .24, ηg2  = .006; under AS condition accuracy for ABA was 92.90%, 
and for CBA it was 94.7%, whereas under FT condition, accuracy on ABA was 
95.20% and on CBA it was 95.40%. The interaction between Response and WML 
was not significant, F (1,19) = 1.30, p > .27, ηg2 = .002; that is, for AS Response 
Repetitions was 93.80%, and Response Switches, 93.70%, whereas, for FT Response 
Repetitions was 95.80%, and Response Switches was 94.80%.  
The three way interaction between Task Sequence, Response, and WML was 
also not significant, F (1,19) = 1.90, p > .18, ηg2  = .004 (see Figure 4.14). For the 
density functions of accuracy n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR and n–2 RS, for 
FT and AS conditions, see Figure 4.15. 
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Figure 4.14 At the top, an illustration of a non-significant three-way interaction 
between Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–
2 Response Switch) and WML (AS vs. FT) for accuracy. At the bottom, n–2 task 
repetition costs varying across Response and WML. Error bars de-note ±SE around 
the mean 
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Figure 4.15 Density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for Articulatory 
Suppression (AS) and Foot Tapping (FT) under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 
Response Switches. 
  
Bayes factors. Table 4.5 contains results for BFs of the four probable models 
explaining n–2 task repetition costs (see Stopping Rule section). As in Experiment 6, 
for completeness, BFs were calculated for RTs as well as accuracy. For RTs, all four 
models had a BF smaller than 1; at the point of data collection being stopped the 
BF10 for a comparison of the full model (i.e., main effects of WML manipulation/ 
Response and an interaction between them) to the best model—which was a main 
effect of Response—was below 1/6, specifically 0.1593 (0.0907/ 0.5692), which 
means that the n–2 task repetition cost was over six times more likely (1/0.1593) to 
be explained by the full model than the main effect of Response. The BF10 for 
comparisons of the full model and the two other models (i.e., the main effect of 
WML; the main effects of WML/ Response) ranged from 0.2603 to 0.438; this is 
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considered as anecdotal evidence for the full model being more likely than the two 
alternative models. Overall, since the evidence is anecdotal, the results have to be 
taken with caution. For accuracy, the Bayesian analysis showed that the model with 
the largest BF was the one with the main effect of Response (BF 1.915), followed by 
the model of two main effects (Response and Experimental Manipulation; BF 
1.423). Comparing the full model with the model of the main effect of Response to 
the full model, the formal one was about twice more likely than the full model. 
Overall, the results Bayesian results for accuracy performance were rather 
inconclusive as the BF10 ranged from 0.6371–0.4734, which is considered as 
anecdotal evidence. 
 
Table 4.5 Bayes factors for selected models predicting the n–2 task repetition cost as 
the DV, and Response and WML as IVs. As in Experiment 7, for completeness, 
Bayes factors were calculated for accuracy as well as for RTs. The reported models 
were compared to a denominator which was that the n–2 task repetition cost was 
predicted by a random factor of Participant. “+” indicates an addition of an effect, 
and “*” indicates an interaction. 
N–2 task repetition cost Model BF 
 
RTs 
Response (1) 0.5692 
WML (2) 0.3485 
R +WML (3) 0.2071 
R + WML + R * WML (4) 0.0907 
Accuracy Response (1) 0.7077 
WML (2) 1.915 
R + WML (3) 1.423 
R + WML + R * WML (4) 0.9066 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 7 aimed to re-examine the relationship between inhibition (as 
reflected by residual n–2 task repetition costs) and WML. In Experiment 7 
participants performed a BI paradigm whilst doing a secondary task; in the AS 
condition participants verbalised “blah blah blah” and in FT condition participants 
tapped their foot. The AS was expected to interfere with WM because it disrupts 
inner speech, whereas FT was used as a control condition WM (Baddeley, 1986, 
1990) because it does not interfere with inner speech. Assuming that the residual n–2 
task repetition cost reflects inhibition and that inhibition relies on WM resources, the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost was expected to be smaller under AS compared to 
FT condition.  
 As expected, the standard n–2 task repetition cost was present for RTs and 
accuracy, whereas the residual n–2 task repetition cost was only present in accuracy; 
however, there was a numerical trend for the residual n–2 task repetition cost in RTs 
too. Contrary to the proposed hypothesis, the experimental manipulation of WML 
did not seem to influence the residual n–2 task repetition costs (which was present 
only in accuracy). In terms of manipulating WML in Experiment 7, the WML 
manipulation used seemed to have worked as performance was statistically different 
between AS and FT; however unexpectedly, performance was slower in the FT 
condition compared to AS. It is uncertain why that would be the case, although a 
speculation can be made. It is possible that slower and less accurate performance 
under FT compared to AS, might have been due to conflict in motor responses as 
both the primary task (i.e., task-switching) and the secondary task (i.e., foot tapping) 
are motor tasks (e.g., Miyake et al., 2004)—especially as participants gave responses 
with their right hand and tapped their right foot. Moreover, it can be speculated that 
we are very well practiced at verbalising, especially nonsensical words such as “blah 
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blah blah”, whereas tapping of the foot whilst performing cognitive tasks, even 
though it is considered as an easy task, is not an over practiced task and could 
require some level of cognitive control and coordination to maintain the tapping of 
the foot in a required rhythm as a secondary task.   
 Taken together, the results from Experiment 7 indicate that inhibition (as 
reflected by accuracy residual n–2 task repetition costs) does not seem to be 
modulated by WML as manipulated through interfering with WM’s phonological 
loop. Overall, these results are consistent with Experiment 5 and 6 in that inhibition 
does not seem to depended on WM. 
 
General Discussion 
In the current study, three experiments investigated whether and to what 
extent cognitive inhibition (as measured via the residual n–2 task repetition cost) is 
related to WMC and WML. Experiment 5 examined individual differences in WMC 
and inhibition; whereas Experiments 6–7 investigated if manipulating WML 
influences inhibition. These three experiments were conducted under the hypothesis 
that the residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects cognitive inhibition which relies on 
WM resources (Conway & Engle, 1994; Conway et al., 1999). The results from all 
three experiments suggest that inhibition in task-switching is not associated with or 
modulated by WM; the results are taken as evidence that inhibition in task-switching 
(as measured with the residual n–2 task repetition cost) is not dependent on WM 
resources. 
 
Individual Differences 
Studies that looked at the relationship between cognitive inhibition (as 
measured with n–2 task repetition cost) and WM (Grange & Houghton, n.d.; 
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Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) showed no relationship between the two; however, they 
used a measure of inhibition confounded by episodic retrieval mismatches, that is, 
the n–2 task repetition cost not controlled for episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 2017). 
This meant that the results from those studies—in light with new evidence (Grange 
et al.)—were difficult to interpret because it was not certain if it was inhibition or 
episodic retrieval that was not linked to WM. The current study aimed to address that 
limitation.  
Assuming that the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval 
(i.e., residual n–2 task repetition cost) is a better measure of inhibition, that 
inhibition depends on WM resources (e.g., Baddeley, 1990; Engle, 1994), and that 
WM individual differences are linked to differences in inhibition (e.g., Conway et 
al., 1999), the residual n–2 task repetition cost was expected to be explained by 
and/or modulated by WM. It was found that results support evidence from Grange 
and Houghton, as well as Pettigrew and colleagues, which is that inhibition (as 
measured with the BI paradigm) does not seem to be related to WM resources. 
Specifically, n–2 task repetition costs (standard and controlled for episodic retrieval) 
were not modulated by WML or linked to WMC; as such, indicating that WM 
individual differences cannot explain differences in n–2 task repetition costs.   
Considering individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost a bit more, 
it was noted in Experiment 5 that participants varied a lot in how performance 
between ABA and CBA sequences differed; that is, n–2 task repetition costs and 
benefits, as well as no n–2 task repetition costs were observed. This is consistent 
with evidence from other studies (e.g., Grange & Juvina, 2015; Chapter 2–4). 
Overall, in Experiment 5 the n–2 task repetition cost was present, and it was 
modulated by episodic retrieval. However, no n–2 task repetition cost was present 
under episodic matches (n–2 RR)—there was actually a non-significant n–2 task 
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repetition benefit present—compared to episodic mismatches (n–2 RS) where a 
statistically significant cost was observed. Therefore, the lack of the overall residual 
n–2 task repetition cost—which could be argued to be a sign of no inhibition—might 
have led to no relationship between the cost and WMC; however, this is unlikely. 
Contrary to studies that link smaller n–2 task repetition costs to weaker/ impaired 
cognitive inhibition (e.g., Fales et al., 2006; Moritz et al., 2004; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), it is concluded that since participants in the current 
study (which represented a healthy university population) performed task-switching 
efficiently and at high accuracy regardless of whether they showed n–2 task 
repetition costs or benefits, they had no impairment of cognitive control. Instead, it is 
speculated, that a behavioral lack of n–2 task repetition costs does not mean that 
inhibition was not deployed (Grange & Juvina, 2015), and that it is more likely that 
n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibitory and non-inhibitory effects which can 
manifests as overall costs or benefits. For now it cannot be said confidently if and to 
what extend inhibition plays a role in task-switching performance characterised with 
n–2 task repetition benefits, which needs to be investigated further. 
Moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost has been recently shown to not be a 
reliable measure of inhibitory control (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 3, 
Experiment 2), which means that the lack of the association between n–2 task 
repetition costs (standard and controlled for episodic retrieval) can be due to low 
reliability of the cost. Also, the n–2 task repetition cost’s low reliability could be due 
to the cost being a difference score which have been shown to be not reliable and 
difficult to interpret (Crawford et al., 2008); this means that inhibition in task-
switching may be important but the measure of it (i.e., the n–2 task repetition cost) is 
not suitable. Therefore, for now we cannot confidently say that inhibition in task-
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switching does not depend on WM, because of the limitations in how inhibition is 
assessed in the BI paradigm.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
Inhibition. Cognitive inhibition has been suggested to be a WM resources 
dependent process (Conway et al., 1999; Engle, 1994); based on this it was expected 
in the current study that people with larger WMC would have larger inhibition 
compared to people with smaller WMC. This is because in people with larger WMC 
there should be more resources to deploy inhibition, whereas in people with small 
WMC, resources are thought to be used up on a primary task, leaving no resources 
for inhibition to be deployed. However, since results of the current study showed no 
such relationship, it can be concluded that inhibition (as measured with the residual 
n–2 task repetition cost) does not depend on WM; that is, that inhibition does not 
seem to be resource dependent.  
The current study gives further evidence to Pettigrew and colleagues’ (2015) 
findings, which is that there is no relationship between inhibition (as measured with 
BI paradigm) and WM. This is based on theory that the n–2 task repetition cost does 
not reflect a top-down control type of process but rather an automatic inhibition 
(Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Houghton et al., 2009; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003) or self-inhibition (Grange et al., 2013; Koch et al., 2010).  
 
Episodic retrieval. The n–2 task repetition cost was not modulated by 
episodic retrieval in Experiments 6–7, which was unexpected. This perhaps indicates 
that WML manipulation interfered with episodic retrieval facilitating task-switching. 
Looking only at numerical trends, the following can be speculated. If the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval reflects inhibition, we would expect 
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the cost under episodic matches to be more affected by WML than under episodic 
mismatches, a pattern which is observed in Experiments 6–7 (although not 
statistically significant). That is, it appears that under episodic mismatches the n–2 
task repetition cost is comparable for high and low WML for RT and accuracy; but 
more importantly, there was a numerical trend for the smaller n–2 task repetition 
costs to be observed under high WML under episodic matches. This is as predicted 
by theory that inhibition is resource depended. On the other hand, if WM was 
important for episodic retrieval (Houghton et al., 2009) more than inhibition—
because retrieved task-set information can be assumed to be manipulated in WM—
we would expect the n–2 task repetition costs not controlled for episodic retrieval to 
be more dependent on WM than the cost controlled for episodic retrieval. There is 
some evidence from the current thesis to support that hypothesis. In Experiment 5 
(Chapter 4) accuracy of the n–2 task repetition cost not controlled for episodic 
retrieval was significantly correlated with WMC, with higher WMC scored being 
linked to smaller accuracy n–2 task repetition cost. This can be interpreted as 
evidence that individuals with higher WMC were more accurate retrieving and 
manipulating task’s parameters and matching them to the current task’s demands 
compared to those who had smaller WMC. However, this correlation did not remain 
significant after adjusting for multiple testing, therefore these results have to be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, n–2 task repetition costs not controlled for 
episodic retrieval were in general similar under both high and low WML (for RT and 
accuracy performance), which suggests they were not affected by manipulation of 
WML or that WML manipulation affected episodic retrieval; therefore, overall, the 
results seem inconsistent. 
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Working memory. Research from task-switching investigating the SC 
(Butler et al., 2011; Draheim et al., 2016; Erickson, 2008; Hester & Garavan, 2005; 
Meiran & Kessler, 2008; van Hooren et al., 2005) and n–2 task repetition costs 
(Grange & Houghton, 2009, 2010b; Grange & Juvina, 2015; Grange et al., 2013; 
Houghton et al., 2009), implies the importance of WM in task-switching. For 
example, it is believed that cues are translated into tasks in WM; that is, cues are 
interpreted and then relevant tasks are retrieved from LTM and activated (e.g., 
Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009). If cues are difficult to interpret, this leads to 
the standard n–2 task repetition increase. It is speculated that once a given task is 
completed and a new cue needs to be translated in WM, the abandoned task’s 
representation may lead to a conflict in WM, therefore cognitive control mechanism 
inhibits the no-longer-relevant task representation. But if cues are informative they 
do not need to be translated in WM, therefore their activations will not ‘linger’ in 
WM, hence less if any inhibition is needed.  
Since there is evidence that inhibition relies on WM and that it can vary 
between people  depending on their WMC (Conway et al., 1999; Engle, 1994), it 
seemed plausible that residual n–2 task repetition costs may also be dependent on 
WM. Specifically, the BI paradigm used in the current study used what can be 
considered as uninformative cues, as such they need translation in WM, therefore 
assuming that inhibition needs WM resources, exhausting WM should decrease 
inhibition (as indicated by reduced residual n–2 task repetition cost); moreover, 
under the same prediction, people with lower WMC should also show smaller 
inhibition. The current study’s findings do not support this speculation, as 
consistently with some previous work (Grange & Houghton, n.d.; Pettigrew & 
Martin, 2015) inhibition in task-switching was not affected by WML or related to 
WMC. Therefore, in terms of the role of WM in cue-translation in task-switching, it 
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can be said that if cues are translated in WM, the efficiency with which this 
translation is performed does not seem to differ between High and Low WM and 
WMC. Although, to be certain, further studies investigating inhibition (as measured 
with residual n–2 task repetition cost) for informative and non-informative cues 
under different WM loads would have to be conducted.  
WM is speculated to be important in task-switching for another reason. 
Research shows that phonological loop (Injoque-Ricle, Barreyro, Formoso, & 
Jaichenco, 2015; Kirkham, Breeze, & Mari-Beffa, 2012), which is a WM mechanism 
aiding retrieving and maintenance of decaying tasks’ representations in WM through 
inner verbal rehearsal, plays a role in task-switching. Increasing WML through AS 
increases the SC (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Goschke, 2000; Miyake, Emerson, 
Padilla, & Ahn, 2004; Saeki & Saito, 2004a, 2004b; Saeki, Saito, & Kawaguchi, 
2006); therefore, it is believed that under AS conditions, phonological loop no longer 
aids these mechanisms, potentially leading to conflicts in WM. In the current study 
AS was used as a manipulation of WML but it is uncertain whether there is a specific 
relationship between the phonological loop and inhibition in task-switching. 
Assuming that phonological loop is necessary for temporary maintenance of 
information (Fürst & Hitch, 2000), which in task-switching would be task’s 
representations, it would be expected that the level to which tasks’ are activated in 
WM would influence the extent of possible conflicts in WM and how they are 
resolved. For example, phonological loop may be important in overcoming 
inhibition; that is, through phonological loop, relevant task sets’ activations can be 
‘boosted’ reducing n–2 task repetition costs. However, evidence from an 
unpublished study would suggest that the n–2 task repetition costs is not affected by 
task-relevant or task-irrelevant verbalisations used to aid and interfere with task 
preparation respectively (Grange, n.d.). 
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Taken together, the results from the current study support another theory on 
inhibition and WM; namely, that inhibition in task-switching is reactive and 
automatic in nature (Anderson & Levy, 2007; Arbuthnott, 2008b; Sinai et al., 2007, 
Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Houghton et al., 2009; Schneider & Verbruggen, 2008; 
Schuch & Koch, 2003), or that it is a self-inhibition mechanism (Grange et al., 2013; 
Koch et al., 2010); therefore, should not be tied to WM resources. This is in line with 
findings from two studies that looked at WM and inhibition in task-switching 
(Grange & Houghton, n.d.; Pettigrew & Martin, 2015). 
 
Limitations 
It is not certain that WML manipulations (i.e., task-irrelevant verbalisations) 
used in the current study were as successful as they could have been. It became 
apparent that manipulating WML within BI paradigm was not easy; the WML 
manipulations in Experiment 6 seemed to have interfered with task-switching and/or 
episodic retrieval considerably beyond anticipated effects. That is, almost a third of 
participants did not complete testing due to not being able to complete the 
experiment in given time, and even though accuracy from task-switching among 
remaining participants was high, their RT performance was almost twice as long in 
High WML compared to Low WML. This was somewhat rectified in Experiment 7; 
however, that study was stopped due to administrative reasons (i.e., ethical approval 
expiring) before more data could be collected. Therefore, the results from 
Experiments 6–7, despite being consistent with some evidence reported in literature, 
can be considered inconclusive. This is especially because WML manipulations 
introduced lead to weak n–2 task repetition cost which was not modulated by 
episodic retrieval. 
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Another limitation, currently somewhat beyond researcher’s control, is that 
the standard and residual n–2 task repetition cost have been shown not to be reliable 
at an individual level (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 2–3, Experiments 1–2). 
Moreover, n–2 task repetition cost is a difference score which are in general difficult 
to interpret (Crawford et al., 2008). The immediate implication of this is that the lack 
of an observed relationship between the n–2 task repetition costs and WM could be 
simply due to the lack of the reliability of the cost itself.   
 
Conclusion 
The current study revisited the relationship between WM and inhibition in 
task-witching by: 1) using an improved measure of inhibition (the residual n–2 task 
repetition cost); 2) assessing WMC with three measures shown to reliably assess this 
ability, and 3) manipulating WML in BI paradigm. It was found that, contrary to the 
theory that inhibition relies on WM resources, the residual n–2 task repetition cost 
did not relate to WM; giving further evidence that inhibition (as measured via the 
residual n–2 task repetition cost) is not dependent on WM. The results can also be 
interpreted as evidence that, the n–2 task repetition cost does not reflect a top-down 
control, which typically is associated with WM, and that instead the n–2 task 
repetition cost reflects an automatic, low-level processing.  
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Chapter 5 Perceptual Load and the n–2 task 
Repetition Cost 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Cognitive inhibition is believed to play an important role in goal-driven and context-
specific behavior. In task-switching cognitive inhibition is measured with the n–2 
task repetition cost (an effect of slower and less accurate performance on ABA 
compared to CBA tasks sequences). The n–2 task repetition cost has been replicated 
well and has become a signature of cognitive inhibition; however, its source is still 
debatable, and the origin of individual differences seen in the cost is not known. The 
n–2 task repetition cost is not linked to working memory, therefore the current study 
aimed to examine whether this cost is modulated by another resource-limited 
construct, perceptual attention. Perceptual load was varied within the BI paradigm to 
manipulate attentional resources; high perceptual load was used to exhaust 
attentional resources compared to low perceptual load. Experiments’ 8–9 results are 
somewhat inconsistent; evidence favors the n–2 task repetition cost not being 
modulated by perceptual load, but there is also some support for the cost being 
modulated by it. Also, individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost are not 
related to cognitive failures scores (measured with Cognitive Failures Questionnaire) 
linked to individual differences in perceptual load and inhibition.   
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Introduction 
Going through day-to-day routines, in any given moment more than one 
action can be performed; for example, walking into a living room, we can turn on the 
TV, reach for a newspaper, or pick up a phone to check emails. In general, the action 
we decide to select matches the current goal we have in mind; so, if the goal is to 
watch the TV, we can ignore other stimuli in our environment that also afford action. 
Moreover, if someone knocked on our door whilst we were watching the TV, we 
could disengage from TV watching and open the door. That is, we can shift our 
attention from one task to another to match a new goal. However, certain 
environmental factors and individual differences can make selecting appropriate 
action difficult. For example, people that are naturally easily distractible, have a 
medical or a developmental condition, may struggle to select, focus on, or switch 
between tasks (Broadbent et al., 1982; D’Alberto, Funnell, Potter, & Garavan, 2017; 
Forster & Lavie, 2009b; Iaccarino et al., 2014; Lhermitte, 1983; Lhermitte, Pillon, & 
Serdaru, 1986; Shahamat, Fadardi, Amir, Yazdi, & Talaei, 2016). Moreover, 
research into human perception suggests that under certain circumstances, ignored 
information is processed and can impair how efficiently a given action is performed 
(Lavie, 1995; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009). 
When carrying out context-specific actions becomes problematic, it 
highlights that seemingly easy and automatic behavior should not be taken for 
granted. Our ability to exert controlled-behavior and shift between goals are likely to 
be products of the cognitive systems’ numerous processes interacting together; for 
example, when presented with some stimuli (e.g., whilst driving a car coming across 
a STOP road sign) we need to be able to perceive and encode that stimuli, as well as 
retrieve and select relevant knowledge on what to do with it to manipulate that 
knowledge (e.g., what the sign represents and when it applies), and use it to produce 
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appropriate behavior (e.g., to stop the vehicle at STOP sign). Moreover, to adapt to 
our environment and its changing demands, we must be able to maintain desired 
action, as well as to adjust it if needed. This concept is known as the stability-
flexibility dilemma (Goschke, 2000); it is a dilemma, because it is not certain how 
exactly the cognitive system manages stable behavior allowing for it to be flexible at 
the same time. Goschke proposes that this dilemma may be understood through 
looking at goal-oriented and context-specific behaviours as a product of changing 
moment-to-moment activations and deactivations of mental representations of 
different goals. Mental representations (or internal representations) of goals is a 
concept that is rather abstract, as researchers tend not to define it extensively in their 
work. Instead, it is assumed that mental representations of goals can be thought of as, 
for example, “memory stores, procedural knowledge, and response schemas” 
(Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000, p.338), or “transient associations between 
mental representations of stimuli and responses in accordance to a specific goal” 
(Sdoia & Ferlazzo, 2008, p.322); in task-switching research this is known as a task-
set (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Assuming such a definition of mental representations 
of goals, cognitive psychology research nominates cognitive inhibition as a process 
facilitating decision making needed for goal-oriented and context-specific behavior, 
which is thought to be achieved through inhibition of irrelevant representations 
(Diamond, 2013; Friedman & Miyake, 2017; Gorfein & MacLeod, 2007; Johnson, 
2007; Koch et al., 2010; Miyake et al., 2000; Steinbeis & Crone, 2016). 
Task-switching research offers promising insight into whether, when, and 
how cognitive inhibition shapes behaviour. In experiments which require participants 
to switch back and forth between three tasks in a serial run (i.e. Backward Inhibition 
(BI) paradigm), an effect known as the n–2 task repetition cost is observed (Mayr & 
Keele, 2000). This effect is characterised by an overall slower and less accurate 
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performance on tasks that were performed recently compared to tasks that were not. 
Any current task n is classified as an n–2 task repetition if it is the same task that was 
performed on the n–2 trial; and, it is classified as an n–2 task switch if the current 
task is not the same task as the one on n–2 trial.  The former one is arbitrarily 
referred to as an ABA sequence and the latter one is referred to as a CBA sequence; 
the n–2 task repetition cost is the difference in performance between ABA and CBA 
sequences. The BI paradigm tests for presence of cognitive inhibition in task-
switching based on the following hypothesis: cognitive inhibition facilitates the 
switch from one task to another by suppressing the mental representation of the no-
longer relevant, abandoned task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). Inhibition is believed to be 
important for efficient task-switching because the abandoned task’s mental 
representations continue to be active so they interfere with accessing a new task. 
However, applied inhibition makes the affected task less accessible momentarily; 
therefore, if that task is needed soon after being inhibited, it should be performed less 
efficiently, as reflected by slower and less accurate performance. This is exactly 
what Mayr and Keele found, providing support for the importance of cognitive 
inhibition in task-switching (for a review see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). 
For a long time, the n–2 task repetition cost was resistant to non-inhibitory 
explanations, which led to this effect becoming a signature of cognitive inhibition 
(Koch et al., 2010). As such, researchers have used the n–2 task repetition cost to 
assess cognitive inhibition in clinical populations (Fales et al., 2006; Foti et al., 
2015; Mayr et al., 2006; Meiran, Diamond, Toder, & Nemets, 2011; Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2012; Yiu-kwan, 2008), as well as to assess individual differences in 
inhibitory control (Whitmer & Banich, 2007). However, new evidence emerged 
showing that the n–2 task repetition cost is not reliable (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2016; 
also, see Chapters 2–3), and that it is considerably modulated by episodic retrieval 
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(Grange, Kowalczyk, & Loughlin, 2017; also, see Chapter 3). As a consequence, 
there is less confidence in the n–2 task repetition cost as a measure of cognitive 
inhibition. Moreover, findings from Chapter 4 (see also, Grange & Houghton, n.d.; 
Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) of this thesis indicate that the n–2 task repetition cost 
(standard and the residual) is not associated with Working Memory Capacity 
(WMC) or modulated by Working Memory Load (WML). This is contrary to the 
theory that cognitive inhibition is a resource dependent process (Conway & Engle, 
1994; Engle, 1994; Heitz et al., 2005). This is important, because noticeable 
individual differences have been noted in the n–2 task repetition cost (Grange & 
Juvina, 2015), and WM was a promising candidate to explain those differences 
(Houghton et al., 2009). As such, currently, there seems to be no other evidence on 
the source of individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost.   
 
Perceptual Load 
The cause of individual differences in the n–2 task repetition cost can be 
speculated to arise from another resource limited system, perceptual attention (also 
referred to as selective/ visual attention) (Broadbent, 1958; Lavie, 1995). The next 
few paragraphs will introduce the literature on how relevant information is selected 
against irrelevant information, what this process depends on, and how it links to 
inhibition and the n–2 task repetition cost. 
  Research from information selection in visual attention shows that the 
extent to which interference (e.g., distractors) may affect performance on cognitive 
tasks depends on perceptual load (Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1981; Lavie & Fox, 
2000). Perceptual load characterises the level of perceptual demands a task puts on 
attention; for example, competing responses, the number of stimuli and distractors 
presented, as well as their location and distinctiveness (Forster & Lavie, 2008a, 
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2008b; Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Perceptually low load is when a small 
display-set is presented (e.g., a single target, or a target and a distractor), compared 
to perceptually high load when a large display-set is presented (e.g., a target being 
accompanied with numerous distractors). Original research looking at how relevant 
information is selected against irrelevant stimuli in our environment proposed two 
competing theories: early-selection (Broadbent, 1958) and late-selection (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963). Early-selection theory argues that relevant information is selected 
early on during processing of stimuli and irrelevant information is ignored, which is 
due to attentional resources being limited, hence resources are directed towards task-
relevant information, leaving very little if any resources for processing of irrelevant 
information (Broadbent, 1958); the late-selection theory proposes that attention is 
automatic which means that task-relevant as well as task-irrelevant information are 
processed initially, and then task-relevant information is selected at later stages of 
processing (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Since those two theories were developed, it 
has been shown that either of strategies for information selection can be employed 
given the right conditions (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). By combining 
assumptions from the early and late information-selection theories—the limited and 
automatic nature of visual attention—it has been proposed and consequently 
demonstrated that ”perceptual processing is a limited resource, but it proceeds 
automatically until it runs out of capacity” (Lavie & Tsal, 1994, p. 185). In other 
words, if task does not exhaust attentional resources, all stimuli (task-relevant as well 
as task-irrelevant) may be processed, and if the task’s demands consumes attentional 
resources, only task-relevant information is likely to be processed. As such, low 
perceptual load (LPL) has been shown to facilitate late-selection, and high perceptual 
load (HPL) early-selection strategy (Lavie, 1995). 
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Evidence from perceptual load research has potential implications on how 
behavioural tasks’ results are interpreted; specifically, task-switching effects (e.g., n–
2 task repetition costs) may be confounded by processing of task-irrelevant 
information because task-switching paradigms are typically simple in presentation, 
under which conditions task-irrelevant information may be processed and affect 
cognitive effects measured. This means that under LPL assessment of cognitive 
performance can be confounded by interference from distractors even if participants 
do not consciously attend to them.  However, it also means that by increasing a 
task’s attentional demands—through varying the task’s difficulty, responses, or 
stimuli location and distinctiveness—the attentional resources can be manipulated to 
allow for less or more interference effects from external distractors (Cave & Chen, 
2016; Forster & Lavie, 2009b; Rorden, Guerrini, Swainson, Lazzeri, & Baylis, 2008; 
Wilson, Muroi, & MacLeod, 2011). Furthermore, it has also been shown that task-
irrelevant information interference can also be generated internally, as in one study 
people reported more task-unrelated-thoughts (TUTs) under LPL compared to HPL 
(TUTs, Forster & Lavie, 2009). This is significant because more TUTs being 
reported under LPL imply that attentional resources under that condition can be 
allocated to task-irrelevant information in the form of intrusive thoughts, which 
again, may confound measures of cognitive performance.  Taken together, research 
from perceptual attention shows that regardless of the source of distractors 
(internally or externally generated), they seem to be processed through the same 
attentional resources, and both can be manipulated with perceptual load. 
 
The Current Study 
So, how does perceptual attention and perceptual load research relate to task-
switching and the n–2 task repetition cost? Currently in the literature there are no 
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studies that investigated the influence of perceptual load on the n–2 task repetition 
cost; however, some speculations on how they may interact can be made.  
To begin, other effects that are speculated to reflect cognitive control—such 
as negative priming, the Stroop effect, and response competitor—have been shown 
to be reduced under HPL (Forster & Lavie, 2008a; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1981; 
Lavie & Fox, 2000; Rorden et al., 2008). Therefore, if the n–2 task repetition cost 
reflects cognitive inhibition, it can be speculated that it should be sensitive to 
perceptual load manipulations. Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost would be 
expected to be reduced under HPL, compared to LPL, because under HPL there 
should be less spare attentional resources for inhibition to be activated, compared to 
LPL. 
 
Distractors. By design task-switching paradigms are perceptually simple; 
that is, they typically involve processing a single stimulus (Altmann, 2007; 
Arbuthnott, 2009; Mayr, 2007) falling into the category of LPL, although some 
experiments introduce distractors (Houghton et al., 2009; M. Hübner et al., 2003; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000). This means that we cannot be certain if and to what extent 
distractors interfere with task-switching, potentially influencing measured cognitive 
processes. This means that n–2 task repetition costs in different experiments may 
reflect slightly different cognitive processing, even though in general it is thought to 
represent cognitive inhibition.  
One could argue that BI paradigms, in general, are not designed to introduce 
distractors, therefore perceptual load should not be an issue in task-switching. 
Moreover, inhibition is thought to be necessary for successful task-switching to 
reduce the interference of alternative tasks, which are not thought of as distractors. 
However, even if alternative tasks cannot be classed as distractors, in BI paradigms 
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that can be described as perceptually low, TUTs are likely (and were often 
anecdotally reported during the course of collecting data for this thesis). Thus, the 
presence of TUTs would be expected to lead to stronger inhibition during task-
switching; alternatively, TUTs may exhaust attentional capacity leaving very little if 
any resources left for inhibition. Furthermore, in BI paradigms that introduce 
distractors (unintentionally or by design), the number of these irrelevant stimuli on 
any given trial is rather small (e.g., 3 irrelavnt items, Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 
2009; Mayr & Keele, 2000), which has been shown to be insufficient to act as HPL 
(Lavie & Fox, 2000). Therefore, it is uncertain as yet, whether and to what extent 
inhibition—as measured with the n–2 task repetition cost—is confounded by 
distractors introduced to BI by design and/ or by TUTs; nevertheless, the n–2 task 
repetition cost would be expected to be smaller under HPL which makes it less likely 
for intrusive, task-irrelevant thoughts to occur during task-switching. 
 
Episodic retrieval. The n–2 task repetition cost has been shown to be 
modulated by episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 2017), which was taken as evidence 
that the original n–2 task repetition costs were confounded by memory conflicts. 
That is, in standard BI paradigms, a task is classified as an n–2 task repetition or an 
n–2 task switch depending on whether the same cue and instructions are given or not 
across the tasks sequences. But, across the ABA/ CBA sequences n–2 response 
repetitions/ switches are not controlled for; so in ABA sequence, for the n parity task 
a digit “8” may be presented requiring M-key press, and on n–2 parity task repetition 
a digit “3” may be presented requiring the Z-key press. Recently it has been shown 
that when n–2 response repetitions/ switches are controlled for during n–2 task 
repetitions/ switches, the n–2 task repetition cost is considerably reduced under n–2 
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response repetitions compared to n–2 response switches (Grange et al.); and the 
mechanism by which this takes place is explained in the next paragraph.  
Research shows that when we encounter an event a memory trace (i.e., event-
file) of that event is formed (Hommel, 1998; Neill, 1997; Waszak et al., 2003); in a 
task-switching context a memory trace is thought to hold information on which cue 
was presented and what followed after the cue (e.g., stimulus’ appearance and 
response). This memory trace can influence consequent performance of a task; that 
is, if previously performed task is required again, upon seeing a cue, the relevant 
memory trace is retrieved, and if the retrieved memory trace matches the demands of 
the current task (i.e., episodic match), performance is enhanced, and if the memory 
trace does not match the task’s demands (i.e., episodic mismatch), performance is 
slower and less accurate (e.g., when a Z-key press response is retrieved but the M-
key press is required). The reduction in the n–2 task repetition cost under episodic 
matches compared to episodic mismatches is taken as evidence that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is in large part due to non-inhibitory mechanism, namely episodic 
retrieval (Grange et al., 2017). However, typically, the n–2 task repetition cost is not 
removed with episodic matches (although see Chapter 4, Experiment 5); the 
remaining cost is referred to as the residual n–2 task repetition cost, though to be a 
better reflection of inhibition.  
Currently, there seems to be no reported studies that looked at episodic 
retrieval and perceptual load, which makes it difficult to predict whether and how 
standard/ residual n–2 task repetition costs and perceptual load will interact. Because 
perceptual load seems to affect if and how task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli are 
perceived and processed, it can be speculated that under different perceptual loads 
what becomes part of memory traces (as well as what is retrieved) can differ between 
loads (Lavie, 2000; p.1050). For example, in task-switching under reduced perceptual 
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processing (i.e., HPL) task-irrelevant information should be less efficiently encoded 
due to limited attentional resources; but in task-switching without obvious distractors 
(i.e., LPL), what can be assumed to be encoded is task-relevant as well as task-
irrelevant information.  
The following argument presents why predictions on episodic retrieval in task-
switching and perceptual load are problematic. Task-switching and BI paradigms are 
typically simple in presentation falling under the category of LPL, therefore memory-
traces from trial-to-trial can be speculated to be potentially confounded by task-
irrelevant information affecting measured effects such as the n–2 task repetition cost; 
however, there is some evidence—from LPL-tasks—to suggest that stimuli-features 
do not seem to bind to memory-trace of a task if these features are not task-relevant 
(Chapter 3, Experiment 4; Grange et al., 2017, Experiment 3; Hommel, 1998). There 
is also evidence that controlling within task-switching for cue, stimulus, and response 
repetitions (Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016)—using tasks that fall under the LPL—
reduces an effect known as the switch cost (SC, an effect of slower performance 
switching compared to repeating tasks); the cues, stimuli, and responses were task-
relevant in that study, therefore, assuming that tasks used in that study are indeed LPL-
tasks, it is not certain whether and to what extent the SC was also  affected by 
incidental processing of task-irrelevant information. This is because, under perceptual 
load theory, given the correct conditions, binding of co-existing features is automatic 
in nature—and as such is important for the process of learning and healthy functioning 
(Hommel, 2004)—therefore, it is not clear whether and how episodic retrieval or 
inhibition interacted with perceptual load in some of the studies (Chapter 3, 
Experiment 4; Grange et al., 2017). 
Perhaps, the problem of applying perceptual load theory to episodic retrieval 
in task-switching is how interference is triggered and defined. For example, in task-
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switching the interference is thought to come from competing task-sets, specifically, 
ongoing activation of temporarily not relevant task-sets, and episodic mismatches; 
whereas, in perceptual load research interference comes from external or internal 
distractors that tend to be task-irrelevant. As mentioned earlier, it is uncertain 
whether in BI paradigms, whilst one of the three tasks is performed, the alternative 
tasks can be classed as distractors. However, despite this uncertainty, it still seems 
very plausible that under HPL, performance should be worse than under LPL; also 
inhibition (as measured with the residual n–2 task repetition cost) should be smaller 
than under LPL. 
  
Individual differences. The magnitude of the n–2 task repetition cost varies 
between participants and the source of those is not known. Interestingly, there is 
evidence from perceptual load research (Forster & Lavie, 2009b) that the magnitude 
of the interference effect—as measured with response competitor task—can vary 
depending on individual differences in how people deal with distractions in day-to-
day life—as measured by Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, CFQ (Broadbent et al., 
1982). That is, under LPL compared to HPL, the interference effect was larger for 
people that scored high on the CFQ vs. people that scored low on that measure; 
however, under HPL, individual differences measured with CFQ diminished, and the 
interference effect was equal for both groups. Therefore, it is speculated that 
individual difference seen in the residual n–2 task repetition cost—assuming that it 
reflects inhibition triggered through competing task-sets interference—may also be 
explained with differences in the CFQ. 
To summarise, the current study looks at whether and to what extent the n–2 
task repetition cost—specifically the residual n–2 task repetition cost—is modulated 
by perceptual load, and whether individual differences seen in the residual n–2 task 
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repetition cost can be accounted for by differences in the day-to-day distractibility 
trait. It is speculated that if the residual n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition, it 
should be smaller or diminished under HPL compared to LPL; and that, people who 
score high compared to those who score low on the CFQ should show larger residual 
n–2 task repetition costs under LPL vs. HPL, where residual n–2 task repetition costs 
should be more equal in low and high scorers on CFQ.  
 
Experiment 8 
Method 
 Participants. Forty-two participants were recruited from the School of 
Psychology at Keele University in exchange for partial course credits. The inclusion 
criteria were to be at least 18-years-old, have normal/ corrected to normal vision, and 
understand written and spoken English. Two of the participants’ data were removed 
due to incomplete data; that is, two participants completed only one part of the 
experiment in the time given. There were twenty-five women, and the average age of 
participant was 20.9 (SD 2.13). 
 
 Stopping rule. The sample size was determined with Sequential Bayes 
Factors (BF) (Schönbrodt et al., 2014), which allows to quantify the strength of 
evidence for the null as well as the alternative hypothesis. Also, unlike with the 
standard power analysis (i.e., null hypothesis statistical testing, NHST, which uses p-
values), with sequential BF, the sample is decided during testing and not before. 
Specifically, evidence provided by data—for either of the hypotheses—is evaluated 
once data collection begins. 
The way evidence is evaluated is based on comparing probable models that 
can explain the patterns seen in data. For the current experiment it was of interest to 
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investigate if the n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., standard and residual) is modulated by 
perceptual load. The four models were: 1) the full model made of two main effects 
(Response and Perceptual Load), and an interaction between them; 2) model with the 
main effect of Response and Perceptual Load; 3) the model with the main effect of 
Perceptual Load; and 4) the model with the main effect of Response. For each of 
those models, the random effect of participant was added, and each model was 
compared to a common denominator which was that the n–2 task repetition cost is 
explained by random effects of participants.  
 The model under which the n–2 task repetition cost is explained by random 
effects of participants can be classed as the prior belief, which for BF calculation is 
expressed as prior distribution. Next, density distributions are considered for 
observed data under each selected model which offers new information; based on 
these, posterior distribution is expressed. The posterior distribution tells researchers 
by how much the prior belief must be updated; that is, likelihood distributions are 
utilised to calculate BFs, which is a ratio of density of posterior distribution and the 
height of the prior distribution. See Equation 5.1; where D refers to the actual data, 
H0 is the prior belief (or null hypothesis), the H1 is the alternative hypothesis, and p 
is the probability. The larger the BF, the larger the difference between the prior 
distribution and empirical data’s distribution supporting that model.  
Equation 5.1 
𝐵𝐹10 =
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0)
 
 
 
 Initial BFs for the current experiment were calculated at twenty participant 
and re-calculated after every testing-session (Schönbrodt et al., 2014). At the fortieth 
participant, the BF10 reached what is considered one of the thresholds at which data 
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collection can be stopped; that is, the BF10 fell below 1/6 (the other threshold was 
BF10 of 6). That is, at fortieth participant it became apparent that the model with the 
main effect of perceptual Load 22.7 times more likely than the full model (i.e., the 
main effects of Response/ Perceptual Load and an interaction between them).   
 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The task-switching part was presented on a 17-inch 
monitor PC through Psychopy (Pierce, 2007) software. Participants’ responses were 
recorded via 1-ms precise USB keyboard. 
 
Low perceptual load BI paradigm. For the LPL condition, the original 
Backward Inhibition paradigm was used (Mayr & Keele, 2000). The stimuli were 
shown in a black square frame (7cm x 7cm) on a white background (Figure 5.1, top 
panel); in the center of that frame a cue in the form of a shape appeared—a triangle 
signified the “horizontal” task, a hexagon indicated the “vertical” task, and a square 
represented the “diagonal” task (3cm in height and width; black outline with no fill). 
The target appeared inside the frame, in one of the inner corners in the form of a grey 
circle (1.2cm diameter). The “Error” message shown on the screen when a mistake 
was made was presented in red. 
 
High perceptual load BI paradigm. For the HPL condition, the basic set-up 
was the same as in LPL; however, with an additional feature. Instead of seeing one 
stimulus being presented on each trial, four stimuli were shown. All stimuli 
presented were circles, where one of the circles was noticeably smaller than other 
three. The smaller circle was the target participants had to make a spatial 
transformation of (Figure 5.1; lower example). The manipulation for HPL in 
Experiment 8 was chosen as suitable—even though it had only three distractors—
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because distractors did not afford responses, and the target was not obviously smaller 
than the stimuli making locating of the target relatively difficult; the pop-out effect is 
associated with efficient search but inefficient distraction rejection (Lavie & Cox, 
1997). As such successful perceptual load manipulations are considered those that 
increase task-relevant processing.  
 
CFQ. The CFQ is a self-reported questionnaire which measures failures in 
memory, perception, and motor function. This questionnaire is made up of twenty-
five questions; participants are asked to consider whether any of the minor mistakes 
contained in questions happened to them in the last six months. For example: “Do 
you read something and find that you haven’t been thinking about it and must read it 
again?” The available answers are: “Very often” (4), “Quite often” (3), 
“Occasionally” (2), “Very rarely” (1), and “Never” (0).  Each of the available answer 
options has a score assigned to it, as seen in the brackets; the total score is calculated 
by adding scores for individual answers. The maximum score is 100, and the 
minimum score is 0. In the current experiment, participants’ average score on CFQ 
was 47.7, with the minimum score of 23, and a maximum score of 71. 
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Figure 5.1 An illustration for the trial structure in High and Low Perceptual loads 
conditions. The arrows indicate the corners at which the correct spatial 
transformation was to be made; these are just for an instruction purpose, they were 
not included in the experimental run. Images are not to scale. 
 
 Procedure. Participants attended a single session during which they 
performed two task-switching tests (under LPL and HPL load) and filled in the CFQ 
questionnaire. The order of the task-switching tests was counterbalanced.  
Instructions were given to participants verbally; participants then learnt the cue-task 
pairing, after which they practiced task-switching for 16 trials; if they made four or 
more errors during the first practice, they were offered another practice with sixteen 
trials; however, no more than two practices were allowed. 
 For both task-switching conditions, each trial began with a black square 
frame appearing in the center of the screen inside which participants saw a cue for 
150ms. The task order was random with the restriction that no immediate task-
repetitions were allowed (Philipp & Koch, 2006). The cue was followed by the 
appearance of a single target (a grey circle) in the one of the four corners of the black 
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frame in the LPL condition, and four circles (one in each corner) with one target and 
three distractors—the target was smaller than the other three circles—in the HPL. 
The task consisted of making a spatial transformation of the target according to the 
rule dictated by the cue; that is, participants had to decide in which corner the target 
would move to if it moved according to the direction the cue represented (Figure 5.1; 
arrows indicate correct spatial transformation). Participants made their responses by 
pressing one of the four keyboard keys on the numeric part of the keyboard which 
were spatially congruent with the corners of the black frame; 1 (lower-left), 2 (lower-
right), 4 (upper-left), and 5 (upper-right). In both task-switching conditions the 
stimulus/ stimuli and the cue stayed on the screen until participants made their 
response. If an incorrect response was given, “Error” message appeared on the 
screen (1000ms). 
For LPL and HPL, participants performed 480 trials in each condition. To 
optimise participants’ performance (i.e., to avoid participants becoming fatigued) the 
trials were split into four blocks of 120 trials in each, with participant-paced breaks 
between the blocks. It was emphasised to participants that they had to respond as fast 
and as accurate as possible.  
 
 Design. A within-subjects design was utilised to examine RTs (ms) and 
accuracy (%) as dependent variables, and the Task Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), 
Response Repetition (n–2 Response Repetition, RR vs. n–2 Response Switch, RS), 
and Perceptual Load (HPL vs. LPL) as independent variables. To analyse the 
relationship between n–2 task repetition costs (standard and residual) and CFQ, a 
frequentist correlation was conducted. 
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Results 
Data trimming. Participant’s data were included in the analysis, if they had 
an overall accuracy at 80% for LPL and HPL conditions; all participants had 
accuracy at the required level. Furthermore, null trials (i.e., trials that cannot be 
classified as ABA or CBA) were removed (i.e., first two trials of each block and two 
trials following an error). For the RT analysis, apart from null trials, error trials were 
additionally removed. Also, RTs faster than 150ms or slower than 2.5 standard 
deviations above participant’s mean per experimental cell were removed.  
 
Reaction time analysis. For descriptive statistics from RTs analysis, see 
Table 5.1. There was a main effect of Task Sequence on RTs, 𝐹(1,39) = 33.43, 𝑝 <
.001, ηg
2  =  .01; participants were on average slower on ABA (1246ms) compared to 
CBA trials (1169ms). The main effect of Response was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) =
0.94, 𝑝 = .34, ηg
2  =  .0002; the average RTs on n–2 RR was 1202ms and for n–2 
RS, it was 1212ms. The Perceptual Load had a significant main effect on RTs, 
 𝐹(1,39) = 241.37, 𝑝 < .001, ηg
2  =  .37; participants were significantly faster 
performing task-switching under LPL (946ms) than under HPL (1468ms).  
There was no significant interaction between Task Sequence and 
Response, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.17, 𝑝 = .68, ηg
2  =  .0001. The interaction between Task 
Sequence and Perceptual Load was also not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 2.12, 𝑝 =
.15, ηg
2  =  .0006. Between Response and Perceptual Load there was no significant 
interaction, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.02, 𝑝 = .89, ηg
2  =  .000002. The three-way interaction 
between Task Sequence, Response and Perceptual Load, was not significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 0.09, 𝑝 = .77, ηg
2  =  .00001 (Figure 5.2). For the densities distributions 
for RT n–2 task repetition costs see Figure 5.3. 
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Table 5.1 Mean response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard error, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (n–2 RR) and n–2 
Response Switches (n–2 RS), under Low Personal Load (LPL) and High Perceptual 
Load (HPL), from Experiment 8. 
 Task sequence 
 ABA CBA 
Perceptual Load RTs (ms) Accuracy 
(%) 
RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
LPL      
   n–2 RR 982 (103) 97.20 (.005) 901 (80) 96.50 (.005) 
   n–2 RS 1004 (100) 95.70 (.005) 905 (93) 97.10 (.007) 
HPL     
   n–2 RR 1496 (142) 95.50 (.006) 1435 (114) 94.80 (.005) 
   n–2 RS 1504 (124) 94.30 (.006) 1438 (128) 95.20 (.005) 
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Figure 5.2 At the top, an illustration of a three-way interaction between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) and Perceptual Load (High Perceptual Load, HPL vs. Low Perceptual Load, 
LPL) for RTs. At the bottom, n–2 task repetition costs varying across Response and 
Perceptual Load. Error bars de-note ±SE around the mean. 
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Figure 5.3 Density functions for RT n–2 task repetition costs for High and Low 
Perceptual Load under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
Log-RT analysis. There was a considerable difference between RTs on task-
switching under LPL compared to HPL; therefore, RTs were log-transformed and the 
ANOVA was repeated. For log-RT, as for the not transformed RTs, there was a main 
effect of Task Sequence, 𝐹(1,39) = 59.00, 𝑝 <  .001, ηg
2  =  .02, for ABA average 
log-RT was 7.07 compared to 7.00 for CBA sequence. The main effect of Response 
remained not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 1.60, 𝑝 = .21, ηg
2  =  .0002. The Perceptual 
Load main effect continued to be significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 320.70, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂𝑔
2  =
 .41; for log-RT under HPL average RT was 7.26 compared to LPL which was 6.81. 
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response remained non-
significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.86, 𝑝 = .36, ηg
2  =  .0002. The interaction between Task 
Sequence and Perceptual Load became significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 11.49, 𝑝 < .01, ηg
2  =
 .003. Under HPL there was a significant difference in performance between ABA 
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vs. CBA sequences, 𝑡(79) = 3.7, 𝑝 < .001, 95%CI [0.02; 0.06]; and under LPL this 
difference was not significant, 𝑡(79) = −0.92, 𝑝 =  .40, 95%CI [-0.03; -0.01]. The 
n–2 task repetition cost under HPL was 0.04 and for LPL it was 0.10. The interaction 
between Response and Perceptual Load remained non-significant, 𝐹(1,39) =
0.02, 𝑝 = .90 𝜂𝑔
2  =  .0000, so did the three-way interaction between Task Sequence, 
Response, and Perceptual Load, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.15, 𝑝 = .70, ηg
2  <  .001 (Figure 5.4); 
for density functions for log-RT n–2 task repetition cost see Figure 5.5.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 At the top, an illustration of a three-way interaction between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) and Perceptual Load (High Perceptual Load, HPL vs. Low Perceptual Load, 
LPL) for log-RT. At the bottom, n–2 task repetition costs varying across Response 
and Perceptual Load. Error bars de-note ±SE around the mean. 
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Figure 5.5 Density functions for log-RT n–2 task repetition costs for High and Low 
Perceptual Load under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
 
Accuracy analysis. For descriptive statistics from the accuracy analysis, see 
Table 5.1. The main effect of Task Sequence was not significant,𝐹(1,39) =
1.02, 𝑝 = .32, ηg
2  =  .001; participants were marginally more accurate performing 
the CBA (95.91%) compared to ABA (95.69%) sequence. There was no significant 
main effect of Response, 𝐹(1,39) = 1.89, 𝑝 = .18, ηg
2  =  .004; as participants 
performed comparably on n–2 RR (96.01%) and n–2 RS (95.59%). The Perceptual 
Load had a significant main effect on accuracy, 𝐹(1,39) = 31.70, 𝑝 < .001, ηg
2  =
 .06; the accuracy was on average higher for the LPL (96.64%) compared to the HPL 
(94.96%).  
There was a significant interaction between the Task Sequence and 
Response, 𝐹(1,39) = 19.70, 𝑝 < .001, ηg
2  =  .02. For n–2 RR, there was a 
significant difference in accuracy between ABA (96.39%) and CBA (95.63%)—that 
is the n–2 task repetition benefit of 0.79% was present— 𝑡(79) = 2.00, 𝑝 =  .05, 
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95%CI [-0.00001; 0.02]; this difference was also significant for n–2 RS—that is, the 
n–2 task repetition cost of -1.19% was present—𝑡(79) = −5.1, 𝑝 =  .00, 95%CI [-
0.02; -0.01], as participants were more accurate for CBA (96.18%) compared to 
ABA sequence (94.99%). The interaction between Perceptual Load and Task 
Sequence was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.35, 𝑝 = .56, ηg
2  =  .0003. The 
interaction between Response and Perceptual Load was also not significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 0.01, 𝑝 = .92, ηg
2  =  .0004.  
The three-way interaction between Task Sequence, Response, and Perceptual 
Load was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.29, 𝑝 = .59, ηg
2  =  .0004 (Figure 5.6). For 
the densities distributions for accuracy n–2 task repetition costs see Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.6 At the top, an illustration of a three-way interaction between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) and Perceptual Load (High Perceptual Load, HPL vs. Low Perceptual Load, 
LPL) for accuracy. At the bottom, n–2 task repetition costs varying across Response 
and Perceptual Load. Error bars de-note ±SE around the mean. 
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Figure 5.7 Density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for High and Low 
Perceptual Load under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
Bayes Factors. BFs for individual models are contained in Table 5.2. To 
examine whether the n–2 task repetition cost was explained by the full model (Model 
4; main effects of Response and Perceptual Load, and an interaction between them) 
compared to the alternative models, the BF of the full model was divided by the next 
best model’s BF. The alternative models were: Model 1 (main effect of Response), 
Model 2 (main effect of Perceptual Load), and Model 3 (main effect of Response 
and main effect of Perceptual Load).  
For RT analysis Model 2 had the highest BF among the alternative models; 
comparing the full model and Model 2 produced a BF10 of 0.04405 (0.02064/ 
0.4684). This translates to strong evidence for the Model 2—that is, main effect of 
Perceptual Load—being 22.7 (1/ 0.04405) times more likely than the full model. 
Comparing the second-best model, Model 1 to the full model, produced a BF10 of 
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0.1086 (0.02064/ 0.19)—considered as substantial evidence—making the main 
effect of Response 9.21 times more likely (1/ 0.1086) than the full model. There was 
also substantial evidence for Model 3 (i.e., main effects of Response/ Perceptual 
Load) being over 4-times more likely than the full model, with the BF10 of 0.2362. 
Overall, the BF factorial analysis of variance for RT n–2 task repetition cost suggests 
that the full model is an unlikely explanation of patterns seen in n–2 task repetition 
costs in Experiment 8; the second best explanation was the main effect of Perceptual 
Load, followed by the main effect of Response explaining data better than the full 
model.     
The BFs analysis for the log-RT n–2 task repetition cost favored Model 2 
when compared to the full model (i.e., Model 4) which produced the BF10 of 0.0760 
(5.229/ 68.82)—considered as strong evidence—making the main effect of 
Perceptual Load over 13 times more likely than the full model. When Model 1 was 
compared to the full model, the BF10 came out as 185.41 (5.229/ 0.02760); this 
means that the full model was more likely than the main effect of Response. A BF10 
over 100 is considered as extreme/ decisive evidence, and in this case, can be 
considered as certain support for the full model. Also, there was substantial evidence 
for Model 3 (i.e., main effects of Response and Perceptual Load)—with the BF10 of 
0.2535 (5.229/ 20.63)—being almost 4-times more likely than the full model.    
With regards to BF analysis of accuracy, the results showed that the best 
model compared to the full model was Model 1, and when these two models were 
compared, the BF10 came out as 0.05363 (91.65/ 1709); this means there was strong 
evidence for the main effect of Response being over 18-times more likely (1/ 
0.05363) than the full model. The second-best model, Model 3, compared to the full 
model produced the BF10 of 0.2702 (91.65/ 339.2) which is considered as substantial 
evidence for the model with main effects of Response/ Perceptual Load being more 
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likely than the full model. Model 2 when compared to the full model, produced a 
BF10 of 481.61 (91.65/ 0.1903), meaning that the full model was much more likely 
than the main effect of Perceptual Load. Again, a BF10 over 100 is considered as 
extreme/ decisive evidence.  
 
Table 5.2 Bayes factors for selected models predicting the n–2 task repetition cost as 
the dependent variable. The reported models were compared to a denominator which 
was that the n–2 task repetition cost was predicted by a random factor of Participant. 
“+” indicates an addition of an effect, and “*” indicates an interaction. 
N–2 task repetition cost Model BF 
 
 
RT  
Response (1) 0.19 
Perceptual Load (2) 0.4684 
R + PL (3) 0.0874 
R + PL + R * PL (4) 0.02064 
 
log-RT 
Response (1) 0.02819 
Perceptual Load (2) 68.82 
R + PL (3) 20.63 
R + PL + R * PL (4) 5.229 
 Response (1) 1709 
Accuracy Perceptual Load (2) 0.1903 
 R + PL (3) 339.2 
 R + PL + R * PL (4) 91.65 
 
 
Correlations. For the n–2 task repetition cost (not controlled for episodic 
retrieval) the results as follow. For RT performance under HPL and LPL, there was 
no significant correlation between the scores on CFQ and n–2 task repetition costs; 
for HPL correlation 𝑟 =  −.046, 𝑝 =  .80, 𝑡(38) = −0.28, 95%CI [-0.35; 0.27], and 
for LPL it was, 𝑟 = .15, 𝑝 = .40, 𝑡(38) = 0.93, 95%CI [−0.17;  0.44]. For accuracy 
performance, under HPL and LPL there was not a significant correlation between n–
2 task repetition costs and CFQ; for HPL correlation was 𝑟 = −.07, 𝑝 = .70, 
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t(38) = −0.41, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.37;  0.25], and for LPL it was, 𝑟 =  .08, 𝑝 =
. 60, 𝑡 (38) = 0.49, 95%𝐶𝐼[−0.24; 0.38].  
For the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval the results 
are:  Under HPL, there was no significant correlation between n–2 task repetition 
costs for n–RR and CFQ, 𝑟 = .01, 𝑝 =  .90, 𝑡(38) = 0.08, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.30;  0.32]. or 
for n–2 RS, 𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 =  .50, 𝑡(38) = −0.75,95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.42;  0.20]. For LPL, the 
correlation between CFQ and n–2 task repetition costs for n–2 RR was not 
significant, 𝑟 = .15, 𝑝 =  .40 , t(38) = 0.94, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.17;  0.44], as was the 
correlation between the CFQ  n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 RS, 𝑟 =  .06, 𝑝 = .7, 
𝐭(𝟑𝟖) = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓, 𝟗𝟓%𝑪𝑰 [−𝟎. 𝟐𝟔;  𝟎. 𝟑𝟔].   
Looking at accuracy, for HPL, there was no significant correlation between 
n–2 task repetition switching costs and CFQ for n–2 RR, 𝑟 =  −.13, 𝑝 =
.90, 𝑡(38) = 0.08, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.30; 0.32];  so was the correlation between the n–2 
task repetition switching cost and CFQ for n–2 RS, 𝑟 = −.12, 𝑝 = .50, 𝑡(38) =
−0.75, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.42; 0.20]. Under LPL, the correlations between n–2 task 
repetition costs and CFQ were non-significant for n–2 RR, 𝑟 = .15, 𝑝 = .40, 𝑡(38) =
0.94, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.17; 0.44], or for n–2 RS, 𝑟 = .06, 𝑝 =  .70, 𝑡(38) =
0.35, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.26; 0.36]. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 8 looked at whether cognitive inhibition—as measured with the 
n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval—is modulated by perceptual 
load. Two perceptual load conditions were used (High and Low); for LPL an 
unmodified BI paradigm was utilised, and for HPL task-irrelevant distractors were 
incorporated into the BI paradigm. In both perceptual load conditions participants 
made a spatial judgment about the target stimulus; however, in the LPL participants 
292 
 
saw just one stimulus and in the HPL participants had to locate the target stimulus 
among four stimuli that appeared on the screen, where the smaller out of the four 
was the target. Participants also completed the CFQ to allow an investigation of the 
relationship between day-to-day distractibility tendencies and inhibition. Overall, the 
results from Experiment 8 are inconclusive in parts but some informative 
observations can be made.  
The standard n–2 task repetition cost was present at RT but not at accuracy 
level; however, there was a numerical trend for accuracy to be lower for ABA 
compared to CBA. Episodic retrieval on its own did not affect RT/ accuracy 
performance as it was similar under episodic matches (n–2 RR) and episodic 
mismatches (n–2 RS.) The perceptual load manipulation worked well; that is, as 
expected, performance was considerably slower and less accurate in HPL compared 
to LPL.  
N–2 task repetition cost. According to standard ANOVAs, the RT n–2 task 
repetition cost was not modulated by episodic retrieval, or perceptual load. Bayesian 
analysis showed though, that n–2 task repetition costs were best explained by 
perceptual load manipulation. Also, Bayesian analysis provided some evidence that 
an interaction between episodic retreival and perceptual load, better explained n–2 
task repetition cost than episodic retrieval on its own. For accuracy performance 
standard ANOVAs showed that the n–2 task repetition cost was modulated by 
episodic retrieval, and this was confirmed by Bayesian analysis; specifically, the n–2 
task repetition benefit was observed under episodic matches, compared to the n–2 
task repetition cost under episodic mismatches. As such, accuracy n–2 task repetition 
costs were best explained by episodic retrieval, but there was some evidence for the 
interaction between episodic retrieval and perceptual load better explaining the data 
than perceptual load on its own.   
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By looking at numerical trends, RT n–2 task repetition costs were lower for 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches in both, HPL and LPL 
conditions, with the smallest n–2 task repetition cost under episodic matches (HPL), 
and the highest n–2 task repetition cost under episodic mismatches (LPL). For 
accuracy, n–2 task repetition benefits were observed under for episodic matches in 
HPL and LPL; whereas, under episodic mismatches, n–2 task repetition costs were 
observed with the highest cost in LPL condition. 
Perceptual load. The perceptual load manipulation had a strong effect on n–
2 task repetition costs as performance was on average much slower in HPL 
compared to LPL; whereas accuracy performance was not as strongly affected by 
this manipulation. For RT performance there was no obvious benefit of episodic 
retrieval effect and instead performance was similar under episodic matches and 
episodic mismatches respectively in HPL and LPL. However, looking at n–2 task 
repetition costs, they were the smallest under HPL compared to LPL, and within 
those conditions they were smaller under episodic matches relative to episodic 
mismatches. Bayesian analysis suggested n–2 task repetition costs were better 
explained by an interaction between perceptual load and episodic retrieval than 
episodic retrieval on its own.  
At the beginning of this experiment it was not certain how episodic retrieval 
would be affected by perceptual load, but it was speculated that under different 
perceptual loads what would become part of memory traces (as well as what is 
retrieved) could differ between loads (Lavie, 2000; p.1050). For example, under 
HPL task-irrelevant information should be less efficiently encoded due to limited 
attentional resources, but under LPL what can be assumed to be encoded is task-
relevant as well as task-irrelevant information. Since, there was no obvious effect of 
episodic retrieval on n–2 task repetition cost in the current study, it is uncertain how 
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perceptual load manipulation affected episodic retrieval. However, numerical trends 
and Bayesian results would suggest that perceptual load and episodic retrieval 
contributed to overall smaller n–2 task repetition costs under episodic matches 
compare to episodic mismatches in HPL and LPL, mechanics of which are not clear 
from the current results.  
In accuracy performance, it is uncertain to what extent perceptual load affects 
episodic retrieval and/ or inhibition.  For accuracy results there was a strong effect of 
episodic retrieval because under episodic matches n–2 task repetition benefits were 
observed, compared to episodic mismatches which led to n–2 task repetition cost. 
The n–2 task repetition benefits under episodic matches were similar in magnitude 
for LPL and HPL, which suggests no influence of perceptual load on n–2 task 
repetition costs. However, n–2 task repetition costs under episodic mismatches were 
larger under LPL compared to HPL. It is uncertain whether under episodic 
mismatches, it was the episodic retrieval or inhibition that was influenced by 
perceptual load. It seems that larger n–2 task repetition costs under LPL compared to 
HPL may be driven by the amount of interference or how interference is dealt with. 
That is, under LPL (assumed to be marked by spare attentional resources) episodic 
mismatches may lead to more interference which can be resolved with inhibition—
for example, via inhibition of conflicting activations—whereas under HPL, resources 
are limited, therefore mismatches either lead to less interference, or less inhibition is 
released to deal with interference. Therefore, it can be speculated that HPL 
conditions reduce the amount of interference due to mismatches or triggered by it 
inhibition in task-switching, compared to LPL.  
 
 Individual differences. In terms of individual differences, contrary to what 
was expected, the scores on CFQ did not explain differences in n–2 task repetition 
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costs (standard and controlled). It is possible that performance on task-switching was 
confounded by potentially too difficult manipulation of perceptual load, which could 
have affected the measures of inhibition. However, it is also likely that this lack of 
correlation could be due to low reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost which has 
been reported recently (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 3-4 of this thesis). 
Therefore, due to the n–2 task repetition cost not being a reliable a measure of 
individual differences in inhibition, there should be no relationship between other 
measures of individual differences and the n–2 task repetition cost. This is not to say 
that day-to-day distractibility tendencies do not influence performance on task-
switching, or that these differences do not affect how interference is processed; just 
that Experiment 8 did not observe this relationship.    
 
Conclusions. Perceptual load manipulation introduced to the BI paradigm 
worked well, overall n–2 task repetition costs were reduced under HPL compared to 
LPL. However, obvious episodic retrieval modulatory effect was only present in 
accuracy performance, and in RT performance it was somewhat much reduced 
compared to what was expected. Therefore, it is not clear from Experiment 8 
whether inhibition—as measured the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic 
retrieval—is reduced by perceptual load.  
The perceptual load manipulation used in Experiment 8—even though it 
worked well—might have been too difficult and interfered too much with task-
switching performance; therefore, Experiment 9 was conducted to test another 
perceptual load manipulation. The task-irrelevant distractors used in HPL of 
Experiment 8 looked similar to the target, thereby participants searched for the target 
ignoring distractors, which made the task difficult—that is, the target did not 
automatically capture participants’ attention—but distractors did not afford any 
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response. As an alternative, different distractors can be used which appear 
simultaneously with the target, look similar to the target, do not afford a response, 
make presentation perceptually complex but make the task easier to perform. It was 
decided that distractors that are salient, not task-relevant but are likely to be 
processed by visual cortex would be appropriate (Murphy, Dalton, & Spence, 2017; 
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997; Rorden et al., 2008); as such, small circles around the 
cue which change colours on each trial were expected to strain attentional resources. 
As in Experiment 9 task-irrelevant-distractors are meant to be ignored but are 
expected to strain attentional resources, affecting performance. Therefore, as in 
Experiment 9 BI paradigm was adapted accordingly to include task-irrelevant 
distractors; standard and controlled n–2 task repetition costs were measured, as well 
as day-to-day distractibility using CFQ.  
 
 
Experiment 9 
Method 
 Participants. Forty participants were recruited from the School of 
Psychology at Keele in exchange for partial course credits or a one-off monetary 
reimbursement of £6.50. There were twenty-four women, and the average age was 
27.18 (SD 11.16). As in Experiment 8, participants had to be at least 18-years-old, 
understand spoken and written English, have normal/ corrected to normal vision. 
 
 Stopping rule. As in Experiment 8, Sequential Bayes Factors method was 
used to determine the sample size. Also, the same four probable models were 
selected for comparison; that is, the full model being the main effect of Response, 
main effect of Perceptual Load, and interaction between them, as the model of 
interest. At thirty-six participants, the BF10 ascended to below 1/6; however, four 
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more participants were tested as they already booked to take part in the experiment. 
At forty participants, the BF10 was 0.152; this translates to the alternative model 
(main effect of Response, Model 1; see Table 5.4) being 6.58 times more likely than 
the full model.  
 
 Procedure. As in Experiment 8, participants attended a single session during 
which they performed two task-switching tests (Low and High Perceptual load) and 
filled in the CFQ questionnaire. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 8, 
except that in the HPL, participants saw colored circles around the cue which they 
had to ignore.  
 
Apparatus and stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in 
Experiment 8, except that in the HPL, one stimulus appeared in one corner of the 
frame, and the perceptual load was manipulated by introducing small circles around 
the cue. Small circles around the cue had different colors on each trial, as they were 
randomly drawn from the color circle (see Figure 5.8). The CFQ questionnaire was 
also used in Experiment 9. The minimum score on CFQ was 24 and the maximum 
score was 77.  
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Figure 5.8 A visualisation of the paradigm in Experiment 9. The examples on the top 
(with one grey circle) represent low perceptual load and the examples at the bottom 
(with coloured circles around the cue) represent high perceptual load.  
 
Design. As in Study 9, a within-subjects design was utilised to examine RTs 
(ms) and accuracy (%) as dependent variables, and the Task Sequence (ABA vs. 
CBA), Response Repetition (Response Repetition vs. Response Switch), and 
Perceptual Load (High vs. Low) as independent variables. To analyse the 
relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost (standard and controlled) and CFQ, 
a frequentist correlation was conducted. 
 
Results 
Data Trimming. Data for Experiment 9 were trimmed in the same way as 
for Experiment 8. All participants had an overall accuracy above 80% for Low and 
High Perceptual Load conditions. 
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Reaction time analysis.  For descriptive statistics from RTs, see Table 5.3. 
There was a significant main effect of Task Sequence on RTs, 𝐹(1,39) = 45.68, 𝑝 <
 .0001, ηg
2 =  .03, as participants were on average faster performing CBA (916ms) 
compared to ABA (1001ms). The main effect of Response was not significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 0.31, 𝑝 = .58, ηg
2 <  .0001 (n–2 RR 956ms; n–2 RS 961ms). The main 
effect of Perceptual Load was non-significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.09, 𝑝 = .77, ηg
2 =  .0005 
(High Load 964ms; Low Load 952ms).  
The interaction between Task Sequence and Response was significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 10.65, 𝑝 = .002, ηg
2 =  .002. Under n–2 RR performance on ABA 
(987ms) was significantly different compared to CBA (925ms), 𝑡(79) = 4.2, 𝑝 <
 .001, 95%CI [32.40; 90.63], and for n–2 RS, 𝑡(79) = 12.00, 𝑝 <  .0001, 95%CI 
[89.89; 125.46] (ABA 1014ms; CBA 907ms). The n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 
RR was 62ms and 107ms for n–2 RS. The interaction between Task Sequence and 
Perceptual Load was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 2.00, 𝑝 = .17, ηg
2 =  .0003. The n–2 
task repetition cost under HPL was 75ms, and 93ms for LPL. The interaction 
between Response and Perceptual Load was also non-significant, 𝐹(1,39) =
2.68, 𝑝 = .11, ηg
2 =  .0008. 
The three-way interaction between Task Sequence, Response, and Perceptual 
Load was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 1.31, 𝑝 = .26, ηg
2 =  .0002. For n–2 RR, the n–
2 task repetition cost was 45ms under HPL and 78ms under LPL; for n–2 RS, the n–
2 task repetition cost was 107ms under HPL and 108ms under LPL (see Figure 5.9). 
For density for RT n–2 task repetition cost see Figure 5.10. 
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Table 5.3 Mean response times (RTs) and accuracy (%), with standard error, for 
ABA and CBA sequences, within n–2 Response Repetitions (n–2 RR) and n–2 
Response Switches (n–2 RS), under Low Personal Load (LPL) and High Perceptual 
Load (HPL), from Experiment 9. 
 
 Task sequence 
 ABA CBA 
Perceptual Load RTs (ms) Accuracy 
(%) 
RTs (ms) Accuracy (%) 
LPL      
   n–2 RR 1000 (87) 97.60 (.004) 917 (75) 97.50 (.006) 
   n–2 RS 1000 (80) 96.70 (.007) 893 (69) 98.00 (.004) 
HPL     
   n–2 RR 990 (75) 96.71 (.006) 935 (73) 97.10 (.006) 
   n–2 RS 1027 (84) 96.10 (.007) 917 (72) 97.70 (.005) 
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Figure 5.9 At the top, an illustration of a three-way interaction between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) and Perceptual Load (High Perceptual Load, HPL vs. Low Perceptual Load, 
LPL) for RTs. At the bottom, n–2 task repetition costs varying across Response and 
Perceptual Load. Error bars denote ±SE around the mean. 
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Figure 5.10 Density functions for RT n–2 task repetition costs for High and Low 
Perceptual Load under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches 
 
Accuracy analysis. For descriptive statistics from accuracy, see Table 5.3. 
The main effect of Task Sequence on accuracy was significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 7.09, 𝑝 =
.01, ηg
2 =  .008; accuracy was higher for CBA (97.60%) compared to ABA (96.90%) 
sequence. The main effect of Response on the other hand was not significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 0.58, 𝑝 = .45, ηg
2 =  .0005 (n–2 RR 97.30%; n–2 RS 97.20%). The main 
effect of Perceptual Load was significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 4.62, 𝑝 = .04, ηg
2 =  .005; this 
was because the accuracy was higher under LPL (97.50%) compared to HPL 
(97.00%).  
 The interaction between Task Sequence and Response was significant, 
𝐹(1,39) = 6.11, 𝑝 = .02, ηg
2 =  .009. Specifically, there was no significant 
difference in accuracy between ABA (97.34%) and CBA (97.31%) for n–2 RR, 
𝑡(79) = 0.07, 𝑝 =  .90, 95%CI [-0.007; 0.008]; however, for n–2 RS the accuracy 
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on ABA (96.48%) compared to CBA (97.83%) was significantly different, 𝑡(79) =
−4.40, 𝑝 <  .0001, 95%CI [-0.02; -0.007]. The n–2 task repetition cost was 0.03 for 
n–2 RR, and -1.35% for n–2 RS. The interaction between Task Sequence and 
Perceptual Load was not significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.52, 𝑝 = .48, ηg
2 =  .0004; neither 
was the interaction between Response and Perceptual Load, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.01, 𝑝 =
.91, ηg
2 <  .0001. 
The three-way interaction between Task Sequence, Response, and Perceptual 
Load, was non-significant, 𝐹(1,39) = 0.18, 𝑝 = .68, ηg
2 =  .0002. Under HPL, for 
n–2 RR, the n–2 task repetition cost was -0.02 and 0.08 under LPL; for n–2 RS, the 
n–2 task repetition cost was -1.59 under HPL and -1.11 under LPL (see Figure 5.11). 
For density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition cost see Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.11 At the top, an illustration of a three-way interaction between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA), Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) and Perceptual Load (High Perceptual Load, HPL vs. Low Perceptual Load, 
LPL) for accuracy. At the bottom, n–2 task repetition costs varying across Response 
and Perceptual Load. Error bars de-note ±SE around the mean. 
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Figure 5.12 Density functions for accuracy n–2 task repetition costs for High and 
Low Perceptual Load under n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 Response Switches. 
 
 Bayesian factors. The results for BF analysis is in Table 5.4. For RT n–2 
task repetition costs, the Bayesian analysis of variance showed that when the full 
model (Model 4; main effects of Response/ Perceptual Load and an interaction 
between them) was compared to the best model, which was Model 1 (i.e., main 
effect of Response), the BF10 was 0.152 (4.486/ 29.57). This is considered as 
substantial evidence in favour of the main effect of Response explaining patterns 
seen in RT n–2 task repetition cost in data over 6-times more likely (1/0.152) than 
the full model.  There was anecdotal evidence with BF10 of 0.4225 (4.486/ 10.85) for 
the second-best model—that is, Model 3; main effects of Perceptual Load/ 
Response—being over twice more likely than the full model. Also, there was strong 
evidence with BF10 of 13.09 (4.486/0.3504) for the full model being over 13 times 
more likely than Model 2 (i.e., main effect of Perceptual Load).  
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For accuracy, comparing the full model to the best model (i.e., Model 1; main 
effect of Response), showed that there was strong evidence—with BF10 of 0.05027 
(0.5274/10.49)—for the main effect of Response being almost 20-times more likely 
than the full model. The second-best model, which was Model 3 (i.e., main effects of 
Response/ Perceptual Load), compared to the full model was almost 4-times more 
likely than the full model, as reflected with a BF10 of 0.2502 (0.5274/2.108), which 
is considered as substantial evidence. And lastly, there was anecdotal evidence for 
the full model being over twice more likely than Model 2 (i.e., main effect of 
Perceptual Load), with BF10 of 2.6 (0.5274/0.2028).  
 
Table 5.4 Bayes factors for selected models predicting the n–2 task repetition cost as 
the dependent variable. The reported models were compared to a denominator which 
was that the n–2 task repetition cost was predicted by a random factor of Participant. 
“+” indicates an addition of an effect, and “*” indicates an interaction 
N–2 task repetition cost Model BF 
 
 
RTs 
Response (1) 29.57 
Perceptual Load (2) 0.3504 
R + PL (3) 10.85 
R + PL + R * PL (4) 4.486 
Accuracy 
Response (1) 10.49 
Perceptual Load (2) 0.2028 
R + P (3) 2.108 
R + PL + R * PL (4) 0.5274 
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Correlation 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost. There was no significant correlation 
between the RT n–2 task repetition cost and the CFQ for HPL, 𝑟 = .06, 𝑝 =
.70, 𝑡(38) = 0.34, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.26; 0.36]; or for the LPL, 𝑟 = .11, 𝑝 = .50, 𝑡(38) =
 0.71, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.21; 0.41]. 
For accuracy, the n–2 task repetition cost did not correlate significantly with 
CFQ under HPL, 𝑟 = .04, 𝑝 = .80, 𝑡(38) = 0.23, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.28; 0.35]; and it did 
not correlate significantly under LPL, 𝑟 = .11, 𝑝 = .2, 𝑡(38) =
0.71, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.21; 0.41]. 
 
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost. For HPL, in n–2 RR, the correlation 
between the n–2 task repetition cost and the CFQ was non-significant, 𝑟 = .10, 𝑝 =
.60, 𝑡(38) = 0.59, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.22; 0.40]; which was also a case for n–2 RS, 𝑟 =
. −.006, 𝑝 = 1.00, 𝑡(38) =  −0.04, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.32; 0.31]. 
For LPL, in n–2 RR condition, the n–2 task repetition cost did not correlate 
significantly with CFQ, 𝑟 = .19, 𝑝 = .30, 𝑡(38) = 1.2, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.13; 0.47]; this 
correlation was non-significant for n–2 RS too, 𝑟 = −.10, 𝑝 = .50, 𝑡(38) =
 −0.64, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.40; 0.22]. 
For accuracy, under HPL, the n–2 task repetition cost from n–2 RR did not 
correlate significantly with CFQ, 𝑟 = −.01, 𝑝 = 1.0, 𝑡(38) =
 −0.05, 95%𝐶𝐼 [ −0.32; 0.30]; this was also the case for n–2 RS, 𝑟 = .09, 𝑝 =
.60, 𝑡(38) = 0.56, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.23; 0.39]. 
Under PLP, the n–2 task repetition cost from n–2 RR did not correlate 
significantly with CFQ, 𝑟 = −.11, 𝑝 = .50, 𝑡(38) =  −0.67, 95%𝐶𝐼 [−0.41; 0.21]; 
however, the CFQ correlated significantly with the n–2 task repetition cost for n–2 
RS, 𝑟 = .35, 𝑝 = .03, 𝑡 (38) = 2.3, 95%𝐶𝐼 [0.04; 0.60]. When the p value was 
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corrected for multiple correlations—with corrected p was .0125—the latter 
correlation was no longer significant. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 9 was conducted to investigate further the relationship between 
the n–2 task repetition cost and perceptual load. Two perceptual load conditions 
(HPL and LPL) were used, and attentional resources were manipulated by 
introducing task-irrelevant distractors. As in Experiment 8, in both perceptual load 
conditions participants made a spatial judgment about the target stimulus; however, 
in the HPL coloured circles appeared around the cue on each trial, whereas in the 
LPL there were no such circles around the cue. Participants were instructed to ignore 
the coloured circles in the HPL. The relationship between day-to-day distractibility 
tendencies (as measured with CFQ) and n–2 task repetition costs were also looked at. 
As in Experiment 8, standard and controlled n–2 task repetition costs were measured. 
 The n–2 task repetition cost was present in RTs as well as accuracy, and it 
was modulated by episodic retrieval; this is a replication of findings from Chapters 
3–4 of the current thesis (Grange et al., 2017). The perceptual load manipulation 
worked in accuracy but not in RT performance; for accuracy, participants were on 
average less accurate in HPL compared to LPL, and for RTs, performance was 
numerically slower under HPL relative to LPL. Contrary to predictions of the current 
study, the perceptual load manipulation did not influence the standard or controlled 
n–2 task repetition cost; however, numerically the costs were smaller under HPL, 
especially for episodic matches. Bayesian analysis, overall, showed that n–2 task 
repetition costs (standard and controlled for episodic retrieval) were unlikely to be 
modulated by perceptual load; although, an interaction between perceptual load and 
episodic retrieval explained results better than perceptual load on its own. 
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Nevertheless, the predominant support was for episodic retrieval best explaining the 
patterns seen in RT and accuracy n–2 task repetition costs.  Also, as in Experiment 8, 
the n–2 task repetition cost individual differences were not explained by CFQ.  
 
General Discussion 
The current study looked at whether inhibition in task-switching—as 
measured with the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval—is 
modulated by perceptual load, and whether individual differences in this effect can 
be explained by self-reported day-to-day distractibility. This is the first study of this 
kind, as there seems to be no study that reports investigation of attentional resources 
in task-switching using perceptual load. Two experiments were conducted to test for 
effects of task-irrelevant distractors on n–2 task repetition costs. The study was 
conducted under the hypothesis that the extent to which inhibition is deployed in 
cognitive tasks depends on attentional resources—in this case manipulated with 
perceptual load (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Fox, 2000)—and that individual differences 
in n–2 task repetition costs can be accounted for by scores on CFQ, difference which 
should be diminished under HPL (Forster & Lavie, 2009b).  
The results from the two studies are inconclusive, but overall, it seems that 
n–2 task repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval are not modulated by 
perceptual load. However, in Experiment 8 RT n–2 task repetition costs not 
controlled for episodic retrieval was modulated by perceptual load, with the cost 
being smaller under HPL compared to LPL. Also, numerically, in both experiments 
there were trends for n–2 task repetition costs (standard and controlled for episodic 
retrieval) were smaller under HPL relative to LPL, and within those conditions the 
costs were smaller for episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches. 
Moreover, in Experiment 8 Bayesian analysis for RT performance supported 
evidence for perceptual load modulating the n–2 task repetition cost, followed by 
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episodic retrieval, but in Experiment 9 episodic retrieval more likely explained data. 
For accuracy for Experiments 8–9, the predominant support from Bayesian analysis 
was for episodic retrieval modulating n–2 task repetition costs. And in terms of 
individual differences in n–2 task repetition costs, in both experiments they were not 
linked to CFQ.  
 
N–2 Repetition Cost 
 The n–2 task repetition cost was present in RT and log-RT but not in 
accuracy for Experiment 8, and in both RT and accuracy for Experiment 9; therefore 
the standard n–2 task repetition cost was replicated, supporting the reports in 
literature (Grange et al., 2017; Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010; Kowalczyk & 
Grange, 2017) and current thesis’ experiments (Chapters 2–4). In terms of 
controlling for episodic retrieval (Grange & Kowalczyk, 2017; Mayr, 2002; Neill, 
1997; Chapter 3), the n–2 task repetition cost was modulated by it in accuracy only 
in Experiment 8—with performance being numerically more accurate under episodic 
matches compared to mismatches—and in both RT and accuracy in Experiment 9, 
confirming previous reports  (Grange & Kowalczyk, 2017; Chapter 3). 
 
Perceptual Load 
 With it being the first study that looked at perceptual load and inhibition in 
task-switching, there was no indication on what would be considered a suitable 
manipulation of perceptual load. As such, rather than creating a new task-switching 
paradigm, an established BI paradigm (Grange et al., 2017; Mayr, 2007) was adapted 
for the purpose of the current study.  
In Experiment 8 task-irrelevant distractors were used as suitable 
manipulation to construct conditions for HPL; that is, participants saw four similar 
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looking stimuli out of which one was the target. Three distractors may not be 
considered enough to exhaust attentional resources (Lavie & Fox, 2000), but the 
perceptual load manipulation was deemed suitable because the distractors did not 
afford responses, and searching for the target made the task more difficult. The 
results showed that this manipulation worked as performance was less accurate and 
slower under HPL relative to LPL; however, HPL might have been too difficult 
because participants’ accuracy was high but RT performance was considerably 
slower in HPL compared to LPL. N–2 task repetition costs present in log-RTs were 
modulated by perceptual load, with the cost being smaller under HPL compared to 
LPL; also, for RT performance n–2 task repetition costs were smaller under HPL 
relative to LPL. Moreover, even though n–2 task repetition costs controlled for 
episodic retrieval were not modulated by perceptual load, numerically the n–2 task 
repetition cost was smaller for episodic matches under HPL compared to LPL. Since 
the RTs were so slow, too much time might have passed between trials for episodic 
retrieval (Grange et al., 2017; Hommel, 1998; Neill, 1997) effects to be present. 
Bayesian analysis supported perceptual load as likely modulating n–2 task repetition 
costs (for RT and log-RT performance), followed by an interaction between 
perceptual load and episodic retrieval being more likely than episodic retrieval on its 
own.  
 In Experiment 9 different task-irrelevant distractors were used, making the 
task easier to perform (as indicated by comparable performance for HPL and LPL). 
The task-irrelevant distractors were circles in different colours (randomly drawn 
from the colours circle and change on every trial) placed around the cue. The logic 
behind this manipulation was that the presentation on each trial was meant to be 
perceptually rich which should have been enough to strain attentional resources 
(Rees et al., 1997; Rorden et al., 2008), and increase task-relevant processing. This 
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time, the n–2 task repetition cost was present and was modulated by episodic 
retrieval, replicating findings from previous chapters of this thesis. The perceptual 
load manipulation worked well in accuracy but not in RT performance; that is, 
performance was less accurate under HPL compared to LPL, but it was similar in 
HPL and LPL in terms of speed. However, n–2 task repetition costs (standard and 
controlled for episodic retrieval) were not modulated by perceptual load. 
Numerically, n–2 task repetition costs were smaller under HPL relative to LPL, and 
within that, they were smaller for episodic matches compared to mismatches (apart 
from episodic mismatches in RT). However, Bayesian analysis provided more 
support for episodic retrieval than perceptual load modulating the n–2 task repetition 
cost. Overall, the evidence from Experiment 9 leans towards suggesting that n–2 task 
repetition costs are unlikely to be modulated by perceptual load. 
 The manipulations of perceptual load in the current study can be seen as a 
limitation, mainly because they are the first of this type used in BI paradigms; as 
such, the manipulation used in Experiment 8 seemed too difficult and in Experiment 
9 might have been too easy. Also, it is uncertain yet how perceptual load interacts 
with episodic retrieval which makes manipulating perceptual load in task-switching 
difficult. However, with this study being the first one of this kind, it still offers some 
insight into whether task-switching is likely to be modulated by attentional 
resources; based on the current results, it seems that attentional resources may be 
important in task-switching but it may depend of the type of distractors used to 
manipulate perceptual load and whether episodic retrieval is controlled for.   
 
Individual Differences  
 Contrary to what was predicted, individual differences in day-to-day 
distractibility did not predict inhibition measured with the residual n–2 task 
repetition costs. Based on previous research (Forster & Lavie, 2008; Kahneman & 
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Chajczyk, 1981; Lavie & Fox, 2000; Rorden et al., 2008) and assuming that the n–2 
task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval reflects inhibition, the individual 
differences seen in the cost were speculated to be explained by day-to-day 
distractibility (as measured with CFQ), especially under low perceptual load. The 
source of the lack of the relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost and the 
CFQ may be manifold.  
There is a possibility that perceptual load manipulations utilised in the 
current study were not optimal and affected adversely measures of inhibition; 
however, this is unlikely, because n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic 
retrieval did not differ between perceptual load conditions. It is possible also, that 
this study’s findings fit in with results from Chapter 4 (as well as Grange & 
Houghton, n.d.; Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) that indicated that inhibition, as 
measured with the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval, is not 
resource dependent, or that it does not reflect inhibition. For example, controlling for 
episodic retrieval in accuracy lead to accuracy n–2 task repetition benefits instead of 
n–2 task repetition costs; and n–2 task repetition benefits are unlikely to reflect 
inhibition. Also, another candidate explaining the lack of relationship between n–2 
task repetition costs and the CFQ is the lack of the reliability of the n–2 task 
repetition cost—controlled and not controlled for episodic retrieval—which has been 
documented recently (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 2 & 3: Experiment 1). 
Moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost is a difference score which are difficult to 
interpret and are often not reliable (Crawford et al., 2008), therefore it is not certain 
whether inhibition in task-switching is not resource-dependent or whether inhibition 
is just not measured well with n–2 task repetition costs. 
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Conclusions 
Overall, the results from the current study are mixed. Assuming that n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval reflects inhibition, it seems that it is 
not influenced by perceptual load. However, n–2 task repetition cost not controlled 
for episodic retrieval seems affected by perceptual load to some extent. Nevertheless, 
it is not certain whether in the case of n–2 task repetition costs not controlled for 
episodic retrieval, perceptual load affected the episodic retrieval or inhibition. Also, 
individual differences in day-to-day distractibility do not explain n–2 task repetition 
costs, whether controlled for episodic retrieval or not. This is the first study of this 
kind, and more refined investigation of perceptual load role in task-switching is 
needed. 
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Chapter 6 Episodic Retrieval Modulation of the n–
2 task Repetition Cost Examined with Ex-
Gaussian and Diffusion Modelling.   
 
 
Abstract 
Data from four studies were examined with ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling to 
investigate the n–2 task repetition cost—a behavioural effect seen in task-switching 
thought to reflect inhibition. The n–2 task repetition cost is considerably modulated 
by a non-inhibitory mechanism (i.e., episodic retrieval), which questions the extent 
to which it reflects inhibition. Diffusion modelling results show that the n–2 task 
repetition cost was predominantly present in drift rate—evidence for the cost to be a 
carry-over effect (e.g., inhibition)—but the cost was absent or reduced when episodic 
retrieval was controlled for—evidence for the cost unlikely to be due to carry-over 
effects. The n–2 task repetition cost was also present in threshold separation (with/ 
without episodic retrieval controlled for) likely due to more cautious performance on 
ABA compared to CBA sequences. The results for non-decisional parameter were 
inconclusive. Ex-Gaussian modelling showed that n–2 task repetition costs were the 
largest in the tau parameter, but were also observed in mu and sigma parameters; and 
the costs were reduced when episodic retrieval was controlled for. Overall, the 
current study questions the validity of the n–2 task repetition cost as a measure of 
cognitive inhibition.
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Introduction 
Computerised task-switching paradigms are considered very useful in assessing 
executive functions (e.g., inhibition, set-shifting), and have been used widely to study 
cognition in task-switching (for reviews see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003). The 
main feature of this method is that it involves participants switching between or 
repeating simple computerised reaction time tasks. What constitutes a task can be 
determined by instructions given (Dreisbach et al., 2007) but in general a task is 
characterised as a set of rules and procedures required to perform a task resulting in a 
motor response (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). For example, if 
stimuli are digits presented sequentially on a computer screen (one digit shown at a 
time), one task may be to make a judgment about whether a digit is lower or higher than 
number 5, and another task could be to judge whether a digit is an odd or an even 
number. Typically, a cue is presented before each stimulus so participants know which 
task they should be performing. Response choices are often binary (i.e., Correct and 
Incorrect) and are made via pressing relevant keyboard keys (e.g., Z-key press for an 
odd number, N-key press for an even number). Efficient task-switching requires 
participants to learn as well as to manipulate sets of rules and procedures (i.e., task sets) 
required to perform individual tasks, which typically consists of having to remember 
what each cue represents, which task’s rule (e.g., parity or magnitude judgment) to 
apply to the presented stimulus, and then which response to make. Task-switching 
performance—as measured via reaction times and accuracy—is typically examined with 
analysis of variance (i.e., ANOVA); and the differences in performance between 
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experimental conditions, groups, as well as individuals are used to make inferences 
about cognitive processes that might be at play.  
 
N–2 Task Repetition Cost 
One of the consistent findings from the task-switching research is the 
observation of an effect known as the n–2 task repetition cost (Mayr & Keele, 2000), 
which is seen in task-switching paradigms utilising three tasks, a paradigm designed to 
test a hypothesis about inhibition being an important factor for successful task-
switching. In a series of experiments Mayr and Keele have shown that data produced by 
their paradigm were characterised with a pattern consistent with the theory that predicts 
inhibition aiding disengagement from a task—which later was supported by many other 
studies (for a review see Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). In general, when 
participants switch between three tasks, the n–2 task repetition cost is identified by an 
overall slower and less accurate performance when returning to a task that was 
completed on n–2 trial (e.g., ABA sequence), compared to performance on a task that 
was not performed on n–2 trial (e.g., CBA sequence). The letters in sequences ABA and 
CBA are arbitrary labels for three tasks (e.g., A-parity judgment, B-magnitude 
judgment, C-form judgment); the labels reflect whether in a sequence of presented tasks, 
the task on a current trial repeats or not from the n–2 trial. Typically, tasks are presented 
to participants in a random order, and a computer code compares a task on a current trial 
to the one on the n–2 trial and records the sequence as ABA or CBA.  
The n–2 task repetition cost is thought to reflect cognitive inhibition in task-
switching, and the reason for it is supported by the following logic. To perform rapid 
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task-switching efficiently, participants have to shift back and forth between three tasks; 
that is, on a current trial they have to bring to mind the relevant task set selected among 
all possible tasks. Since task-switching is rapid, once a given task is completed, its 
activation is thought not to stop instantly; instead, when attention is shifted away from 
the just performed task, its activation is thought to decay gradually whilst a new task set 
is being activated (Houghton & Tipper, 1994; Mayr & Keele, 2000). The continued 
activation of an abandoned task is thought to interfere with the activation of the next 
task; and inhibition is a process believed to temporarily supress the interfering activation 
of the not relevant task to allow for the next task to be activated. However, if a task that 
was temporarily inhibited is required again, its reactivation will be impaired; that is, a 
task’s reactivation/ execution is delayed until previously applied inhibition decays or is 
overcome. Mayr and Keele (2000) speculated, and consequently found, that a 
behavioural cost (i.e., slower RTs, lower accuracy) is incurred when returning to a task 
from n–2 trial (i.e., as seen in ABA compared to CBA sequences), because that task is 
less accessible being under the influence of inhibition. Since the n–2 task repetition cost 
was observed back in year 2000, it has been replicated many times, and until recently it 
has been resistant to non-inhibitory explanations, making it a popular measure of 
cognitive inhibition in task-switching (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010).  
However, new evidence emerged which questions the usefulness of the n–2 task 
repetition cost as a measure of inhibitory control (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 
2), and the extent to which the n–2 task repetition cost reflects cognitive inhibition 
(Grange, Kowalczyk, & Loughlin, 2017; Chapter 3). Specifically, the n–2 task repetition 
cost recently has been shown not to be reliable as a measure of individual differences in 
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cognitive inhibition, and has been demonstrated to be modulated considerably by an 
effect known as episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 2017; Neill, 1997)—a memory related 
process; as a consequence, the n–2 task repetition cost has been deemed a confounded 
measure of cognitive control. The evidence of episodic retrieval modulating the n–2 task 
repetition cost is of interest to the current study, but before explaining how and why, it 
is useful to look at how performance priming effects influence day-to-day life, and why 
it is relevant to task-switching research. 
 
Priming in Task-Switching 
Human behaviour is shaped by learning through positive as well as negative 
experiences, and practice. With enough exposure to new environmental factors and their 
pairing with action, behaviours can become automatic (Logan, 1985, 1988). This is 
because it is assumed that the associations between environmental factors and action are 
stored in memory and retrieved when necessary, making our actions more efficient 
(Hommel, 2000, 2004, Logan, 1985, 1988). For example, it is through learnt 
associations between stimuli and actions that we learn how and when to use objects 
(e.g., a pen, fork), keep away from dangerous stimuli (e.g., a hot stove), put letters into 
words and sentences, ride a bicycle, or drive a car. Priming, which is a subconscious 
memory process, can facilitate or impair our behaviour through automating activation of 
declarative and procedural memories upon seeing a given stimulus (e.g., keeping a safe 
distance from a hot stove). This unconscious memory effect is an important factor in 
human behaviour because in general, it can make us more efficient responding to and 
interacting with our environment as well as other humans (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & 
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Burrows, 1996; Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012). Positive priming is when 
behaviour is facilitated through previous exposure to stimuli and action associated (e.g., 
reading), whereas negative priming is a slower behaviour due to previous exposure to 
stimuli (e.g., slower reaction to previously ignored stimuli) (Tipper, 1985; Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990).  
Task-switching performance can be sensitive to priming effects because it 
involves repetitive exposure to pairing of stimuli and responses leading to positive as 
well as negative priming (e.g., tasks’ shared perceptual features and/ or responses may 
become inhibited if not relevant in a given moment) (Allport & Wylie, 1999, 2000; 
Altmann, 2011; Grange & Houghton, 2010a; Hommel, 1998, 2004; Horoufchin et al., 
2011; Koch & Allport, 2006; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Neill, 2007; Schmidt & 
Liefooghe, 2016; D. W. Schneider & Logan, 2005; Waszak et al., 2003; Woodward & 
Meier, 2003). For instance, there is evidence (Waszak et al., 2003) that if a presented 
stimulus was previously relevant for another task, task-switching performance is less 
efficient—as measured by a larger switch cost, an effect of slower RTs switching 
compared to repeating a task—relative to when a stimulus was not previously relevant 
for another task. This was taken as evidence that processing of stimuli associated with 
other tasks leads to interference due to competing stimuli’ associations, which has 
support in other studies (Druey, 2014; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016). Responses in task-
switching also can be primed (Gade & Koch, 2007b; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016); for 
example, evidence suggests that if response keys overlap across different tasks (i.e., in 
bivalent tasks, where a task can afford more than one response category), n–2 task 
repetition costs are larger compared to when responses do not overlap (i.e., in univalent 
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tasks, where a task can afford one response category). Moreover, cues used in task-
switching can also be influenced by priming effects (Logan & Schneider, 2006b; Mayr 
& Kliegl, 2003); for instance, if two cues per task are used where some cue-pairs are 
semantically associated within a given task (e.g., parity task, cues: king-queen; 
magnitude task, cues: salt-pepper), associated between tasks (e.g., parity task, cue: king-
salt; magnitude task, cues: queen-pepper), or are semantically unassociated (e.g., parity 
task, cues: king-salt; magnitude task, cue: night-verb), performance is the most efficient 
for task-repetitions under semantically or associatively primed cues. In terms of whether 
a cue or a task repeats or alternates, performance was the fastest for cues repetitions, and 
the slowest for cues alternations. Together these findings were taken as supporting 
evidence for the view that positive and negative priming effects—specifically, cue-
encoding priming—play an important role in successful task-switching.  
 
Episodic retrieval. Findings from research into priming effects in general, are 
very relevant to task-switching as shown in previous paragraph; further evidence for this 
comes from research investigating a memory mechanism known as episodic retrieval—
thought to be behind negative priming (Neill, 1997)—which became particularly 
important for the interpretation of the n–2 task repetition cost as it will be demonstrated 
in the next paragraphs.  
Episodic retrieval can be described as an operation by which the most recent 
exposure to a given stimulus (i.e., declarative and procedural memories; for example, 
task’s parameters such as stimulus’ features, distractors, response made) is retrieved 
automatically upon seeing that stimulus again, either facilitating or impairing 
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performance. It has been speculated and supported experimentally (Hommel, 1998, 
2004, 2009), that performing a task results in this task’s parameters being integrated in 
the form of a memory trace (also known as an event-file), which can be retrieved as 
triggered by being exposed to the same stimulus again (i.e., a retrieval of the most recent 
episode). If upon seeing a given stimulus a retrieved response does not match the 
currently required action, by the episodic retrieval account, it should lead to impaired 
performance because a new response will have to be generated against the one that was 
initiated automatically through episodic retrieval; however, if the retrieved task’s 
parameters match the demands of the current task, performance should be facilitated 
(Hommel, 1998, 2000, 2004).   
In task-switching research in general, of interest is whether across trials tasks 
repeat or not, and typically, what constitutes a task repetition is whether the same task 
and the same instructions are presented. What has not been considered an issue in task-
switching is whether, when a task repeats all its parameters repeat too, which by 
episodic retrieval account should be relevant. If one of the tasks is to make a parity 
judgment (i.e., is presented number odd or even?), the first time participant performs 
this task, they may see a digit “4” for which they have to press “Z” key, but when that 
task repeats, they may see digit “7” for which they have to press “M” key. In this 
scenario, the task and instructions that go with it repeat across trials, but the outcome is 
different. This was problematic for interpreting of the n–2 task repetition cost because, 
when in ABA sequences the current task A repeats from n–2 trial (e.g., parity-
magnitude-parity) but the response on the current trial is different than on n–2 trial (e.g., 
odd-smaller-even), we no longer can tell if the observation of slower RTs and lower 
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accuracy on ABA compared to CBA sequence, is due to performing a previously 
inhibited task, or due to mismatches of retrieved responses for the repeated task.  
Some of the priming effects seen in task-switching have been already linked to 
episodic retrieval mechanisms (Altmann, 2011; Grange & Houghton, 2010a; Horoufchin 
et al., 2011; Logan & Schneider, 2006b; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 
2016; Waszak et al., 2003). In relation to the n–2 task repetition cost, unlike in negative 
priming—another inhibitory mechanism which has been shown to be well explained by 
episodic retrieval (Neill, 1997; Tipper, 2001)—initial investigation of episodic retrieval 
effects on the n–2 task repetition cost showed that it could not be attributed to, or 
modulated by episodic retrieval account (Mayr, 2002). In a specially prepared paradigm 
(Figure 6.1), in which tasks’ features can be easily manipulated, Mayr showed that when 
episodic retrieval was controlled for, there was a numerical reduction in n–2 task 
repetition costs for episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches; however, 
episodic retrieval account did not explain the n–2 task repetition cost, as statistically the 
n–2 task repetition cost was not different for n–2 Response Repetitions and n–2 
Response Switches. This was taken as evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost is a 
result of persisting inhibition rather than episodic retrieval mismatches. However, since 
Mayr’s work was published, further studies have been reported which do not support 
Mayr’s findings (Grange et al., 2017; Chapter 3). In a series of three experiments, 
Grange and colleagues showed that n–2 task repetition costs were considerably reduced 
under n–2 Response Repetitions (i.e., episodic matches) compared to n–2 task repetition 
costs under n–2 Response Switch (i.e., episodic mismatches). As such, Grange and 
colleagues illustrated that the n–2 task repetition cost—typically thought to be a 
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measure of cognitive inhibition—is inflated by episodic retrieval mismatches, which has 
been further supported by experiments conducted in Chapters 4-6 in of the current 
thesis. The current investigation will explore the episodic retrieval modulation of the n–
2 task repetition cost further using alternative to standard analysis methods used in task-
switching research. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Schematic overview of Mayr's (2002) task-switching paradigm. The arrows 
indicate correct answers and they were used only for instruction purposes. Tasks are 
spatial transformations (i.e., horizontal, vertical, diagonal) of a circle. 
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Reaction Time Analysis 
 When looking at RT data—including in task-switching research—it is very 
common to use measures of central tendencies (e.g., mean RTs and accuracy) and a 
dispersion parameter (e.g., standard deviation) as a reflection of performance on 
cognitive tasks; that is, central tendencies measures are used as a summarised reflection 
of performance. However, using central tendencies as an analysis input can be 
problematic or at least not optimally informative (Whelan, 2008). For example, data are 
often not normally distributed (i.e., they are positively skewed and need to be trimmed 
or transformed (or both) before they can be analysed; therefore, potentially informative 
data points are often removed which can make mean outputs misleading and obscuring 
valuable information about data (e.g., two conditions with the same mean performance 
may have different distributions which can be meaningful) (Balota & Yap, 2011; 
Heathcote et al., 1991; Hervey et al., 2006). Moreover, mean RT performance can also 
overestimate experimental effects (Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013). 
 
Ex-Gaussian. Mental chronometry—a study of the processing of nervous 
system via, for example RT and accuracy—is a very popular method used in 
experimental psychology to explore mental processes (Jensen, 2006; Meyer, Osman, 
Irwin, & Yantis, 1988); however, the full exploratory potential of these measures is not 
used. As mentioned previously, mean RTs and accuracy are commonly chosen as a 
suitable reflection of data; however, instead, the right tail of the positively skewed RT 
distribution can be more informative. For example, it has been noted that in people with 
diminished intelligence the right tail of the distribution is much flatter compared to 
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individuals with an average intelligence, which was speculated to be due to neuronal 
oscillations, attentional or motivational differences (Baumeister, 1998). According to 
the ‘worst performance’ theory—that the worst performance trials (i.e., trials at the right 
tail of distribution) are more predictive of general intelligence (g) than best performance 
trials (for a review see Coyle, 2003)—smaller number of worst performance trials seen 
in people with higher general intelligence (hence shorter distribution right tail compared 
to people with lower intelligence), are indicative of less working memory (WM) lapses, 
and efficient cognitive control. 
As an alternative to central tendencies analyses, whole RT distributions can be 
investigated incorporating the positive skew of the distribution using an ex-Gaussian—a 
convolution of normal and exponential distribution (Luce, 1986)—modelling of RTs 
(Ratcliff, 1993). The ex-Gaussian analysis is more informative than looking at central 
tendencies in data because rather than producing outcomes of average performance, ex-
Gaussian analysis characterises RTs distributions with three parameters: µ (mu-mean of 
the normal distribution), δ (sigma-standard deviation of normal distribution), and τ (tau-
the mean of exponential distribution, the long right tail of the distribution) (Burbeck & 
Luce, 1982). The three ex-Gaussian parameters are estimated from raw data to establish 
whether and which parameters differ significantly between experimental conditions. 
Then, the differences in parameters among experimental conditions and groups can be 
linked to different cognitive processes (Hervey et al., 2006; Schmiedek et al., 2007), 
although some would argue that ex-Gaussian parameters’ interpretation has no strong 
theoretical grounds (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009). Among the three ex-Gaussian 
parameters, the one that is being depicted as most meaningful is the tau parameter—
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which characterises the long right tail of distributions, where worse performance trials 
are seen—and it has been associated with cognitive inhibition (Grange & Houghton, 
2011; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996), tasks-conflict 
processing (Shahar & Meiran, 2014; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009), WM (Schmiedek et 
al., 2007; Shahar, Teodorescu, Usher, Pereg, & Meiran, 2014; Tse, Balota, Yap, 
Duchek, & McCabe, 2010), intelligence (Baumeister, 1998), and attentional lapses 
(Hervey et al., 2006). In terms of the Gaussian parameters, larger mu values have been 
linked to response criterion (Spieler, 2001) and response conflicts (Steinhauser & 
Hübner, 2009); that is, in general response related processes. 
Regardless of the view that individual ex-Gaussian parameters cannot be 
confidently mapped on to different cognitive processes (Matzke & Wagenmakers, 
2009), ex-Gaussian analyses can be useful as a descriptive method for examining 
experimental effects associated with higher cognition. For example, assuming that tau 
can reflect WM lapses and task conflicts, in task-switching it would mean that this 
parameter can be sensitive to processing conflicts due to inhibition and episodic 
retrieval, which both can. Also, ex-Gaussian modelling can be extended by theoretically 
stronger methods such as using computational models of how—rather than whether—
performance differs between conditions, and what give rise to these differences 
(Schmiedek et al., 2007; Spieler, 2001; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013).   
 
Computational modelling. Assuming that cognition can be studied through 
mental chronometry and that we understand basics of what cognitive and perceptual 
processes generate RTs (Jensen, 2006; Medina, Wong, Diaz, & Colonius, 2015; Posner, 
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2005; Simmons, Wass, Thomas, & Riley, 2002), models of cognitive mechanisms 
giving rise to observed data can be designed and tested. Specifically, with the use of 
what is known as computational modelling, theories about cognitive processes can be 
simplified and translated into mathematical equations or computational algorithms—
based on abstract assumptions made about cognition—and parameters describing 
performance can be analysed and put into simulation to re-create observed data. These 
models then can be used to test or generate hypotheses, rather than just describe data. 
Of interest to the current study is one particular computational method, known as 
diffusion modelling (Ratcliff, 1978; Voss, Nagler, et al., 2013). This computational 
model assumes that in two-choice reaction time tasks (e.g., Odd vs Even), upon seeing a 
stimulus, the made decision is a result of a noisy information accumulation process. 
Specifically, the following is assumed: The presented stimulus is encoded and compared 
in parallel fashion with information held in memory; information for this comparison 
accumulates gradually in what is referred to as a random walk process (i.e., diffusion 
process, which is assumed to resemble firing neuronal populations), towards either of 
the responses. The response that is executed is the one for which accumulated evidence 
reaches decision criterion first (e.g., which response’ threshold is reached faster) (Figure 
6.2). 
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Figure 6.2 Schematic overview of Ratliff’s diffusion model. At point z information 
accumulation process starts; slope v reflects the drift rate, when an upper (a) or lower 
(0) threshold are hit, the decision is made. Outcomes can vary from trial to trial because 
they result from a random walk process. Examples of decision-time distributions are 
depicted outside the decision time (top, and bottom of the graph). 
 
 
In diffusion modelling, correct as well as incorrect RTs—unlike other methods 
that only use correct responses (e.g., ex-Gaussian), or look at RT and accuracy 
separately—are modelled for each participant and condition, by estimating diffusion 
modelling parameters  (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss, Nagler, et al., 2013; Voss & 
Voss, 2007). Each parameter reflects distinct processing mechanism and the basic 
diffusion modelling parameters are, drift rate (v), threshold separation (a), starting point 
(z), and non-decisional time (t0).  
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The drift rate is meant to reflect the rate (i.e., strength and quality) at which 
information is accumulated, it has been linked to task difficulty (e.g., difficult tasks 
being characterised with smaller drift rates), and speed of processing (e.g., higher drift 
rates linked to faster processing, Schmiedek et al., 2007). The smaller the drift rate, the 
longer is the information accumulation, and the slower the RT; also, under smaller drift 
rates the probabilities of either of the two responses being made are similar, leading to 
more errors. The larger the drift rate, the faster the information accumulation, and the 
faster the RTs are; that is, the larger the drift rates the higher the chance that the correct 
answer is reached sooner. Also, drift rates are sensitive to carry-over effects (e.g., 
interference), and as such, slower information accumulation can be speculated to be due 
to, for example inhibition.  
The threshold separation parameter represents decision criterion boundaries (i.e., 
the width between decisions’ thresholds); that is, the amount of information 
accumulated needed to make a decision. Larger threshold separation parameters are 
linked to a conservative decision style—more information is accumulated before a 
response is selected (i.e., slow but accurate performance)—and smaller threshold 
separation parameters are linked to liberal decision style (i.e., less information is 
accumulated before decision is made; fast but less accurate performance). This 
parameter has been shown to be sensitive to age-related slowing, instructions given to 
participants, and speed-accuracy trade-off (Voss et al., 2004).  
The starting point is a parameter that is relative to separation thresholds (i.e., 
threshold boundary to which the starting point is closer to is the more likely decision to 
be reached) and is meant to reflect where between decision boundaries, information 
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accumulation begins; this parameter can be adjusted to introduce prior biases (e.g., 
proportion of responses: 40:60 Left vs Right key presses). The non-decisional parameter 
reflects the cognitive processes related to information encoding, working memory 
configuration, and response execution.  
The diffusion modelling has become an important method to bring together 
investigation of underlying components of processing and RT data. A good model 
should predict mean performance (i.e., RTs, accuracy), RTs distributions, and changes 
in dependent variables across experimental conditions (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
Diffusion modelling of two-choice reaction tasks is relatively easy to implement, as 
ready software packages are available. Also, the diffusion model’s parameters can be 
mapped on to different cognitive processes more confidently compared to ex-Gaussian 
method, because each diffusion parameter links to a specific cognitive mechanism 
(Matzke & Wagenmakers, 2009). Moreover, specific theories can be tested because 
differences in performance across experimental conditions can be speculated to be due 
to different stages of processing such as, information accumulation, response criterions, 
or delayed motoric response. Therefore, diffusion modelling parameters are considered 
less noisy—that is, they are framed around specific cognitive mechanisms—and are 
more informative than central tendencies measures or ex-Gaussian analysis (Voss, 
Nagler, et al., 2013; Voss, Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2013; White, Ratcliff, Vasey, 
& McKoon, 2010). 
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Task-Switching and Computational Modelling 
Despite the advantages of diffusion modelling (and ex-Gaussian analysis) over 
central tendencies analyses, not many studies have adopted this method for investigation 
of task-switching (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014; Weeda et al., 2014); however, within 
this limited literature some findings are consistent.  
In task-switching research, the non-decisional parameter is associated with 
stimulus encoding, preparation, and response execution; also, it seems to be task-
specific (as it does not change during cue-switches vs. cue-repetitions), and it tends to 
be larger for task-switches compared to task-repetitions, as well as for informative cues 
compared to non-informative cues (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). Moreover, in children 
the non-decisional parameter decreases with age showing that children’ encoding and 
response-related processes become more efficient over time (Weeda et al., 2014).  
The drift rate parameter seems to be sensitive to carry-over effects and tends to 
be larger for task-repetitions compared to task-switches, as well as for short cue-
stimulus-interval (CSI) compared to long CSI. Also, drift rates seem to be influenced by 
task predictability; that is, higher drift rates are observed for predictable compared to 
unpredictable task-switches (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014); that is, under unpredictable 
task sequences, information accumulation is less efficient compared to predictable 
sequences where information is accumulated faster.  In children, drift rates increase with 
age, which suggests that as children get older the information accumulation becomes 
more efficient; moreover, for task-repetitions only, drift rates have been shown to be 
smaller during initial task-repetitions, and to increase with more repetitions (Weeda et 
al., 2014). These observations are taken as evidence that higher drift rates (i.e., 
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reflecting more efficient information accumulation) indicate task readiness, with higher 
rates characterising more prepared responses relative to lower drift rates associated with 
unprepared tasks.  
In terms of threshold separation, it has been shown to reflect response 
cautiousness which can change on a trial-to-trial basis depending on task predictability; 
specifically, threshold separation tends to be larger for task-switches compared to task-
repetitions, indicating that for the former one responses are more cautious (Schmitz & 
Voss, 2012, 2014).  
 
The n–2 task repetition cost. As the current thesis was being conducted, a 
couple of studies utilising diffusion modelling to investigate the n–2 task repetition cost 
were reported. The most recent study (Schuch & Konrad, 2017) investigated whether 
and how inhibition (as measured by n–2 task repetition cost) differs between children 
(9-11 years old) and adults (21-30 years old). The main behavioural prediction of this 
study was that children would show smaller n–2 task repetition costs than adults, 
because cognitive inhibition is thought not to be developed in children as well compared 
to adults. In terms of computational modelling, it was speculated that inhibition, as 
measured with the n–2 task repetition cost, would be reflected in the drift rate, which 
was predicted to be smaller in ABA than CBA sequences. This is because drift rates are 
sensitive to carry-over effects and as such, out of the all diffusion modelling parameters, 
the drift rate is most likely to be affected by interference from previous trials, caused for 
example by inhibition.  
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The results showed that the behavioural n–2 task repetition cost was similar in 
size in children and adults; however, the diffusion modelling showed that adults and 
children differed in the magnitude of drift rates. Specifically, the n–2 task repetition cost 
was present in drift rates for adults but not for children, who instead showed the n–2 
task repetition cost in the non-decisional, and to some extent in threshold separation 
parameters. The main conclusion taken from this study was that despite no differences 
in behavioural data between children and adults found, diffusion modelling can 
distinguish contrasts in how information was processed in these two age groups (e.g., 
differences seen in information accumulation). It seems that inhibition, as measured 
with the n–2 task repetition cost, was reflected in drift rates for adults and in the non-
decisional parameter for children, indicating that adults’ performance was affected by 
carry-over effects (e.g., inhibition) and children’s performance was likely to depend on 
preparatory processes (i.e., they could not prepare tasks quickly enough, a skill which in 
another study has been shown to improve with age, Weeda et al., 2014).  
Schuch and Konrad (2017) used also ex-Gaussian modelling to examine RTs 
distributions; the main finding from that analysis was that n–2 task repetition costs were 
present in tau for adults and mu in children. The former finding fits in with the 
observation that n–2 task repetition costs are most pronounced at slow RTs (Grange & 
Houghton, 2011), and in tau (Grange & Juvina, 2015; Koch, Frings, & Schuch, 2017). 
The reports of larger n–2 task repetition costs at slower RTs compared to smaller n–2 
task repetition costs at fast RTs, have been interpreted as evidence that fast RTs 
represent prepared responses (hence smaller n–2 task repetition costs) whereas slow RTs 
reflect unprepared responses (hence larger n–2 task repetition costs), which overall has 
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been taken as proof that inhibition can be overcome with preparation (DeJong, 2000a; 
Grange & Houghton, 2011). In general, Schuch and Konrad study’s findings were 
consistent with the literature (Schmiedek et al., 2007; Spieler, 2001; Steinhauser & 
Hübner, 2009). 
Another study (Schuch, 2016) investigated inhibitory mechanisms between older 
(64-79 years old) and younger adults (18-26 years old), looking at task and response 
inhibition. Task inhibition was measured with the n–2 task repetition cost, and response 
inhibition was assessed with the n–1 response repetition cost.  Responses repeated from 
n–1 trial are in general slower compared to n–1 responses switch, an effect which is 
believed to be due to response inhibition (Grzyb & Hübner, 2012, 2013; Koch, Schuch, 
Vu, & Proctor, 2011; Verbruggen et al., 2005); that is, upon selectin a given response in 
the context of one task, that action is inhibited hence less accessible if needed for the 
subsequent task. The standard analysis of variance of mean performance (i.e., RTs and 
accuracy) showed that overall, older adults were slower and more accurate than younger 
adults, and n–2 task repetition costs were present in younger and older adults, but they 
did not differ significantly between those groups. The diffusion modelling analysis 
revealed that slower and more accurate performance in older adults was due to larger 
non-decision time, variability of non-decision, and threshold separation; importantly, the 
n–2 task repetition cost was present in drift rates but they did not differ significantly 
between the two age groups. The results for response inhibition analysis showed no age 
differences (for the standard analysis of variance and diffusion modelling), and the 
response inhibition cost was reflected in non-decisional parameter for both age groups; 
specifically, the non-decisional parameter was larger for response repetitions compared 
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to response switches. Together, these results were taken as evidence that in older adults, 
inhibitory processing is intact, and that older adults may engage in more task 
preparation compared to younger adults. 
 
The Current Study 
To summarise, task-switching research shows a lot of behavioural evidence 
suggesting that the n–2 task repetition cost reflects inhibition. When task-switching 
adult data are examined with ex-Gaussian analysis, the n–2 task repetition cost is 
consistently reflected in the tau parameter, and in diffusion modelling this cost is present 
in drift rates. Both, tau and drift rate parameters are associated with the exponential tail 
of the RT distribution; therefore, assuming that in task-switching slower RT are due to 
inhibition, the following can be speculated. The presence of the n–2 task repetition cost 
in drift rates is evidence that this cost is likely to be due to cognitive inhibition, because 
slower information accumulation on ABA compared to CBA sequences can reflect 
persisting inhibition in ABA sequence. When it comes to ex-Gaussian results, the n–2 
task repetition cost in tau—assuming that it reflects unprepared RTs, lapses in WM—
can be interpreted as evidence that the RT are less ready at slower RTs because of 
persisting inhibition in ABA compared to CBA sequences. Also, in children who are 
assumed to have underdeveloped cognitive inhibition—hence inhibition would not be 
expected to be seen as a carry-over effect—n–2 task repetition costs are present in non-
decisional and mu parameters. Together, these findings support the view that the n–2 
task repetition cost represents cognitive control processes, which in children develop at 
later age. However, in the view of new evidence suggesting that the n–2 task repetition 
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cost is inflated by episodic retrieval mismatches, it became necessary to investigate 
whether the n–2 task repetition cost—when controlled for episodic retrieval 
mismatches—continues to be reflected in tau in ex-Gaussian analysis and drift rate in 
diffusion modelling.  
Since ex-Gaussian modelling is an effective method to describe data, and 
diffusion modelling offers more insight into specific cognitive processes (e.g., 
information accumulation, response criterions, or delayed motoric response related 
mechanisms), the current study used ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling to re-
investigate the n–2 task repetition cost considering modulating effects of episodic 
retrieval. Data from three already-conducted studies, and one study run specifically for 
this investigation were analysed. There are no reports of such analyses being conducted 
for the n–2 task repetition cost which is controlled for episodic retrieval; therefore, this 
will be the first investigation of this type.  
 
Main Predictions 
 For the standard n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., not controlling for episodic 
retrieval), it is predicted that in all data sets used in the current investigation, n–2 task 
repetition costs will be present in tau for ex-Gaussian analysis, and in drift rate for 
diffusion modelling, as it has been shown already in existing literature. The tau 
parameter is expected to be larger for ABA compared to CBA sequence. In diffusion 
modelling, the n–2 task repetition cost is expected to be present in drift rate; smaller in 
ABA than CBA, with smaller drift rates indicating slower information accumulation 
over time, in this case speculated to be due to persisting inhibition. For the n–2 task 
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repetition cost which has been controlled for episodic mismatches, predictions are 
different than for the standard n–2 task repetition cost. There does not seem to be much 
literature to guide hypotheses on whether and how episodic retrieval matches compared 
to mismatches can manifest in diffusion modelling; therefore, related predictions are 
less clear.  
 
Diffusion modelling. Existing behavioural evidence suggests that the standard 
n–2 task repetition costs are due to inhibition, as reflected in the drift rate parameter 
which is sensitive to carry-over effects and interference. However, under the episodic 
retrieval hypothesis, n–2 task repetition costs are largely due to episodic mismatches; 
therefore, it is uncertain whether and how episodic retrieval affects information 
accumulation. With the reports that lower drift rates are linked to negative, competitor 
and associative priming, task-switches, random task sequence, and short cue-stimulus 
(CSI) interval (Schmitz & Voss, 2012; Voss, Rothermund, et al., 2013; Weeda et al., 
2014), it can be speculated that under episodic matches, the n–2 task repetition cost 
should not be present in the drift rate parameter. This is because, episodic matches, 
unlike episodic mismatches, do not lead to interference, which typically is reflected in 
the drift rate parameter, but rather facilitate performance leading to faster information 
accumulation. Moreover, the drift rate has been shown to increase with task subsequent 
repetitions and practice  (Weeda et al., 2014; Weigard & Huang-Pollock, 2014); this 
means that as tasks are practiced and repeated, the information accumulation improves 
over time. Together, these observations can be interpreted as an indication that the drift 
rate is likely to reflect relative task readiness, with lower drift rates reflecting 
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uncompleted preparation or response selection difficulty; therefore, the n–2 task 
repetition cost under episodic mismatches should be characterised with lower drift rates 
compared to the n–2 task repetition cost under episodic matches which should be 
characterised by higher drift rates. 
The non-decisional parameter has been linked to task-set reconfiguration, cue 
encoding, categorical priming, longer motor response, and longer retrieval (Voss, 
Rothermund, et al., 2013; Weeda et al., 2014). The n–2 task repetition cost is not 
expected to be present in the non-decisional parameter, because the current study is not 
looking at age differences, and encoding is assumed to be similar across tasks used; 
however, if under episodic mismatches information is retrieved less efficiently (e.g., due 
to longer retrieval) or if motor response is slower, compared to episodic matches, effects 
in the non-decisional parameter may be present.  
The threshold separation tends to be larger for task-switches compared to task-
repetitions, and this is thought to be because large boundary reflects more information 
needed before decision is made, hence more cautious decision (Schmitz & Voss, 2012; 
Weeda et al., 2014); so, for example, if participants cannot predict the upcoming task, 
they will be more cautious with their responses compared to if task-switches are 
predictable. Also, this parameter does not seem to change with practice (Weigard & 
Huang-Pollock, 2014). Also, participants in all four studies from which data were used 
in the current investigation, were told that both, accuracy and speed, are equally 
important. Moreover, n–2 task repetition costs tend to be present in accuracy as well as 
speed. As such, the n–2 task repetition cost is not expected to be seen in threshold 
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separation; unless, participants are more cautious performing ABA compared to CBA 
sequences, or more cautious under episodic mismatches compared to episodic matches.  
Overall, the main hypothesis for the current investigation is that, if the n–2 task 
repetition cost is present in the drift rate—after controlling for episodic retrieval—it will 
be evidence that this cost is driven by unprepared responses due to carry-over effects 
(e.g., cognitive inhibition), or difficulty in decision selection (i.e., interference). 
However, if the n–2 task repetition cost is no longer present in the drift rate—for 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches—it will be evidence that the n–2 
task repetition cost is not driven by carry-over effects, such as inhibition. Also, if the n–
2 task repetition cost is present in non-decisional parameter (and/ or it differs between 
episodic mismatches compared to episodic matches), it can be interpreted as evidence 
that there is a difference in stimuli encoding, and/or longer retrieval. There is no 
expectation that the n–2 task repetition cost will be present in threshold separation, 
unless participants are particularly more cautious in some conditions over others.  
 
Ex-Gaussian modelling. For the ex-Gaussian analysis, typically the n–2 task 
repetition cost is predominantly present in tau; therefore, in the current study it was 
expected to be the case for the standard n–2 task repetition cost too. In previous studies, 
such observation was interpreted as evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost is due to 
inhibition (Grange & Houghton, 2011; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Spieler et al., 1996); 
moreover, the tau parameter has been also linked to tasks-conflict processing (Shahar & 
Meiran, 2014; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009), WM (Schmiedek et al., 2007; Shahar et al., 
2014; Tse et al., 2010). With the tau parameter in general being associated with 
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executive functions, and episodic retrieval being an automatic mechanism, tau should 
not be affected by episodic retrieval as such. Instead, the Gaussian parameters (i.e., mu 
and sigma) are more likely to be affected by episodic retrieval, as these parameters are 
linked to response conflict (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009), which can be generated by 
mismatching response being retrieved. Schuch and Konrad’s (2017) study reported 
some differences between ABA and CBA in mu and sigma parameters, results which 
were deemed limited to make conclusions; however, larger mu parameter values for 
ABA compared to CBA can be linked to non-decision time from diffusion modelling. If 
episodic retrieval affects response criterion (Spieler & Balota, 1996)—that is, whether 
participants are conservative or liberal with how much information is needed before 
response is made—tau could be affected by episodic retrieval. Specifically, episodic 
mismatches may lead to more cautious responses compared to episodic matches; in 
which case, tau would be larger for ABA than CBA under episodic mismatches 
compared to episodic matches. Assuming that episodic matches facilitate performance 
as a form of priming mechanism, mu and sigma parameters should be smaller for 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches, which would reflect less noisy and 
more efficient response selection. That is, episodic matches, unlike episodic 
mismatches, lead to more consistent performance, because there is less interference and 
conflict between retrieved and required responses. 
 
Modelling Parameters and WM Correlations. The WM study (Chapter 4; 
Experiment 2)—one of the studies from which data were used in the current 
investigations—looked at individual differences in WM capacity (WMC) as a predictor 
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of inhibition, as measured by the n–2 task repetition cost. Specifically, it was predicted 
that people with higher WMC would have larger n–2 task repetition costs; this is 
because, the higher the WMC, the more resources are available for deployment of 
inhibition; this is assuming that inhibition is resource dependent (Conway & Engle, 
1994; Conway et al., 1999). The WM study’s results showed that n–2 task repetition 
costs (i.e., standard and controlled for episodic retrieval) and WMC were not related. 
These results were interpreted as evidence that inhibition—as measured with n–2 task 
repetition cost—is not resource dependent. Having measures of WMC for every 
participant from WM study, it can be explored whether ex-Gaussian and diffusion 
modelling parameters are associated with WMC. For example there is evidence that the 
ex-Gaussian tau and diffusion modelling drift rate are linked strongly to WM 
(Schmiedek et al., 2007). Specifically, tau was negatively correlated with WM, and drift 
rate was positively correlated with WM; that is, in the latent factors analysis of ex-
Gaussian and diffusion modelling parameters, higher tau values were linked to lower 
WM, and higher drift rates were linked to higher WM. For the relationship between tau 
and WM is further supported by other studies (Heathcote et al., 1991; Shahar et al., 
2014).   
Since tau and drift rate are linked to WM, the current study set out—as an 
additional check—whether in the WM study data, the mentioned parameters are also 
associated with WM. Individual ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling parameters’, as 
well as n–2 task repetition costs’ for those parameters relationship with WM  will be 
looked at. Based on existing literature, it was predicted that tau would be linked 
negatively and the drift rate positively to WM. 
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Method 
Simulation Studies: Data Information 
Four data sets were used to examine the n–2 task repetition cost with ex-
Gaussian and diffusion modelling. Data were obtained from Chapter 4 (Experiment 5) 
for Stimulation Study 1, Chapter 3 (Experiment 2) for Simulation Study 2, data 
collected in the lab for another study (Grange & Kowalczyk, 2017) for Simulation Study 
3, and data collected especially for Simulation Study 4. For details on individual studies 
see relevant chapters and journal papers; apart from Simulation Study 4, for which 
details are included in this report. In experiments from which data were used in 
Simulation Studies, participants performed 480 trials (Simulation Studies 1–3) and 960 
trials (Simulation Study 4).    
 
Participants. Data of forty-two participants were used for Simulation Study 1 
(mean age 19.17; SD 1.55; thirty-six females), seventy-six for Simulation Study 2 
(mean age 21.63; SD 6.43; fifty-eight females), twenty-nine for Simulation Study 3 (age 
range 18–25), and forty-four for Simulation 4 (mean age of 19.52; SD 3.59; thirty-five 
women).  
 
 Data trimming: standard ANOVA. For ANOVA analyses (RT and accuracy), 
all four data sets were trimmed in the same way. For accuracy analysis, null trials were 
removed (i.e., trials that could not be classified as ABA or CBA); two trials at the 
beginning of each experimental block, and two trials following each error. Also, 
participants had to have an overall accuracy at 90% to be included in further analyses. 
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For RT analysis, for each participant’s data, and each experimental design cell (i.e., 
ABA, CBA), RTs faster than 150ms or slower than 2.5 standard deviations above 
participant’s mean were removed. The DVs (i.e., dependent variables) were accuracy 
and RTs, and IVs (i.e., independent variables) were Task Sequence (ABA vs CBA 
sequence) and Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response Switch; for the 
purpose of results reporting these will be referred to as n–2 RR vs n–2 RS).  
Data trimming: ex-Gaussian. For ex-Gaussian modelling correct RTs 
distributions from all four data sets were used. Data used for ex-Gaussian modelling 
were free from null trials (i.e., first two trials of each experimental block and two trials 
following errors) as well as error trials; however, RTs were not trimmed for slow and 
fast responses. It was important to not trim RT data and instead to use the whole RT 
distribution because the exponential tail of the distribution—characterised by tau in the 
ex-Gaussian modelling—is thought to reflect extreme but meaningful scores rather than 
just outliers (Heathcote et al., 1991). Three ex-Gaussian parameters (i.e., mu, sigma, 
tau) were estimated, used for modelling of RT data for the standard as well as the 
controlled n–2 task repetition costs (i.e., controlled for episodic retrieval), and analysed 
via 2-way ANOVAs.  
 
Data trimming: diffusion modelling. For diffusion modelling purposes, data 
were trimmed differently than for the standard analysis and ex-Gaussian modelling; that 
is, the null trials were removed (i.e., two first trials from each block, two trials following 
an error), but also RTs faster than 200ms and slower than 4 standard deviations from the 
participant’s mean, per cell of the experimental design, were removed. Outliers can 
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negatively influence diffusion modelling parameter estimation (Luce, 1986; Voss, 
Nagler, et al., 2013; Voss, Rothermund, et al., 2013; Voss, Voss, & Lerche, 2015; 
Whelan, 2008); responses faster than 200ms are considered to be most problematic 
because they are thought to be guesses or a result of processes difficult to identify, 
therefore are not included in the modelling. Slow RTs—though less problematic for 
diffusion modelling than fast RTs—also have to be trimmed. In general, slow RTs are 
informative, reflecting slower processing (i.e., decision making) and response execution; 
however, typically, RT slower than 5sec are considered outliers (Voss, Nagler, et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, the trimming criteria can differ between studies (Schmiedek et al., 
2007; Schuch, 2016; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Weeda et al., 2014; Weigard & Huang-
Pollock, 2014). With the evidence that removing outliers does not necessarily lead to a 
better parameter estimation (Lerche, Voss, & Nagler, 2016), and since the parameters 
estimation method used in the current study (i.e., KS, Kolmogorov-Smirnov method) 
has been shown to be robust against outliers (Voss & Voss, 2008), the chosen trimming 
criteria for the current study were considered as suitable. Error trials were kept in the 
data set; this is because in diffusion modelling correct as well as error RTs are used to 
determine the cognitive processes giving rise to particular patterns in data (Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008; Voss et al., 2004; Wagenmakers, van der Maas, & Grasman, 2007). 
 
Simulation Studies: Modelling Parameters Estimation  
The modelling began with estimating modelling parameters for ex-Gaussian and 
diffusion modelling; see details below. Next the estimated parameters were used to 
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simulate new data sets, of which distributions are graphed and analyse to show how well 
the parameters can reflect the observed data. 
 
Ex-Gaussian. The ‘timefit’ function of the ‘retimes’ package (Massidda, 2015) 
in R software (R Developement Core Team, 2018) was used to estimate ex-Gaussian 
parameters, and the ‘rexgauss’ function (Massidda, 2015) was used to simulate new 
data. 
The ex-Gaussian data models’ fitness was examined with density and cumulative 
distribution functions (i.e., CDFs) graphs. CDFs were used as an additional check for 
how accurately modelled data can be fitted to the observed data, because CDFs offer 
detailed insight into patterns in data through examining performance across the whole 
RT distribution at various points. Moreover, in task-switching literature CDFs have 
been used to inform us about prepared and unprepared trials under the failure to prepare 
theory (DeJong, 2000a; Grange & Houghton, 2011); where reduction in n–2 task 
repetition costs at fast RTs is thought to reflect well prepared responses, whereas larger 
n–2 task repetition costs at slow RTs are believed to reflect unprepared responses. This 
reduction of n–2 task repetition costs at fast RTs is seen as evidence that inhibition (as 
measured with the n–2 task repetition cost) can be reduced with preparation.  
To create CDFs graphs, for each data set RTs were sorted from the fastest to the 
slowest, and then CDFs were obtained by calculating RT quantiles—at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 
0.9 points—for each participant and condition (i.e., ABA and CBA). For modelled data, 
RTs were sorted from the fastest to the slowest, and RT quantiles were calculated for 
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ABA and CBA sequences. Next, mean quantiles RTs were calculated for observed data 
as well as modelled data and graphed. 
 
Diffusion modelling. Diffusion modelling parameters—for the standard n–2 
task repetition cost and the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval—
were estimated using fast-dm programme (Voss & Voss, 2007); within that programme, 
parameters were optimised with KS criterion. The KS criterion is a statistic which 
informs a researcher on how well modelled data fit the observed data; the KS statistic is 
a p value, and the higher the KS value is the better the model fit is (KS < 0.05 denoting 
a poor model fit). Using estimated diffusion modelling parameters’ (a, v, t0) mean 
values for every condition, new data were simulated using fast-dm ‘construct-samples’ 
function.  
Results 
The results will start with reporting how well estimated parameters reproduced 
the observed data in ex-Gaussian and in diffusion modelling.  
 
Ex-Gaussian: Model Fit 
 Standard n–2 task repetition cost. Overall, ex-Gaussian parameters estimated 
for RTs on ABA and CBA sequences reflected observed data well, as seen through RT 
simulated data based on ex-Gaussian parameters (Figure 6.3); apart from Young Adults 
data for which the model fit was not optimal. 
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Figure 6.3 Density functions graphs for observed and ex-Gaussian modelled RTs (i.e., 
Reaction Times) for ABA (on the left) and CBA (on the right) sequences, for 
Stimulation 1 with WM data, Simulation 2 with Mayr Replication data, Simulation 3 
with Young people data, and Simulation 4 with New Data set.  
 
 As another check for how well the estimated parameters reflected observed data 
CDF graphs were produced; Figure 6.4 shows that overall, the modelled data were 
similar to the observed data, as reflected with overlapping average RTs at quantile 
points. However, for Young Adults and New Data the fit was not ideal.  
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It was also of interest whether the n–2 task repetition cost increased with slower 
RTs (Figure 6.4); to investigate that, ANOVAs were performed on observed data for 
quantile RTs means as DVs, and Quantiles (i.e., quantile points) and Task Sequence 
(ABA vs. CBA) as IVs. For WM data, the interaction between Task Sequence and 
Quantiles was significant, F (1, 40) = 4.62, p = .04,  ηg
2 = .005; that is, the magnitude of 
the n–2 task repetition cost increased significantly across quantile points. Specifically, 
the n–2 task repetition cost was the smallest at 0.1 quantile (38ms) and gradually 
increased with slower RTs reaching 106ms at 0.9 quantile, which was confirmed by the 
linear trend characterising Task Sequence and Quantiles interaction, F (1, 3) = 26.9, p = 
.01. For Mayr Replication data the interaction between Task Sequence and Quantiles 
was also significant, F (1, 75) = 29.39, p < .0001,  ηg
2 =.01. The magnitude of the n–2 
task repetition cost increased gradually with slower RTs, with the smallest cost at 0.1 
quantile (28ms), and the largest at 0.9 quantile (111ms), as confirmed by the linear trend 
for Task Sequence and Quantiles interaction which was significant, F (1, 3) = 34.4, p = 
.01. For Young Adults data Task Sequence and Quantiles interacted significantly too, 
F(1,28) = 13.47, p < .01,  ηg
2  =.006. The n–2 task repetition cost increased with slower 
RTs from 25ms at 0.1 quantile, to 137ms at 0.9 quantile, which was confirmed by a 
significant linear trend, F (1, 3) = 25.2, p = .02. And lastly, for New Data the n–2 task 
repetition cost increased with slower RTs, as Task Sequence and Quantiles interacted 
significantly, F(1,43) = 27.49, p < .001,  ηg
2 =.02, which was confirmed by the linear 
trend of this relationship, F(1, 3) = 29.6, p = .01. 
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Figure 6.4 Cumulative distribution functions for observed and ex-Gaussian simulated 
data from Simulation Study 1 (WM Data), Simulation Study 2 (Mayr Replication Data), 
Simulation Study 3 (Young Adults Data), and Simulation Study 4 (New Data). Data 
depicted in the graphs are for cumulative functions for ABA and CBA sequences; the 
lines represent modelled data (dashed: model for ABA; solid: model for CBA) and the 
dots represent observed data (black dots: ABA; white circles: CBA sequences). Correct 
RTs only included. Correct RTs only included. 
 
 
 Controlled n–2 task repetition cost.  Ex-Gaussian parameters were estimated 
for the n–2 task repetition cost controlling for episodic retrieval; that is, ex-Gaussian 
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parameters were estimated for ABA and CBA sequences under episodic matches (n–2 
RR) and episodic mismatches (n–2 RS). Next using estimated parameters new data were 
simulated for every data set, and examined for how well simulated data fit the observed 
data. As it can be seen in Figures 6.5–6.6, all simulated data fitted the observed data 
well. The CDFs for four simulated and observed data sets show (Figure 6.7) that ex-
Gaussian estimated parameters for ABA/ CBA under n–2 RR/ n–2 RS reflect observed 
data well.   
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Figure 6.5 Density functions graphs for observed and ex-Gaussian modelled data points 
(i.e., Reaction Times) for ABA (on the left) and CBA (on the right) sequences, under n–
2 Response Repetitions (Rep) and n–2 Response Switch (Sw) for Stimulation 1 with 
WM data and Simulation 2 with Mayr Replication data. 
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Figure 6.6 Density functions graphs for observed and ex-Gaussian modelled data points 
(i.e., Reaction Times) for ABA (on the left) and CBA (on the right) sequences, under n–
2 Response Repetitions (Rep) and n–2 Response Switch (Sw) for Stimulation 3 with 
Young Adults data and Simulation 4 with New Data. 
 
 
Looking at whether the n–2 task repetition cost increased with slower RTs for n–
2 RR and n–2 RS in WM data, it was found that Task Sequence did not interact 
significantly with Quantiles, F (4, 160) = 1.53, p = .20,  ηg
2 =.001; that is, the n–2 task 
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repetition cost did not increase with slower responses, which was the case for n–2 RR 
and n–RS, as evidenced by non-significant interaction between Task Sequence, 
Response and Quantiles, F (4, 160) = 1.89, p = .11,  ηg
2 =.001. For Mayr Replication 
data, Task Sequence interacted significantly with Quantiles, F (4, 300) = 12.57, p = 
.001,  ηg
2 =.003; the linear trend for the n–2 task repetition cost to increase with slower 
RTs was significant, F (1, 3) = 33.50, p = .01. However, the interaction between Task 
Sequence, Response and Quantiles was not significant, F (4, 300) = 0.85, p = .49,  ηg
2 
=.001. 
 In Young Adults data Task Sequence did not interact significantly with 
Quantiles, F (4, 112) = 2.29, p = .06,  ηg
2 =.003. The interaction between Task Sequence, 
Response and Quantiles was not significant, F (4, 112) = 0.08, p = .08,  ηg
2 =.001. This 
means that for Young Adults’ data n–2 task repetition cost did not increase with slower 
RTs.  
In New Data the interaction between Task Sequence and Quantiles was 
significant, F (4,172) = 8.10, p < .0001, ηg
2 =.002 (ABA, CBA); showing the n–2 task 
repetition cost increased with slower RTs, F (1, 3) = 29.20, p = .01. The three-way 
interaction between Task Sequence, Response, and Quantiles was also significant, F (4, 
172) = 5.70, p < .0001,  ηg
2 < .001. This was followed by two separate ANOVAs; for n–
2 RR, the interaction between Task Sequence and Quantiles was not significant, F (1, 
43) = 0.51, p = .92,  ηg
2 < .001; but for n–2 RS Task Sequence and Quantiles was 
significant, F (1, 43) = 24.01, p < .001,  ηg
2 = .02; the linear trend for n–2 task repetition 
cost to increase with slow RTs was significant, F (1, 43) = 31.70, p = .01 
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Figure 6.7 Cumulative distribution functions for observed and modelled mean RTs from 
Simulation Studies 1–4, for ABA and CBA sequences under n–2 Response Repetitions 
(on the left) and n–2 Response Switches (on the right); the lines represent modelled data 
(dashed: model for ABA; solid: model for CBA) and the dots represent observed data 
(black dots: ABA; white circles: CBA sequences). Correct RTs only included. 
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Diffusion Modelling: Model Fit 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost. Diffusion modelling parameters based data 
fitted well observed data in all four data sets (Figure 6.8). The KS criterion for WM data 
for diffusion modelling parameters ranged .57–1; for Mayr Replication data .15–1; and 
for Young Adults data .08–.50. For New Data the KS criterion ranged from .0002–.99; 
that is, for four out of 44 participants parameters were not estimated optimally, and 
these participants’ data were removed from further analysis.  
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Figure 6.8 Correct RTs distributions densities for four data sets (i.e., Data)—for WM, 
Mayr Replication, Young Adults, New Data—and diffusion modelling data (i.e., 
Model); ABA (the left panel) and CBA (the right panel). 
 
 
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost. The p value for KS statistic—for all 
participants across all conditions in WM data (i.e., ABA and CBA under n–2 RR and n–
2 RS)—ranged .11–1. For Mayr Replication data estimated diffusion parameters the KS 
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statistic ranged .35–1, and for Young Adults it ranged .05–.99. For New Data the KS 
statistics ranged from .0005 to 1; for two out of 44 participants the p value KS statistic 
was significant, which means that parameters for these models were not well estimated. 
Two participants for whom p values for KS statistic were significant were removed from 
further analysis. Those two participants were the same two (out of four) whose data 
were not used in diffusion modelling analysis for the standard–2 task repetition cost. 
Overall, data simulated on estimated diffusion modelling parameters fitted observed 
data well (Figures 6.9–6.10). 
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Figure 6.9 Correct RTs distributions densities for two data sets (i.e., Data)—for WM 
and Mayr Replication—and diffusion modelling data (i.e., Model); ABA (the left panel) 
and CBA (the right panel) under n–2 Response Repetition (Rep) and n–2 Response 
Switch (Sw).  
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Figure 6.10 Correct RTs distributions densities for two data sets (i.e., Data)—for Young 
Adults and New Data—and diffusion modelling data (i.e., Model); ABA (the left panel) 
and CBA (the right panel) under n–2 Response Repetition (Rep) and n–2 Response 
Switch (Sw). 
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ANOVAs 
 Having ensured that ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling parameters reflect 
observed data well, the parameters were put through a series of ANOVAs to examine if 
and which parameters are marked with n–2 task repetition costs and whether these costs 
are modulated by episodic retrieval. Before modelling parameters’ ANOVAs are 
reported, ANOVAs on RT and accuracy from all four data sets are summarised.  
 
RT performance.  All ANOVAs results are provided in Table 6.1. The n–2 task 
repetition cost was present in RT performance in all four data sets; that is, the main 
effect of Task Sequence was significant (i.e., difference between ABA vs. CBA 
sequence). The n–2 task repetition cost was modulated by episodic retrieval (Figure 
6.11); that is, Task Sequence interacted with Response, as the n–2 task repetition cost 
was consistently present and larger under episodic mismatches (i.e., n–2 RS) compared 
to episodic matches (i.e., n–2 RR) where the cost was present only in Mayr Replication 
data. Specifically, in WM data the n–2 task repetition cost was not significant for n–2 
RR, t (40) = 0.03, p = 1.0, 95%CI [-51.09, 53.67], however, it was significant for n–2 
RS, t (40) = 8.6, p < .001, 95%CI [87.44, 141.95]. In Mayr Replication data, the n–2 
task repetition cost was significant for n–2 RR, t (75) = 4.20 p < .0001, 95%CI [25.21, 
70.37], as well as for n–2 RS, t (75) = 13.00, p < .0001, 95%CI [72.94, 98.56]. In Young 
Adults data, Individual t–tests revealed that, the difference between ABA (1365ms) and 
CBA (1329ms) was not significant for n–2 RR, t (28) = 0.99, p = 0.3, 95%CI [-32.00, 
91.97], however it was significant for n–2 RS, t (28) = 9.0, p < .0001, 95%CI [89.2, 
141.7]. And in New Data the n–2 task repetition cost was not significant for n–2 RR, t 
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(43) = 0.98, p = 0.30, 95%CI [-14.79, 42.68], however it was significant for n–2 RS, t 
(43) = 11.0, p < .0001, 95%CI [88.11, 127.10].  
 
Table 6.1 Results for ANOVAS on RT and accuracy performance for WM (1), Mayr Replication (2), 
Young Adults (3), and New Data (4), with Task Sequence and Response as IVs.  
 RT and accuracy ANOVAs 
   
Main effect of Task 
Sequence 
 
Main effect of Response 
 
Interaction: Task Sequence 
x Response 
           
  F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 
1
 
          
RT 12.30 <.01 .01 13.17 <.001 .004 21.66 <.001 .01 
Error 
Rates 
4.04 0.051 .01 5.97 0.02 .02 5.90 .02 .02 
           
2
 
RT 94.14 <.001 .02 18.22 <.001 .004 9.60 <.01 .002 
Error 
Rates 
3.36 .07 .006 12.17 <.001 .02 1.32 .25 .003 
           
3
 
RT 15.67 <.001 .01 6.33 <.02 .0008 9.07 <.01 .005 
Error 
Rates 
1.11 .30 .006 0.87 .36 .003 20.07 <.001 .09 
           
4
 
RT 74.89 <.0001 .02 20.33 <.0001 .007 22.18 <.0001 .01 
Error 
Rates 
19.30 <.001 .07 8.49 <.006 .02 24.63 <.001 .04 
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Figure 6.11 An illustration of a two-way interactions in RTs between Task Sequence 
(ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response Switch) for 
WM, Mayr Replication, Young Adults, and New Data. Error bars denote ±SE around 
the mean. 
 
Accuracy performance. For statistical results from accuracy ANOVAs see 
Table 6.1. In accuracy, the n–2 task repetition cost was only present in New Data set; 
however, Task Sequence interacted significantly with Response in 3/4 data sets (Figure 
6.12). Specifically, in WM data under n–2 RR there was no n–2 task repetition cost, t 
(40) = 0.15, p = .90, 95%CI [-0.007, 0.008] but the cost was present under n–2 RS, t 
(40) = -3.3, p = .002, 95%CI [-0.018, -0.004]. In Mayr Replication data, Task Sequence 
did not interact with Response. In Young Adults data set, under n–2 RR an n–2 task 
repetition benefit was present (ABA 97.14%, CBA 95.61%) and significant, t (28) = 2.2, 
p = .03, 95%CI [0.001, 0.03], and for n–2 RS an n–2 task repetition cost was present 
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(ABA, 94.76%; CBA, 97.25%) t (28) = -4.2, p < .001, 95%CI [-0.04, -0.01]. And in 
New Data set, for n–2 RR there was no significant n–2 task repetition cost, t (43) = -
0.89, p = .40, 95%CI [-0.01, 0.004]; whereas for n–2 RS the cost was present, t (43) = -
7.4, p < .0001, 95%CI [-0.02, -0.01]. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 An illustration of a two-way interactions in accuracy between Task 
Sequence (ABA vs. CBA) with Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response 
Switch) for WM, Mayr Replication, Young Adults, and New Data. Error bars denote 
±SE around the mean. 
 
Ex-Gaussian parameters. The standard n–2 task repetition cost was 
consistently present in mu, sigma, and tau parameters (apart from sigma parameter in 
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the Young Adults data set; see Table 6.2). All three parameters were larger for ABA 
compared to CBA sequences (Figure 6.13).  
Controlling for episodic retrieval analysing ex-Gaussian parameters produced 
somewhat mixed results. Overall, the n–2 task repetition cost remained in the mu and 
tau parameters, but for sigma parameter was present in 2/4 data sets (Table 6.2). In 
terms of the effect of Response on ex-Gaussian parameters, the results were very mixed 
and are difficult to interpret (Table 6.2; Figure 6.13).   
For the mu parameter, there was a significant interaction between Task Sequence 
and Response for 3/4 data sets (Table 6.2); specifically, in WM data set, the n–2 task 
repetition cost was not present under n–2 RR, t (40) = 0.35, p = .70, 95%CI [-23.77, 
33.79], but was present under n–2 RS, ), t (40) = 5.1, p < .001, 95%CI [25.10, 58.45]. 
The results for Mayr Replication data were the same, with the n–2 task repetition cost 
under n–2 RS, t (75) = 8.0, p < .0001, 95%CI [31.28, 51.94], but absent under n–2 RR, t 
(75) = 1.1, p = .30, 95%CI [-6.00, 21.11].  For Young Adults data, there was no 
interaction between Task Sequence and Response. And in the New Data set, the n–2 
task repetition cost was absent under n–2 RR, , t (43) = 1.4, p = .20, 95%CI [-3.91, 
23.63], but present under n–2 RS, t (43) = 6.2, p < .0001, 95%CI [31.08, 61.04]. 
For the sigma parameter, in none of the data sets interaction between Task 
Sequence and Response was significant; and for the tau parameter in 2/4 data sets this 
interaction was significant. In the WM data set the n–2 task repetition cost was absent 
under n–2 RR, t (40) = -0.14, p = .9, 95%CI [-70.22, 61.35], but was present under n–2 
RS, t (40) = 4.3, p < .001, 95%CI [35.50, 97.61]. In the Mayr Replication and Young 
Adults data sets, the interaction between Task Sequence and Response was not 
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significant. In the New Data set, the n–2 task repetition cost was absent under n–2 RR, t 
(43) = -0.29, p = .80, 95%CI [-37.70, 28.29], but it was present under n–2 RS, t (43) = -
5.5, p < .001, 95%CI [38.87, 84.53]. 
 Table 6.2 Results for ANOVAS for ex-Gaussian parameters-mu, sigma, and tau—for WM (1), Mayr 
Replication (2), Young Adults (3), and New Data sets (4), with Task Sequence and Response as IVs. 
 Ex-gaussian parameters ANOVAs 
   
Main effect of Task 
Sequence 
 
Main effect of 
Response 
 
Interaction: Task Sequence x 
Response 
           
  F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 
  
 
1 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
mu 25.14 <.001 .03       
sigma 6.61 .01 .05       
tau 9.39 .004 .008  
 
     
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
mu 7.42 <.01 .01 3.22 .08 .004 5.48 .02 .006 
sigma 2.06 .16 .02 4.73 .04 .02 0.06 .80 .001 
tau 2.61 .10 .003 0.86 .36 .0006 4.53 .04 .004 
           
 
2 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
mu 48.64 <.0001 .02       
sigma 17.39 <.001 .05       
tau 34.65 <.0001 .01  
 
     
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
mu 30.72 <.001 .01 11.25 <.01 .007 17.12 <.001 .007 
sigma 8.75 <.01 .02 5.37 .02 .02 1.45 .23 .004 
tau 24.24 <.0001 .01 1.93 .17 .0009 0.01 .90 .0001 
          
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
3 mu 6.23 <.02 .02       
sigma 0.46 .50 .004       
tau 
21.31 <.001 .01  
 
     
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
mu 9.34 <.01 .01 0.04 .83 .004 3.35 .08 .004 
sigma 0.27 .61 .002 0.66 .42 .004 2.36 .14 .01 
tau 10.71 <.003 .008 6.03 .02 .007 2.02 .15 .001 
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
4 mu 27.85 <.0001 .03       
sigma 16.88 <.0001 .08       
tau 
35.16 <.0001 .02  
 
     
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
mu 20.43 <.0001 .02 9.66 <.01 .003 25.91 <.001 .01 
sigma 11.95 .001 .05 3.18 .08 .007 1.84 .18 .005 
tau 9.28 .004 .005 9.80 .003 .005 9.98 .003 <.007 
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Figure 6.13 An illustration of two-way interactions between Task Sequence (ABA vs. 
CBA) and Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response Switch) for ex-
Gaussian parameters—mu, sigma, and tau—in WM, Mayr Replication, Young Adults, 
and New Data. Error bars denote ±SE around the mean. 
 
Diffusion modelling parameters. All the statistical results for diffusion 
modelling parameters ANOVAs are contained in Table 6.3 and visualised in Figure 
6.14. The n–2 task repetition cost was present in threshold separation in majority of data 
sets, with the threshold separation parameter being consistently higher in ABA 
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compared to CBA sequence. Also, the n–2 task repetition cost was consistently present 
in the drift rate parameter with smaller drift rates under ABA relative to CBA sequence. 
However, the cost was absent from non-decisional parameters across all data sets. 
For the parameters estimated when controlling for episodic retrieval, the n–2 
task repetition cost continued to be present in drift rate and threshold parameters, and 
absent from non-decisional parameter. The diffusion modelling parameters were not 
affected by the effect of Response; apart from the drift rate in New Data set with the 
drift rate higher under n–2 RR compare to n–2 RS. 
In terms of the modulatory effect of episodic retrieval on the n–2 task repetition 
cost, the results are mixed; in two of the data sets the cost was modulated (Young Adults 
and New Data sets) in the drift rate and non-decisional parameters. For the drift rate, the 
n–2 task repetition cost was absent under n–2 RR in Young Adults, t(28) = 0.39, p = .07, 
95%CI [-0.14, 0.21], and in New Data set, t(41) = -0.96, p = .40., 95%CI [-0.23, 0.08], 
compared to n–2 RS where the n–2 task repetition cost was present in Young Adults 
data, t(28) = -6.0, p < .001, 95%CI [-0.57, -0.28], and in New Data, t(41) = -6.4, p < 
.001, 95%CI [-0.53, -0.28]. 
For the non-decisional parameter there was no n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 
RR in Young Adults, t (28) = -1.5, p = .10, 95%CI [-0.08, 0.01], and under n–2 RS, t 
(28) = 1.8, p = .09, 95%CI [-0.006, 0.08]; however, in New Data, the n–2 task repetition 
cost was present (just about) under n–2 RR, t (41) = -2.1, p = .04, 95%CI [-0.05, 0.001], 
and absent under n–2 RS, t (41) = 1.9, p = .06, 95%CI [-0.001, 0.05]. 
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Table 6.3 Results for ANOVAS for diffusion modelling—a, v, and t0—for WM (1), Mayr Replication 
(2), Young Adults (3), and New Data sets (4), with Task Sequence and Response as IVs. 
 Diffusion modelling parameters ANOVAs 
   
Main effect of Task 
Sequence 
 
Main effect of Response 
 
Interaction: Task Sequence x 
Response 
           
  F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 F(1,40) p ηg2 
  
1
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
a 10.62 <.01 .06       
v 4.11 .0492 .009       
t0 1.70 .20 .04       
          
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
a 8.27 <.01 .01 .039 .53 .001 .32 .57 .001 
v 0.72 .40 .002 .84 .36 .003 1.38 .25 .003 
t0 3.20 .08 .01 1.17 .29 .003 0.82 .37 .003 
           
2
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
a 10.20 <.01 .02       
v 41.63 <.0001 .03       
t0 
0.29 .59 .0007  
 
     
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
a 6.95 .01 .01 0.03 .80 .00005 0.79 .40 .001 
v 24.10 <.0001 .02 2.16 .15 .001 1.22 .27 .0009 
t0 0.12 .73 .0002 0.87 .35 .001 0.89 .34 .002 
          
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
3
 
a 5.64 .02 .02       
v 17.18 <.001 .05       
t0 0.55 .46 .002       
 
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
a 5.32 .03 .02 0.001 .98 .0001 2.34 .14 .01 
v 10.75 .003 .03 3.22 .08 .007 20.93 <.001 .03 
t0 0.01 .92 .0001 0.34 .56 .002 4.64 .04 .02 
 
 
Standard n–2 task repetition cost 
 
4
 
a 0.48 .49 .002       
v 59.18 <.0001 .16       
t0 3.62 .07 .02       
 
Controlled n–2 task repetition cost 
a 8.79 .005 .02 0.19 .66 .0006 1.27 .27 .002 
v 28.61 .001 .06 13.60 <.001 .02 23.61 <.001 .04 
t0 0.01 .92 <.0001 3.06 .09 .01 8.07 <.01 .02 
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Figure 6.14 An illustration of two-way interactions between Task Sequence (ABA vs. 
CBA) and Response (n–2 Response Repetition vs. n–2 Response Switch) for diffusion 
modelling parameters—a, v, and t0—in WM, Mayr Replication, Young Adults, and 
New Data. Error bars denote ±SE around the mean. 
 
Correlation 
In Chapter 4 of the current thesis (WM data, Experiment 5) correlations for the 
standard and controlled n–2 task repetition costs (for RTs and accuracy) with WM 
capacity (WMC) are reported. That study found that the RT standard n–2 task repetition 
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cost did not correlate significantly with WMC, 𝑟 =  .23, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 = .14; this was the 
same for the n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR, 𝑟 = .09, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 = .57.  For 
accuracy, the standard n–2 task repetition cost correlated significantly with WMC, 𝑟 =
.34, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 =  .03; however, this correlation did not remian significant after 
adjustment for multiple testing. The n–2 task repetition cost under n–2 RR did not 
correlate significantly with WMC, 𝑟 =  .01, 𝑛 = 41, 𝑝 =  .95. These correlations were 
revisited using modelling parameters.  
 
Ex-Gaussian. Looking at individual ex-Gaussian parameters’—for ABA and 
CBA sequences—correlations with WMC, it was found that none of the parameters for 
ABA sequences were significantly correlated with WMC (Table 6.4). For CBA 
sequences—under not controlled episodic retrieval—sigma correlated significantly with 
WMC, 𝑟 = .31, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .05; and so did tau, 𝑟 = −.30, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .05. The tau 
parameter also, correlated significantly with WMC for CBA sequences under n–RS also, 
𝑟 = −.33, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .04. However, these correlations did not remain after controlling 
to multiple testing.   
  
374 
 
Table 6.4 Correlations coefficients for relationships between WMC and ex-Gaussian 
parameters for ABA and CBA sequences under not controlled episodic retrieval (i.e., 
Mixed), and controlled episodic retrieval (i.e., n–2 RR and n–2 RS).  
  ABA CBA 
 
mu 
Mixed -.004 .05 
n–2 RR -.04 .08 
n–2  RS .09 .007 
    
 
sigma 
Mixed -.04 .31* 
n–2 RR -.17 .17 
n–2 RS .18 .27 
    
 
tau 
Mixed -.21 -.30* 
n–2 RR -.12 -.21 
n–2 RS -.27* -.33* 
 
In terms on the parameter’s n–2 task repetition costs with WMC correlation, the 
results are following. The mu n–2 task repetition cost did not correlate significantly with 
WMC, 𝑟 =  −.11, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .50, which was also a case for the sigma, 𝑟 =
 −.26, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .10. However, the tau n–2 task repetition cost correlated 
significantly with WMC, 𝑟 = .33, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .04. 
 
For ABA and CBA sequences parameters controlling for episodic retrieval, none 
of the correlations between parameters’ n–2 task repetition costs were significant. For 
the n–2 RR, the correlation between mu n–2 task repetition cost and WMC was 𝑟 =
−.16, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .30; for the sigma it was 𝑟 = −.23, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .20; and for tau it 
was 𝑟 = .15, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .30. For the n–2 RS, the correlation between mu n–2 task 
repetition cost and WMC it was  𝑟 = .19, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .20; for the sigma it was 𝑟 =
.02, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .90; and for tau it was 𝑟 = .18, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .20. 
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Diffusion modelling. For individual diffusion modelling parameters for ABA 
and CBA sequences, majority of correlations between parameters and WMC were not 
significant (Table 6.5). The two correlations that were significant were for CBA 
sequences parameter with episodic retrieval not controlled for: for drift rate, 𝑟 =
 .31, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .05; and, for the non-decisional parameter, 𝑟 =  −.30, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =
 .05. However, these correlations did not remain after controlling to multiple testing.   
 
Table 6.5 Correlations coefficients for relationships between WMC and diffusion 
modelling parameters for ABA and CBA sequences under not controlled episodic 
retrieval (i.e., Mixed), and controlled episodic retrieval (i.e., n–2 RR and n–2 RS). 
 ABA CBA 
 
a 
Mixed .30 .05 
n–2 RR .07 .03 
n–2 RS -.19 -.11 
    
 
v 
Mixed -.04 .31* 
n–2 RR .16 .16 
n–2 RS -.02 .16 
    
 
t0 
Mixed -.21 -.30* 
n–2 RR -.14 -.16 
n–2 RS .10 .05 
 
 
Correlating diffusion modelling parameters’ n–2 task repetition costs means with 
WMC yielded the following results. The threshold separation n–2 task repetition cost 
did not correlate significantly with WMC, 𝑟 = .004, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  1; the drift rate n–2 
task repetition cost also did not correlate significantly with WMC, 𝑟 = −.09, 𝑛 =
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39, 𝑝 =  .60; and the non-decisional parameter did not correlate with WMC too, 𝑟 =
.006, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  1. 
For parameters for ABA and CBA when episodic retrieval was controlled for, 
the following was found. For n–2 RR, there was no significant correlation between the 
threshold separation n–2 task repetition cost and WMC, 𝑟 = .05, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .80; the 
drift rate n–2 task repetition cost also did not correlate significantly with WMC. 𝑟 =
.01, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  1; and, the non-decisional parameter n–2 task repetition cost did not 
correlate significantly with WMC too, 𝑟 = −.01, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  1. For the n–2 RS, the 
correlation between the threshold separation n–2 task repetition cost and WMC was not 
significant, 𝑟 = − .18, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .30; so was the correlation between the drift rate n–
2 task repetition cost and WMC, 𝑟 = −.19, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .20; and between the non-
decisional n–2 task repetition cost and WMC, 𝑟 = .25, 𝑛 = 39, 𝑝 =  .10. 
 
Discussion 
 The n–2 task repetition cost, argued by many to reflect cognitive inhibition, is a 
behavioural effect seen in task-switching research. Recently the n–2 task repetition cost 
has been shown to be modulated considerably by non-inhibitory processes (i.e., episodic 
retrieval); specifically, a large proportion of the n–2 task repetition cost was evidenced 
to be due to an automatic memory retrieval rather than control mechanism, questioning 
the validity of the n–2 task repetition as a suitable measure of cognitive inhibition. 
Typically, in task-switching research performance is analysed by looking at central RT 
and accuracy tendencies; the current study offers insight into the cognitive processing 
underlying the n–2 task repetition cost by adopting alternative analyses. The standard 
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procedure of analysing task-switching performance was complemented with ex-
Gaussian analysis, CDFs, and diffusion modelling to decompose the n–2 task repetition 
cost. Because of these analyses, a better understanding of the n–2 task repetition cost, 
and how episodic retrieval affects it was obtained.  
First, it is important to report that consistently with existing literature, the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost (when episodic retrieval is not controlled for) was 
present in behavioural results in all four data sets. When diffusion modelling was 
applied, expectedly the standard n–2 task repetition cost was present in drift rate; this 
supports the view that this cost is due to carry-over or interference effects inhibition  
(Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014), with the likely candidate being inhibition. Specifically, 
the drift rate was smaller for ABA sequence compared to CBA sequence, and smaller 
drift rates are linked with less efficient and slower information accumulation 
(Schmiedek et al., 2007). However, the novel finding that the current study provides is 
that when episodic retrieval is controlled for, the overall trend is that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is no longer observed in drift rate under episodic matches (n–2 RR) 
compared to episodic mismatches (n–2 RS). The main implication of this finding is that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is unlikely a reflection of cognitive control, pointing to 
automatic memory retrieval processes as being the source of the n–2 task repetition cost. 
Further discussion on results and their implications are presented below.  
 
Standard n–2 Task Repetition Cost 
 Ex-Gaussian. The ex-Gaussian modelling offers a detailed description of data 
through estimating ex-Gaussian parameters characterising RTs distributions. In terms of 
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the standard n–2 task repetition cost, the existing literature (Grange & Juvina, 2015; 
Schuch & Konrad, 2017) shows that this cost is predominantly seen in the ex-Gaussian 
tau parameter, which was replicated for all four data sets used in the current 
investigation. This observation has been interpreted as evidence that the standard n–2 
task repetition cost is driven by the exponential tail of distribution which in task-
switching literature is linked to slower RTs and less prepared responses (DeJong, 
2000a), and in general is associated with executive functions (Schmiedek et al., 2007; 
Shahar & Meiran, 2014). However, the rest of the ex-Gaussian modelling results 
showed that n–2 task repetition costs were also observed in Gaussian parameters mu and 
sigma (apart from the Simulation Study 3 where the n–2 task repetition cost was not 
present in sigma), which is somewhat inconsistent with evidence that n–2 task repetition 
costs are predominantly associated with tau (Grange & Juvina, 2015). As such, this 
inconsistency makes reported results harder to interpret; however, similar results have 
been noted previously (Schuch & Konrad, 2017) and have been seen as noisy. Still, 
having looked at four separate data sets in the current study, it seems unlikely that all 
four simulations produced noisy results, but it is possible if ex-Gaussian modelling does 
not capture effects which lead to n–2 task repetition costs adequately. Importantly, 
values for tau n–2 task repetition cost were the largest among the three parameters (see 
Appendix A), which is more consistent with literature; hence, overall, the results for the 
ex-Gaussian modelling of the standard n–2 task repetition cost can be taken as a 
confirmation that this cost is largely driven by higher cognitive mechanisms (e.g., 
inhibition).   
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 Also, despite some unusual results from the ex-Gaussian modelling for the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost, further consistent patterns were observed; namely, for 
ABA sequences, parameters mu, sigma, and tau, were higher than for CBA sequences 
parameters. Overall, performance on ABA sequences was characterised by slower RTs 
as reflected by longer and flatter right tail of distribution, compared to CBA sequences, 
indicating differences due to higher cognitive processing (i.e., executive functions) 
between those two conditions. This is because, larger tau and longer right tail of 
distribution are associated with attentional/ WM lapses (Hervey et al., 2006; Schmiedek 
et al., 2007), inhibition (Grange & Houghton, 2011; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Spieler et 
al., 1996), tasks-conflict processing (Shahar & Meiran, 2014; Steinhauser & Hübner, 
2009), WM (Schmiedek et al., 2007; Shahar et al., 2014; Tse et al., 2010), and lower 
intelligence (Baumeister, 1998); all of which can be linked to cognitive control. As 
such, current results can be interpreted as evidence that participants find ABA 
sequences, compared to CBA sequences, harder to perform to their best of abilities; that 
ABA sequences put a cognitive strain on processing of information, leading to overall 
slower performance compared to CBA sequences.  
In terms of the patterns seen in Gaussian parameters, larger mu parameters have 
been linked to response related processes, such as response criterion (Spieler, 2001) and 
response conflicts (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009). For example, more conservative 
response criterion is linked to slower performance, and more liberal response criterion 
leads to faster performance. Taking this into account, it is possible that on ABA 
sequences participants find it harder to select responses (due to, for example episodic 
mismatches), and as a consequence they may adopt a more cautious response criterion, 
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compared to CBA sequence, assertion which current results would support. In terms of 
the sigma parameter, literature does not offer a clear indication on whether, how and 
why it would differ between ABA and CBA sequences; however, sigma as well as mu 
have been linked to response conflict (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009). 
 
 Diffusion modelling. For the diffusion modelling analyses, it was predicted that 
the standard n–2 task repetition cost would be present in drift rate. This is because this 
parameter has been linked to carry-over effects and interference with cognitive 
inhibition being the likely mechanisms leading to the n–2 task repetition cost (Schmitz 
& Voss, 2012, 2014). Consistent with existing literature, the current study revealed that 
the standard n–2 task repetition cost was present in drift rate for all four data sets; 
specifically, the drift rate was smaller for ABA compared to CBA sequence. Smaller 
drift rates are linked with less efficient and slower information accumulation 
(Schmiedek et al., 2007), which fits in with how inhibition is believed to be affecting 
performance on task-switching. That is, if inhibition from n–2 trial impairs performance 
on the current trial, we would expect to see slower information accumulation due to the 
current task being less accessible. Another observation for the current study was that n–
2 task repetition costs were also present in the threshold separation parameter for the 
three out of four data sets. Specifically, the threshold separation was larger for ABA 
sequences compared to CBA sequences, which can be interpreted as evidence that, for 
the ABA sequence responses were more conservative compared to the CBA sequences 
in those two conditions; larger threshold separation typically indicates slower but more 
accurate responses (in the New Data for which there was no n–2 task repetition cost 
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seen in threshold separation, numerically, this parameter was also larger for ABA 
compared to CBA). In terms of the non-decisional parameter, there were no significant 
differences between ABA and CBA across all four data sets, which can be interpreted as 
evidence that in all four data sets information was equally well encoded and responses 
were equally efficiently executed.  
 Overall, these results support the view that the n–2 task repetition cost is likely 
to be due to carry-over effect with inhibition being the probable candidate. This is 
consistent with results from existing studies (Schuch, 2016; Schuch & Konrad, 2017). 
With drift rates being consistently smaller for ABA than CBA sequences—where 
smaller rates indicate slower information accumulation—the average n–2 task repetition 
cost for drift rates resulted in negative values (Appendix A). This taken together with 
the observation that threshold separation was higher for ABA compared to CBA 
sequences—with higher rates indicating more conservative responses—can be taken as 
evidence that less efficient information accumulation for ABA sequences was driving 
participants response criterion to be higher (Schuch, 2016). Also, despite ex-Gaussian 
modelling producing, what can be interpreted as, noisier results compared to diffusion 
modelling, results from both point to the n–2 task repetition cost being due to higher 
cognition conflicts (as reflected in tau being higher and drift rate being smaller for ABA 
compared to CBA sequences) as well as response related effects (as reflected in mu/ 
sigma and threshold separation being higher for ABA compared to CBA sequences).  
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Controlled n–2 Task Repetition Cost  
 Ex-Gaussian. The results from ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling analyses 
for controlled n–2 task repetition cost are less clear than for the standard n–2 task 
repetition cost, but some patterns can be distinguished.  
In terms of the tau parameter, the n–2 task repetition cost was present as 
expected (for three out of four data sets); however, for two data sets this cost was 
modulated by episodic retrieval, whereby for the episodic matches (i.e., RR) there was 
no n–2 task repetition cost but it was present for episodic mismatches (i.e., RS). This 
was the general pattern for three out of the four data sets. Assuming that tau is 
associated with executive functions (Grange & Houghton, 2011; Hervey et al., 2006; 
Schmiedek et al., 2007; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Shahar & Meiran, 2014; Shahar et al., 
2014; Spieler & Balota, 1996; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009; Tse et al., 2010), and that 
episodic retrieval is an automatic mechanism, these findings can be interpreted as 
evidence that, either tau can reflect automatic processes as well as executive functions 
or that episodic retrieval influences how information is processed within executive 
functions.  
  When it comes to the mu parameter, generally the n–2 task repetition cost was 
also modulated by episodic retrieval; this was the case for three out of four data sets. 
Specifically, for episodic matches (i.e., RR) mu for ABA and CBA were similar but 
they differed considerably for episodic mismatches (i.e., RS). Consistently, n–2 task 
repetition costs in mu were substantially smaller for episodic matches compared to 
episodic mismatches (see Appendix A). Keeping in mind that Gaussian parameters are 
associated with response mechanisms (Spieler et al., 1996), these results can be taken as 
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evidence that episodic retrieval mismatches drive the n–2 task repetition cost in mu by 
creating a response conflict.  
With regard to the sigma parameter, it was not straight forward to predict results 
from ex-Gaussian analysis; however, in general, Gaussian parameters are associated 
with response related mechanisms (Spieler, 2001; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009). There 
were no substantial differences for n–2 task repetition costs in sigma for episodic 
matches and episodic mismatches for Task Sequence and Response, and they did not 
interact. As a general observation, it was noted that for episodic matches the variance of 
sigma was smaller than for episodic mismatches (see Appendix A). Assuming that 
episodic retrieval, as an automatic mechanism, leads to more consistent responses under 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches, this would be expected; namely, 
episodic mismatches generate response conflict, which may be solved by various 
strategies and depend on individual differences, compared to episodic matches which 
automatically prime responses to be more efficient and consistent.   
 
Diffusion modelling. When the standard n–2 task repetition cost is explored 
with diffusion modelling, the typical finding is that this cost is present predominantly in 
drift rate, which is sensitive to carry-over effects and interference (with inhibition being 
the likely candidate driving the n–2 task repetition cost). In light with new reports that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by episodic retrieval, whereby the large 
proportion of this cost is explained by episodic retrieval, it was of interest to investigate 
whether under episodic matches the n–2 task repetition cost would continue to be 
observed in drift rate. Specifically, if episodic retrieval can affect information 
384 
 
accumulation needed to make a decision, it was speculated that under episodic matches 
the n–2 task repetition cost would not be present compared to episodic mismatches. 
However, if the n–2 task repetition cost was still observed under episodic matches, it 
would mean that episodic retrieval does not affect information accumulation.  
The general finding for the drift rate was that under episodic matches, the n–2 
task repetition cost was reduced or absent, compared to episodic mismatches where this 
cost remained. That is, information accumulation was considerably less efficient and 
slower for episodic mismatches compared to episodic matches (see Appendix A). This 
fits in with prediction that the n–2 task repetition cost is unlikely to reflect cognitive 
inhibition and instead is more likely to be a result of non-inhibitory mechanism, 
specifically episodic mismatches. Larger drift rates for episodic matches compared to 
episodic mismatches, suggest that under the former one information accumulation was 
more efficient. This fits in with reports of smaller drift rates being linked to interference 
and carry-over effects (Schmitz & Voss, 2012; Voss, Rothermund, et al., 2013; Weeda 
et al., 2014). Episodic matches, unlike episodic mismatches, do not lead to interference, 
but rather facilitate performance leading to faster information accumulation and higher 
drift rates. Together, these observations can be interpreted as an indication that drift 
rates reflect relative task readiness, with lower drift rates reflecting uncompleted 
preparation or response selection difficulty, likely due to a conflict caused by episodic 
mismatches; and higher drift rates reflecting completed preparation, with episodic 
matches likely facilitating information accumulation, and relative task readiness. 
The threshold separation was not expected to differ between ABA and CBA, 
mainly because this parameter reflects response criterion; that is, how much information 
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is accumulated before a decision is made. Typically, threshold separation is sensitive to 
speed-accuracy trade-off, and since participants for all four studies from which data 
were taken for the current study were instructed that both, accuracy and speed, are 
equally important, it was expected that the n–2 task repetition cost should not differ 
between ABA and CBA sequences, or episodic matches compared to episodic 
mismatches, unless participants were more cautious under some conditions (e.g., under 
ABA vs CBA, or episodic mismatches vs episodic matches). Also, the n–2 task 
repetition cost is known to be present in both, RTs and accuracy; which is another 
reason why no n–2 task repetition cost would be expected in threshold separation. The 
results from the current study are rather inconclusive; that is, the standard n–2 task 
repetition cost was present in threshold separation for two out of the four data sets (WM 
and Mayr Replication), with the ABA characterised by larger threshold separation 
compared to CBA. This means that for ABA sequences, threshold separation for 
responses was more conservative, compared to CBA; it is uncertain though, whether 
participants naturally responded more cautiously for ABA compared to CBA sequences, 
or whether inefficient information accumulation led to more cautious responses. It 
seems that episodic retrieval could not affect threshold separation, because n–2 task 
repetition costs did not seem to differ between episodic matches compared to episodic 
mismatches. This somewhat makes sense if it is assumed that episodic retrieval is 
automatic, therefore should not lead to bias in threshold separation. Moreover, threshold 
separation parameter’s n–2 task repetition cost was not modulated by episodic retrieval, 
further suggesting that this parameter is not affected by automatic retrieval processing. 
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In relation to the non-decisional parameters, the n–2 task repetition cost was not 
expected to be present in that parameter, which for all four data sets was the case. 
However, for two out of the four data sets there was a non-significant numerical trend 
for the parameter to be smaller for ABA compared to CBA under episodic matches, but 
for episodic mismatches, the non-decisional parameter was smaller for CBA compared 
to ABA sequences (i.e., there was an interaction between Task Sequence and Response; 
see Appendix A). The non-decisional parameter is associated with information 
encoding, motor response, preparation, and WM configuration (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 
2014; Weeda et al., 2014). For example, the smaller the non-decisional parameter is, the 
more efficient encoding and responses are; also, larger non-decisional parameters are 
linked with task-switches compared to task-repetitions, unpredictable task-switches 
compared to predictable task-switches, additional preparation, and task reconfiguration. 
As such, the results for the non-decisional parameter in the current study can be 
interpreted in the following way.  
First of all, it can be assumed that information encoding for all task-switches in 
the four data sets were the same because the same cues, stimuli, and response mappings 
were used; moreover, the execution of response, once is selected should be the same for 
ABA and CBA sequences regardless episodic retrieval. This leaves WM reconfiguration 
and preparation as possible processes affected by episodic retrieval. Assuming that 
retrieved information is manipulated in WM, under the episodic retrieval account, for 
episodic matches, there should be less of a conflict when it comes to response selection 
because retrieved response matches the task demands; under the episodic mismatches 
however, retrieved response conflicts with required response which leads to a conflict in 
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WM. As such, the former one would be expected to lead to smaller non-decisional 
parameter and faster performance on ABA compared to CBA sequences; whereas the 
latter one would be associated with larger non-decisional parameter and slower 
performance on ABA compared to CBA sequences, a general pattern seen in the current 
study. Also, in terms of preparation, absence of it is associated with completed 
preparation, whereas increased non-decisional parameter has been linked to additional 
preparation. Therefore, despite the same paradigms being used in four studies from 
which data sets for the current investigation were used, it could be that the results of no 
effect of Task Sequence or interaction between Task Sequence and Response, could be 
an indication of these particular participants’ samples being able to prepare their 
responses better than in data sets where differences in the non-decisional parameter 
were observed. However, since in all four studies’ paradigms, the preparatory interval 
(i.e., the cue-stimulus-interval) was identical, the possibility of additional preparatory 
processes taking place in some but not in the other data sets seems unlikely.  
 
WM and Modelling Parameters 
 For one of the data sets used for modelling in the current study—the WM study 
from Chapter 4 of the this thesis, measures of WMC were also collected; it was found 
that WM was not associated with n–2 task repetition cost whether episodic retrieval was 
controlled for or not. This was interpreted as evidence that inhibition—as measured with 
n–2 task repetition cost–was not dependent on WM resources, contrary to some theories 
(Conway & Engle, 1994; Conway et al., 1999), Since, there is evidence that WM is 
linked to ex-Gaussian tau and diffusion modelling drift rate parameters (Heathcote et al., 
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1991; Schmiedek et al., 2007; Shahar & Meiran, 2014), it was of interest to investigate 
whether modelling parameters from WM study relate to WM scores. To ascertain that, 
individual modelling parameters as well as n–2 task repetition costs for parameters were 
correlated with WMC measure. Evidence of a relationship between parameters and 
WMC is very limited; however, some patterns can be identified though.  
The main observation was that, none of the ex-Gaussian and diffusion modelling 
parameters for ABA sequences were linked to WMC. For CBA sequences, it was sigma 
and tau parameters from ex-Gaussian modelling, as well as drift rate and non-decisional 
parameters from diffusion modelling, that were associated with WMC; although, those 
relationships did not remain so after controlling for multiple testing, some insight can be 
gained from those associations.  
Consistently with existing evidence (Schmiedek et al., 2007), higher tau values 
were linked with lower WM in the current study. Assuming that ABA sequences 
(compared to CBA sequences) are linked with inhibition, and inhibition has been shown 
to be WM dependant (Conway & Engle, 1994; Conway et al., 1999), it is somewhat 
unexpected that correlations were predominantly present for the CBA and not ABA 
sequences.  However, keeping in mind that tau parameter has been argued to reflect 
tasks-conflict processing (Shahar & Meiran, 2014; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009), 
intelligence (Baumeister, 1998), and attentional lapses (Hervey et al., 2006); whereby, 
people with higher WM and intelligence show smaller tau values, and task-switches as 
well as more attentional lapses as characterised by larger tau values, the following can 
be speculated.  It is possible that, WM seems to be linked more to CBA sequences 
because under these conditions—due to what can be considered as substantial task as 
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well as response conflicts—WM is more needed to resolve these conflicts. It would 
appear that WM was particularly important for CBA sequences when episodic retrieval 
was not controlled for (as seen in sigma and tau) and under episodic mismatches (seen 
in tau); this would imply, that WM may be especially important for resolving response 
conflicts.  
In terms of diffusion modelling parameters, the results pattern was that WM 
associated with drift rate and non-decisional parameters for CBA under not controlled 
episodic retrieval, where drift rate was correlated positively and the non-decisional 
parameter negatively with WM. Higher drift rates are in general linked to faster and 
more efficient information accumulation; therefore, it is possible that people with higher 
WMC can resolve task/ response conflict more efficiently than people with lower 
WMC.  This fits in with findings from ANOVAs analyses in the current study where it 
was observed that drift rates were considerably smaller for episodic matches compared 
to episodic mismatches; that, in general, episodic matches are associated with more 
efficient information accumulation, which can depend on WMC, as illustrated by results 
from correlational analyses.  
The non-decisional parameter—for CBA sequences not controlled for episodic 
retrieval—was linked with WMC too, which can be interpreted in the following way. It 
has been observed by other researchers that non-decisional parameter is higher for task-
switches compared to task-repetitions (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014), and task 
reconfiguration (Voss et al., 2004), and is linked to more preparation (Schuch, 2016). As 
such, it is possible that, the negative correlation between the non-decisional parameter 
and WMC from the current study is an indication of some individual differences in how 
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WMC affects non-decisional parameter. It is uncertain at this point though, whether 
people with higher WMC are more efficient at preparing their responses, or 
reconfiguring tasks between switches, compared to people with lower WMC. Since it 
was the non-decisional parameter for CBA sequences under episodic not controlled for 
that correlated with WM, it is unlikely that people with higher WMC simply executed 
their responses faster. 
 
CDFs 
 To further explore the n–2 task repetition cost, CDFs were obtained for the 
standard and controlled n–2 task repetition cost. There is evidence (Grange & 
Houghton, 2011) to suggest that the n–2 task repetition cost is smaller for fast RTs 
compared to slower RTs; this pattern was replicated for all four data sets in the current 
investigation for the standard n–2 task repetition cost. When episodic retrieval was 
controlled for, the linear trend for the n–2 task repetition cost did not seem to differ 
between episodic matches and mismatches; apart from New Data where for episodic 
matches the n–2 task repetition cost did not increase with slower RTs, but for episodic 
mismatches it did increase.  
 Assuming that fast RTs reflect prepared and slow RTs not fully prepared 
responses (DeJong, 2000a), the linear trend of the n–2 task repetition cost to increase 
with slower RTs, has been interpreted as evidence that inhibition (as measured with the 
n–2 task repetition cost) can be overcome with preparation (Grange & Houghton, 2011). 
If faster RTs reflect better prepared responses, it would be expected that episodic 
retrieval mismatches would impair that preparation; as such, it would mean that for 
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episodic matches there should be no linear trend of n–2 task repetition cost increasing 
with slower RTs, contrary to episodic mismatches which should be characterised by that 
trend. Among four data sets used in the current study, only one data set fit that 
prediction, as shown with CDFs analyses, the New Data; and looking at CDF graphs, 
there was a tendency for that pattern in other data sets too (although not statistically 
significant). Also, from diffusion modelling, for two out of the four data sets (including 
New Data), the n–2 task repetition cost in non-decisional parameter was affected by 
episodic retrieval, where by it was larger for episodic mismatches compared to episodic 
matches. The non-decisional parameter has been linked to preparation with larger 
parameters indicating additional preparation (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014; Weeda et 
al., 2014), which would fit it with prediction that n–2 task repetition cost should remain 
small across fast and slow RTs. Nevertheless, findings from CDFs analyses can be 
considered as limited evidence; therefore, for now it is unclear whether episodic 
retrieval truly does not affect the linear trend for the n–2 task repetition cost to increase 
with slower RTs (as majority of the results from the current investigation would 
suggest), or whether to tap into these effects more data are needed (as seen in 
Simulation 4).   
 
Conclusions 
 
Findings from Chapter 6 question the validity of the n–2 task repetition cost as a 
measure of cognitive inhibition. Consistently with previous literature the n–2 task 
repetition cost was predominantly present in the drift rate; however, when episodic 
retrieval was controlled for, the cost in drift rate reduced numerically in half of the 
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simulations and was removed in the other half. This means that the n–2 task repetition 
cost in drift rate—typically interpreted as evidence of inhibitory processes—is likely to 
be driven by non-inhibitory, automatic mechanisms, in this case episodic retrieval. The 
trend for the n–2 task repetition cost presence in threshold parameter—which was not 
expected—was interpreted as evidence that participants were more cautious on ABA 
compared to CBA sequences. Also, n–2 task repetition costs seen in threshold parameter 
were not affected by episodic retrieval, which means that automatic retrieval does not 
bias the decision criterion. And as expected, non-decisional parameter was not marked 
by the n–2 task repetition cost. In terms of ex-Gaussian modelling, despite some results 
being consistent with existing literature (e.g., n–2 task repetition costs seen in the tau 
parameter), overall, conclusions are difficult to draw due to no specific pattern of 
episodic retrieval on the tau parameter, and n–2 task repetition costs seen in mu and 
sigma parameters. 
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General Discussion 
  
The current thesis aimed to further our understanding of the n–2 task repetition 
cost (Mayr & Keele, 2000) which is a behavioural effect seen in task-switching, 
specifically in the Backward Inhibition (BI) paradigm. In that paradigm participants 
switch back and forth between three tasks, and it is a very common observation that 
when they repeat a task from an n–2 trial (referred to as an ABA sequence) they are 
slower and less accurate compared to when the task they perform is a switch from the n–
2 trial task (referred to as a CBA sequence); and the difference between those two 
conditions is known at the n–2 task repetition cost. This effect has been replicated many 
times and used extensively as a measure of cognitive inhibition (for reviews see Kiesel 
et al., 2010; Koch, Gade, Schuch, & Philipp, 2010). Successful and efficient task-
switching is argued to be attributable to inhibition (Goschke, 2000; Mayr & Keele, 
2000), and as such the n–2 task repetition cost has become an important effect reflecting 
inhibitory processing.  
The predominant explanation of the source of the n–2 task repetition cost is the 
inhibitory theory; specifically, when participants switch from one task to another, as a 
given task is abandoned it becomes inhibited so its activation does not interfere or 
interferes less with the next task (Mayr & Keele, 2000). When performing a task 
repeated from the n–2 trial (i.e., ABA sequence) that task is under the influence of 
recently applied inhibition, making it less accessible, which leads to slower reaction 
times (RTs) and more errors, compared to performing a task that is different from the 
one on the n–2 trial. In the current thesis, across four experimental chapters (Chapters 
2–5; Experiments 1–9) and one computational modelling chapter (Chapter 6; Simulation 
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Studies 1–4), the n–2 task repetition cost was examined with regards to its reliability, 
factors that may modulate it, and individual differences that may predict it. Together, 
the results show that the n–2 task repetition cost is unlikely to reflect cognitive 
inhibition and should be avoided as a measure of individual differences in inhibitory 
control. The general discussion will summarise the overall findings, focusing on the key 
messages, which will be followed by conclusions.  
 
Reliability 
 Chapter 2 looked at the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost using three 
different BI paradigms known to produce this effect (Gade & Koch, 2008; Houghton et 
al., 2009; Schuch & Koch, 2003), and explored potential predictors of the individual 
differences seen in the n–2 task repetition cost (processing speed: Brown, Brockmole, 
Gow, & Deary, 2012; Naber, Vedder, Brown, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016; Stawski, 
Sliwinski, & Hofer, 2013; depressive rumination: Whitmer & Banich, 2007). It was 
important to investigate these factors in relation to the n–2 task repetition cost because 
this effect has been used by many as a measure of inhibitory control in group (Fales et 
al., 2006; Foti et al., 2015; Lawo et al., 2012; Mayr, 2001; Mayr et al., 2006; Moritz et 
al., 2004; Prior, 2012; Yiu-kwan, 2008) to individual differences research (Pettigrew & 
Martin, 2015; Whitmer & Banich, 2007, 2012). However, the reliability of the n–2 task 
repetition cost was not known; as much as it was not a problem for group differences 
studies, for individual differences research it was an area of concern. Many robust 
behavioural effects used widely for assessment of healthy and impaired cognition are 
proven to be reliable (stop-signal task: Congdon et al., 2012; go/no-go task: Leue, Klein, 
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Lange, & Beauducel, 2013; Stroop test: Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005), but 
some have been shown to have low reliability (e.g., the negative priming effect; Bestgen 
& Dupont, 2000), which indicates that we should not mistake robustness for reliability 
of the effect. Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that the n–2 task repetition cost is not 
reliable despite its robustness.  
Across three BI paradigms used in Experiment 1 it was systematically shown 
that the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost is low at an individual level 
(Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 2). The reliability (rc , coefficient corrected for the 
split-half reliability) of the reaction times (RTs) n–2 task repetition cost ranged .37–.60, 
and for accuracy n–2 task repetition cost it ranged .13–.32. For a test to be considered 
suitable for individual differences research, it should have a reliability coefficient of 
minimum .70 (e.g., Cronbach, 1951; Nunnally, 1967; Picardi & Masick, 2013; Revelle 
& Condon, 2014; Streiner, 2003). This is because a cognitive test used for individual 
differences research should provide reproducible results, and be sensitive to fluctuations 
occurring in performance (Drost, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). Reliability 
values similar to the ones reported in Chapter 2 were interpreted in other studies as 
“moderate” (Leue, Klein, & Lange, 2013), “poor”–good” (Condon et al., 2012), and 
“quite low” (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015). None of these are necessarily “correct”; 
however, there seems to be an overall consensus in the wider literature that reliability 
within the range reported for the n–2 task repetition cost in this thesis is not satisfactory.  
 
Individual differences. Experiment 1 also measured individual differences that 
were likely to predict the n–2 task repetition cost, as it was planned that they would be 
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controlled for in the reliability analysis. It was demonstrated that the n–2 task repetition 
cost was not linked to processing speed (van der Elst et al., 2006) or depressive 
rumination (contrary to Whitmer & Banich, 2007), and therefore, they were not used in 
further analysis. The lack of the relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost and 
individual differences examined in Experiment 1 can be speculated to be due to at least 
a couple of reasons. Processing speed and depressive rumination may simply not be 
linked to the n–2 task repetition cost, or the n–2 task repetition cost is not a reliable 
measure. Low reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost can be due to the cost not 
measuring inhibition exclusively (e.g., measuring inhibitory and non-inhibitory 
processing), or due to its nature—that is, the cost being a difference score—which will 
be discussed next.   
 
Difference scores. The n–2 task repetition cost is a difference score—that is, a 
score obtained from subtracting performance in one condition from another—and these 
can be very difficult to interpret (e.g., negative priming, Bestgen & Dunpont, 2000), and 
are known to have low reliability (Crawford et al., 2008; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; 
Dunlap et al., 1989; Kopp, 2011). Specifically, a reliability of difference scores is “a 
function of the average reliability of its two components and of the correlation between 
them” (Kopp, p. 562; Crawford et al.). If a difference score is made up of two related 
components, the correlation between those components will be high (or even approach 
the reliabilities of the two components); as such, the variance of the difference scores is 
likely to reflect mainly error variance. Since the n–2 task repetition cost is a difference 
score, low reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost is likely to be due to the nature of the 
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cost, which means that the lack of the relationship between individual differences and 
the n–2 task repetition cost is difficult to interpret, and we cannot say for certain that 
processing speed and/ depressive rumination do not influence cognitive inhibition. For 
now, it can be said that the n–2 task repetition cost as we know it, may not be as 
meaningful as originally thought (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), 
therefore should be used with caution in individual differences research.  
There is evidence that other cognitive effects which are difference scores—the 
negative priming (Bestgen & Dupont, 2000; Frings, Schneider, & Fox, 2015) and Stroop 
effects (Strauss et al., 2005)—also can have low reliability, but not always. For 
example, in terms of the Stroop effect there is evidence that this effect can be reliable 
(Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005); this means that low reliability of 
difference scores cannot be assumed, and researchers should always examine the 
reliability of their difference scores effects when used in individual differences research. 
Also, it indicates that there may be factors which influence difference scores’ reliability 
which are not fully understood yet. And, with regard to the negative priming effect, 
there are at least a couple of issues which may affect its reliability; that is, it is a 
difference score (like the Stroop effect and the n–2 task repetition cost), and it has been 
shown to reflect more than one cognitive process, episodic retrieval as well as inhibition 
(Tipper, 2001). Considering these issues together, some suggest that this is evidence 
against the negative priming effect being used as a measure of inhibitory processes 
(Frings et al., 2015). Therefore, when it comes to the n–2 task repetition cost, we should 
exercise caution interpreting this effect because it is also a difference score, and as it is 
proposed in discussion of Chapter 2 and later shown in Chapter 3, the n–2 task 
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repetition cost also reflects a mixture of inhibitory and non-inhibitory mechanisms 
(which is discussed further in the later parts of this discussion). This means that, as the 
negative priming effect, the n–2 task repetition cost is most likely not a good measure of 
individual differences in inhibitory control, and should be used with caution if at all. 
The issues around the reliability of difference scores and whether/ how well a 
given measure captures the processes of interests, highlight a bigger problem, which is 
that cognitive effects are not examined enough in terms of their reliability, and that the 
usefulness of those is often based on how replicable they are which seems to be 
associated with robustness. The point is that, robustness of an effect—how replicable it 
is—should not be mistaken for how reliable it is, and as a good practice, reliability of 
cognitive effects should be reported in individual differences research.  
There are alternatives to difference scores, for example some suggest that 
instead, rate residual scores can be used (Hughes et al., 2014), which take into account 
reaction times and accuracy, and as such are considered as more accurate measure of 
cognitive processes (Rush et al., 2006). This method involves calculating a rate of 
correct responses per second for the conditions of interest, and these rates are put into 
regression (for a detailed description of this method see Hughes et al., 2014); however, 
one study  (Pettigrew & Martin, 2015) showed that using rate residual scores did not 
improve the reliability of the n–2 task repetition cost. Pettigrew and Martin also showed 
that both the standard n–2 task repetition cost and rate residual scores when used to 
reflect the performance in the BI paradigm did not correlate with working memory 
(WM) capacity. Therefore, it terms of n–2 task repetition cost it seems that the cost’s 
reliability and the extent to which it can be explained by individual differences, is not 
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improved with the use of rate residual scores, which further adds to the uncertainty over 
the n–2 task repetition cost.  
It is important to continue to explore methods alternative to difference scores to 
examine cognitive effects, as well as issues around difference scores’ reliability and 
meaningfulness, but for now based on results from Chapter 2, it seems that the n–2 task 
repetition cost is not reliable or correlated with processing speed and depressive 
rumination. Therefore, the n–2 task repetition cost should be avoided as a measure of 
individual differences in cognitive control, but research on task-switching should 
continue in order to gain a better understanding on the source of the differences between 
ABA and CBA sequences; and if the n–2 task repetition cost is used in individual 
differences research, as a good practice, its reliability should be reported. 
 
Episodic Retrieval 
The n–2 task repetition cost is thought to reflect inhibitory processes, and this is 
the predominant interpretation of this effect (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010; Mayr 
& Keele, 2000). However, in light with the evidence that the n–2 task repetition cost has 
low reliability at an individual level (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017), task-switching 
performance in general being sensitive to priming effects (Allport & Wylie, 1999; 
Altmann, 2011; Goschke, 2000; Horoufchin et al., 2011; Logan & Bundesen, 2003; 
Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016), and other effects ascribed to cognitive inhibition shown to 
be highly modulated by priming effects (Tipper, 2001), it was important to explore to 
what extent the cost measured cognitive inhibition. Therefore, based on Mayr’s (2002) 
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work three studies investigated the extent to which the n–2 task repetition cost was 
modulated by episodic retrieval (Hommel, 1998, 2004, 2009; Neill, 1997). 
Experiments 2–4 from Chapter 3 show that the n–2 task repetition cost is largely 
due to automatic and non-inhibitory mechanism, namely episodic retrieval (Hommel, 
1998, 2004, 2009; Neill, 1997), as evidenced with much smaller n–2 task repetition 
costs under episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches. Specifically, when 
within n–2 task repetitions we ensure that the n–2 response repeats too, the n–2 task 
repetition cost reduces compared to n–2 task repetitions with n–2 response switches. 
This is thought to be because if upon seeing a given stimulus a retrieved response does 
not match the currently required action (as seen in n–2 task repetition costs under n–2 
response switches), by the episodic retrieval account, it leads to an impaired 
performance because a new response will have to be generated against the one that was 
initiated automatically through episodic retrieval; however, if the retrieved task’s 
parameters match the demands of the current task (as seen in n–2 task repetition costs 
under n–2 response repetitions), performance is facilitated (Hommel, 1998, 2000, 2004). 
This shows that the n–2 task repetition cost, as we know it, does not exclusively reflect 
inhibition, but instead captures processing of episodic mismatches and inhibition.  
Moreover, apart from experiments 2–4, the rest of the experiments in this thesis 
(5–9) and computational modelling study also controlled episodic retrieval within the BI 
paradigm. Together, in 7/10 data sets reaction time (RT) n–2 task repetition costs and 
8/10 data sets accuracy n–2 task repetition costs were modulated by episodic retrieval. 
Taking into account only data sets in which the n–2 task repetition cost was modulated 
by episodic retrieval, for RT performance in 4/7 cases and for accuracy performance in 
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5/8 cases the n–2 task repetition costs were removed; that is, controlling for episodic 
retrieval led to performance to be similar between ABA and CBA sequences, compared 
to when episodic retrieval was controlled for. Furthermore, for accuracy there was a 
general trend for n–2 task repetition benefits under episodic matches; that is, for 4/5 data 
sets where there were no significant differences between ABA and CBA sequences, 
accuracy for ABA was higher than for CBA; and for 3/3 data sets where those 
differences were significant, accuracy for ABA was higher than for CBA. These are the 
first results to show that RT n–2 task repetition cost can be removed when episodic 
retrieval is controlled for, and that it can lead to n–2 task repetition benefits in accuracy 
which is contrary to the original research conducted in this area (Mayr, 2002). These 
results are important because they question the nature of the n–2 task repetition cost and 
its usefulness as a measure of cognitive control, and they provide some evidence the n–2 
task repetition cost can be explained with episodic retrieval. 
It is not to say that after controlling for episodic retrieval, we can be certain that 
the remaining/ small residual costs (if present) are attributable to inhibition, instead, at 
this stage it is uncertain if they do, or what type of inhibition they may reflect. For 
example, it seems that residual n–2 task repetition costs are unlikely to be due to 
response conflicts/ inhibition because these are controlled by episodic matching of 
responses. Also, from the current thesis it cannot be ascertained whether the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval is not an underestimated reflection of 
inhibition; that is, episodic matches may lead to a better performance, but it is not to say 
that inhibition is not applied during task-switching under episodic mismatches. For 
instance, episodic mismatches may lead to interference due to retrieved information not 
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matching demands of a task at hand, which may require inhibition of irrelevant 
responses; which means that the standard n–2 task repetition cost may be a reflection of 
inhibition and episodic mismatches processing. Whereas when episodic retrieval is 
controlled for, there is less of a chance for interference due to retrieved information not 
matching the demands of a task at hand, hence less inhibition would be present.  For 
now, it is concluded that episodic mismatches contribute largely to the n–2 task 
repetition cost increasing its magnitude, and that controlling for episodic retrieval can 
reduce as well as remove the n–2 task repetition cost; however, it is uncertain under 
what conditions the n–2 task repetition cost is entirely removed and when it is just 
reduced.  
 Residual n–2 task repetition cost’s reliability. Experiment 2 from Chapter 3 
also showed that when the n–2 task repetition cost is controlled for episodic retrieval, 
the reliability of the cost does not improve, which supports the recent reports about the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost’s low reliability (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 
2). This means, that the n–2 task repetition cost not being a pure measure of cognitive 
inhibition is not the reason for the cost’s low reliability as it was suggested in Chapter 2. 
There is still an issue that the n–2 task repetition cost’s low reliability may be due to it 
being a difference score, as it was discussed earlier. Moreover, there are no studies 
reported that explored the controlled n–2 task repetition cost’s reliability using rate 
residual scores or any other methods alternative to difference scores; therefore, for now 
it is uncertain if when the n–2 task repetition cost is controlled for episodic retrieval, the 
rate residual scores’ reliability would be improved compared to the n–2 task repetition 
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cost. For now, results from Experiment 2 further question the n–2 task repetition cost as 
a measure of individual differences in inhibitory control.  
Cue-transparency. In Experiment 3 of Chapter 3, transparent and non-
transparent cues were used to investigate whether the cue-transparency (Grange & 
Houghton, 2010b; Houghton et al., 2009) influences the n–2 task repetition cost or 
episodic retrieval. This is because there is evidence that the lower the cue-transparency 
is, the larger the n–2 task repetition cost is (Grange & Houghton, 2010a, 2010b; 
Houghton et al., 2009), which is taken as evidence that the non-transparent cues, unlike 
transparent cues, require more translation in WM leading to interference which is 
resolved by inhibition, as evidenced by larger n–2 task repetition costs (Grange & 
Houghton, 2010a, 2010b; Houghton et al., 2009). However, in light with evidence that 
the n–2 task repetition cost is highly modulated by episodic retrieval (Kowalczyk & 
Grange, 2017; Chapter 3), it was not certain whether and to what extent the episodic 
retrieval modulatory effect on the n–2 task repetition cost extended to processing of 
cues, which is an important aspect in task-switching and one that is likely to be sensitive 
to priming effects (Jost et al., 2013; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003).  
The results from Experiment 3 showed that when comparing the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval across the Cue-Types (i.e., transparent, 
Arrows vs. non-transparent, Shapes), the n–2 task repetition cost was absent under 
episodic matches regardless of the Cue-Type, but was present under episodic 
mismatches for both Cue-Types, with the n–2 task repetition cost being larger under 
non-transparent relative to transparent cues. This means that, when the n–2 task 
repetition cost is controlled for episodic retrieval, there seems to be no interference from 
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non-transparent cues processing (i.e., no evidence of a conflict in WM), which implies 
that episodic retrieval is the likely source of the cost in the first place. When episodic 
retrieval is not controlled for, non-transparent cues lead to more interference than 
transparent cues, as shown previously by other researchers (Grange & Houghton, 2010b; 
Houghton et al., 2009), with the n–2 task repetition cost being larger under non-
transparent cues relative to transparent cues. What that means is that episodic retrieval 
seems to drive the n–2 task repetition cost more than cue-transparency, because under 
episodic matches in non-transparent cues condition the n–2 task repetition cost was 
removed, which implies that cues, thanks to efficient retrieval, were likely not lead to 
interference, hence less if any inhibition was required/ present.  
It is not to say that cue-transparency is not important for the n–2 task repetition 
cost; clearly it is, but its role seems different to the one originally suggested (Houghton 
et al., 2009). Specifically, when episodic retrieval is not controlled for, it appears that 
non-transparent cues make the retrieval less efficient leading to larger n–2 task 
repetition cost compared to transparent cues, which is likely to be due to weak cue-task 
associations leading to inaccurate information being retrieved, and/ or due to a failure of 
episodic retrieval which leads to information being processed in an “algorithmic” 
manner (Logan, 1988). That is, rather than performance being facilitated via an 
automatic retrieval of task’s parameters (i.e., via automatisation), an effortful process of 
identifying a cue and manipulating of a task-set in WM must take place, which over 
time can be replaced by automatic mechanisms given enough practice (Logan). 
Therefore, it is important for the future research to establish whether practice effects 
407 
 
(Grange & Juvina, 2015) can lead to the reduction of the n–2 task repetition cost under 
non-transparent cues when episodic retrieval is not controlled for.  
 
Stimuli low-level features. Furthermore, Experiment 4 of Chapter 3 was 
interested whether low-level stimuli features affect the n–2 task repetition cost and/ or 
episodic retrieval. This is because, there is evidence from WM (Baddeley, 2000), 
episodic retrieval (Hommel, 2004), procedural learning (Pashler & Baylis, 1991), and 
task-switching research (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; Schmidt & 
Liefooghe, 2016; Waszak et al., 2003) that perceptual features of stimuli can become 
bounded with other task’s parameters (e.g., cue, response); as such, stimulus’ features 
may be important for manipulating and retrieving information during task-switching.  
The results from Experiment 4 showed that the modulatory effect of episodic retrieval 
on the n–2 task repetition cost does not seem to be influenced by low-level stimulus 
features, because the costs were similar across the two conditions which manipulated 
stimulus matching (i.e., n–2 stimuli match, letter A presented on each trial vs. n–2 
stimuli mismatch, different letters of alphabet presented on each trial).  
However, the interpretation of the results from Experiment 4 is limited due to its 
design. For example, the stimuli-manipulation used varied stimuli features which were 
not task-relevant, that is, they were not necessary for task-switching performance. Also, 
letters used in Experiment 4 either always repeated or never repeated, therefore a 
comparison of n–2 stimulus switch compared to an n–2 stimulus repetition was not 
possible. This means that it is uncertain from this experiment whether if stimuli features 
became task-relevant, the stimuli-mismatching/ matching across ABA/ CBA sequences 
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would affect the performance on task-switching; but based on research on episodic 
retrieval theory and priming in general (Neill, 1997; Schmidt & Liefooghe, 2016; Spapé 
& Hommel, 2008; Woodward & Meier, 2003) manipulation of task-relevant features 
would be expected to influence performance. That is, controlling for episodic retrieval 
of stimuli with task-relevant features should facilitate performance on task-switching. In 
terms of the n–2 task repetition cost, assuming that the cost is in general affected by 
episodic retrieval, it would be expected that, repeating task-relevant stimuli-features 
would facilitate performance and reduce the n–2 task repetition cost, compared to 
stimuli-switching.  
 
Implications. With regards to practical implications of the modulatory effect of 
episodic retrieval on the n–2 task repetition cost (Grange et al., 2017), an important one 
is that interpretations of findings from many studies that used the cost as a measure of 
inhibitory control (Dreher et al., 2001; Fales et al., 2006; Lawo et al., 2012; Mayr et al., 
2006; Moritz et al., 2004; Prior, 2012; Whitmer & Banich, 2007) are now likely to be 
incomplete or even inaccurate. That is, group differences thought to be due to 
inhibition—for example, larger n–2 task repetition costs in Parkinson’s patients 
compared to control group interpreted as evidence for impaired inhibition in patients 
(Fales et al.)—are less clear now and should be revisited to establish to what extent the 
differences in n–2 task repetition costs can be ascribed to inhibition and/ or episodic 
retrieval. The same applies to individual differences research using the n–2 task 
repetition cost as a measure of inhibitory control. For instance, in one study higher rates 
of depressive rumination predicted smaller n–2 task repetition costs, which was 
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interpreted by Whitmer and Banich as evidence for ruminative trait to be linked to 
impaired inhibition; however, since the n–2 task repetition cost is largely due to episodic 
retrieval mismatches, this interpretation is likely to be lacking.  
There is another important implication of the modulatory effect of episodic 
retrieval on the n–2 task repetition cost. In the current thesis it was demonstrated that 
when episodic retrieval is controlled for, a reduction in an average n–2 task repetition 
cost, its removal, and/or n–2 task repetition benefits were present. This was also noted at 
an individual level as many participants showed n–2 task repetition benefits instead of 
n–2 task repetition costs, or showed no cost at all, which is something that has been 
observed by others in their research (e.g., Grange & Juvina, 2015). Also, it seems that 
the number of n–2 task repetition benefits increases when episodic retrieval is controlled 
for. This means that any model that attempts to explain n–2 task repetition cost should 
account for the role of episodic retrieval in task-switching facilitating/ impairing 
performance—as well as episodic retrieval leading to n–2 task repetition benefits in 
accuracy—and that not all participants show the costs associated with task-switching.  
Existing models lead to different predictions; for example, some previous work 
(Grange et al., 2013) shows that activation-only model leads to n–2 task repetition 
benefits (which at the time was deemed a not suitable model of the cost), and a model 
which accounts for small amounts of inhibition can produce null n–2 task repetition cost 
(which showed that behavioral absence of inhibition does not mean that it was not 
present); but now it seems more plausible that a combination of both is more likely to 
explain the n–2 task repetition cost. Moreover, existing models of control in task-
switching based on activation-decay (Altmann & Gray, 2008) and inhibition-decay 
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(Altmann, 2007; Mayr & Keele, 2000) will have to be reevaluated; for example, how is 
episodic retrieval in task-switching affected by activation-decay, and does residual n–2 
task repetition cost benefit from extended response-cue intervals (Horoufchin et al., 
2011)?  
For now we know that the n–2 task repetition cost is greatly modulated by 
episodic retrieval, but it remains uncertain if and to what extent inhibition affects 
performance on task-switching, especially that there is evidence that episodic retrieval 
and inhibition are not mutually exclusive (Spapé & Hommel, 2008; Tipper, 2001). But 
contrary to the view that smaller n–2 task repetition costs reflect weaker/ impaired 
cognitive inhibition (e.g., Fales et al., 2006; Moritz et al., 2004; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012), it is concluded from this thesis that since participants 
(which represented a healthy university population) performed task-switching efficiently 
and at high accuracy regardless of whether they showed n–2 task repetition costs or 
benefits, they had no impairment of cognitive control. Instead, it is likely that a 
behavioral lack of n–2 task repetition costs does not mean that inhibition was not 
deployed (Grange et al., 2013), and that it is more likely that n–2 task repetition cost can 
reflect a combination of inhibitory and non-inhibitory effects which can manifests as 
overall costs or benefits.  
 
Working Memory 
Chapter 4 examined whether individual differences in the n–2 task repetition 
cost can be explained with WM capacity (WMC) or be modulated by WL load (WML). 
Inhibition has been shown to depend on WM resources (Conway & Engle, 1994; Engle, 
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1996), and with the n–2 task repetition cost assumed to reflect inhibition, one of the 
aims of the current thesis was to examine if and to what extent this cost depends on 
WM. With a considerable amount of research supporting the importance of WM in task-
switching (Goschke, 2000; Grange & Juvina, 2015; Grange et al., 2013; Houghton et al., 
2009; Logan, 1988; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000, 2003; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Miyake et al., 
2004; Saeki & Saito, 2004b, 2004a), it was likely that the n–2 task repetition cost would 
be resource-dependent. At the point of this thesis being conducted there was one 
unpublished study that reports investigation between the n–2 task repetition cost and 
WM (Grange & Houghton, n.d.), and another study was published (Pettigrew & Martin, 
2015) after this thesis began. Both of those studies provided evidence against the view 
that the n–2 task repetition cost is resource-dependent; however, they both had 
limitations which were addressed by the current thesis. The n–2 task repetition cost’s 
relationship with WM was investigated by assessing WMC with three measures (Foster 
et al., 2014), using the n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval (Grange 
et al., 2017)—rather than the standard n–2 task repetition cost used by previous 
studies—and using two different WML manipulations. Together, Experiments 5–7 
showed consistently that the n–2 task repetition cost—whether controlled for episodic 
retrieval or not—is not dependent on WM resources; that is, n–2 task repetition costs 
were not linked to individual differences in WMC, or modulated by WML.  
Taking into account only statistically significant results, the findings from 
Chapter 4 are consistent with other studies that researched the relationship between the 
n–2 task repetition cost and WM (Grange & Houghton, n.d.; Pettigrew & Martin, 2015), 
which is that they are not related. That is, WMC does not predict the n–2 task repetition 
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cost (whether controlled for episodic retrieval or not) and the n–2 task repetition cost is 
not modulated by WML.  
 
WMC. In terms of individual differences, at this stage it is uncertain whether the 
n–2 task repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval does not reflect cognitive 
inhibition, or if it does but it is not resource-dependent. Also, in terms of individual 
differences, there is also the issue of the n–2 task repetition cost being a difference 
score—argued to be not very reliable (Crawford et al., 2008; Kopp, 2011)—which 
means that the lack of the relationship between WMC and the cost could be attributable 
to the cost being a difference scores. Also, assuming that residual n–2 task repetition 
costs reflect inhibition, the results and existing literature point to another likely 
alternative explanation on why the residual n–2 task repetition cost and WM are not 
linked; specifically, the residual cost being due to automatic (i.e., lateral) rather than a 
top-down inhibition (Gade & Koch, 2005, 2007; Houghton et al., 2009; Schneider & 
Verbruggen, 2008; Schuch & Koch, 2003), or arising as a result of self-inhibition 
(Grange et al., 2013; Koch et al., 2010). 
 
WML. In terms of WML and the n–2 task repetition cost, it is important to add 
that manipulating WML seemed to have affected the modulatory effect of episodic 
retrieval on the n–2 task repetition cost (i.e., the cost was not modulated by it); that is, 
manipulating WML might have interfered with how efficient episodic retrieval was. As 
such, knowing that in previous experiments in this thesis the n–2 task repetition cost is 
modulated by episodic retrieval, interpreting the lack of effect of WML on n–2 task 
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repetition costs is difficult. This is because the results show that we may have to 
understand how WML interacts with episodic retrieval in task-switching first, before we 
attempt to reinvestigate the relationship between the n–2 task repetition cost controlled 
for episodic retrieval and WM.  
Despite no statistical evidence for WM being influencing the n–2 task repetition 
cost, some observations based on numerical trends can be made. If the n–2 task 
repetition cost controlled for episodic retrieval reflects inhibition, and that inhibition 
depends on WM, we would expect the cost under episodic matches to be more affected 
by WML than under episodic mismatches, a pattern which is observed in Experiments 
6–7, although not statistically significant. That is, it appears that under episodic 
mismatches the n–2 task repetition cost is comparable for high and low WML for RT 
and accuracy, but more importantly, there was a numerical trend for the smallest n–2 
task repetition costs to be observed under high WML under episodic matches. This is as 
predicted by the theory that inhibition is resource dependent. On the other hand, if WM 
was important for episodic retrieval more than inhibition—because retrieved task-set 
information can be assumed to be manipulated in WM—we would expect n–2 task 
repetition costs not controlled for episodic retrieval to be more dependent on WM than 
the cost controlled for episodic retrieval. There is some evidence from the current thesis 
to support that hypothesis. In Experiment 5 accuracy of the n–2 task repetition cost not 
controlled for episodic retrieval was significantly negatively correlated with WMC, with 
higher WMC scores linked to smaller accuracy n–2 task repetition cost. This can be 
interpreted as evidence that individuals with higher WMC were more accurate retrieving 
and manipulating task’s parameters and matching them to the current task’s demands 
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compared to those who had smaller WMC. However, this correlation did not remain 
significant after adjusting for multiple testing, therefore these results must be interpreted 
with caution. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, n–2 task repetition costs not controlled 
for episodic retrieval were in general similar under both high and low WML (for RT and 
accuracy performance), which suggests performance under episodic mismatches was not 
affected by manipulation of WML; therefore, overall, the results seem inconsistent. 
Overall, it can be concluded that based on Experiments 5–7 the n–2 task 
repetition cost is not dependent on WM, and further investigation on how manipulation 
of WML affects episodic retrieval and/ or inhibition in task-switching should be carried 
out to help to ascertain whether it is the episodic retrieval and/ or inhibition that are 
influenced by WM.   
 
Perceptual Load 
Chapter 5 looked at the n–2 task repetition cost, attentional capacity/ resources 
(i.e., perceptual load, Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Fox, 2000) and distractibility traits 
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Forster & Lavie, 2009b). With the n–2 task repetition cost not 
being linked to WM, attentional capacity was identified as another potential cognitive 
resource hypothesised to influence inhibition. Attentional capacity (Broadbent, 1958; 
Lavie, 1995) is important in selective attention, specifically it plays a role in how task-
relevant information is processed against task-irrelevant information. Perceptual 
processing happens automatically but how much is perceived and processed depends on 
attentional capacity, which as WM, is limited (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994).  
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Attentional resources are typically manipulated via varying perceptual load with 
the use of distractors (Cave & Chen, 2016; Forster & Lavie, 2009b; Rorden et al., 2008; 
Wilson et al., 2011), which can be present without researcher’s intention in the form of 
task-unrelated-thoughts (TUTs, Forster & Lavie, 2009a). In the current thesis, in 
Experiments 8–9 perceptual load was manipulated within the BI paradigm by 
incorporating distractors to create HPL (high perceptual load) condition, and the BI 
paradigm without distractors was used as the LPL (low perceptual load) condition. In 
Experiment 8 participants searched for the target among distractors that looked similar 
to the target, and in Experiment 9 distractors in the form of small coloured circles 
presented around the cue were used. 
The important aspect of perceptual load research that is relevant to the n–2 task 
repetition cost is that distractors are processed differently under LPL relative to HPL; 
under LPL distractors have been shown to be processed and may interfere with the task 
at hand, whereas under HPL due to attentional resources being exhausted, task-relevant 
stimuli are predominantly processed and distractors less if at all (Lavie & Tsal, 1994). 
Importantly for the current thesis, under HPL relative to LPL, perceptual load have been 
shown to reduce cognitive control effects such as negative priming, the Stroop effect, 
and response competitor (Forster & Lavie, 2008a; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1981; Lavie 
& Fox, 2000; Rorden et al., 2008). Therefore, it was speculated that if the n–2 task 
repetition cost (controlled for episodic retrieval) reflects inhibition, it was likely to be 
modulated by perceptual load. Moreover, since the n–2 task repetition cost has been 
shown to be modulated by episodic retrieval (Grange et al., 2017; Chapter 3), it was of 
interest to examine whether perceptual load would affect episodic retrieval and/ or 
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inhibition; that is, it was of interest whether distractors under different perceptual loads 
would become part of memory traces and be retrieved interfering with performance 
(Lavie, 2000; p.1050). There seems to be no reports in literature on the relationship 
between the n–2 task repetition cost and attentional resources manipulated with 
perceptual load, therefore this is the first investigation of this kind.  
Overall, the results were rather inconsistent. That is, the perceptual load 
manipulations were in general successful; that is, in Experiment 8 performance was less 
accurate under HPL compared to LPL, and in Experiment 9 performance was less 
accurate and slower under HPL relative to LPL. Since the n–2 task repetition cost was 
used as a measure of inhibition, it is unclear whether inhibition was modulated by 
perceptual load. This is because in accuracy, episodic retrieval modulatory effect led to 
n–2 task repetition benefits under both HPL and LPL; that is, n–2 task repetition 
benefits were not affected by perceptual load. In RT performance, the episodic retrieval 
modulatory effect on the n–2 task repetition cost was present only in Experiment 9, and 
the residual n–2 task repetition cost was not affected by perceptual load; that is, the 
residual cost was similar under HPL and LPL.  
However, in Experiment 8, statistically RT n–2 task repetition cost was not 
modulated by episodic retrieval, but the log-RT the n–2 task repetition cost was, as it 
was smaller under HPL compared to LPL. Also, there was a numerical trend across 
Experiments 8–9 for the n–2 task repetition costs not controlled for episodic retrieval to 
be smaller under HPL vs. LPL. Therefore, for the n–2 task repetition cost not controlled 
for episodic retrieval, it is not clear whether it was episodic retrieval or inhibition that 
was being influenced by perceptual load. Despite the limited support in the form of 
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statistical evidence, the overall observations from Experiments 8–9 is that we cannot 
rule out perceptual load as a factor that may influence n–2 task repetition costs. It seems 
that when episodic matches are ensured, perceptual load does not influence n–2 task 
repetition costs/ benefits, but n–2 task repetition costs confounded by episodic 
mismatches seem to be affected by it. That is, n–2 task repetition costs confounded by 
episodic mismatches were smaller under HPL compared to LPL; this suggests that, HPL 
created conditions under which less interference was caused by episodic mismatches or 
less inhibition was deployed because of those mismatches, compared to LPL.  
In terms of individual differences in inhibition (as measured with n–2 task 
repetition costs controlled for episodic retrieval), it was predicted that in LPL condition 
people highly distractible day-to-day—as measured with Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire  (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982)—would have stronger inhibition 
compared to people who are not very distractible in day-to-day life, and that these 
differences would be diminished under HPL (Forster & Lavie, 2009b). The results 
showed that n–2 task repetition costs (controlled for episodic retrieval and not 
controlled) were not predicted by day-to-day distractibility trait.  
However, at this stage it is not certain whether residual n–2 task repetition cost 
does not reflect inhibition or whether inhibition in task-switching in not linked to the 
day-to-day distractibility trait. That is, for n–2 task repetition modulated by episodic 
retrieval, RT n–2 task repetition costs did not differ between perceptual load conditions, 
and in accuracy n–2 task repetition benefits were present. That is, in accuracy 
performance no residual n–2 task repetition costs—thought to measure inhibition—were 
present, and in RT performance, even though the residual n–2 task repetition cost was 
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present, it did not differ between perceptual load conditions. Therefore, it can be 
speculated that n–2 task repetition benefits are unlikely to reflect inhibition hence were 
not linked to the distractibility trait; and in terms of the residual n–2 task repetition cost, 
since it did not differ between perceptual loads, is also unlikely to reflect inhibition, 
because by perceptual load theory, inhibitory effects should differ between perceptual 
load conditions (Forster & Lavie, 2008; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1981; Lavie & Fox, 
2000; Rorden et al., 2008).  
Also, another candidate explaining the lack of relationship between n–2 task 
repetition costs and the CFQ is the lack of the reliability of the n–2 task repetition 
cost—controlled and not controlled for episodic retrieval—which has been documented 
recently (Kowalczyk & Grange, 2017; Chapter 2 & 3: Experiment 1). Moreover, the n–2 
task repetition cost is a difference score which are difficult to interpret and are often not 
reliable (Crawford et al., 2008), therefore it is not certain whether inhibition in task-
switching is not resource-dependent or whether inhibition is just not measured well with 
n–2 task repetition costs. 
 
Computational Modelling 
Chapter 6 adopted alternative methods to analyse the n–2 task repetition cost to 
explore to what extent this effect is due to inhibition, and to what extent it can be 
attributed to non-inhibitory factors (i.e., episodic retrieval). Central tendencies measures 
(e.g., mean RTs and mean accuracy) and dispersion parameter (e.g., standard deviation), 
which are used in task-switching research, are not optimally informative due to RT 
trimming and output averaging (Balota & Yap, 2011; Heathcote et al., 1991; Hervey et 
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al., 2006; Whelan, 2008). Therefore, ex-Gaussian  (Heathcote et al., 1991) and diffusion 
modelling (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) were used on three pre-collected data sets and 
one data set collected specifically for Chapter 6 to gain a better understanding of the n–2 
task repetition cost, and how episodic retrieval affects it.  
Consistently with the literature (Grange & Juvina, 2015; Schuch & Konrad, 
2017), ex-Gaussian modelling showed a tendency for n–2 task repetition costs to be the 
largest in the tau parameter, typically interpreted as evidence for the costs linked to 
executive functions (Schmiedek et al., 2007; Shahar & Meiran, 2014), and to slower 
RTs and less prepared responses (DeJong, 2000a). However, n–2 task repetition costs 
were also present in the mu and sigma parameters, which is more difficult to interpret 
but has been noted before (Schuch & Konrad, 2017). When episodic retrieval was 
controlled for, the tau and mu parameters were modulated to some extent (i.e., not in all 
data sets). In terms of the tau parameter, n–2 task repetition costs were absent from 
episodic matches relative to episodic mismatches, and assuming that effects in the tau 
parameters reflect executive functions processes  (Grange & Houghton, 2011; Hervey et 
al., 2006; Schmiedek et al., 2007; Schuch & Konrad, 2017; Shahar & Meiran, 2014; 
Shahar et al., 2014; Spieler & Balota, 1996; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009; Tse et al., 
2010) the results can be interpreted as evidence that either tau can reflects automatic 
processes as well as executive functions or that episodic retrieval influences how 
information is processed within executive functions. For the mu parameter, n–2 task 
repetition costs were much smaller under episodic matches compared to episodic 
mismatches, and since the mu parameter has been linked to response mechanisms 
(Spieler et al., 1996), these results can be taken as evidence that episodic retrieval 
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mismatches drive the n–2 task repetition cost in mu by creating a response conflict. And 
in terms of the sigma parameter, there were no substantial differences for n–2 task 
repetition costs in sigma for episodic matches and episodic mismatches. 
In terms of diffusion modelling results, as it was predicted, the standard n–2 task 
repetition cost was predominantly present in drift rate, which supports the view that this 
cost is due to carry-over or interference effects, with the likely candidate being 
inhibition  (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014); specifically, the drift rate was smaller for 
ABA sequence compared to CBA sequence, and smaller drift rates are linked with less 
efficient and slower information accumulation (Schmiedek et al., 2007). The n–2 task 
repetition cost was also present in the threshold separation parameter for the three out of 
four data sets, with larger threshold separation parameter for ABA compared to CBA 
sequences; this is likely to be due to more conservative responses in ABA relative to the 
CBA sequences, as larger threshold separation parameter typically indicates slower but 
more accurate responses. In terms of the non-decisional parameter, there were no 
significant differences between ABA and CBA across all four data sets, which indicates 
that in all four data sets information was equally well encoded and responses were 
equally efficiently executed.  
However, when episodic retrieval was controlled for, the n–2 task repetition cost 
was reduced or absent from the drift parameter. This finding is taken as evidence that 
the n–2 task repetition cost in the drift rate is unlikely to reflect cognitive inhibition and 
instead is more likely to be a result of non-inhibitory mechanism, specifically episodic 
retrieval mismatches. That is, the observation of larger drift rates for episodic matches 
compared to episodic mismatches, imply that under the former one information 
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accumulation was more efficient, probably because episodic matches—unlike episodic 
mismatches—do not lead to interference, but rather facilitate performance leading to 
faster information accumulation, which improves the relative task readiness (Weeda et 
al., 2014).  
In terms of the threshold parameter, episodic retrieval did not seem to affect it 
because n–2 task repetition costs in the threshold parameter did not differ between 
episodic matches compared to episodic mismatches; this is consistent with the 
assumption that episodic retrieval is automatic and it should not lead to bias in threshold 
separation. And, in relation to non-decisional parameter, for two out of the four data sets 
there was a trend for this parameter to be smaller for ABA compared to CBA under 
episodic matches, but for episodic mismatches, the non-decisional parameter was 
smaller for CBA compared to ABA sequences. The non-decisional parameter is 
associated with information encoding, motor response, preparation, and WM 
configuration (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014; Weeda et al., 2014). In the current 
investigation, information encoding and motor responses are assumed to not differ 
between ABA and CBA sequences across the four data sets, which leaves preparation 
and WM reconfiguration as possible sources of smaller non-decisional parameter in 
ABA compared to CBA sequences. It is unlikely that there were preparation differences 
across task-sequences because identical preparatory interval (i.e., the cue-stimulus-
interval) was used across the four studies, which leaves WM reconfiguration as a likely 
source of differences observed in non-decisional parameter. That is, assuming that 
retrieved information is manipulated in WW, episodic matches do not lead to conflicts 
during response selection because retrieved response matches the task demands (smaller 
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non-decisional parameter and faster performance on ABA compared to CBA 
sequences), but episodic mismatches result in conflicts in WM because required 
response is different to the one retrieved (larger non-decisional parameter and slower 
performance on ABA compared to CBA sequences).  
The main implication of findings from Chapter 6 is that its evidence further 
questions the validity of the n–2 task repetition cost as a measure of cognitive inhibition. 
That is, consistently with previous literature (Schuch, 2016; Schuch & Konrad, 2017) 
the n–2 task repetition cost was predominantly present in the drift rate, however in half 
of the Simulation Studies the cost was modulated by episodic retrieval (a pattern 
observed in other data sets too). This means that the n–2 task repetition cost in drift 
rate—previously interpreted as evidence of inhibitory processes (Schuch, 2016; Schuch 
& Konrad, 2017)—is likely to be driven by non-inhibitory, automatic mechanisms, in 
this case episodic retrieval mismatches. Moreover, effects seen in non-decisional 
parameter would imply further that the n–2 task repetition cost is largely driven by non-
inhibitory and automatic processes. In terms of ex-Gaussian modelling, despite some 
results being consistent with existing literature (e.g., n–2 task repetition costs seen in the 
tau parameter), overall, conclusions are difficult to draw due to no specific pattern of 
episodic retrieval on the tau parameter, and n–2 task repetition costs seen in mu and 
sigma parameters. 
 
Conclusions 
The current thesis provides novel insights into the n–2 task repetition cost which 
have theoretical and practical implications on what the cost is thought to represent. It 
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was established that the n–2 task repetition cost is modulated by a non-inhibitory 
mechanism, specifically episodic retrieval; that is, controlling for episodic retrieval 
considerably reduces the n–2 task repetition cost, and in some instances removes the 
cost or leads to n–2 task repetition benefits. Together with computational modelling 
results, this is taken as evidence that it is unlikely that the n–2 task repetition cost is a 
measure of inhibition; instead, it seems that the cost reflects processing of mismatches 
in episodic retrieval. Moreover, the n–2 task repetition cost has been shown to have low 
reliability at an individual level, and as such should be avoided as a measure of 
individual differences in inhibitory control. In terms of individual differences, the n–2 
task repetition cost is not predicted by WMC, processing speed, depressive rumination, 
or day-to-day distractibility. It is not to say that these individual differences are not 
linked to inhibition, instead it is more likely that the n–2 task repetition cost is not a 
good measure of inhibition. And lastly, the n–2 task repetition cost does not seem to 
depend on WM resources but as it stands can be influenced by attentional resources to 
some extent. Altogether, based on results from the current thesis, it is concluded that the 
n–2 task repetition cost is unlikely to reflect cognitive inhibition, and if used as such 
should be interpreted with caution.  
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Appendix A 
A.1 Digit-Symbol Substitution Task 
 
 
1  2  3  
 
4  5  6  7  8  9 
S D B P E C Q T G 
 
 
 
 
5 8 2 9 6 3 8 2 8 4 7 2 6 3 3 6 7 4 5 2 
                    
 
8 9 9 7 1 9 7 8 5 6 4 2 7 5 3 7 8 6 3 5 
                    
 
4 7 5 7 2 7 9 2 2 6 9 8 1 8 2 7 1 7 6 6 
                    
 
4 8 4 3 8 4 3 9 2 2 2 3 5 5 3 9 1 7 3 6 
                    
 
7 4 6 1 9 6 8 1 7 4 9 1 2 1 1 3 6 2 5 6 
                    
 
5 9 4 4 8 9 8 3 5 3 4 8 3 9 4 1 3 1 7 6 
                    
 
3 2 1 8 5 1 9 4 5 1 8 1 6 5 2 9 5 4 6 9 
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A.2 Ruminative Response Scale 
 
Please read each statement carefully. I would like to stress that no assumptions of existing 
depression (or other such problems) are made. Therefore, some statements in this questionnaire 
may be more relevant to you than others, or they may not be relevant at all. After reading each 
statement  decide how often you do things described in each statement: 
 
1. almost never  2.sometimes  3.often   4.almost always 
 
Circle the answer that best reflects your answer. 
 
This questionnaire is used for non-diagnostics purpose, which means that when questionnaire is 
scored, no diagnosis will be given, and you will not be contacted regarding your score. If you are 
concerned about how you answer questions on this measure, please consult your GP or services 
which details are provided in the De-brief Form. Your data will be kept anonymous and 
confidential. 
 
 
1 Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 1            2            3           4 
2 Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are 
depressed 
1            2            3           4 
3 Think “Why do I always react this way?” 1            2            3           4 
4 Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 1            2            3           4 
5 Write down what you are thinking and analyse it 1            2            3           4 
6 Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 1            2            3           4 
7 Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 1            2            3           4 
8 Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 1            2            3           4 
9 Analyse your personality to try to understand why you are 
depressed 
1            2            3           4 
10 Go someplace alone to think about your feelings 1            2            3           4 
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A.3 Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
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Appendix B 
B.1 Ex-Gaussian parameters n–2 task repetition costs graph 
 
Figure A.1 A visualisation of the n–2 task repetition cost for ex-Gaussian parameters for the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost (Mix), under episodic matches (Rep), and under episodic 
mismatches (Sw).  
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B.2 Diffusion modelling parameters n–2 task repetition costs 
 
 
Figure A.2 A visualisation of the n–2 task repetition cost for diffusion modelling parameters for the 
standard n–2 task repetition cost (Mix), under episodic matches (Rep), and under episodic 
mismatches (Sw).  
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Ref: ERP347 
24th September 2015 
Agnieszka Kowalczyk 
Research Institute of Social Sciences Room CBA 
2.018 
Chancellor’s Building 
Keele University 
 
Dear Agnieszka 
 
Re: Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control during Task Switching 
Thank you for submitting your revised application for review. I am pleased to inform you that your application 
has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel. The panel would like to commend you for your careful 
attention to their requests. 
 
The following documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows: 
 
Document Version Date 
Summary Document 2 10/07/2015 
Study Poster 1 10/07/2015 
Information Sheet 3 20/08/2015 
Consent Form 2 10/07/2015 
Debrief Form 2 10/07/2015 
Tasks 1, 2 & 3 1 27/05/2015 
Ruminative Research Scale 2 28/08/2015 
Digital Symbol Substitution 
Task 
1 27/08/2015 
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application 31st August 2016, you must notify the Ethical 
Review Panel via the ERP administrator at uso.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP3 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
 
If there are any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the 
ERP administrator stating ERP3 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
uso.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP3 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Helena Priest 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel 
CC RI Manager 
Supervisor 
Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 
T: +44(0)1782 734467 
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Ref: ERP2322 
 
15th February 2017 
 
Agnieszka Kowalczyk 
School of Psychology 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University 
 
Dear Agnieszka, 
 
Re: Task Switching and Perceptual Load 
Thank you for submitting your revised application for review. I am pleased to inform you that your application has 
been approved by the Ethics Review Panel. 
The following documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows: 
 
Document(s) Version Number Date 
Information Sheet 2 13-02-2017 
Consent Form 1 17-01-2017 
De-brief Form 2 10-02-2017 
CFQ 1 11-01-2017 
Task Switching Paradigm 1 14-01-2017 
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, 31st August 2017, or there are any other amendments to 
your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the ERP administrator at 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk, stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel
CC RI Manager 
Supervisor 
Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 
T: +44(0)1782 734467
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Agnieszka Kowalczyk 
School of Psychology 
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Keele University 
 
Dear Agnieszka, 
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Participant Information sheet 3 07-03-2017 
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Just to remind you, if the fieldwork goes beyond the 31st August 2017, or there are any other amendments to your 
study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the ERP administrator at 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel
CC RI Manager 
Supervisor 
Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 
T: +44(0)1782 734467 
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Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University 
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  Re: Task Switching and Perceptual Load 
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all Keele University students. I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethical Review 
Panel. 
 
The following document have been reviewed and approved by the Panel as follows:- 
 
Document Version Date 
Participant Information sheet 4 17-05-2017 
Poster 1 17-05-2017 
 
Just to remind you, if the fieldwork goes beyond the 31st August 2017, or there are any other amendments to your 
study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the ERP administrator at 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel
CC RI Manager 
Supervisor 
Directorate of Engagement & 
Partnerships 
T: +44(0)1782 734467
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Ref: ERP2322 
 
30th August 2017 
 
Agnieszka Kowalczyk 
School of Psychology 
Dorothy Hodgkin Building 
Keele University 
 
Dear Agnieszka, 
 
 Re: Task Switching and Perceptual Load 
Thank you for submitting your application to amend study (3rd request), informing us of an extension to your project end 
date from the 31st August 2017 to the 31st October 2017 and various other changes. I am pleased to inform you that 
your application has been approved by the Ethical Review Panel. 
 
The following document has been reviewed and approved by the Panel as follows:- 
 
Document Version Date 
Participant Information sheet 5 30-07-2017 
 
Just to remind you, if the fieldwork goes beyond the 31st October 2017, or there are any other amendments to your 
study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the ERP administrator at 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 
research.governance@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-mail. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel
CC RI Manager 
Supervisor 
Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 
T: +44(0)1782 734467 
 
492 
 
 
